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of the uprisings, and by offering theoretical reflections on their meaning, consequences 
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ABSTRACT While the scholarship on the Arab uprisings is increasingly complex
and intellectually reﬁned, this special issue considers an aspect that so far has
failed to attract sustained scholarly attention, namely continuity and change. This
introduction provides the framework underpinning the special issue as a whole
and discusses all the articles composing it, while elaborating on the scientiﬁc
contribution that the examination of continuity and change before and after the
uprisings can make to our understanding of politics in the region.
The Arab uprisings have generated a signiﬁcant amount of scholarly reﬂections on
how politics functions in the Middle East and North Africa, with scholars broadly
shifting between the dynamics of either democratic change or authoritarian
continuity. There is a vast literature on the causes of the uprisings and on
explanations for how they occurred in some countries and not in others, but it is
accepted as conventional wisdom that the politics of the region, both in the short
and the long term, has changed for good.1 This is potentially the case, but one
should be aware that the complexity of earth-shattering events is considerable and
that it takes time to tease out their impact.2 It should thus be highlighted that in the
examination of any revolutionary process there should also be an emphasis on
what has not suddenly changed from one day to the next, and more attention
should be paid to long-term processes of change, whose culminating moments are
revolutions, instead of conceptualising revolutions as unexpected and sudden
events. It is both academically and politically problematic to look at the uprisings
solely relying on ‘change’ as the dominant perspective because we can always
detect a certain amount of continuity in the political, social and economic relations
of societies having witnessed massive upheavals.
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2
grasp and explain the complexities on the ground. Indeed, both paradigms
understand social and political phenomena as conducive to either democratisation
or to the strengthening of authoritarianism, displaying a degree of inﬂexibility that
prevented scholars from ‘seeing’ the uprisings coming.
This does not mean that the scholarship should have predicted the uprisings,8
but more attention should have been given to actors and processes that were
considered irrelevant or marginal and turned out instead to be extremely
signiﬁcant. In addition, although the outbreak of the protests has in some cases
boosted scholarly interest in the democratisation paradigm9 and ‘democracy
spotting’,10 it can be legitimately argued that even if successful transitions to
democracy were to occur, democratisation theories would be ill equipped to
account for them.11 This is the case not only because a different set of marginal
actors—others than the ‘usual middle-class suspects’ of mainstream democratisa-
tion theories—have been empowered as the protagonists of the protests, but also
because contentious state–society relations have been developing differently from
the template provided by orthodox theories of transitions to democracy.
Thus, the most important aim of this special issue is to invite scholars to look for
relevant political processes in speciﬁc loci of negotiation and conﬂict among
social and political actors, exploring the contradictions between the literature and
the actual dynamics on the ground while reconsidering some of the seemingly
granitic assumptions of both democratisation and authoritarian resilience. In order
to offer an empirically grounded substantiation of this, the special issue compares
and contrasts three case studies. While the uprisings have followed very different
trajectories in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, some of the contributions to this
special issue demonstrate that the dynamics of continuity and change may be
surprisingly similar in the three countries. For instance, Gianluca Parolin’s
revealing analysis of the processes of constitution making in Tunisia and Egypt
exposes the attempt on the part of the political elites in both countries to exclude
radical revolutionary fringes in order to be able to proceed with moderate and
unthreatening ‘pacted constitutions’. Adam Hanieh’s comparative examination of
the negotiations between the three North African regimes and international
ﬁnancial institutions also reveals common characteristics in the content and logic
of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending conditions to these
three countries.
To be sure, there are also important differences in the way in which Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt have gone through the uprisings and subsequent political
turmoil. Some contributors demonstrate that the stark differences the three case
8 As correctly pointed out by Marc Lynch, ‘Response to Howard and Walters’, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2)
(2014), pp. 415–416.
9 Alfred Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations’, Journal of Democracy, 23(2) (2012), pp. 89–
103.
10 Michael Hudson, ‘Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reﬂections on the Current Wave of
Protest in the Arab World’, Jadaliyya, 16 May 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1601/awakening-
cataclysm-or-just-a-series-of-events-ref, accessed 23 September 2014.
11 As already pointed out by Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and Neo-liberal
Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009); Michelle Pace
and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective—An Introduction’, Mediterranean
Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 125–138; and, more recently, by Ricardo Rene´ Laremont (ed.), Revolution, Revolt and
Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2013); Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust
(eds), Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2014).
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This special issue presents contributions exposing the overlapping of continuity
and change. More speciﬁcally, it investigates them in the context of state building,
institutional reforms, contentious politics and economic relations in Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt. By examining the political dynamics in these three countries,
where the protests have resulted in very different trajectories of regime
reconﬁguration, the articles identify patterns of both continuity and change and
expose the very problematic nature of the notions of ‘regime change’ and ‘regime
stability’. For instance, it is rather unclear how to label post-July 2013 political
events in Egypt. Some would suggest that there is an inevitable return to the
paradigm of authoritarian resilience after a brief interlude of intra-regime
negotiations that allowed pluralism to emerge,3 while others would contend that it
is a rather classic case of failed transition and that genuine change is only being
suppressed in the short term.4 Adopting a different perspective, the special issue
aims to examine the process of regime transformation and reconﬁguration and
brings to the forefront of scholarly attention the similarities and differences in the
cases of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.
One of the most relevant debates through which the uprisings have been
examined centres on the usefulness of the two dominant paradigms in the study of
the politics of the Middle East and North Africa, namely transition to democracy
and authoritarian resilience.5 While the study of authoritarian resilience ﬂourished
in the past decades and has resulted in theoretically rich accounts of why regimes
have been so durable, the examination of political change in the Middle East had
suffered for some time from the over-presence of ‘transitology’, as detailed in
numerous works since the mid-2000s.6 The dominance of the ‘transitological
approach’ to political change has determined a sort of neglect of a serious analysis
of howMiddle Eastern societies have actually changed, to the point that criticising
‘transitology’ became academically more appropriate than engaging social or
political change. Studies on activism and social change did abound in the ﬁeld, but
a ‘transitological bias’ characterised them and it is only after the mid-2000s that
scholars engaged civil society, activism and social movements in authoritarian
contexts with no teleological focus on democratisation.7 In fact, it is not a
coincidence that scholarly interest in authoritarian resilience emerged after
criticism of ‘transitology’ had become established in the ﬁeld of Middle Eastern
studies. The uprisings contributed to make it clear that these two dominant
paradigms—democratisation and authoritarian resilience—are far too rigid to
3 Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime
Responses to the “Arab Awakening”’, Globalizations, 8(5) (2011), pp. 647–653.
4 Nathan Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013), pp. 45–58.
5 See the debate generated by Marc Morje´ Howard and Meir R. Walters, ‘Explaining the Unexpected: Political
Science and the Surprises of 1989 and 2011’, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2) (2014), pp. 394–408, in particular
Ellen Lust, ‘Response to Howard and Walters’, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2) (2014), pp. 413–414.
6 Lisa Anderson, ‘Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East’, Annual
Review of Political Science, 9 (2006), pp. 189–214; Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Authoritarian Persistence,
Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique’, Democratization, 13(3) (2006),
pp. 373–395. More recently: Andres C. Ha¨rdig, ‘Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the
Middle East and North Africa’, Democratization (2014), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
13510347.2014.917626.
7 See Janine Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan,
and Yemen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Andrea Liverani, Civil Society in Algeria. The
Political Functions of Associational Life (London: Routledge, 2008); and more recently: Francesco Cavatorta and
Vincent Durac, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism (London:
Routledge, 2010).
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(2014), pp. 415–416.
9 Alfred Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations’, Journal of Democracy, 23(2) (2012), pp. 89–
103.
10 Michael Hudson, ‘Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reﬂections on the Current Wave of
Protest in the Arab World’, Jadaliyya, 16 May 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1601/awakening-
cataclysm-or-just-a-series-of-events-ref, accessed 23 September 2014.
11 As already pointed out by Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and Neo-liberal
Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009); Michelle Pace
and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspective—An Introduction’, Mediterranean
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Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2013); Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust
(eds), Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2014).
REGIME RECONFIGURATION ND POLICYMAKING IN NORTH AFRICA
3
This special issue presents contributions exposing the overlapping of continuity
and change. More speciﬁcally, it investigates them in the context of state building,
institutional reforms, contentious politics and economic relations in Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt. By examining the political dynamics in these three countries,
where the protests have resulted in very different trajectories of regime
reconﬁguration, the articles identify patterns of both continuity and change and
expose the very problematic nature of the notions of ‘regime change’ and ‘regime
stability’. For instance, it is rather unclear how to label post-July 2013 political
events in Egypt. Some would suggest that there is an inevitable return to the
paradigm of authoritarian resilience after a brief interlude of intra-regime
negotiations that allowed pluralism to emerge,3 while others would contend that it
is a rather classic case of failed transition and that genuine change is only being
suppressed in the short term.4 Adopting a different perspective, the special issue
aims to examine the process of regime transformation and reconﬁguration and
brings to the forefront of scholarly attention the similarities and differences in the
cases of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.
One of the most relevant debates through which the uprisings have been
examined centres on the usefulness of the two dominant paradigms in the study of
the politics of the Middle East and North Africa, namely transition to democracy
and authoritarian resilience.5 While the study of authoritarian resilience ﬂourished
in the past decades and has resulted in theoretically rich accounts of why regimes
have been so durable, the examination of political change in the Middle East had
suffered for some time from the over-presence of ‘transitology’, as detailed in
numerous works since the mid-2000s.6 The dominance of the ‘transitological
approach’ to political change has determined a sort of neglect of a serious analysis
of howMiddle Eastern societies have actually changed, to the point that criticising
‘transitology’ became academically more appropriate than engaging social or
political change. Studies on activism and social change did abound in the ﬁeld, but
a ‘transitological bias’ characterised them and it is only after the mid-2000s that
scholars engaged civil society, activism and social movements in authoritarian
contexts with no teleological focus on democratisation.7 In fact, it is not a
coincidence that scholarly interest in authoritarian resilience emerged after
criticism of ‘transitology’ had become established in the ﬁeld of Middle Eastern
studies. The uprisings contributed to make it clear that these two dominant
paradigms—democratisation and authoritarian resilience—are far too rigid to
3 Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime
Responses to the “Arab Awakening”’, Globalizations, 8(5) (2011), pp. 647–653.
4 Nathan Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013), pp. 45–58.
5 See the debate generated by Marc Morje´ Howard and Meir R. Walters, ‘Explaining the Unexpected: Political
Science and the Surprises of 1989 and 2011’, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2) (2014), pp. 394–408, in particular
Ellen Lust, ‘Response to Howard and Walters’, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2) (2014), pp. 413–414.
6 Lisa Anderson, ‘Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East’, Annual
Review of Political Science, 9 (2006), pp. 189–214; Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Authoritarian Persistence,
Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique’, Democratization, 13(3) (2006),
pp. 373–395. More recently: Andres C. Ha¨rdig, ‘Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the
Middle East and North Africa’, Democratization (2014), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
13510347.2014.917626.
7 See Janine Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan,
and Yemen (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Andrea Liverani, Civil Society in Algeria. The
Political Functions of Associational Life (London: Routledge, 2008); and more recently: Francesco Cavatorta and
Vincent Durac, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism (London:
Routledge, 2010).
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sense, the consensus on the open-ended nature of the uprisings is a step in the right
direction, but does not tell us much about what has actually changed or remained
the same. In order to address this, Valbjørn and Bank had suggested that to
examine ‘actual continuity in the apparent changes’ and the ‘actual changes in the
apparent continuity’ is useful. Thus, even before the uprisings, the two authors
invited the scholarly community to focus on the
changes within regimes (e.g., a transformation from populist to post-populist
authoritarianism), in the relations with the opposition (e.g., the changing regime/Islamist
partiesdynamics) andwithin the latter (e.g., anemerging cooperationbetween the secularLeft
and Islamists), and ﬁnally changes in the society at large (e.g., the emergence of alternative
orders coexisting in parallel with the ofﬁcial political order) [emphasis in original].13
Drawing on this point, the special issue aims to advance our knowledge of the
ongoing dynamics operating outside the rigidity of ‘regime change’ or ‘regime
survival’. In this sense, it seems productive to focus on the reconﬁgurations of
policies and political processes. Indeed, no regime surviving the uprisings has
remained the same and no ‘new’ regime in place after the uprisings is entirely new
and, in this sense, the study of policymaking process and policies seems a very
appropriate and fertile ‘venue’ for research.
Following on from this, the special issue aims to make two substantial
contributions to the scholarship. The ﬁrst is to bring continuity and change to the
forefront of scholarly interest by examining speciﬁc case studies in the realm of
politics and policymaking. In particular, by adopting a micro- and meso-
perspective of empirical analysis, the special issue targets the co-existence of
factors of change in contexts characterised by political stability and, vice versa, the
persistence of elements of continuity (in terms of elite composition and values,
institutional resilience, unchanged policies, governance structure, top-down
approach to policymaking and securitisation of societies and polities) in contexts
of broad change.14 Here, the suggestion15 of examining the meta-meaning of the
democratisation studies toolkit is taken on board: ‘continuity’ and ‘change’ do not
equate with ‘authoritarian continuity’ and ‘democratic change’, and do not
constitute a meritocratic scale according to which change is preferable to
continuity. In particular, the empirical, micro- and meso-level analysis this special
issue offers aims to provide insights about the real degree of change and continuity
in North African political and economic systems. For instance, after regimes
changed and new governments came to power in Egypt and Tunisia, it is unclear
whether and to what extent the personnel of former regimes still play a role in
decision-making processes. This is a relevant issue because it impacts on the
extent to which actual change can be brought about by political and business elites
still connected with previous regimes. Factors of continuity can be clearly visible
13 Morten Valbjørn and Andre´ Bank, ‘Examining the “Post” in Post-democratization: The Future of Middle
Eastern Political Rule through Lenses of the Past’, Middle East Critique, 19(3) (2010), p. 188.
14 This is not new to social and political scientists from other ﬁelds. For example, social scientists of the post-
Second World War era in Europe already underlined the strong continuity in the Italian political system before
and after 1945 in terms of elite composition, political and business networks and elite values. See Salvatore Lupo,
Il fascismo: la politica in un regime totalitario (Rome: Donzelli Editore, 2005). For a similar approach to Eastern
European political conﬁgurations before and after the fall of Communism, see Andrew C. Janos, ‘Continuity and
Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics’, East European Politics & Societies, 8(1)
(1993), pp. 1–31.
15 Andrea Teti, ‘Beyond Lies the Wub: The Challenges of (Post) Democratization’, Middle East Critique, 21(1)
(2012), pp. 5–24.
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studies present can be enlightening as to why dynamics of change and continuity
have unfolded following speciﬁc national patterns, thus shedding further light on
the workings of politics in the region. In this sense, the comparative analysis
proposed by Raymond Hinnebusch of post-independence state-formation
processes and path-dependent institutional and social conditions of the three
countries is of particular signiﬁcance. In fact, it sets out the factors and processes
that have determined the patterns followed by the uprisings—with a look to likely
future political and social developments. In a similar vein, Florian Kohstall’s
comparative examination of higher education reforms in Egypt and Morocco
elucidates the different approaches to reform that the Moroccan monarchy and
Mubarak’s administration had adopted, elaborating on the two regimes’ different
management of contention and revolt, thus illuminating the reason why the
uprisings had such different outcomes in the two countries.
The focus on speciﬁc actors, policies or processes is rewarding also in the case of
articles focusing on individual countries, such as Raquel Ojeda Garcı´a and A´ngela
Sua´rez Collado’s detailed examination of regionalisation policy inMorocco; Fabio
Merone’s sharp class-based analysis of the Tunisian revolutionary process and
emergence of the Salaﬁst Ansar al-Sharia;Matt Buehler’s insightful examination of
trade unions inMorocco; and Rosita Di Peri’s in-depth analysis of the tourist sector
of Tunisia. All these articles indeed stress a common dynamic throughout North
Africa, namely that actors, be they the Moroccan king or Tunisia’s radical Islamic
revolutionary constituencies, have tried to turn to their advantage the
‘revolutionary’ moment created by widespread protests, seizing or attempting to
seize the opportunities political turmoil offered, no matter what the broader
scenario—whether regime survival or change—might have been. However, not all
attempts at seizing these ‘windows of opportunities’ resulted in success, with some
actors failing spectacularly, as the contributors explain in their analysis.12
Regardless of the ﬁnal result, the articles highlight the relevance of the transnational
dimension of the ‘Arab Spring’. In fact, this was of crucial importance both to
national actors, because they could make their protests resonate within a wider,
international arena, and to authoritarian regimes, as their fear of being wiped away,
as occurred in neighbouring countries, resulted in ‘authoritarian learning’. In order
to grasp these dynamics, the focus on speciﬁc actors and policies is of great help, as
it allows for a detailed analysis of complex processes unfolding on the ground.
In fact events in the region highlight that, beyond authoritarian resilience or
democratic transformation, there are deeper and more enduring trajectories of
continuity and change in the way in which actors and structures interact.
Regime Reconﬁguration and the Historicity of the Uprisings
Although the uprisings have exposed a number of contradictions, the tendency to
focus on regimes’ broad transformations has continued and the conclusion of this
special issue partially returns the theme. However, this almost exclusive focus has
led the scholars to underestimate more subtle and partially more obscure political
dynamics and, once again, to concentrate attention on either a broad canvas of
change or granitic continuity when in fact the reality might not be so stark. In this
12 See Francesco Cavatorta, ‘No Democratic Change . . . and yet no Authoritarian Continuity. The Inter-paradigm
Debate and North Africa after the Uprisings’, this issue.
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heterogeneity of time frames at work in the aftermath of the uprisings includes the
longue dure´e of an enduring colonialism, which has taken new forms but is still
present in the policy imprimatur of former colonies, as the case of Tunisia’s process
of identity building and Morocco’s regionalisation policy demonstrate;20 the
medium dure´e of the post-independence period, characterised by political
authoritarianism and its several transformations, decompressions and
retrenchments21 and by the dependence on international ﬁnancial institutions,
which has become seemingly irrevocable despite popular demands during the
uprisings;22 and the most recent, post-uprisings dure´e, where enduring and non-
linear pattern of contention meet relatively new trajectories of institution building,
generating further changes, as the politics of constitutionmaking and constitutional
reformdemonstrate in allNorthAfrican countries.23 Such plurality of time frames is
highlighted in the ‘moment’ of the uprisings,which generate change and continuity.
These different time frames are intertwined and contribute to shape continuity and
change. There is no over-determination on the part of speciﬁc time frames, as long-
term tendencies have been reshaped and refashioned by events that have taken place
in the mid and short term. The result is a dialogical effect, where all the different
dure´es are connected and impact on each other. Thus, looking at the dynamics of
change and continuity allows for a stretching of our historical perspective, which
has often been concerned with the most recent events taking place in the region
because of their rapidly changing and often puzzling nature. The ‘change and
continuity’ framework allows for exploring speciﬁc political and social processes in
a temporal ﬂux.
Although the uprisings remain a watershed in national and international history,
determining when the uprisings actually started and when they terminated is a
rather difﬁcult, if not impossible, task. For example, revolutions both in Egypt and
Tunisia underwent several waves of mobilisation and regime conﬁguration from
late 2010. In addition, revolutions can be temporally framed in different ways
according to the subject accounting for them. In this sense the case of Morocco is
very interesting because, despite the fact that the regime has not lost its supreme
authority as happened in Egypt and Tunisia, the country is undergoing an
everlasting process of change, whose leading trigger is however shifting between
the king and social opposition.24 It is no coincidence, then, that the special issue
calls for the analysis of speciﬁc phenomena in a time framework that can be
stretched according to the actors observed. Thus, the micro- and meso-approach
adopted by the contributors allows for a grounded examination of speciﬁc aspects
20 Fabio Merone, ‘Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond Political Islam’, this issue;
Raquel Ojeda Garcı`a and A´ngela Sua´rez Collado, ‘The Project of Advanced Regionalisation in Morocco.
Analysis of a Lampedusian Reform’, this issue.
21 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation
in Arab North African States’, this issue; Florian Kohstall, ‘From Reform to Resistance: Universities and Student
Mobilisation in Egypt and Morocco before and after the Arab Uprisings’, this issue; Matt Buehler, ‘Labour
Demands, Regime Concessions: Moroccan Unions and the Arab Uprising’, this issue.
22 Adam Hanieh, ‘Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual? Continuity and Change in the Post-2011 IMF and
World Bank Engagement with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt’, this issue; Rosita Di Peri, ‘An Enduring “Touristic
Miracle” in Tunisia? Coping with Old Challenges after the Revolution’, this issue.
23 Gianluca Parolin, ‘Constitutions against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa’, this issue.
24 See Driss Maghraoui, ‘Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern Politics’, The
Journal of North African Studies, 16(4) (2011), pp. 679–699; Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘The Monarchy vs. the 20
February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political Change in Morocco?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(3)
(2011), pp. 435–441.
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and evident, as in the case of the role played by the army in Egypt, but they may
also be present in less visible sectors of political, social and economic life. What
are, for instance, the degrees of change and continuity in speciﬁc policy sectors,
such as higher education in Egypt or tourism in Tunisia, if we contrast the pre- and
post-uprisings eras? To what extent did the inclusion of Islamist political forces in
Tunisia help to remake a new, post-Ben Ali Tunisia? In the case of Morocco,
similar questions can be asked not only in connection to the apparent ‘politics of
compromise’ that the monarchy carries out when threatened by political
mobilisation or by the popular consensus of Islamist groups,16 but also in
connection to labour policies and labour-related contentious politics, which might
have introduced elements of change despite the broader scenario of monarchical
continuity. More generally speaking, what are the consequences that speciﬁc post-
uprisings policies and reforms—regionalisation policy and constitutional reforms
to name just two—may engender in the future, considering the stability of the
monarchy-centred political conﬁguration of Morocco? Accordingly, elements of
both rupture and stability are present at the same time. To be sure, scholars have
already been preoccupied with some of these issues and have already attempted to
answer some of these questions, denouncing that ‘dictators have gone but regimes
have remained in place’;17 this special issue, however, expands such an analysis
through a more nuanced examination of the micro-processes that do operate
beneath the apparent regime survival. In particular, the focus of the authors on the
interplay of agency – or change – and structure – namely continuity – highlights
how they are not mutually exclusive, with change taking place during those rare
moments when agency defeats structures. On the contrary, institutions and
regimes are regularly contested, with actors trying to redirect or subvert them and
generating gradual but nevertheless transformative change. The contributions
highlight the way in which actors have cultivated change from within before the
uprisings or, conversely, how they currently are working towards the maintenance
of some traits of former regimes in the post-uprising period.
The second contribution this special issue makes is to draw attention to the
historicity of the uprisings. In the context of the debate about the uprisings as a long-
or short-term phenomenon, the contributions to the special issue highlight that
protests have been the result of long-term processes18 which have engendered novel
trajectories. This is the case, for instance, with new technologies and social media
which, capitalising on past mobilisations, have been a new and relevant feature in
the protests and which may change future mobilisation patterns for good.19 The
16 Mohamed Daadaoui, Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
17 Vincent Durac, ‘Protest Movements and Political Change: An Analysis of the “Arab Uprisings” of 2011’,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 31(2) (2013), pp. 175–193; Marina Ottaway, ‘The Presidents Left, the
Regimes are Still Here’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 February 2011, http://
carnegieendowment.org/2011/02/14/presidents-left-regimes-are-still-here, accessed 23 September 2014; Eva
Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring’,
Comparative Politics, 44(2) (2012), pp. 127–149; Ellis Goldberg, ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak. Why Egypt’s
Military Will Not Embrace Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 11 February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/67416/ellis-goldberg/mubarakism-without-mubarak, accessed 23 September 2014.
18 Achcar, The People Want; Koenraad Bogaert, ‘Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics behind Three
Decades of Neoliberalism in the Arab World’, Middle East Critique, 22(3) (2013), pp. 213–234.
19 Marc Lynch, ‘Media, Old and New’, in Marc Lynch (ed.), The Arab Uprisings Explained. New Contentious
Politics in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), pp. 93–110; Ricardo Rene´ Laremont,
‘Demographics, Economics and Technology: Background to the North African Revolution,’ in Laremont,
Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa, pp. 15–30.
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and evident, as in the case of the role played by the army in Egypt, but they may
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Regimes are Still Here’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 February 2011, http://
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Military Will Not Embrace Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 11 February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
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overarching conclusion is that constitution-making processes can be instruments
of continuity not only because they may be participated in by the old elite or by
factions linked to the former regime, but also because they are widely regarded as
a crucial step in the stabilisation of newly reconﬁgured political regimes at the
expense of people’s political participation. With the goal of making his argument
more compelling, Parolin contrasts the case of the constitution-making process in
Libya with those of Egypt and Tunisia, in order to explore a case of failed
stabilisation through the constitution-making process. The conclusion the author
reaches is interesting as he highlights how failed stabilisation (Libya) may
paradoxically result in more democratic and inclusive constitution-making
processes than those in successfully stabilised countries (Tunisia and Egypt),
where the constitution-making processes have been smoother at the expense of
political inclusion and participation.
The second set of issues the contributions to the special issue explore is related
to contentious politics. Contentious politics is obviously a crucial dimension for
the examination of post-uprisings North Africa, and the articles shed light on two
aspects. The ﬁrst is how and whether the uprisings have changed the dynamics of
contestation and activism, while the second aspect revolves around how and to
what extent the ruling authorities have changed their attitude towards mobilisation
and discontent as a result of the uprisings. Florian Kohstall and Fabio Merone
insightfully underline the relevance of the medium and longue dure´e in the
examination of revolutionary or protest movements, highlighting that national
authorities may follow a path-dependent pattern in dealing with them. Indeed, the
speciﬁc conﬁguration of regimes and their ability to cope with threats of
mobilisation signiﬁcantly impact on the characteristics of the post-uprisings
political arena. On the contrary, while not neglecting the longue dure´e of
Morocco’s labour-related mobilisations, Matt Buehler’s article demonstrates how
contemporary events, such as the fall of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, have had an
impact on Moroccan authorities’ attitude towards political contention, weakening
their resistance to yield to workers’ demands while strengthening the workers and
trade unions.
Florian Kostall’s article deals with university politics and education reforms in
Egypt and Morocco, and comparatively examines how the different management
of such reforms links to the uprisings and their contrasting outcomes. Kohstall
contends that, contrary to Egypt, the Moroccan monarchy has so far resisted
protests and even regime overthrow thanks to a more ‘dynamic’ blend of reform
and repression—a successful ‘blend’ the monarchy used to introduce education
reforms too and to cope with the discontent they generated. Indeed, the Moroccan
higher education reform introduced a new form of governance in public
universities, whereas in Egypt the government established a parallel system
through the mushrooming of private universities. These different systems of
governance emerging in the two countries partly reﬂect the different political
conﬁguration of the two regimes, with Morocco being characterised by party
pluralism beneath the hegemony of the king and, on the contrary, Egypt having
been dominated for a long time by a quasi one-party system—with some features
that the uprisings did not succeed in challenging and transforming. This difference
also explains the trajectory and outcome of state–society contention in the two
countries.
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of the political, social and economic life in the countries, generating detailed
analysis and empirically and theoretically rich contributions.
Finally, this approach highlights at best the beneﬁts the scholarship may have
gained from the ‘methodological encounter’ between the micro-analysis of
processes and policies on the one hand, and the historicity of the uprisings on the
other. These two dimensions are indeed intertwined, and enable us to shift away
from the immediate ‘democracy spotting’ as well as from the ‘authoritarian
stalemate’ paradigm, while revealing the complexity and richness of the
phenomena under consideration.
Mapping Continuity and Change
In order to highlight all of the points discussed above, the special issue offers a
broad spectrum of articles that touch upon three clusters of issues. The ﬁrst set of
issues relates to the process of state building, which has profoundly affected the
outcomes of the uprisings in the three countries and which, in turn, has been
deeply affected by them after regime change and reconﬁguration. Raymond
Hinnebusch comparatively reﬂects on the impact that the long-term process of
state building in the three North African countries has had on the outcome of the
protests, highlighting the relevant role that ‘distinctive packages of authority (seen
throughWeberian lenses), institution–society relations (via modernisation theory)
and political economy infrastructures (Marxism)’ have played in the explanation
as to why we had such diversiﬁed trajectories despite the many similarities
displayed by the protests. Hinnebusch offers a compelling example of how the
uprisings have been inﬂuenced by the longue and medium dure´e of post-
independence state building, providing an analysis of how longer historical
dynamics meet short-term events.
Raquel Ojeda Garcı´a and A´ngela Sua´rez Collado on Morocco and Gianluca
Parolin on Egypt, Tunisia and Libya provide examples of how policymaking and
institution-building processes have been inﬂuenced by the uprisings. The authors
do so by examining in depth the seizing of the ‘windows of opportunity’ provided
by the uprisings on the part of various national political actors in the three
countries. Raquel Ojeda Garcı´a and A´ngela Sua´rez Collado examine the advanced
regionalisation reform in Morocco, whose launch took place after the eruption of
protests in Morocco and which constituted an instrument in the hands of the king
to respond to political turmoil and discontent. Indeed, the two authors contend that
the regionalisation project is part of the broader ‘never-ending reform package’
that, more generally, characterises the Moroccan system to ensure its continuity as
a stable executive monarchy. In this respect, the two authors highlight the
paradoxical display of a ‘theatre of change’ in a reality of continuity, whereby the
king was successful in portraying himself as the proponent of change, by
exploiting the novelty and the transformations brought about by the
regionalisation reform, in a context of continuity with the pre-uprisings era.
Gianluca Parolin comparatively examines the processes of constitution making
in Tunisia and Egypt, focusing on the shifting power balance and power-sharing
agreements among the different factions that have taken part in it. Parolin’s
analysis aims to examine North Africa’s ‘constitution-making stories’ by
assessing the role of the actors that inﬂuenced or even ‘captured’ those processes,
thus exposing continuity and change in terms of elite self-preservation. The
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characteristics and nature evenmore resilient. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
national authorities, both before and after the revolution, have exploited tourism as
the core of a narrative of (their) national success.Di Peri’s analysis is interesting as it
makes two important points when examining the issue of continuity and change
aftermajor political events. She suggests that political and social actorsmight not in
fact be able to seize the new opportunities the revolution offers, as happened in the
case ofTunisia’s operators of the touristic sectorswhohave not exploited the chance
to impose a signiﬁcant shift in the industry to their beneﬁt. This argument
counterbalances other contributions, although Di Peri does not overlook the
novelties and new experiences that have been taking off in the realm of sustainable
and local tourism in particular. In addition, Di Peri touches upon a relevant issue in
policy-making analysis, namely the fact that policiesmight not change because they
are too encapsulated in the existing regime structure, thus reinforcing the status quo
while removing possibilities for change. This issue speaks to the theories of regime
stability and authoritarian resilience, suggesting that policy-making is a relevant
’venue for research’ scholars should focus on in order to advance our understanding
of the workings of authoritarianism in the region.
Adam Hanieh comparatively examines the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank’s engagement with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, and asks to what
extent change and continuity can be observed in the negotiations between them. The
article ﬁnds that despite the widespread condemnation of neoliberal economic
policies by activists and various political groups during the uprisings, and despite
the rhetorical commitment on the part of the International Financial Institutions
(IFI) to reinforce attention to social issues, little has changed. States and national
business elites have not raised any signiﬁcant opposition to the economic policies
associated with the two ﬁnancial institutions, and negotiations with them have
continued along the same trajectory as under previous rulers. However, Hanieh
concludes his contribution by highlighting the existence of some degrees of change,
or as he puts it, ‘rearticulating continuity’, beneath the continuity of practices and
policies characterising his case studies. He points out the ongoing mobilisation and
turmoil in North Africa, which may affect the continuity of IFI policies considering
that potential political disorder remains of signiﬁcant concern to policymakers, who
may turn their indulgence into bolder attitudes should turmoil continue.
Existing scholarly examinations of the uprisings and their consequences can
hardly answer all of the questions we ask as academics and observers, and further
research into their causes, trajectories and effects will be of great beneﬁt to our
knowledge and understanding of the actual dynamic on the ground. With the
ambition of contributing to this advancement, this special issue targets an aspect,
namely continuity and change, which has not previously been considered in a
consistent and substantial way. Adopting a regional, comparative scope, the
special issue hopes to shed some light on the questions raised.
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Fabio Merone explores the continuities and changes in the ﬁeld of contentious
politics in Tunisia through the examination of political inclusion and exclusion
before and after the uprisings. He does so by investigating in depth two case
studies, namely the inclusion of the moderate Islamic party Al-Nahda and the
emergence of the radical Salaﬁst party and social movement Ansar al-Sharia.
Through a historical analysis of Al-Nahda’s marginalisation from national
independence up to the uprising of 2010–2011, Merone builds an innovative
argument as he highlights the persistence of old logics in the deﬁnition of political
inclusion and exclusion in the national political game, which, according to the
author, is mainly built on social class cleavages. The emergence of Salaﬁsm after
the uprisings is of particular relevance, the author argues, in elucidating this.
Indeed, while Tunisia’s conservative middle class joined the Al-Nahda party,
compromising with secular opposition parties but enjoying the beneﬁts of the
revolution in exchange, Ansar al-Sharia’s disenfranchised constituencies
remained excluded both politically and economically. Merone concludes by
highlighting the persistence of two continuities in Tunisia’s modern history,
namely the resilience of a deﬁnition of national identity, or tunisiannite´, built
along the acceptance of ‘secular modernity’ and moderation, and the exploitation
of the threat of radical Islamism to mystify social class exclusion.
Matt Buehler examines labour protests in Morocco before and after the 2011
protests, and highlights the crucial importance that regional turmoil and disorders
had in allowing trade unions to strategically use the ‘revolutionary’ moment to
advance their demands. The author carries out a historical analysis of trade unions’
strategies and struggles in Morocco with the purpose of illuminating the long
process existing behind the outbreak of political discontent in the country, with
more general mobilisation and workers’ protests existing since French colonialism.
However, protests increased from 2010 and, in the context of North African
mobilisations and revolutionary processes, threats of disorder became very
efﬁcacious, thus allowing the trade unions to see their demands accepted.
The third and last set of issues the special issue explores relates to the economy.
More speciﬁcally, Adam Hanieh and Rosita Di Peri adopt two distinctive
perspectives (international political economy and domestic economy) to examine
the dynamics of continuity and change in two crucial sectors of the economies of
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, namely their relation to international ﬁnancial
institutions on the one side, and Tunisia’s touristic industry on the other.
Interestingly enough the two authors, while not overlooking the transformations
they detected in their in-depth examinations of the economic sectors, contend that
continuity has prevailed over change.
Rosita Di Peri details her analysis of the tourist industry of Tunisia by
investigating its history and characteristics since independence. By recalling this
long history, she is able to identify two main constants, or thawabit. The ﬁrst is the
persistence of touristic and developmental models, which have traditionally been
interconnected in Tunisia, based on the ‘3S’ (Sun, Sand and Sea), despite the
economic and ﬁnancial evidence of major weaknesses, in particular during the past
decade. The second continuity is the persistence of tourism as the centrepiece of the
narrative of the ‘new Tunisia’. The author’s analysis is convincing in arguing that,
because of its economic success, the touristic model of Tunisia has been self-
reinforcing for decades, thus making change rather difﬁcult. In addition, its
economic relevance and credibility at the international level has made its
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in new forms.2 The aim is to provide a macro-historical context for the more
contemporary micro studies that follow in this special issue.
The article assesses the effect of the three regimes’ distinctive packages of
authority (seen through Weberian lenses), institution–society relations (via
modernisation theory) and political economy infrastructures (via Marxism). These
approaches have dominated the state formation literature on the region and
although each focuses on a particular—but indispensable—part of the picture,
they can be subsumed loosely within historical sociology’s very broad church.
Indeed, following the Marxist tradition, they can be seen as conceptually distinct
interacting layers of a pyramidal structure, with the economic ‘infrastructure’ the
base, elites (and social movements) the apex and institution–society relations the
intermediate layer. Elites and social movements provide agency while institutions
and economic infrastructure constitute the structure, with each interacting to
explain outcomes.
The Colonial Heritage
The starting point of state formation in North Africa goes back at least to the
colonial period. Firstly, because the imperial powers merely took over and ruled
through functioning pre-modern regimes, NA states started independence with
more secure identities than the many regional states newly created by imperialism.
Secondly, colonial rule, in introducing secular education, precipitated secular
nationalist movements that, to an extent, marginalised Islam, thereby introducing
enduring societal cleavages over the role of religion in public life. Thirdly,
differences in regime type were shaped by the interaction of monarchs with the
colonial power: where they were seen to collaborate with imperialism, they were
pushed aside in the transition to independence, with the nationalist movement in
Tunisia and the army in Egypt constituting alternative pillars of the post-
independence republics; by contrast the conﬂicts of Morocco’s king with the
French endowed the monarchy with a nationalist legitimacy that kept it at the
centre of the post-independence state.
As will be seen below, the ﬁrst phase in post-independence state formation
(1945–70) further accentuated the initial divergences between the regimes,
particularly between ‘traditional’ Morocco and the ‘modernising’ republics.
Thereafter, however, a convergence among them was driven ﬁrst by similar neo-
patrimonial state consolidation strategies (1970–90) and later by similar
neoliberal ‘authoritarian upgrading’ (1990–2010), which in turn generalised
similar grievances manifested in the Arab uprising. Yet remaining regime
differences appear to explain greater post-uprising continuity in Morocco and
divergences in in the extent of democratisation in Egypt and Tunisia.
Independence and Modernisation (1945–70)
Analyses of NA state formation in the ﬁrst decades of independence were largely
framed by modernisation theory, notably classics by Halpern and Huntington.
A main theme was the mobilisation of new actors, notably the middle class, into
2 For an insightful historical overview of the region, see Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb:
Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (Columbia/Hurst: Columbia University
Press, 2012).
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Uprising: The Consequences of State
Formation in Arab North African
States
RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH*
ABSTRACT This article provides a comparative macro-level overview of
political development in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. It examines their
evolution from the colonial period through several distinct phases, showing how
differences in their origins were followed over time by a certain convergence
towards a common post-populist form of authoritarianism, albeit still
distinguished according to monarchic and republican legitimacy principles.
On this basis, it assesses how past state formation trajectories made the republics
more vulnerable to the Arab uprising but also what differences they make for the
prospects of post-uprising democratisation. While in Morocco the monarch’s
legitimacy allows it to continue divide-and-rule politics, in Egypt the army’s
historic central role in politics has been restored, while in Tunisia the trade union
movement has facilitated a greater democratic transition.
How far can the state formation paths of North African (NA) states help us to
understand the variable impact on them of the Arab uprising? Historical
sociology’s concept of ‘path dependency’1 shows that history matters: the past
tangents of states’ formation close off some possibilities and make others more
likely. While the uprising was spectacularly the product of agency—reaction
against the previous features of the regional states, the structure—the durable
inheritances from the past have constrained the outcomes of agency. As Marx
put it, men make their own history but not in circumstances of their own
choosing.
This article examines the literature on state formation in Morocco, Tunisia and
Egypt for evidence of how far it explains different mixes of continuity and change
under the impact of the Arab uprising, notably differences regarding the
displacement or survival of the incumbent regime and also the extent to which the
old authoritarian politics has been superseded by democratisation or has persisted
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elected parliament. He was seen to rule by exploiting Morocco’s divisions,
balancing between Berber, rural notable and city Arabs. He used the pro-monarchic
notable parties, which delivered the conservative rural votes of clientalised
peasants and pastoralists, to contain the politically mobilised cities. The Berber
tribal-recruited army and interior ministry were turned into royal ﬁefdoms and used
to repress the urban nationalist left. Governments were picked from a rotatingmenu
of king’s men and the bourgeois opposition politicians recruited via family
connections from a small upper stratum of landlords and rich merchants satisﬁed
with the status quo. Decision-making was paralysed, with landed interests
obstructing land reform and education preserved as an elitist bastion. While the
monarchy was congruent with still dominant traditional structures, it was being de-
legitimised in the eyes of the emerging modern middle class.
Egypt was a coherent society similar to Tunisia and also with its own distinct
historic identity, although suffering from the worst resource to population deﬁcit
in the region. By contrast to Morocco, the monarchy and landed oligarchy were
quickly overthrown once British protection diminished. Weberian writings, such
as Dekmejian’s Egypt under Nasir,8 interpreted the authority of the ﬁrst republican
president as charismatic, resting on his anti-imperialist foreign policy victories.
Attempts were made to institutionalise the leader’s legitimacy in institutions, the
presidency, but also in parliament and in various versions of the ruling single party
that were meant to incorporate pro-regime participation but which were seen as
weak and chieﬂy instruments of control. Less sympathetic writers framed Free
Ofﬁcer rule as ‘praetorian’.9 Political economy approaches, such as those of Abdul
Malik and Ayubi, saw Egypt as a modernising bureaucratic state fostering import
substitute industrialisation to deal with land to population constraints;
nationalisations of banking and industry and agrarian reform were breaking the
hold of the old oligarchy over the economy and giving the regime the means to co-
opt the masses.10 Egypt’s revolution signiﬁcantly levelled what had been an
oligarchic social structure. Indeed, Egypt’s more thorough social reforms,
especially land reform, which had no analogue in either Tunisia or Morocco,
produced signiﬁcantly lower long-term inequality levels (a Gini index of 33 in the
late 1990s compared to 40 in the latter cases). Egypt was widely seen as a
successful model in much of the Arab world during the pan-Arab era.
Regime Consolidation (1970–90)
If the 1950–60s appeared to be a period of radical change and mobilisation, the
next two decades were ones of regime consolidation and de-mobilisation. In the
republics, the main change, in Weberian terms, was the ‘routinisation’ of
charismatic legitimacy in some combination of neo-patrimonial leadership and
rational institutions, while in Morocco the monarchy’s persistent traditional
legitimacy and political dexterity allowed it to survive a period of major crisis.11
8 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1971).
9 Amos Perlmutter, Egypt, the Praetorian State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
10 Anwar Abdul Malik, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Vantage Books, 1968); Nazih Ayubi, Bureaucracy
and Politics in Contemporary Egypt (London: Ithaca Press, 1980).
11 Jean Leca and Yves Schemeil, ‘Clientelisme et patrimonialisme dans le monde arabe’, Revue internationale de
science politique, 4(4) (1983), pp. 455–494.
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politics and the rise of middle class-led modernising regimes.3 The building of
new authority was seen as requiring that expanding participation be channelled
through stable institutions; otherwise, ‘praetorian’ struggles for power on the
streets and via military coups and countercoups destabilised regimes.4 Political
effectiveness was measured by how far institutions performed vital political
functions such as recruiting political elites, aggregating society interests and
mobilising support. Regimes were distinguished, in terms of Weber’s authority
types,5 according to their relative concentration of power for radical change or its
constraint by tradition or legal institutions. In the period after independence,
regimes diverged sharply: the new republics concentrated power for modernising
‘revolutions’ while monarchies put it in the service of ‘tradition’. At least as
compared to the Mashreq, however, key NA states stood out for their seeming
greater ability to advance modernisation and contain praetorianism.
Republican Tunisia was the ‘poster child’ of modernisation theorists.6 The
Tunisian state came to independence with important advantages. A small
homogeneous society, Tunisia had a cohesive elite recruited from professionals
sharing similar upper middle class, regional and educational backgrounds and the
experience of the independence struggle. The regime, headed by the charismatic
founder of the nation, Habib Bourguiba, enjoyed the ideological hegemony of a
successful independence struggle and rested on a mass party incorporating middle
class activists, the Islamic bourgeoisie and a highly developed trade union
movement. The regime was seen as the most effective in NA at development,
notably via investment in education and modernisation of agriculture through
cooperatives. Its ‘soft’ version of populist authoritarianism put concentrated power
in the service of rational development, albeit at some cost to institutionalisation.
Morocco’s monarchy also came to independence with an important advantage:
by contrast to the Western-created monarchies of the Levant and Gulf, Morocco’s
had deep historical roots, uncontested traditional legitimacy and the added
legitimacy of its king’s alignment with the nationalist movement against the
French coloniser. On the other hand, however, Morocco resembled those Arab
countries, such as Egypt, where monarchies fell in the revolutions of the 1950s and
1960s, in the large size of its cities, the much lesser role of tribalism, a large
impoverished population and lack of oil wealth, combined with a fairly developed
political society. It had a strong nationalist independence movement, the Istiqlal
party, based on the urban commercial bourgeoisie and a mass incorporating
opposition party of the left linked to the unions (the National Union of Popular
Forces (UNFP) and its successors). This complexity of political society required
the king to be an effective politician in order to survive.
The consensus verdict among modernisation theorists at the end of the ﬁrst
decade of independence depicted Morocco as an ‘immobile monarchy’,7
eschewing modernisation and preserving tradition. The ‘Commander of the
Faithful’ enjoyed enormous powers of patronage, including the constitutional
power to dissolve parliament and appoint its upper house, thus weakening the
3 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1963).
4 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
5 Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 324–406.
6 Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1970).
7 Moore, Politics in North Africa; John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political
Elite; a Study of Segmented Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).
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greater political freedoms, and ‘opposition as a form of support’15 gave it a greater
resiliency than the authoritarian republics.
In Tunisia, the president for life retained unmatched legitimacy within the elite
and brokered intra-elite rivalries and circulation. Although tolerant of opposition
(with dissidents out of favour later forgiven and readmitted to the elite), Bourguiba
nevertheless purged any potential competitors within the ruling party and when
the party became too autonomous used the government to weaken it, moving the
system towards a neo-patrimonial order. Circulation at the top was blocked by the
elderly leadership, with ‘change held in abeyance’. The party had lost
mobilisational capacity while the trade union movement, formerly a regime
partner, now led a general strike against it. Small opposition parties were secular
liberal or leftist, many of them splinters from the ruling party, with Islamists still
on the margins and directing their ﬁre at secularists.
Analysis of Egypt in this period, marked by the transition from Nasser to
Sadat, stressed the continuity of a presidential-dominated bureaucratic regime.
The presidency did, however, evolve from charismatic to neo-patrimonial
authority, with Sadat appealing to religion and tradition to legitimise himself.
This was paralleled by considerable turnover in ministerial and military elites
accompanying Sadat’s policy breaks with the past, including the ousting of the
Soviet-backed Nasserites, periodic waves of further purges of centre-left elites
accompanying economic liberalisation (inﬁtah) and then of opponents of the
Peace Treaty with Israel. Technocratic recruitment to top elite posts advanced,
while ex-revolutionary ofﬁcers declined. Bureaucratic politics over jurisdictions
and clientelist rivalries over patronage replaced ideological conﬂicts.
An experiment in controlled political liberalisation and party pluralism
appeased and contained dissident elites whose views were being marginalised
without allowing them to mobilise mass support, even as the ruling party
reconnected with the rural notability to sustain control in the villages.
Economic opening led to a burst of prosperity, mostly for the well off, and
increased economic insecurity for the masses as the regime attempted to
disengage from the social contract, albeit incrementally owing to fear of mass
protest such as that which broke out in 1977. A post-populist transition was
shifting the social power balance towards those with wealth and against
Nasser’s populist constituency.16
The main vulnerability of all three regimes was that they were starting to
‘overproduce’ elites relative to the co-optative economic capacity of the state to
absorb. New generations were ﬁngered as the main possible threat to stability as
the era of ‘political full employment’ came to an end. Although political Islam
was starting to express the protest of the lumpenproletariat, it remained
marginalised. Morocco, whose large impoverished masses were becoming more
socially mobilised, was seen as the most vulnerable of the regimes and Tunisia
as the least.
15 William I. Zartman, ‘Opposition as a Support of the State’, in Dawisha and Zartman, Beyond Coercion,
pp. 61–87.
16 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1983); Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist
Transformation of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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Two iconic collections edited by Zartman et al. explained regime consolidation
in terms of increased institutionalisation.12 Power was seen as conferred by top
ofﬁce in the centralised Tunisian and Egyptian republics. Ofﬁce made the man,
elites typically originating in modest societal strata, rising through occupations
such as the military and teaching, from which they were co-opted into elite ranks.
The technocracy, more interested in efﬁciency and growth than redistribution, had
moved to the centre of decision-making, somewhat at the expense of the party
politicians and military ofﬁcers recruited from the ﬁrst post-independence
generation. In parallel, the oil wealth available in the region from the mid-1970s
price boom provided patronage for clientelist strategies and neo-patrimonial
practices that made regimes more autonomous of society. In Marxist accounts, the
ﬁrst generation elite of modest origins used its command of the public sector to
enrich itself, consolidating a new privileged and status quo-oriented state
bourgeoisie at the heart of the state.13 If the holders of private wealth still only
enjoyed uneven access to power, ordinary people were being demobilised.
Variations in regimes were, however, signiﬁcant and Morocco’s monarchy
remained different. Property, traditional status and clientele connections to the
monarchy were more important than formal ofﬁce or technocratic skills, in part
because the private sector was more developed and the lack of land reform kept the
rural notability fully intact. Morocco still stood out in the persistence of the
traditional elite and lack of elite recruitment from the lower middle strata that was
typical in the republics; for its lack of mass incorporation; for the government’s
disinterest in development programmes; and by the absence of ideology in public
life. Morocco had never had a populist social contract: however, rent transferred
from the Gulf monarchies allowed increased public spending and a burst of growth
in the late 1970s. Growth of educated youth with identities shaped by education in
Arabic rather than French generated petit bourgeois radicalism formerly seen in
the republics. Marked increases in social inequality and mass impoverishment and
slowing economic growth as rent declined in the 1980s, combined with increased
social mobilisation, were seen to threaten the regime.14
Mounting unrest in the late 1960s was met with repression and a shutdown of
parliamentary life. This, however, left a vacuum, issuing in two attempted military
coups in the early 1970s which pushed the king to re-liberalise the political system
in 1975. This decision was made easier by the fact that the monarchy had
recovered its legitimacy through the annexation of Western Sahara, which won the
acclaim of urban nationalist opinion and where also the military could be
employed away from politics. The return to political liberalisation strengthened
the regime. Zartman highlighted the advantage the Moroccan monarchy enjoyed
in allowing opposition parties and semi-competitive elections, with the king
periodically forming a government that could include ministers from the loyal
opposition; even though ultimate power remained with the palace, competition for
ofﬁce was a means of co-opting and setting ambitious elites against each other.
In retrospect, the monarchy’s mix of quite selective coercion, the safety valve of
12 William I. Zartman et al. (eds), Political Elites in Arab North Africa (New York: Longman, 1982); Adeed
Dawisha and William I. Zartman (eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State (London: Croom
Helm, 1988), pp. 61–87.
13 Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conﬂict in Egypt (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).
14 Mark Tessler, ‘Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance’, in Zartman et al., Political
Elites, pp. 35–91.
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emergence of competing opposition parties, facilitating the co-optation and
division of the opposition, while various electoral manipulations and bureaucratic
restrictions prevented them from mobilising mass constituencies.24 Gerrymander-
ing of electoral systems fostered neoliberal parties incorporating the regimes’ new
crony capitalist constituencies.25 The republics’ original corporatist ruling parties
situated themselves between the conservative and radical opposition parties, but
they and their corporatist organisations, such as workers’ unions, that had
mobilised the masses in the populist era (against the coloniser or old oligarchy)
now functioned to keep them demobilised.26 Able to stand above and balance
between winners and losers, presidents and kings become more autonomous of
their former party/bureaucratic/popular bases, while ruling families, going into
business, were aggrandised; yet, reneging on the former social contract, they
suffered legitimacy losses and had to rely more on divide and rule and coercion.
In Tunisia, neoliberalism followed an incremental path. The trade union
federation initially effectively resisted moves against worker interests with
protests and strikes, hence reforms had to be agreed via a tripartite state–
business–union corporatism. However, this changed when debt led to negative
growth and an IMF structural adjustment programme in the 1980s; union leaders
were arrested and purged and loyalists appointed. Under Ben Ali, who brought in
technocrats, neoliberalism deepened. The new union leadership agreed to Ben
Ali’s economic policies, claiming that workers had to adapt to economic
globalisation and there were few strikes even though worker gains were eroded.
Political developments were shaped by this political economy context. The Ben
Ali era started with political liberalisation, under a national pact in which the ruling
partywas to forfeit its privileged position; however, the IslamistAl-Nahdamovement
grew, posing as the new champion of those being marginalised. Unable to co-opt the
opposition, Ben Ali banned Al-Nahda and initiated controlled elections in which
the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) always won big majorities. The
contraction of political and press freedoms put Tunisia among the more authoritarian
of the Arab states despite its relatively high socio-economic indicators.27
Privatisation took an increasingly crony capitalist form, with the president’s and
his wife’s relatives the biggest business operators. Typically, state banks gave
unsecured loans to insiders to buy up state assets; these insiders laid off workers,
sometimes sold the machinery, and neglected to repay the loans. Also an agrarian
counter-revolution transferred 600,000 ha. to a rural elite and privatised peasant
cooperatives, all with support from a World Bank loan. Joining the Euro-Med
partnership forced tariff cuts and bankruptcies on local manufacturers. By 2007,
the private sector dominated and the IMF gave Tunisia star marks. The growth rate
was 5 per cent in 1982–86 and 3.5 per cent in 1992–96 but, owing to unequal
distribution, the standard of living of the masses still fell. Nonetheless, Tunisia
24 Jean Leca, ‘Opposition in the Middle East and North Africa’,Government and Opposition, 32 (1997), pp. 557–
577; Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conﬂict in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
pp. 126–152.
25 Louis Bradley Glasser, Economic Development and Political Reform: The Impact of External Capital on the
Middle East (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001).
26 King, The New Authoritarianism.
27 Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London: Macmillan,
1999); Rikke Haugbolle and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up?
Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 38
(3) (2011), pp. 323–341.
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Neoliberal Globalisation and Authoritarian Upgrading (1990–2011)
In this period neoliberal globalisation17 came to NA as the old populist social
contract and state developmental formulas gave way to ‘post-populism’.18 Several
converging factors drove this change. All NA regimes suffered foreign exchange
crises and debt attendant on the late 1980s–1990s depression in oil prices, and
became more vulnerable to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creditor
pressures for austerity-driven ‘structural adjustment’. Neoliberalism was
promoted by cabinets of technocrats or businessmen more attuned to the demands
of international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) than those of their peoples. A parallel
economic opening (inﬁtah) led to unequal competition from Western exporters,
driving national industries under, while tax breaks were accorded to foreign
companies. Labour rights were removed, and welfare provision was delegated to
private networks linked to the regime or to Islamists. Iconic of the shift in regimes’
social bases was the partial reversal of land reform in Tunisia and Egypt that
allowed the restoration of the rural oligarchy at the expense of the peasantry
initially favoured by populist regimes. As regimes abandoned efforts to politically
incorporate their populations, they faced rising Islamist and anti-Western
opposition.19 As such, authoritarian power was retained, albeit now to protect new
inequalities on behalf of the bourgeoisie and against the mass public.
Analysts asked how regimes could initiate economic liberalisation that
potentially weakened state control over the economy and also antagonised their
original popular constituencies while remaining in control and even politically
liberalising. King argued that the authoritarian survival formula amounted to a
cultivation of new constituencies to substitute for those being abandoned: the
privatisation of public sectors provided patronage to co-opt rent-seeking
supportive crony bourgeoisies.20 Heydeman argued that economic liberalisation
replaced public with private monopolies;21 rather than generating an independent
bourgeoisie able to check the state, privatisation created a rent-seeking state-
dependent bourgeoisie that supported authoritarianism. By comparison to such
concentrated entrenched interests supportive of regimes, the collective action
problem deterred the mobilisation of the lower strata to contest the upward
redistribution of wealth that neoliberal policies promoted. Finally, regimes
became dependent on Western powers to provide ﬁnancial or security support
used to co-opt or control opposition, all legitimised after 2011 by the ‘war on
terror’—which, however, tended to further radicalise some opposition elements.22
In parallel, regimes found ways to ‘upgrade’ and adapt authoritarian rule in an
age of democratisation. ‘Lop-sided’ limited political liberalisation favoured those
who supported neoliberal policies.23 Pluralisation of party systems permitted the
17 Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and Neo-liberal Globalization (Reading: Ithaca
Press, 2009).
18 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Liberalization without Democratization in ‘Post-populist’ Authoritarian States:
Evidence from Syria and Egypt’, in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manel Hassassian (eds), Citizenship and the
State in the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 123–145.
19 Remy Leveau, Le Sabre et le Turban: L’Avenir du Maghreb (Paris: Francois Bourin, 1993).
20 Stephen King, The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2009).
21 Steven Heydemann (ed.), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
22 Lise Storm, ‘The Persistence of Authoritarianism as a Source of Radicalization in North Africa’, International
Affairs, 85(5) (2009), pp. 997–1013.
23 Hinnebusch, ‘Liberalization without Democratization’.
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power ﬂowed away from politicians and political institutions to a newly
empowered monarchy and technocrats attuned to the demands of IFIs.
Egypt’s post-populist political development was also marked by cycles of
opening,when the regimehad sufﬁcient rent to sustain patronage, and closing,when
opposition mounted, often associated with deepening neoliberalism or unpopular
foreign policy moves.32 Egypt’s regime had cracked down in the late Sadat period
onmounting opposition, notably to peacewith Israel, but re-liberalised politically in
the early Mubarak period when enough rent was accumulated to resist external
neoliberal pressures. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) positioned itself
between populism, represented by the left-wing National Progressive Unionist
Party (NPUP), and neoliberalism advocated by the Wafd, representative of the
inﬁtah bourgeoisie with ties to Western capital. However, the oil price collapse of
the late 1980s, debt and IMF pressures put harder reforms—notably privatisation of
the public sector—on the agenda. For its anti-Saddam stand in the 1990 Gulf War,
Western donors accorded Cairo a big windfall in debt relief in exchange for
deepening of economic ‘reform’. Having previously referred to the IMF as a ‘quack
doctor’, Mubarak now claimed that under globalisation there was no alternative to
its demands. The regime fostered a supportive coalition: business organisations
were well organised and got increasing political access through parliament, while
the NDP lurched to the right. The Wafd was co-opted, allowed 15 per cent of the
vote and 58 parliamentary seats, while the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood),
representative of Gulf capital, was allowed to join the Wafd’s lists. All shared
support for neoliberalism, privatisation of the public sector, and revision of land
tenancy laws to favour owners. The parties of the left, Hizb al-‘Amal and theNPUP,
were prevented from forming a joint list and from actively campaigning among the
mass public. However, in parallel with neoliberalisation, the regime faced
throughout the 1990s an increasingly violent Islamist uprising; instead of
strengthening themoderate Ikhwan in order to isolate the radicals, the regime turned
against and repressed the Ikhwan, thus contracting the political opening.
In the 2000s, the NDP moved even further right as it increasingly co-opted the
emerging business class. Businessmen and Western-educated neoliberal-oriented
technocrats encouraged by Gamal Mubarak took over the government under the
2004 ministry of Ahmad al-Nazif. Under it, privatisation involved selling public
assets at below market prices to a small group of crony capitalist bureaucrats and
investors. Lucrative franchises on foreign ﬁrms were also acquired by crony
capitalists. In parallel, a new labour law (no. 12 of 2003) increased the right of
employers to dismiss workers and a new tax law shifted the burden from the rich to
the middle class, with the rate levied on the super-rich cut to 10 per cent. The
1990s reversal of Nasser’s tenancy laws led to expulsions of peasants from the
land and protests and repression by police and landlord thugs; by the end of the
1990s, 7 per cent of the population owned 60 per cent of the land. This was
paralleled in foreign policy by growing ties, including business relations, with
Israel.
How were the masses controlled and opposition marginalised? World Bank and
other funders provided funds to pay off those dismissed from public employment
in the transition period. Much of the politically conscious urban population did not
vote while the ruling party distributed patronage in elections, rural notables
32 Glasser, Economic Development and Political Reform, pp. 50–54.
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retained more of a social safety net and investment in health and education than
other NA states; and to keep social peace, ﬁrms had to make contributions to
national insurance, which deterred investors who had to operate in a neoliberal
global market wherein labour costs must be driven down.28
A similar economic tangent was evident in Morocco. In the late 1970s, the
country had suffered a sharp drop in export earnings from phosphates while oil
import costs had risen. Soaring debt and later slashes in Saudi aid forced structural
adjustment involving public spending and subsidy cuts that led to bread riots in
1984. While the riots delayed austerity, by the 1990s Morocco was a model of
budgetary discipline. Privatisation of the public sector concentrated its assets in
the hands of the royal family and a handful of cronies or foreign ﬁrms. Public
employment, wages and the Human Development Index (HDI) all fell while the
percentage in poverty rose from 13 per cent in 1990–91 to 25 per cent in 2005.29
Since, under these circumstances, urbanisation was increasing the dangers of
protest, private and foreign aid funds were channelled into charities under royal
control. At the same time, to organise a constituency among the beneﬁciaries of
neoliberalism, the regime created a new centre-right party, the Constitutional
Union, representative of the higher bourgeoisie and championing militant
neoliberalism; the regime used gerrymandering, fraud and rural notables to deliver
the votes to put it in power.
With the regime weakening in the early 1990s, as the king lost legitimacy for his
stand with the West in the Gulf War and royal succession imminent, the makhzen
placated the opposition with increased freedom of the press and civil society,
reductions in repression and fairer elections. This allowed the populist Union
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), which had opposed structural adjustment,
to win an electoral plurality and form the government under Abdul Salam Yussuﬁ,
the ﬁrst time the opposition had taken power after an election; yet this seeming
watershed in democratic accountability was diluted by the royal-appointed upper
house and the king’s veto over policy from his power to dismiss the government.
As its co-optation by the regime cost theUSFPpopular support, the opposition’s rise
to government turned out to be a variation on classic divide and rule.30
In 1999, the new king, Muhammad VI, came to power, promising political
reform but by 2003 his opening was reversed as the civil war in Algeria, the events
of 9/11 and terrorist incidents in Morocco legitimised a ‘war on terror’ against
Islamic militancy that extended to all dissent deemed threatening. Indeed, the very
moderation of the mainstream Islamic movements, increasing their appeal, and
their attempts to create a secular-Islamist coalition to pressure the monarchy into
democratisation, made them special targets of repression.31 From 2003–2011,
28 Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Clay “Tiger”: Tunisia and the End of the “Bread” Economic Model’, IPRIS Maghreb
Bulletin (2011); Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Participatory Development and Liberal Reforms in Tunisia: The Gradual
Incorporation of Some Economic Networks’, in Heydemann, Networks of Privilege, pp. 223–242.
29 Myriam Catusse, ‘Morocco’s Political Economy: Ambiguous Privatization and the Emerging Social
Question’, in Guazzone and Pioppi, The Arab State, pp. 185–216.
30 Remy Leveau, ‘The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium’, in Joseph
Kositner (ed.), Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000),
pp. 117–130; Michael Willis, ‘Morocco’s Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange Case of
the Party that Did Not Want to Win’, Mediterranean Politics, 9(1) (2004), pp. 53–81; Francesco Cavatorta,
‘“Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail”: Opposition Politics in Morocco’, Democratization, 16(1) (2009),
pp. 137–156.
31 Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Civil Society, Islamism and Democratisation: The Case of Morocco’, Journal of
Modern African Studies, 44(2) (2006), pp. 203–222.
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power ﬂowed away from politicians and political institutions to a newly
empowered monarchy and technocrats attuned to the demands of IFIs.
Egypt’s post-populist political development was also marked by cycles of
opening,when the regimehad sufﬁcient rent to sustain patronage, and closing,when
opposition mounted, often associated with deepening neoliberalism or unpopular
foreign policy moves.32 Egypt’s regime had cracked down in the late Sadat period
onmounting opposition, notably to peacewith Israel, but re-liberalised politically in
the early Mubarak period when enough rent was accumulated to resist external
neoliberal pressures. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) positioned itself
between populism, represented by the left-wing National Progressive Unionist
Party (NPUP), and neoliberalism advocated by the Wafd, representative of the
inﬁtah bourgeoisie with ties to Western capital. However, the oil price collapse of
the late 1980s, debt and IMF pressures put harder reforms—notably privatisation of
the public sector—on the agenda. For its anti-Saddam stand in the 1990 Gulf War,
Western donors accorded Cairo a big windfall in debt relief in exchange for
deepening of economic ‘reform’. Having previously referred to the IMF as a ‘quack
doctor’, Mubarak now claimed that under globalisation there was no alternative to
its demands. The regime fostered a supportive coalition: business organisations
were well organised and got increasing political access through parliament, while
the NDP lurched to the right. The Wafd was co-opted, allowed 15 per cent of the
vote and 58 parliamentary seats, while the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood),
representative of Gulf capital, was allowed to join the Wafd’s lists. All shared
support for neoliberalism, privatisation of the public sector, and revision of land
tenancy laws to favour owners. The parties of the left, Hizb al-‘Amal and theNPUP,
were prevented from forming a joint list and from actively campaigning among the
mass public. However, in parallel with neoliberalisation, the regime faced
throughout the 1990s an increasingly violent Islamist uprising; instead of
strengthening themoderate Ikhwan in order to isolate the radicals, the regime turned
against and repressed the Ikhwan, thus contracting the political opening.
In the 2000s, the NDP moved even further right as it increasingly co-opted the
emerging business class. Businessmen and Western-educated neoliberal-oriented
technocrats encouraged by Gamal Mubarak took over the government under the
2004 ministry of Ahmad al-Nazif. Under it, privatisation involved selling public
assets at below market prices to a small group of crony capitalist bureaucrats and
investors. Lucrative franchises on foreign ﬁrms were also acquired by crony
capitalists. In parallel, a new labour law (no. 12 of 2003) increased the right of
employers to dismiss workers and a new tax law shifted the burden from the rich to
the middle class, with the rate levied on the super-rich cut to 10 per cent. The
1990s reversal of Nasser’s tenancy laws led to expulsions of peasants from the
land and protests and repression by police and landlord thugs; by the end of the
1990s, 7 per cent of the population owned 60 per cent of the land. This was
paralleled in foreign policy by growing ties, including business relations, with
Israel.
How were the masses controlled and opposition marginalised? World Bank and
other funders provided funds to pay off those dismissed from public employment
in the transition period. Much of the politically conscious urban population did not
vote while the ruling party distributed patronage in elections, rural notables
32 Glasser, Economic Development and Political Reform, pp. 50–54.
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retained more of a social safety net and investment in health and education than
other NA states; and to keep social peace, ﬁrms had to make contributions to
national insurance, which deterred investors who had to operate in a neoliberal
global market wherein labour costs must be driven down.28
A similar economic tangent was evident in Morocco. In the late 1970s, the
country had suffered a sharp drop in export earnings from phosphates while oil
import costs had risen. Soaring debt and later slashes in Saudi aid forced structural
adjustment involving public spending and subsidy cuts that led to bread riots in
1984. While the riots delayed austerity, by the 1990s Morocco was a model of
budgetary discipline. Privatisation of the public sector concentrated its assets in
the hands of the royal family and a handful of cronies or foreign ﬁrms. Public
employment, wages and the Human Development Index (HDI) all fell while the
percentage in poverty rose from 13 per cent in 1990–91 to 25 per cent in 2005.29
Since, under these circumstances, urbanisation was increasing the dangers of
protest, private and foreign aid funds were channelled into charities under royal
control. At the same time, to organise a constituency among the beneﬁciaries of
neoliberalism, the regime created a new centre-right party, the Constitutional
Union, representative of the higher bourgeoisie and championing militant
neoliberalism; the regime used gerrymandering, fraud and rural notables to deliver
the votes to put it in power.
With the regime weakening in the early 1990s, as the king lost legitimacy for his
stand with the West in the Gulf War and royal succession imminent, the makhzen
placated the opposition with increased freedom of the press and civil society,
reductions in repression and fairer elections. This allowed the populist Union
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), which had opposed structural adjustment,
to win an electoral plurality and form the government under Abdul Salam Yussuﬁ,
the ﬁrst time the opposition had taken power after an election; yet this seeming
watershed in democratic accountability was diluted by the royal-appointed upper
house and the king’s veto over policy from his power to dismiss the government.
As its co-optation by the regime cost theUSFPpopular support, the opposition’s rise
to government turned out to be a variation on classic divide and rule.30
In 1999, the new king, Muhammad VI, came to power, promising political
reform but by 2003 his opening was reversed as the civil war in Algeria, the events
of 9/11 and terrorist incidents in Morocco legitimised a ‘war on terror’ against
Islamic militancy that extended to all dissent deemed threatening. Indeed, the very
moderation of the mainstream Islamic movements, increasing their appeal, and
their attempts to create a secular-Islamist coalition to pressure the monarchy into
democratisation, made them special targets of repression.31 From 2003–2011,
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capita income compared to Egypt and Morocco, combined with respectable
growth rates of 5 per cent per year.
The enduring legitimacy of the centuries-old Moroccan dynasty compared to
that of republican presidents was crucial. The republics’ legitimacy relied on some
combination of nationalism and development performance. But Egypt’s regime
squandered the nationalist legitimacy of Nasser, its founding president, especially
under Mubarak whose collaboration with Israel and dependence on the US,
paralleled by the self-enrichment of the presidential family, was particularly
delegitimising.35 The enrichment of the presidential family was similar in Tunisia.
The aggrandisement of the Moroccan monarch and his close cronies was no less
egregious, yet the king retained hegemony over society, especially the poor;
owning big chunks of the economy he was, according to LeVine,36 enabled to both
proﬁteer at the expense of the poor and provide them with charity. Kings,
responsible to God, are perhaps expected to aggrandise themselves while the
legitimacy of republican presidents, responsible to the ‘people’, is debilitated by
the same process. In addition, while presidents cannot easily avoid responsibility
for policies, kings are better able to distance themselves, however much they have
the last word, from the policies of their governments and to deﬂect public anger
onto those incumbents, who can be rotated as a way of appeasing discontent.
While Morocco’s system diffused responsibility away from the king, in Tunisia
and Egypt the concentration of power and patronage in the presidential families
concentrated responsibility.
A second factor was the deeper and more authentic political pluralisation in
Morocco combined with a lower level of social mobilisation compared to the
republics. Morocco’s limiting of education also limited employment absorption
pressures while the preservation of patriarchal society contained political
demands. By contrast, Tunisia, of the three states, combined the most educated
and socially mobilised population—which, however, could not be sufﬁciently
absorbed into jobs—with the least open political system, where the Islamists and
secular opposition were thoroughly excluded from the political arena, the press
least free, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) most controlled. Egypt
was more open than Tunisia and less open than Morocco, with its limited
pluralisation periodically reversed and nearly shut down just prior to the uprising.
Morocco’s system afforded more effective mechanisms for co-optation of the
political opposition, which was largely excluded in Tunisia or frustrated by the
regime’s cat and mouse games in Egypt.
Table 1. Political Economy Measures, NA States
PER CAPITA $PPP (2005) HDI (2003) LITERACY (2003) (%)
Egypt 5049 65.9 55.6
Morocco 3547 63.1 50.7
Tunisia 6461 73.3 74.3
Source: Sami Bibi and Mustafa K. Nabli, Equity and Inequality in the Arab Region, Policy Research
Report No. 33 (Dokki, Giza: Economic Research Forum, 2010), pp. 8–49.
35 Mark Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’,Middle East Critique, 19(3) (2010), pp. 251–267.
36 Mark LeVine, ‘In the Arab World’s Deepest State the Revolution Continues’, Al-Jazeera, 20 February 2013,
http://m.aljazeera.com/story/20132209305838184, accessed 15 September 2014.
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delivered their clients and businessmen trucked their workers to the polls. The
labour union leadership was co-opted, endorsing the 1991 privatisation law and
containing pressures for strikes while the government repressed independent
unions; yet, from the mid-2000s, Egypt experienced the longest wave of worker
protests and strikes since World War II. On and off repression continued as
emergency law was replaced by counter-terrorism law.
The neoliberal NDP government and perceived plans for Mubarak to pass
power to his son, neoliberal icon Gamal Mubarak, provoked the kefaya
demonstrations calling for Mubarak to go; this, combined with US democracy
pressures, led to the relatively free 2005 parliamentary election in which the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged as the main opposition, with 88 seats and 20
per cent of the vote. However, as US pressures receded, political liberalisation was
again reversed, with the Brotherhood facing new repression. One of the factors
that helped spark the uprising against Mubarak was the 2010 election, when the
regime engineered the virtual expulsion of the opposition from parliament.
The regime’s zig-zag, combining selective relaxation of control over the political
arena—e.g. greater freedom of the press and opposition access to parliament—with
subsequent re-tightening and closing of access, turned limited political
pluralisation into a source of frustration rather than a safely value as intended.
The Arab Uprising (2010–)
The underlying causes of the Arab uprising—a combination of neoliberal economics
and neo-patrimonial regimes—were relatively uniformly present across North
Africa. The uprising also took the quite similar, and unprecedented, form of large-
scale peaceful mass protest against incumbent regimes, indicative of similar high
levels of social mobilisation (e.g. education, middle class formation) across the
region.33Notwithstanding this, NA regimes sharply diverged,with Tunisia andEgypt
experiencing leadership change and state weakening while Morocco seemingly
escaped this.34 Do their state formation tangents help explain these variations in
the extent of change? Do they equip NA states for a post-uprising transition to
stable democracy or make for more authoritarian continuity than change?
Regime change or adaptation
Why has Morocco’s monarchy proved more resilient, in spite of the fact that
analysts long saw it as more, not less, vulnerable because of its disinterest in
development and social reform? Moreover, the neoliberalism that helped provoke
the Arab uprising had actually been more damaging in Morocco than in the
republics: its starting point was a more unequal society that only got more unequal.
By contrast, the pre-neoliberal developmental heritage in the republics left behind
better scores on indicators such as growth, equality, poverty reduction and
education (Table 1). Ironically, Tunisia, where the uprising began, had the lowest
poverty rate in the region, higher education, literacy rates, life expectancy and per
33 George Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects’, The Journal of North African Studies,
16(4) (2011), pp. 507–532; Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya’, Foreign Affairs, 2 (2011), pp. 2–7.
34 Ricardo Laremont (ed.), Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond
(London: Routledge, 2013).
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capita income compared to Egypt and Morocco, combined with respectable
growth rates of 5 per cent per year.
The enduring legitimacy of the centuries-old Moroccan dynasty compared to
that of republican presidents was crucial. The republics’ legitimacy relied on some
combination of nationalism and development performance. But Egypt’s regime
squandered the nationalist legitimacy of Nasser, its founding president, especially
under Mubarak whose collaboration with Israel and dependence on the US,
paralleled by the self-enrichment of the presidential family, was particularly
delegitimising.35 The enrichment of the presidential family was similar in Tunisia.
The aggrandisement of the Moroccan monarch and his close cronies was no less
egregious, yet the king retained hegemony over society, especially the poor;
owning big chunks of the economy he was, according to LeVine,36 enabled to both
proﬁteer at the expense of the poor and provide them with charity. Kings,
responsible to God, are perhaps expected to aggrandise themselves while the
legitimacy of republican presidents, responsible to the ‘people’, is debilitated by
the same process. In addition, while presidents cannot easily avoid responsibility
for policies, kings are better able to distance themselves, however much they have
the last word, from the policies of their governments and to deﬂect public anger
onto those incumbents, who can be rotated as a way of appeasing discontent.
While Morocco’s system diffused responsibility away from the king, in Tunisia
and Egypt the concentration of power and patronage in the presidential families
concentrated responsibility.
A second factor was the deeper and more authentic political pluralisation in
Morocco combined with a lower level of social mobilisation compared to the
republics. Morocco’s limiting of education also limited employment absorption
pressures while the preservation of patriarchal society contained political
demands. By contrast, Tunisia, of the three states, combined the most educated
and socially mobilised population—which, however, could not be sufﬁciently
absorbed into jobs—with the least open political system, where the Islamists and
secular opposition were thoroughly excluded from the political arena, the press
least free, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) most controlled. Egypt
was more open than Tunisia and less open than Morocco, with its limited
pluralisation periodically reversed and nearly shut down just prior to the uprising.
Morocco’s system afforded more effective mechanisms for co-optation of the
political opposition, which was largely excluded in Tunisia or frustrated by the
regime’s cat and mouse games in Egypt.
Table 1. Political Economy Measures, NA States
PER CAPITA $PPP (2005) HDI (2003) LITERACY (2003) (%)
Egypt 5049 65.9 55.6
Morocco 3547 63.1 50.7
Tunisia 6461 73.3 74.3
Source: Sami Bibi and Mustafa K. Nabli, Equity and Inequality in the Arab Region, Policy Research
Report No. 33 (Dokki, Giza: Economic Research Forum, 2010), pp. 8–49.
35 Mark Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’,Middle East Critique, 19(3) (2010), pp. 251–267.
36 Mark LeVine, ‘In the Arab World’s Deepest State the Revolution Continues’, Al-Jazeera, 20 February 2013,
http://m.aljazeera.com/story/20132209305838184, accessed 15 September 2014.
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delivered their clients and businessmen trucked their workers to the polls. The
labour union leadership was co-opted, endorsing the 1991 privatisation law and
containing pressures for strikes while the government repressed independent
unions; yet, from the mid-2000s, Egypt experienced the longest wave of worker
protests and strikes since World War II. On and off repression continued as
emergency law was replaced by counter-terrorism law.
The neoliberal NDP government and perceived plans for Mubarak to pass
power to his son, neoliberal icon Gamal Mubarak, provoked the kefaya
demonstrations calling for Mubarak to go; this, combined with US democracy
pressures, led to the relatively free 2005 parliamentary election in which the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged as the main opposition, with 88 seats and 20
per cent of the vote. However, as US pressures receded, political liberalisation was
again reversed, with the Brotherhood facing new repression. One of the factors
that helped spark the uprising against Mubarak was the 2010 election, when the
regime engineered the virtual expulsion of the opposition from parliament.
The regime’s zig-zag, combining selective relaxation of control over the political
arena—e.g. greater freedom of the press and opposition access to parliament—with
subsequent re-tightening and closing of access, turned limited political
pluralisation into a source of frustration rather than a safely value as intended.
The Arab Uprising (2010–)
The underlying causes of the Arab uprising—a combination of neoliberal economics
and neo-patrimonial regimes—were relatively uniformly present across North
Africa. The uprising also took the quite similar, and unprecedented, form of large-
scale peaceful mass protest against incumbent regimes, indicative of similar high
levels of social mobilisation (e.g. education, middle class formation) across the
region.33Notwithstanding this, NA regimes sharply diverged,with Tunisia andEgypt
experiencing leadership change and state weakening while Morocco seemingly
escaped this.34 Do their state formation tangents help explain these variations in
the extent of change? Do they equip NA states for a post-uprising transition to
stable democracy or make for more authoritarian continuity than change?
Regime change or adaptation
Why has Morocco’s monarchy proved more resilient, in spite of the fact that
analysts long saw it as more, not less, vulnerable because of its disinterest in
development and social reform? Moreover, the neoliberalism that helped provoke
the Arab uprising had actually been more damaging in Morocco than in the
republics: its starting point was a more unequal society that only got more unequal.
By contrast, the pre-neoliberal developmental heritage in the republics left behind
better scores on indicators such as growth, equality, poverty reduction and
education (Table 1). Ironically, Tunisia, where the uprising began, had the lowest
poverty rate in the region, higher education, literacy rates, life expectancy and per
33 George Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects’, The Journal of North African Studies,
16(4) (2011), pp. 507–532; Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya’, Foreign Affairs, 2 (2011), pp. 2–7.
34 Ricardo Laremont (ed.), Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond
(London: Routledge, 2013).
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proved unwilling to step in and ﬁre on massed civilians, the regime’s coercive
capacity was spent.39 In Tunisia also, the small army was unwilling to ﬁre on
protestors while the combined mobilisational role of the trade unions and middle
class activists was accelerated by police brutality. Morocco also experienced
demonstrations by the February 20th movement that brieﬂy combined Islamist and
secular elements demanding a constitutional monarchy. Being better situated to
make political concessions, the king responded with less repression and a more
credible power-sharing initiative that allowed him to divide his opponents while
stopping well short of democratisation. Protests by 100,000 youth activists were
contained by the royalist loyalty of the illiterate rural masses and the newly
co-opted established parties, an outcome very different from that in the
republics.40
Between democratisation and authoritarian persistence
It is one thing to overthrow incumbent presidents and quite another to make the
transition to democracy. However, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia have relative
advantages in making a transition compared to other Arab states. Unlike the
Mashreq states, ethnic and sectarian cleavages are not insurmountable obstacles
since the three NA states enjoy relative homogeneity, long histories of statehood
and relative incorporation of minorities, whether Berbers in Morocco or Copts in
Egypt. Governing largely de-tribalised societies and without huge amounts of rent,
they cannot clientalise and co-opt tribal society to marginalise participatory
pressures in the way possible in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regimes.
Tunisia in particular, with its larger middle class, mass literacy, secular tradition
and moderate Islamist movement, was widely seen as having the best prospects for
democratic consolidation. In all three states, Islamist movements with large
constituencies embraced the democratic political process and were the initial
winners in post-uprising elections. Yet, at the same time, the enduring power of the
‘deep state’ and the enduring intractability of inherited problems meant the extent
of democratic change remained constrained.41
In Morocco, democratisation depended on whether the king was willing to
concede enough real power sharing to increase incorporative capacity. He did
concede constitutional changes requiring that he appoint the government from the
party that achieved a plurality in elections; yet he could still dismiss the Prime
Minister and dissolve parliament and he also retained control over the armed
forces, security and foreign policy. This limited change was enough to revitalise
political parties that had been marginalised by neoliberal technocrats.42 The
moderate Islamist JDP won a plurality on the basis of promises to attack the
corrupt crony capitalism around the makhzen and formed a coalition government
with the Istiqlal party and two smaller parties, around a platform of a ‘third way
between revolution and authoritarianism’. However, once the threat of the uprising
39 Mona Ghobashy, ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution’, Middle East Report, 258 (2011), www.merip.org/
mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution, accessed 15 September 2014.
40 Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘The Monarchy vs. the 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political
Change in Morocco?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(3) (2011), pp. 435–441.
41 Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa’; Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Arab Uprising, Islamists and Democratization’,
Mediterranean Politics, 18(2) (2013), pp. 170–188.
42 Atul Razdan, ‘Arab Awakening: Morocco’s Genteel Arab Spring’,Diplomatist, 2012, http://www.diplomatist.
com/dipo10th2012/story_017.htm, accessed 5 March 2013.
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Third, the republics were less advantageously positioned to manage Islamic–
secular cleavages than Morocco’s monarchy. Ironically, in the secular Egyptian
and Tunisian regimes, political Islamists were both alienated and marginalised in
the short run. Yet they were actually relatively empowered in the longer run;
regimes’ repression tended to disproportionately weaken secular forces whose
associations and access to the public could be more easily contained compared to
Islamists who enjoyed the advantage of mosques and religious networks relatively
more immune to state control. The privatisation of state welfare functions
inadvertently positioned Islamists to move into the vacuumwhere the post-populist
republics withdrew from welfare provision. The republics, especially Tunisia,
passed up the opportunity to effectively co-opt moderate Islamists in order to
marginalise the militants. Many secular opposition parties, such as the Egyptian
NPUP, saw the Islamists as a greater threat than the regime, allowing them to be
co-opted and neutered by the latter, thereby losing their popular bases; as such, the
spearhead of opposition passed to the younger generation of activists, amongwhom
secularists and Islamists united in the protests that brought down Mubarak.
In Morocco, by contrast, the king’s religious legitimacy made it harder for
Islamist movements to challenge the regime and easier for him to split them and
co-opt the moderates among them. Thus, he was able to diffuse pressure for
regime change after 2011, most notably by co-opting the moderate Justice and
Development Party (PJD) Islamists, and allowing them to form a government after
they gained a plurality in elections, while the rival anti-monarchist Justice and
Charity Islamists founded by Abdesslam Yassine remained in (peaceful)
opposition and Salaﬁsts, a third grouping, remained opposed to the latter two.
The regime also exploited the Islam–secular divide to abort a democratic coalition
against the monarchy. Ironically, secularists supported the religious legitimacy of
the king as a bulwark against Islamists; in turn, many Islamists saw themselves
closer to the king than to secularists. Some secularists wanted Islamists excluded
from politics because, being cut off from mass culture, they could not compete
with the Islamists’ ability to use mosques and charity to reach the people. Many
Westernised women felt threatened by the Islamists but the king, immune to
Islamist criticism, promoted and protected their rights, giving them a stake in the
regime.37 Thus, the many cultural conﬂicts in Morocco’s political space continued
to prevent the opposition coalition needed to pressure the palace into thorough
democratisation.
Finally, how regimes responded to the uprising mattered, with repression
proving quite counterproductive in the two republics and increasing the scope of
anti-regime mobilisation to the point where regime cohesion, and hence its
capacity to repress, broke down.38 Decisive was the unwillingness of the Egyptian
and Tunisian armies to repress the protests in defence of the president. In Egypt the
highly developed mukhabarat had successfully contained protest for decades, yet
resentment against police corruption and brutality and experience of street protest
built up over many years, and, combined with internet organising, led to a
watershed massive mobilisation that overwhelmed the police. Once the army
37 Julie Pruzan-Jorgensen, ‘Analysing Authoritarian Regime Legitimation: Findings fromMorocco’,Middle East
Critique, 19(3) (2010), pp. 269–286.
38 Frederic Volpi, ‘Explaining (and Re-explaining) Political Change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring:
Trajectories of Democratization and of Authoritarianism in the Maghreb’, Democratization, 20(6) (2013),
pp. 969–990.
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proved unwilling to step in and ﬁre on massed civilians, the regime’s coercive
capacity was spent.39 In Tunisia also, the small army was unwilling to ﬁre on
protestors while the combined mobilisational role of the trade unions and middle
class activists was accelerated by police brutality. Morocco also experienced
demonstrations by the February 20th movement that brieﬂy combined Islamist and
secular elements demanding a constitutional monarchy. Being better situated to
make political concessions, the king responded with less repression and a more
credible power-sharing initiative that allowed him to divide his opponents while
stopping well short of democratisation. Protests by 100,000 youth activists were
contained by the royalist loyalty of the illiterate rural masses and the newly
co-opted established parties, an outcome very different from that in the
republics.40
Between democratisation and authoritarian persistence
It is one thing to overthrow incumbent presidents and quite another to make the
transition to democracy. However, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia have relative
advantages in making a transition compared to other Arab states. Unlike the
Mashreq states, ethnic and sectarian cleavages are not insurmountable obstacles
since the three NA states enjoy relative homogeneity, long histories of statehood
and relative incorporation of minorities, whether Berbers in Morocco or Copts in
Egypt. Governing largely de-tribalised societies and without huge amounts of rent,
they cannot clientalise and co-opt tribal society to marginalise participatory
pressures in the way possible in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regimes.
Tunisia in particular, with its larger middle class, mass literacy, secular tradition
and moderate Islamist movement, was widely seen as having the best prospects for
democratic consolidation. In all three states, Islamist movements with large
constituencies embraced the democratic political process and were the initial
winners in post-uprising elections. Yet, at the same time, the enduring power of the
‘deep state’ and the enduring intractability of inherited problems meant the extent
of democratic change remained constrained.41
In Morocco, democratisation depended on whether the king was willing to
concede enough real power sharing to increase incorporative capacity. He did
concede constitutional changes requiring that he appoint the government from the
party that achieved a plurality in elections; yet he could still dismiss the Prime
Minister and dissolve parliament and he also retained control over the armed
forces, security and foreign policy. This limited change was enough to revitalise
political parties that had been marginalised by neoliberal technocrats.42 The
moderate Islamist JDP won a plurality on the basis of promises to attack the
corrupt crony capitalism around the makhzen and formed a coalition government
with the Istiqlal party and two smaller parties, around a platform of a ‘third way
between revolution and authoritarianism’. However, once the threat of the uprising
39 Mona Ghobashy, ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution’, Middle East Report, 258 (2011), www.merip.org/
mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution, accessed 15 September 2014.
40 Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘The Monarchy vs. the 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political
Change in Morocco?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(3) (2011), pp. 435–441.
41 Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa’; Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Arab Uprising, Islamists and Democratization’,
Mediterranean Politics, 18(2) (2013), pp. 170–188.
42 Atul Razdan, ‘Arab Awakening: Morocco’s Genteel Arab Spring’,Diplomatist, 2012, http://www.diplomatist.
com/dipo10th2012/story_017.htm, accessed 5 March 2013.
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Third, the republics were less advantageously positioned to manage Islamic–
secular cleavages than Morocco’s monarchy. Ironically, in the secular Egyptian
and Tunisian regimes, political Islamists were both alienated and marginalised in
the short run. Yet they were actually relatively empowered in the longer run;
regimes’ repression tended to disproportionately weaken secular forces whose
associations and access to the public could be more easily contained compared to
Islamists who enjoyed the advantage of mosques and religious networks relatively
more immune to state control. The privatisation of state welfare functions
inadvertently positioned Islamists to move into the vacuumwhere the post-populist
republics withdrew from welfare provision. The republics, especially Tunisia,
passed up the opportunity to effectively co-opt moderate Islamists in order to
marginalise the militants. Many secular opposition parties, such as the Egyptian
NPUP, saw the Islamists as a greater threat than the regime, allowing them to be
co-opted and neutered by the latter, thereby losing their popular bases; as such, the
spearhead of opposition passed to the younger generation of activists, amongwhom
secularists and Islamists united in the protests that brought down Mubarak.
In Morocco, by contrast, the king’s religious legitimacy made it harder for
Islamist movements to challenge the regime and easier for him to split them and
co-opt the moderates among them. Thus, he was able to diffuse pressure for
regime change after 2011, most notably by co-opting the moderate Justice and
Development Party (PJD) Islamists, and allowing them to form a government after
they gained a plurality in elections, while the rival anti-monarchist Justice and
Charity Islamists founded by Abdesslam Yassine remained in (peaceful)
opposition and Salaﬁsts, a third grouping, remained opposed to the latter two.
The regime also exploited the Islam–secular divide to abort a democratic coalition
against the monarchy. Ironically, secularists supported the religious legitimacy of
the king as a bulwark against Islamists; in turn, many Islamists saw themselves
closer to the king than to secularists. Some secularists wanted Islamists excluded
from politics because, being cut off from mass culture, they could not compete
with the Islamists’ ability to use mosques and charity to reach the people. Many
Westernised women felt threatened by the Islamists but the king, immune to
Islamist criticism, promoted and protected their rights, giving them a stake in the
regime.37 Thus, the many cultural conﬂicts in Morocco’s political space continued
to prevent the opposition coalition needed to pressure the palace into thorough
democratisation.
Finally, how regimes responded to the uprising mattered, with repression
proving quite counterproductive in the two republics and increasing the scope of
anti-regime mobilisation to the point where regime cohesion, and hence its
capacity to repress, broke down.38 Decisive was the unwillingness of the Egyptian
and Tunisian armies to repress the protests in defence of the president. In Egypt the
highly developed mukhabarat had successfully contained protest for decades, yet
resentment against police corruption and brutality and experience of street protest
built up over many years, and, combined with internet organising, led to a
watershed massive mobilisation that overwhelmed the police. Once the army
37 Julie Pruzan-Jorgensen, ‘Analysing Authoritarian Regime Legitimation: Findings fromMorocco’,Middle East
Critique, 19(3) (2010), pp. 269–286.
38 Frederic Volpi, ‘Explaining (and Re-explaining) Political Change in the Middle East during the Arab Spring:
Trajectories of Democratization and of Authoritarianism in the Maghreb’, Democratization, 20(6) (2013),
pp. 969–990.
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depose the elected president restored the power of the deep state; in deposing the
elected Islamist president, using violence against Mursi’s supporters and
outlawing the MB as a terrorist organisation, the military and the deep state,
with the complicity of secularists and revolutionary youth, in effect made a
transition to democracy impossible. No democracy that excludes one of the most
important socio-political forces in Egypt can be consolidated. Only a regime
retaining extra-constitutional powers for the security forces can possibly
marginalise the Islamists and cope with the violent spill-over of their resistance
to repression. The result appears to be a hybrid regime, Bonapartist, but with
pluralistic appendages and restoring the army to the central role it assumed in
Egypt’s state building after the 1952 revolution.
In Tunisia, on the other hand, a precarious democratic transition remained on
track, despite problems similar to Egypt’s. The Islamist Al-Nahda won a plurality
in the ﬁrst post-uprising elections, owing to its unique name recognition, lack of
complicity in the Ben Ali regime, grassroots organising capacity, higher
penetration of rural areas compared to city-centric secularists, and a moderate
Islamic message attuned to Tunisia’s political culture.44 Unlike the Egyptian
Ikhwan, however, Al-Nahda shared power with two secular parties, and a
secularist politician became president alongside an Islamist Prime Minister. To be
sure, once in power the Nahda party sought to ban members of the two-million-
member former ruling RCD from participating in politics, a move that would
weaken secularists and liberals, some of whom were associated with the old
regime at various points, and prevent them from joining in a counter-coalition
which, polls showed, could have mounted a major challenge to Al-Nahda. Former
regime party members were behind growing protests against the government; the
trade union movement called a general strike and faced attack by the Islamist
militia, the League for Protection of the Revolution. Militant Salaﬁsts’ attempts to
restrict cultural expression they considered anti-Islamic seemed tolerated by the
government. The acrimonious discourse and the murders of secular political
leaders critical of the Al-Nahda government plunged the country into crisis in
2013 similar to what was, in parallel, happening in Egypt. The main difference
was that the unpoliticised Tunisian military lacked the ambition to use the crisis to
assert dominance; indeed, because there was no ‘man on horseback’ in the small
politically unambitious military that rival political forces could call upon to
‘rescue’ the country from the other, they needed to compromise their differences
through dialogue.45 In brokering a compromise, the powerful trade union
federation played a role similar to the monarchy and army as arbiter; this reﬂected
its historically pivotal role going back to the independence struggle.46
Whatever the variations in political practices among the three states, a deeper
obstacle to democratic consolidation in all of them is that democratic procedures
by themselves are unlikely to deliver solutions to problems rooted in a political
economy where globalised neoliberalism dominates. This is particularly likely to
44 Erik Churchill, ‘Tunisia’s Electoral Lesson: The Importance of Campaign Strategy’, Sada, 27 October 2011,
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa¼show&article¼ 45841&solr_hilite¼ , accessed 15 September
2014.
45 For a thorough analysis of Tunisia’s prospects, see Emma Murphy, ‘The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious
Path to Democracy’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(2) (2011), pp. 299–305.
46 Mohamed-Salah Omri, ‘Trade Unions and the Construction of a Speciﬁcally Tunisian Protest Conﬁguration’,
OpenDemocracy, 24 September 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/mohamed-salah-omri/trade-unions-and-
construction-of-speciﬁcally-tunisian-protest-conﬁguration, accessed 15 September 2014.
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passed, especially as secular–Islamist tensions split the youth movement, the king
moved to block the PJD’s investigations into his cronies. His constitutional
concessions were yet another variant on the monarchy’s tested techniques of
diffusing and absorbing popular discontent rather than a serious movement
towards a constitutional democracy. It worked because of the monarchy’s
continued prestige among what is the most illiterate and patriarchal of North
African societies.43 In Morocco, the monarch continued to possess the hegemony
to deﬁne and manipulate the rules of the game.
By contrast, in the republics the removal of entrenched presidential monarchies
exposed sharper and less manageable societal divisions. First, a three-way division
opened up between state establishments, secular opposition and Islamic forces.
The main initial outcome of regime collapse in Egypt and Tunisia was the
empowerment of Islamists, alarming secularists and liberals; the Islamist victories
in the ﬁrst post-democracy elections were, however, partly a result of the
dissolution of ruling parties and the disorganisation of the secular opposition and
revolutionary youth. In Egypt, the presidential election in which the old regime
candidate was barely edged by his Islamist rival, Muhammad Mursi, better
reﬂected the actual distribution of social power. But this was not reﬂected inside
political institutions dominated by Islamists, and the MB, ﬁnding that winning an
electoral mandate did not give real authority over the bureaucratic ‘deep state’,
was unwilling to more widely share power. This precipitated an alignment of the
secularists and youth with the remnants ( falool) of the old regime to subsequently
shift the power balance away from the Islamists.
Second, in these struggles, the rules of the game—notably constitutional
provisions regulating political competition—became themselves the objects of
contestation. Particularly in Egypt, adherence to democratic rules by all three
camps was contingent on the effect on their power positions. Unelected bodies
such as the military and judiciary acted in a highly partisan way while Islamist-
dominated assemblies pushed through provisions alienating secularists. Both
Islamists and liberals competed to get the military on their side against the other,
with the MB striking a power-sharing deal that left the military autonomous of
civilian oversight and entrenched as a powerful economic actor.
In the absence of institutionalised rules of the game, praetorianism was
unleashed, again particularly in Egypt, with the struggle for power taking place not
just through elections but also via street protest and violence, strikes, repression
and intrigue to win over the military and external funders. The weakened state was
less capable of restoring order at a time when mobilisation exceeded
institutionalisation but in Egypt the split between secular and Islamist civil/
political society restored a certain capacity for the army-led ‘deep state’ to balance
between them and position itself as the guardian of order appealing to a population
tired of constant turmoil in a way similar to the role of the makhzen in Morocco.
However, despite somewhat similar Islamist–secular splits, the trajectories of
the two republics also diverged, reﬂective of their earlier state formation
differences. In Egypt, deepened praetorianism sharply reversed democratisation.
The convergence of mass street protests with the military coup of 30 June 2013 to
43 Maati Monjib, ‘All the King’s Islamists’, Sada, 20 September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/
20/all-king-s-islamists/e289, accessed 15 September 2014; Muhammed Jalid, ‘The Rise of Populists in Moroccan
Politics’, Sada, 29 November 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/11/29/rise-of-populists-in-
moroccan-politics/eo0c, accessed 15 September 2014.
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depose the elected president restored the power of the deep state; in deposing the
elected Islamist president, using violence against Mursi’s supporters and
outlawing the MB as a terrorist organisation, the military and the deep state,
with the complicity of secularists and revolutionary youth, in effect made a
transition to democracy impossible. No democracy that excludes one of the most
important socio-political forces in Egypt can be consolidated. Only a regime
retaining extra-constitutional powers for the security forces can possibly
marginalise the Islamists and cope with the violent spill-over of their resistance
to repression. The result appears to be a hybrid regime, Bonapartist, but with
pluralistic appendages and restoring the army to the central role it assumed in
Egypt’s state building after the 1952 revolution.
In Tunisia, on the other hand, a precarious democratic transition remained on
track, despite problems similar to Egypt’s. The Islamist Al-Nahda won a plurality
in the ﬁrst post-uprising elections, owing to its unique name recognition, lack of
complicity in the Ben Ali regime, grassroots organising capacity, higher
penetration of rural areas compared to city-centric secularists, and a moderate
Islamic message attuned to Tunisia’s political culture.44 Unlike the Egyptian
Ikhwan, however, Al-Nahda shared power with two secular parties, and a
secularist politician became president alongside an Islamist Prime Minister. To be
sure, once in power the Nahda party sought to ban members of the two-million-
member former ruling RCD from participating in politics, a move that would
weaken secularists and liberals, some of whom were associated with the old
regime at various points, and prevent them from joining in a counter-coalition
which, polls showed, could have mounted a major challenge to Al-Nahda. Former
regime party members were behind growing protests against the government; the
trade union movement called a general strike and faced attack by the Islamist
militia, the League for Protection of the Revolution. Militant Salaﬁsts’ attempts to
restrict cultural expression they considered anti-Islamic seemed tolerated by the
government. The acrimonious discourse and the murders of secular political
leaders critical of the Al-Nahda government plunged the country into crisis in
2013 similar to what was, in parallel, happening in Egypt. The main difference
was that the unpoliticised Tunisian military lacked the ambition to use the crisis to
assert dominance; indeed, because there was no ‘man on horseback’ in the small
politically unambitious military that rival political forces could call upon to
‘rescue’ the country from the other, they needed to compromise their differences
through dialogue.45 In brokering a compromise, the powerful trade union
federation played a role similar to the monarchy and army as arbiter; this reﬂected
its historically pivotal role going back to the independence struggle.46
Whatever the variations in political practices among the three states, a deeper
obstacle to democratic consolidation in all of them is that democratic procedures
by themselves are unlikely to deliver solutions to problems rooted in a political
economy where globalised neoliberalism dominates. This is particularly likely to
44 Erik Churchill, ‘Tunisia’s Electoral Lesson: The Importance of Campaign Strategy’, Sada, 27 October 2011,
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa¼show&article¼ 45841&solr_hilite¼ , accessed 15 September
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45 For a thorough analysis of Tunisia’s prospects, see Emma Murphy, ‘The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious
Path to Democracy’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(2) (2011), pp. 299–305.
46 Mohamed-Salah Omri, ‘Trade Unions and the Construction of a Speciﬁcally Tunisian Protest Conﬁguration’,
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passed, especially as secular–Islamist tensions split the youth movement, the king
moved to block the PJD’s investigations into his cronies. His constitutional
concessions were yet another variant on the monarchy’s tested techniques of
diffusing and absorbing popular discontent rather than a serious movement
towards a constitutional democracy. It worked because of the monarchy’s
continued prestige among what is the most illiterate and patriarchal of North
African societies.43 In Morocco, the monarch continued to possess the hegemony
to deﬁne and manipulate the rules of the game.
By contrast, in the republics the removal of entrenched presidential monarchies
exposed sharper and less manageable societal divisions. First, a three-way division
opened up between state establishments, secular opposition and Islamic forces.
The main initial outcome of regime collapse in Egypt and Tunisia was the
empowerment of Islamists, alarming secularists and liberals; the Islamist victories
in the ﬁrst post-democracy elections were, however, partly a result of the
dissolution of ruling parties and the disorganisation of the secular opposition and
revolutionary youth. In Egypt, the presidential election in which the old regime
candidate was barely edged by his Islamist rival, Muhammad Mursi, better
reﬂected the actual distribution of social power. But this was not reﬂected inside
political institutions dominated by Islamists, and the MB, ﬁnding that winning an
electoral mandate did not give real authority over the bureaucratic ‘deep state’,
was unwilling to more widely share power. This precipitated an alignment of the
secularists and youth with the remnants ( falool) of the old regime to subsequently
shift the power balance away from the Islamists.
Second, in these struggles, the rules of the game—notably constitutional
provisions regulating political competition—became themselves the objects of
contestation. Particularly in Egypt, adherence to democratic rules by all three
camps was contingent on the effect on their power positions. Unelected bodies
such as the military and judiciary acted in a highly partisan way while Islamist-
dominated assemblies pushed through provisions alienating secularists. Both
Islamists and liberals competed to get the military on their side against the other,
with the MB striking a power-sharing deal that left the military autonomous of
civilian oversight and entrenched as a powerful economic actor.
In the absence of institutionalised rules of the game, praetorianism was
unleashed, again particularly in Egypt, with the struggle for power taking place not
just through elections but also via street protest and violence, strikes, repression
and intrigue to win over the military and external funders. The weakened state was
less capable of restoring order at a time when mobilisation exceeded
institutionalisation but in Egypt the split between secular and Islamist civil/
political society restored a certain capacity for the army-led ‘deep state’ to balance
between them and position itself as the guardian of order appealing to a population
tired of constant turmoil in a way similar to the role of the makhzen in Morocco.
However, despite somewhat similar Islamist–secular splits, the trajectories of
the two republics also diverged, reﬂective of their earlier state formation
differences. In Egypt, deepened praetorianism sharply reversed democratisation.
The convergence of mass street protests with the military coup of 30 June 2013 to
43 Maati Monjib, ‘All the King’s Islamists’, Sada, 20 September 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/
20/all-king-s-islamists/e289, accessed 15 September 2014; Muhammed Jalid, ‘The Rise of Populists in Moroccan
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fostered crony capitalism regardless of regime type, pushing a convergence
towards deepened patrimonialisation of leadership in all three NA states.
Yet persisting variations in state formation paths help to explain the variations
in continuity and change accompanying the Arab uprising in the three states. The
much lesser extent of change in royal Morocco as compared to republican Tunisia
and Egypt can be explained by several factors. First, as modernisation theory
argued, the increased social mobilisation accompanying modernisation must be
matched by higher levels of economic development and political incorporation if
regimes are not to face destabilisation. As regards economic development, the
very virtues of the modernising republics—notably greater investment in
education—exacerbated their crisis of job creation. As regards political
incorporation, the Moroccan monarchy incrementally increased its techniques of
co-optation to match delayed social mobilisation; the Tunisian and Egyptian
regimes did the opposite, propelling modernisation at a greater rate than political
incorporation. Additionally, where neo-patrimonial leadership dominates,
traditional monarchs are more ‘naturally’ legitimate; while presidents’ legitimacy
depended on nationalist or socio-economic achievements, which they did not
sufﬁciently deliver, the traditional legitimacy of Morocco’s monarchy was
impervious to its socio-economic under-performance. Finally, while the monarchy
exploited inherited secular–Islamic divisions, the republics’ attempts to
marginalise Islam only generated a permanent opposition-in-waiting.
Such persisting structural differences made for key differences in agency: the
lesser mobilisation and more moderate demands of protestors in Morocco reﬂected
the divided, co-opted political arena structured by the monarchy over decades,
while the more thorough and radical mobilisations in Tunisia and Egypt reﬂected
the imbalance between social mobilisation and political inclusion. This variation
in agency—mass mobilisation—profoundly mattered for the differences between
regime survival in Morocco and removal in Egypt and Tunisia; so too did the
choices of the military commanders not to defend presidents in the republics, a
function of the greater de-legitimation of presidential monarchs. The agency of
democratic movements to go beyond regime leadership change towards
democratic transition also varied according to inherited structure; thus,
democratisation made more headway in Tunisia because it was more compatible
with this structure, such as the historic centrality of trade union power, and less so
in Egypt where it was obstructed by the military-dominated deep state; and in
Morocco where the monarch’s semi-pluralistic practices substituted for it.
This points to how state formation trajectories generated enduring structures
that make it likely that the coming years will bring as much authoritarian
continuity as democratic change. First, especially in the republics, the uprising
unleashed levels of political mobilisation that could not readily be absorbed by
institutions; the lack of consensus on rules of the game, particularly regarding the
roles of the army and religion in politics, set back moves towards democratic
consolidation. Second, the uprising exposed the enduring secular–Islamic
cleavage that undermined the shared identity needed for democratisation. The
army in Egypt and the king in Morocco exploited public weariness with disorder
and cultural cleavages to limit democratisation.
Political economy analysis identiﬁes a further obstacle to democratisation. The
uprisings were a reaction against the period of neoliberal globalisation in the
region, which created both acute social inequalities and enduring dependencies on
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disillusion those who backed political change in order to redress the wealth mal-
distribution under neoliberal crony capitalism. Revolution has so far remained
purely political, with no attempts to attack unjust economic inequalities; at the
same time, it actually worsened economic growth, and hence prospects for
addressing unemployment, by deterring investors and tourism. What has changed
for the unemployed is increased political freedom to express their frustrations. Nor
are elected governments necessarily better able to manage deep-rooted economic
crises. While they might enjoy greater legitimacy to take hard economic
decisions—although there is so far no sign of this—they will also be caught
between the need to favour investors and to deliver material beneﬁts to voting
constituents, hence they may prove less able to manage the economy than the old
regimes. Nor will elected governments, facing the deep state, be likely to promote
thorough reform of past abuses; thus, in Morocco limited democratisation was not
enough to break down the regime’s unwillingness to countenance attacks on crony
capitalism and in post-Mursi Egypt Mubarak’s crony capitalists were
rehabilitated. Moreover, the fragmentation of political parties, with often
indistinguishable socio-economic programmes, will make governance and the
capacity of voters to hold governments to account difﬁcult, especially as many of
the big issues, notably wealth distribution, will remain excluded from the political
agenda by neoliberal measures pushed by IFIs on vulnerable economies. As in the
West, all parties will follow similar economic policies, hollowing out democracy
and discouraging participation. Elections will therefore likely turn on cultural and
identity issues framed in de-stabilising zero-sum terms.
Finally, irreversible dependence on the West will continue to be a legitimacy
liability in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as many of the grievances that
motivated the uprising can be traced back to Western pressures for neoliberalism
and policies towards the region. If elected governments are unable to assert any
more independence than their authoritarian predecessors, the new regimes will be
deprived of one key ingredient crucial to democratic consolidation elsewhere:
nationalist legitimacy.
Conclusion
The North African experience allows us to assess the agent–structure debate
regarding the extent to which path dependency closes off possibilities for agency.
First, it suggests that the deep political economy infrastructure shapes
developments at the institutional and leadership level. Thus, in the age of statist
modernisation (coterminous with bi-polarity and Keynesian mixed economies
globally), populist authoritarianism dominated the region. In the republics,
charismatic ideological leadership governed through single-party institutions and
corporatism led by the ‘new middle class’ and including peasants and workers.
In this period, traditional monarchy, eschewing state-led development, was on the
defensive. Later, rent from the 1970s oil boom drove parallel institutional
expansion and clientelism, with charismatic authority routinised in neo-
patrimonial institutions; conversely, the oil bust opened the door to neoliberalism.
The movement towards US hegemony and neo-globalisation, driving neoliber-
alism at the regional level, was reﬂected in a post-populist authoritarian
reconﬁguration of state–society relations giving privileged access to new
bourgeoisies and excluding populist constituencies. Neoliberalism uniformly
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fostered crony capitalism regardless of regime type, pushing a convergence
towards deepened patrimonialisation of leadership in all three NA states.
Yet persisting variations in state formation paths help to explain the variations
in continuity and change accompanying the Arab uprising in the three states. The
much lesser extent of change in royal Morocco as compared to republican Tunisia
and Egypt can be explained by several factors. First, as modernisation theory
argued, the increased social mobilisation accompanying modernisation must be
matched by higher levels of economic development and political incorporation if
regimes are not to face destabilisation. As regards economic development, the
very virtues of the modernising republics—notably greater investment in
education—exacerbated their crisis of job creation. As regards political
incorporation, the Moroccan monarchy incrementally increased its techniques of
co-optation to match delayed social mobilisation; the Tunisian and Egyptian
regimes did the opposite, propelling modernisation at a greater rate than political
incorporation. Additionally, where neo-patrimonial leadership dominates,
traditional monarchs are more ‘naturally’ legitimate; while presidents’ legitimacy
depended on nationalist or socio-economic achievements, which they did not
sufﬁciently deliver, the traditional legitimacy of Morocco’s monarchy was
impervious to its socio-economic under-performance. Finally, while the monarchy
exploited inherited secular–Islamic divisions, the republics’ attempts to
marginalise Islam only generated a permanent opposition-in-waiting.
Such persisting structural differences made for key differences in agency: the
lesser mobilisation and more moderate demands of protestors in Morocco reﬂected
the divided, co-opted political arena structured by the monarchy over decades,
while the more thorough and radical mobilisations in Tunisia and Egypt reﬂected
the imbalance between social mobilisation and political inclusion. This variation
in agency—mass mobilisation—profoundly mattered for the differences between
regime survival in Morocco and removal in Egypt and Tunisia; so too did the
choices of the military commanders not to defend presidents in the republics, a
function of the greater de-legitimation of presidential monarchs. The agency of
democratic movements to go beyond regime leadership change towards
democratic transition also varied according to inherited structure; thus,
democratisation made more headway in Tunisia because it was more compatible
with this structure, such as the historic centrality of trade union power, and less so
in Egypt where it was obstructed by the military-dominated deep state; and in
Morocco where the monarch’s semi-pluralistic practices substituted for it.
This points to how state formation trajectories generated enduring structures
that make it likely that the coming years will bring as much authoritarian
continuity as democratic change. First, especially in the republics, the uprising
unleashed levels of political mobilisation that could not readily be absorbed by
institutions; the lack of consensus on rules of the game, particularly regarding the
roles of the army and religion in politics, set back moves towards democratic
consolidation. Second, the uprising exposed the enduring secular–Islamic
cleavage that undermined the shared identity needed for democratisation. The
army in Egypt and the king in Morocco exploited public weariness with disorder
and cultural cleavages to limit democratisation.
Political economy analysis identiﬁes a further obstacle to democratisation. The
uprisings were a reaction against the period of neoliberal globalisation in the
region, which created both acute social inequalities and enduring dependencies on
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disillusion those who backed political change in order to redress the wealth mal-
distribution under neoliberal crony capitalism. Revolution has so far remained
purely political, with no attempts to attack unjust economic inequalities; at the
same time, it actually worsened economic growth, and hence prospects for
addressing unemployment, by deterring investors and tourism. What has changed
for the unemployed is increased political freedom to express their frustrations. Nor
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Conclusion
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modernisation (coterminous with bi-polarity and Keynesian mixed economies
globally), populist authoritarianism dominated the region. In the republics,
charismatic ideological leadership governed through single-party institutions and
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defensive. Later, rent from the 1970s oil boom drove parallel institutional
expansion and clientelism, with charismatic authority routinised in neo-
patrimonial institutions; conversely, the oil bust opened the door to neoliberalism.
The movement towards US hegemony and neo-globalisation, driving neoliber-
alism at the regional level, was reﬂected in a post-populist authoritarian
reconﬁguration of state–society relations giving privileged access to new
bourgeoisies and excluding populist constituencies. Neoliberalism uniformly
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ABSTRACT This article looks into the genesis of Madisonian factions (or Elster’s
interests) in the constitution-making process. The North African constitutional
transitions offer prime insights into the appetites of political forces to appropriate
the key decisions on how to write the constitution, which ultimately leads to undue
advantages in the drafting stage. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya show different ways of
appropriating that moment and the involvement of different forces. These
appropriations, however, all involve limitations to political participation, with
various degrees as evidenced in the three experiences. If distortions of
constitution-making are deemed inappropriate, then appropriations need to be
avoided.
Revolution and constitutional change have been deliberately associated to instil
the belief of a hand-in-glove dynamic between the two. The radical change sought
by revolutions, however, has very little chance of being attained in constitutional
processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when these come to be
controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change. North Africa offers a
set of examples of how the process of constitutional change can be designed to
keep radical forces and ideas away from the drafting table. Drafters in turn made
sure to entrench their positions and further sideline the marginalised.
Constitutional failure might not be bad news, then, for the revolutionaries.
Continuity in the North African constitutional transitions of the current decade
can be detected on various levels, and textual continuity with previous
constitutions is only the ﬁnal outcome. There is abundant literature explaining
textual continuity; some emphasise the strength and stickiness of constitutional
traditions,1 while others point to the fact that regimes operate within a
constitutional framework that is not necessarily authoritarian.2 In order to trace
continuity at its source, however, I suggest that we shift our attention away from
the text and consider the moment when the critical decision between continuity
and change was taken—without hesitation—in favour of the former.
From the North African experiences one can draw a few considerations on the
subtle strategies of exclusion that liberal constitutionalism allows, the constraints
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the Western-centred international ﬁnancial system. However, the latter locks
Middle East states into neoliberal practices and removes the big issues of
politics—distribution of wealth—from domestic political agendas; doses of
authoritarian power, as well as divide and rule, will likely be needed to turn back
demands for social justice that cannot be accommodated in a neoliberal order.
As inherited structure closes in on the agency unleashed by the uprisings, the
most likely outcome in all three states is hybrid regimes, with varying mixes of the
authoritarian features of their earlier state formation with the mass mobilising
effects of the uprising. Now politicians must use and manipulate the more
mobilised masses in their rivalries, but they must also share power with the ‘deep
state’ and are constrained by external dependencies. While such hybridity appears
to have greater legitimacy in a monarchy because of its ability to stand ‘above’
politics, in all three states it is congruent with current circumstances.
RAYMOND H NEBUSCH
30
Constitutions against Revolutions:
Political Participation in North Africa
GIANLUCA P. PAROLIN*
ABSTRACT This article looks into the genesis of Madisonian factions (or Elster’s
interests) in the constitution-making process. The North African constitutional
transitions offer prime insights into the appetites of political forces to appropriate
the key decisions on how to write the constitution, which ultimately leads to undue
advantages in the drafting stage. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya show different ways of
appropriating that moment and the involvement of different forces. These
appropriations, however, all involve limitations to political participation, with
various degrees as evidenced in the three experiences. If distortions of
constitution-making are deemed inappropriate, then appropriations need to be
avoided.
Revolution and constitutional change have been deliberately associated to instil
the belief of a hand-in-glove dynamic between the two. The radical change sought
by revolutions, however, has very little chance of being attained in constitutional
processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when these come to be
controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change. North Africa offers a
set of examples of how the process of constitutional change can be designed to
keep radical forces and ideas away from the drafting table. Drafters in turn made
sure to entrench their positions and further sideline the marginalised.
Constitutional failure might not be bad news, then, for the revolutionaries.
Continuity in the North African constitutional transitions of the current decade
can be detected on various levels, and textual continuity with previous
constitutions is only the ﬁnal outcome. There is abundant literature explaining
textual continuity; some emphasise the strength and stickiness of constitutional
traditions,1 while others point to the fact that regimes operate within a
constitutional framework that is not necessarily authoritarian.2 In order to trace
continuity at its source, however, I suggest that we shift our attention away from
the text and consider the moment when the critical decision between continuity
and change was taken—without hesitation—in favour of the former.
From the North African experiences one can draw a few considerations on the
subtle strategies of exclusion that liberal constitutionalism allows, the constraints
*Department of Law, The American University in Cairo, New Campus, AUC Avenue, PO 74, New Cairo, 11835,
Egy t. Email: gparolin@aucegypt.edu
1 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg an James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Pres , 2009).
2 Giorgio Lombard , Premesse al corso di diritto pubblico comparato. Problemi di metodo (Milan: Giuffre`,
1986).
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015
Vol. 42, No. 1, 31–45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973186
q 2014 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
30450.indd   30 29/05/15   3:34 PM
31
Constitutions against Revolutions:
Political Participation in North Africa
GIANLUCA P. PAROLIN*
ABSTRACT This article looks into the genesis of Madisonian factions (or Elster’s
interests) in the constitution-making process. The North African constitutional
transitions offer prime insights into the appetites of political forces to appropriate
the key decisions on how to write the constitution, which ultimately leads to undue
advantages in the drafting stage. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya show different ways of
appropriating that moment and the involvement of different forces. These
appropriations, however, all involve limitations to political participation, with
various degrees as evidenced in the three experiences. If distortions of
constitution-making are deemed inappropriate, then appropriations need to be
avoided.
Revolution and constitutional change have been deliberately associated to instil
the belief of a hand-in-glove dynamic between the two. The radical change sought
by revolutions, however, has very little chance of being attained in constitutional
processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when these come to be
controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change. North Africa offers a
set of examples of how the process of constitutional change can be designed to
keep radical forces and ideas away from the drafting table. Drafters in turn made
sure to entrench their positions and further sideline the marginalised.
Constitutional failure might not be bad news, then, for the revolutionaries.
Continuity in the North African constitutional transitions of the current decade
can be detected on various levels, and textual continuity with previous
constitutions is only the ﬁnal outcome. There is abundant literature explaining
textual continuity; some emphasise the strength and stickiness of constitutional
traditions,1 while others point to the fact that regimes operate within a
constitutional framework that is not necessarily authoritarian.2 In order to trace
continuity at its source, however, I suggest that we shift our attention away from
the text and consider the moment when the critical decision between continuity
and change was taken—without hesitation—in favour of the former.
From the North African experiences one can draw a few considerations on the
subtle strategies of exclusion that liberal constitutionalism allows, the constraints
*Department of Law, The American University in Cairo, New Campus, AUC Avenue, PO 74, New Cairo, 11835,
Egypt. Email: gparolin@aucegypt.edu
1 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
2 Giorgio Lombardi, Premesse al corso di diritto pubblico comparato. Problemi di metodo (Milan: Giuffre`,
1986).
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015
Vol. 42, No. 1, 31–45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973186
q 2014 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
the Western-centred international ﬁnancial system. However, the latter locks
Middle East states into neoliberal practices and removes the big issues of
politics—distribution of wealth—from domestic political agendas; doses of
authoritarian power, as well as divide and rule, will likely be needed to turn back
demands for social justice that cannot be accommodated in a neoliberal order.
As inherited structure closes in on the agency unleashed by the uprisings, the
most likely outcome in all three states is hybrid regimes, with varying mixes of the
authoritarian features of their earlier state formation with the mass mobilising
effects of the uprising. Now politicians must use and manipulate the more
mobilised masses in their rivalries, but they must also share power with the ‘deep
state’ and are constrained by external dependencies. While such hybridity appears
to have greater legitimacy in a monarchy because of its ability to stand ‘above’
politics, in all three states it is congruent with current circumstances.
RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH
30
      i  air , e  Cairo, Egypt.
Constitutions against Revolutions:
Political Participation in North Africa
GIANLUCA P. PAROLIN*
ABSTRACT This article looks into the genesis of Madisonian factions (or Elster’s
interests) in the constitution-making process. The North African constitutional
transitions offer prime insights into the appetites of political forces to appropriate
the key decisions on how to write the constitution, which ultimately leads to undue
advantages in the drafting stage. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya show different ways of
appropriating that moment and the involvement of different forces. These
appropriations, however, all involve limitations to political participation, with
various degrees as evidenced in the three experiences. If distortions of
constitution-making are deemed inappropriate, then appropriations need to be
avoided.
Revolution and constitutional change have been deliberately associated to instil
the belief of a hand-in-glove dynamic between the two. The radical change sought
by revolutions, however, has very little chance of being attained in constitutional
processes imbued with liberal legality, especially when these come to be
controlled by forces pursuing continuity rather than change. North Africa offers a
set of examples of how the process of constitutional change can be designed to
keep radical forces and ideas away from the drafting table. Drafters in turn made
sure to entrench their positions and further sideline the marginalised.
Constitutional failure might not be bad news, then, for the revolutionaries.
Continuity in the North African constitutional transitions of the current decade
can be detected on various levels, and textual continuity with previous
constitutions is only the ﬁnal outcome. There is abundant literature explaining
textual continuity; some emphasise the strength and stickiness of constitutional
traditions,1 while others point to the fact that regimes operate within a
constitutional framework that is not necessarily authoritarian.2 In order to trace
continuity at its source, however, I suggest that we shift our attention away from
the text and consider the moment when the critical decision between continuity
and change was taken—without hesitation—in favour of the former.
From the North African experiences one can draw a few considerations on the
subtle strategies of exclusion that liberal constitutionalism allows, the constraints
*Department of Law, The American University in Cairo, New Campus, AUC Avenue, PO 74, New Cairo, 11835,
Egy t. Email: gparolin@aucegypt.edu
1 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg an James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Pres , 2009).
2 Giorgio Lombard , Premesse al corso di diritto pubblico comparato. Problemi di metodo (Milan: Giuffre`,
1986).
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2015
Vol. 42, No. 1, 31–45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.973186
q 2014 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
30450.indd   31 29/05/15   3:34 PM
CONTINUITy AND CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS
32
The choice of a roadmap for the transition, for instance, is a good example of a
Big Bang moment, since it is the generative act that empowers certain factions and
interests while sidelining others. Considering the actors involved in the choice of
the roadmap and their preferences illuminates the genesis of factions and interest
clusters and their downstream inﬂuence on constitution-making. Scholarship
recognises how inﬂuential these ‘procedural arrangements’ can be on ordinary
politics, but their effects on constitution-making are still understudied.
Assessments of the transitions in North Africa lack this perspective, thus failing
to appreciate the disengagement and frustration they have produced, as evidenced
in the extraordinarily fast drop in voter turnout ﬁgures from 2011 to the present.
In this article, I want to focus on one speciﬁc aspect of constitutional Big Bangs
in North Africa: their capturing. Far from arguing that the sheer capturing
produces pre-determined outcomes in favour of those seizing the Big Bang
moment (Elster precisely shows how these clusters interact and can produce all
sorts of outcomes), I would rather frame the issue in terms of advantages that
actors try to secure for themselves in the form of privileged positions in the
drafting, control over the selection of drafters or the timing of elections.
The North African transitions offer prime examples of these dynamics and can
function as good case studies for the Big Bang moments of constitution-making.
They also show how complex (and messy) Big Bang moments can get.
Tunisia’s Big Bang Phase
In Tunisia, the departure of Ben Ali in January 2011 signalled the beginning of the
transition, but it was not until end of March 2011 that a choice on its roadmap was
ﬁnalised. Even if the ﬁgures actively involved in these two months are no longer
on the frontline of Tunisian politics, their involvement in determining the roadmap
and the constitution-making process has had long-lasting effects. The continuous
pressure from the streets has also signiﬁcantly steered choices on many occasions.
A simple glimpse at the bios of these Big Bang ﬁgures shows how these
politicians, administrators, statesmen or men of the law share a common social
background within the small Tunisian elite, and all partook in the higher
administration of the state at the service of the two Tunisian presidents since
independence: Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Continuity here took the form of a class
operation, I argue, as the goal of the Tunisian social and political elite was to
maintain its control over state institutions while disengaging with the previous
regime. The elite negotiated at the same time an honourable way out for the ﬁgures
of the old regime within its ranks, and a gloriﬁed role for itself in the new
conﬁguration of the state against street protests.
On Ben Ali’s departure, on 14 January 2011, his PrimeMinister, Muhammad al-
Ghannushi, attempted to downplay events and provisionally assume the functions
of the President based on the assumption of the President’s only temporary
inability to serve. Sixty-nine-year-old al-Ghannushi had served as Ben Ali’s Prime
Minister since 1999, and retained his post even after the government reshufﬂe that
Ben Ali offered to quell the protests in December 2010. Al-Ghannushi’s
manoeuvre had constitutional coverage in that art. 56 regulated cases of temporary
inability of the President, but required an act of transfer of powers from the latter
to his Prime Minister.
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that a given process places on the possibility of embracing radical change, and the
virtues of constitutional failures for the revolutionary project. In this article, I aim
to offer some background for that, and therefore present a narrative of the
transitions in Tunisia and Egypt (and Libya) that focuses exclusively on the
dynamics of the capture(s) of the constitution-making process.
The Big Bang Moments
Quite surprisingly, the constitution-making process is a relatively recent area of
investigation. Post-1989 transitions triggered the interest of scholars who were
weighing up the pros and cons of various modes of constitution-making. In 1995,
social and political theorist Jon Elster laid the foundations of a theory of forces and
mechanisms involved in the constitution-making process, and their impact on it.3
Elster pursued an interest in the agency of ‘factions’ that can be traced as far back
as James Madison in North American literature,4 but in doing so Elster went
further to explore the inner dynamics of the process. Even if Elster’s piece is often
referenced as bringing to the fore the paradox of constitution-making as an activity
conducted in times of crisis under the least favourable circumstances for
meticulous and vigilant design,5 the author focused more broadly on how
individual, group and institutional interests intersect, and are aggregated,
transformed and misrepresented in the process.
Elster argues that certain provisions, procedural arrangements and institutional
design options can be explained with the involvement of individual, group and
institutional interests. He gives as examples of (a) provisions precipitated by
individual interests, the ones guaranteeing immunity to former regime ﬁgures;6 as
examples of (b) provisions precipitated by group interests, the ones regulating
electoral procedures and executive-legislative relations;7 and as examples of (c)
provisions precipitated by institutional interests, the ones giving preponderant
importance to one or the other branch of government.8
Elster points us to the ways in which interests pervade constitutional choices,
but I suggest we move further upstream to identify when these interests come into
existence and become relevant: these moments are what I call the Big Bangs of
constitution-making—a visual reference to a central episode in the line of murky
ﬂuctuations and system inﬂation. In other words, the Big Bang moment is that
central episode in the constitution-making process when Madison’s factions and
Elster’s interests are generated or empowered. The Big Bang moment of factions
or interest clusters, I argue, is what generates and empowers such clusters or
factions, since their own existence and political weight depend on the creative act
that characterises that moment.
3 Jon Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’, Duke Law Journal, 45 (1995),
pp. 364–396.
4 See James Madison’s discussion of passions and reasons in ‘The Federalist No. 10’, Daily Advertiser, 22
November 1787.
5 Mark Tushnet, ‘Constitution-Making: An Introduction’, Texas Law Review, 91 (2013), p. 1993.
6 As in the case of former regime ﬁgures in Bulgaria or Romania. See Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms’, p. 377.
7 As in the case of the preference of small Communist or ex-Communist parties in Poland and Czechoslovakia for
a PR system in the immediate aftermath of 1989. See Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms’, p. 378.
8 As in the case of the preponderant role of ordinary legislatures in all the post-1989 Eastern European
constitutions. See Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms’, p. 380.
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passed during the transitional period, acts of the interim government, state
appointments, membership and jurisdiction of the three commissions created by
the interim government, and urgent measures for the judicial and information
systems.12 Claiming oversight powers over the three commissions created by the
interim government clearly signalled the dissatisfaction and suspicion that
signatories had towards the activities of these commissions, in particular the one
on political reform.
The creation of the NCPR posed a serious threat to the interim government,
because it could boost a much stronger legitimacy than the regime holdovers’
government itself. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Interim President
(al-Mubazza‘), the Prime Minister (al-Ghannushi) and the chair of the HCPR (Ben
‘Ashour) all reacted quite strongly to the announcement of the creation of the
NCPR.13 The NCPR sought ofﬁcial endorsement, which was denied by al-
Mubazza‘, but Ben ‘Ashour was swifter in spotting the opportunity and hijacked
the NCPR move, offering a merger with his own HCPR. The agreement was
drafted by Ben ‘Ashour’s HCPR in the form of an emergency decree (De´cret-Loi
6/2011-18/2/2011). In the ﬁne print, the NCPR found that (1) old HCPR members
retained a privileged position as the ‘Experts’ Committee’ (art. 3(4)); (2)
membership in the council was decided by the chair (Ben ‘Ashour, art. 3(3)); (3)
deliberations would be secret (art. 7); and (4) voting in the council would be based
on the principle of one person one vote (which meant that a large political party
and ‘a Tunisian personality’ both weighed the same (art. 5)). The outcome of the
merger was called the High Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the
Revolution, Political Reform, and Democratic Transition (al-Hay’at al-‘Ulya li-
Tahqiq Ahdaf al-Thawra wa-l-Islah al-Siyasi wa-l-Intiqal al-Dimuqrati, or
ISROR, its French acronym).
The last days of al-Ghannushi’s government were riddled with street protests.
The announcement of general elections for mid-July met with tepid reception as
the size of street protests kept increasing until al-Ghannushi resigned on 27
February.
Whereas during the ﬁrst phase, the unfolding of the contest for legitimacy was
centre stage, during the second phase what captured the spotlight was the deﬁnition
of the framework for the transition. Deﬁning the roadmapmeans deciding who will
have a say in the constitution-making phase, which ultimately reads as who will be
entrenching its position within the new institutional design. In this second phase, a
new government was appointed, but key decisions on the transition were still taken
within the ISROR, under the tight control of Ben ‘Ashour.
The new government was chaired by al-Baji Qa’id al-Sabsi, a ﬁgure with a very
similar proﬁle to that of Ben ‘Ashour. Al-Baji Qa’id al-Sabsi, an 84-year-old
lawyer stemming from the upper class, was deeply involved in the Bourguiba
administration as Interior Minister, Minister of Defence and of Foreign Affairs.
When Ben Ali became president, he served as Ambassador to Germany, and later
also for a term in parliament (even being Speaker for a year).
While working on the selection of the members of the ISROR council in early
March, Ben ‘Ashour had to confront the challenge of those who opposed the
merger between the NCPR and the HCPR. Most of the leftist and nationalist
12 See the six-point declaration signed on 11 February, and the names of the 28 signatories: Chaker, ‘Les conseils
pour la protection de la re´volution’, pp. 7–8.
13 For the details, see Chaker, ‘Les conseils pour la protection de la re´volution’, pp. 18–22.
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On the very next day, 15 January 2011, the procedure provided for in art. 57
(regulating cases of permanent inability of the president) was set in motion. The
Constitutional Council gathered and appointed as interim president the Speaker of
the Lower House, 77-year-old Fu’ad al-Mubazza‘, who served until the end of the
year (13 December 2011). During his ofﬁce, two distinct phases of transition
followed: a ﬁrst phase quite ﬁrmly controlled by old regime ﬁgures, and a second
phase led by ﬁgures less implicated with the old regime yet originating from the
same elite circles of the Tunisian upper crust.
During the ﬁrst phase, when al-Ghannushi still served as Prime Minister of a
government of national unity (17 January–27 February 2011), the horizon of the
transition was the meagre promise of general elections within six months. The day
after the government was formed, al-Ghannushi resigned from the old regime
ruling party (al-Tajammu‘ al-Dusturi al-Dimuqrati, the Democratic Constitutional
Rally or RCD, its French acronym), but the operation did not ease street protests.
Ten days later, al-Ghannushi purged the government of all former RCD members
while retaining his post.
Before being forced out of government, al-Ghannushi established the High
Commission for Political Reform (al-Lajna al-‘Ulya li-l-Islah al-Siyasi, HCPR)9
and appointed Yadh Ben ‘Ashour to chair it. Ben ‘Ashour, a 65-year-old law
professor stemming from one of the most revered families of the elite, had
somehow distanced himself from the Ben Ali regime, but had previously served in
a variety of state functions, including on the Constitutional Council. Ben ‘Ashour
selected for the HCPR a number of cronies and colleagues of his, including his
brother Rafaa. The selection was highly criticised for its arbitrariness, and for the
previous support that members of the team had offered to the Ben Ali regime, in
particular for the 2002 amendments to the constitution, amendments that allowed
Ben Ali to hold on to power until the uprising.10
While the interim government was engaged full-speed in trying to capture the
transition and limit the losses for the regime, the opposition mobilised and
organised around a number of councils for the protection of the revolution.11 The
most important of these mobilisation efforts was the one spearheaded by the ‘14
January Front’, a constellation of leftist and nationalist parties whose common
political platform was to stand united against the forces of the counter-revolution.
In late January, the front organised the ﬁrst Qasba sit-in, demanded al-Ghannushi’s
resignation and called for the formation of a Constituent Assembly. On 11
February, members of the front together with other unions, political parties
(notably the Islamist Al-Nahda) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
announced the creation of the National Council for the Protection of the
Revolution (NCPR) (al-Majlis al-Watani li-Himayat al-Thawra), afﬁrmed
decision-making powers, and listed among its tasks control over legislation
9 See Paul Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi, ‘Ben Ali’s Fall’, Journal of Democracy, 22 (3) (2011), p. 16. Schraeder
and Redissi consider the establishment of the HCPR and two other fact-ﬁnding commissions by the interim
government as ‘heartening’. I am sure the authors would have advanced a different reading had they looked at the
rationale and internal dynamics of such commissions, in particular the HCPR.
10 Mounir Ben Aicha (pseudonym), ‘Le risque du de´tournement de la Re´volution tunisienne par la future
Assemble´e Nationale Constituante’, Nawaat, 4 April 2011, http://nawaat.org/portail/2011/04/04/lavenir-de-la-
revolution-tunisienne-dans-la-future-assemblee-nationale-constituante/, accessed 8 April 2014.
11 An account of the various councils, both at the national and local levels, and their membership can be found in
Houki Chaker, ‘Les conseils pour la protection de la re´volution’, L’observatoire tunisien de la transition
de´mocratique, http://www.aihr-resourcescenter.org/administrator/upload/documents/HOUKICORR(1).pdf,
accessed 8 April 2014.
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passed during the transitional period, acts of the interim government, state
appointments, membership and jurisdiction of the three commissions created by
the interim government, and urgent measures for the judicial and information
systems.12 Claiming oversight powers over the three commissions created by the
interim government clearly signalled the dissatisfaction and suspicion that
signatories had towards the activities of these commissions, in particular the one
on political reform.
The creation of the NCPR posed a serious threat to the interim government,
because it could boost a much stronger legitimacy than the regime holdovers’
government itself. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Interim President
(al-Mubazza‘), the Prime Minister (al-Ghannushi) and the chair of the HCPR (Ben
‘Ashour) all reacted quite strongly to the announcement of the creation of the
NCPR.13 The NCPR sought ofﬁcial endorsement, which was denied by al-
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drafted by Ben ‘Ashour’s HCPR in the form of an emergency decree (De´cret-Loi
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deliberations would be secret (art. 7); and (4) voting in the council would be based
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the ISROR in late June) on the tasks of the body to be elected: to serve for a year
both as a CA (drafting the constitution) and ordinary House (passing legislation,
holding government accountable, and preparing for a new round of general
elections). Turnout on the day of the elections was fairly low (52 per cent of
eligible voters), and because of the size of the districts one-third of the votes were
cast for parties that won no seat.17
Egypt’s Big Bang Phase(s)
In Egypt, the ousting of Mubarak in February 2011 signalled the beginning of the
transition, but its roadmap has changed repeatedly ever since. The existence of an
act relinquishing powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
signalled institutional continuity before and after Mubarak’s ouster. SCAF
nonetheless proceeded immediately to the suspension of the constitution and the
dissolution of both houses of parliament. The interim government last appointed
by Mubarak kept serving for a few weeks, until 3 March 2011.
Immediately after the suspension of the 1971 constitution, SCAF appointed a
committee to draft amendments to the suspended text in line with what Mubarak
had promised in his last televised speech. The committee was composed of senior
ﬁgures from the judiciary—including the committee’s chair, Tariq al-Bishri (a
respected intellectual with Islamist leanings)—and a surprising oddity, Subhi
Saleh, a lawyer whose only salient trait was to be a prominent Muslim
Brotherhood member. The composition of the committee signalled to many a deal
between the army and the Brotherhood to control the transition. The committee
drafted the amendments to the provisions indicated in Mubarak’s last speech, but
went further in tweaking other minor provisions and—most importantly—deﬁning
a roadmap for the transition; a roadmap which featured elections ﬁrst. It was clear
that early polls would favour forces with rehearsed voter mobilisation strategies,
namely the Brotherhood and regime holdovers. The committee, furthermore,
introduced a provision sealing the deal and preventing any walkout, as it required
an absolute majority of votes of all elected MPs to elect members to the CA.
In the amended version of art. 189, the committee proposed an indirectly elected
CA. Voters would vote for the elective members of both houses of parliament,
who would later gather in a joint session to elect by absolute majority the members
of the CA. The absolute-majority requirement is an anomaly, and inconsistent with
the alleged aim of guaranteeing the broadest representation possible in the
constitution-making body. The absolute-majority requirement, on the other hand,
does not guarantee that equal representation is respected by the majority coalition,
and binds all candidates to a ‘ticket’, which prevents individual groups from
choosing who will represent them.18
The Brotherhood and the yet-to-be-dissolved former ruling party campaigned in
favour of the committee’s amendments. The pro-amendments campaign used
common good arguments, raised the spectre of an un-Islamic constitution,
foreshadowed a long, insecure transition and forewarned against a prolonged
17 Duncan Pickard, ‘Challenges to Legitimate Governance in Post-Revolution Tunisia’, The Journal of North
African Studies, 16(4) (2011), p. 639.
18 See Gianluca Parolin, ‘The Ticking Referendum and a “Smarter Strategy”’, Al-Masry Al-Youm (English), 13
March 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com//opinion/ticking-referendum-and-%E2%80%9Csmarter-
strategy%E2%80%9D, accessed 16 July 2014.
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parties of the ‘14 January Front’ who were at the forefront of the NCPR in fact
refused to join the ISROR, and started disputing its legitimacy, but with the
heavyweight unions and parties joining in (ﬁrst and foremost the UGTT and Al-
Nahda), Ben ‘Ashour’s operation can be considered to have been quite successful.
His selection of members, however, was heavily criticised from within. His
response was to progressively increase the number of members, which in three
weeks doubled from 71 to 145. As Ben ‘Ashour was giving in to various cleavage
requests, he was also making sure to appoint enough ‘national ﬁgures’ to keep the
balance in favour of the elite.
Meanwhile, the Interim President had announced a roadmap to a Constituent
Assembly (CA, 3 March 2011) and later issued a decree suspending the old
constitution and regulating the interim functions of state institutions (De´cret-Loi
14/2011-23/3/2011) without mentioning the ISROR. There is a reason for that; the
ISROR had skilfully become the heart of the negotiations over the transition.
Thanks to Ben ‘Ashour’s merger, the ISROR council had become the body with
the strongest legitimacy, and its Experts’ Committee the mastermind of all
transitional legislation. By dissolving parliament, the De´cret-Loi 14/2011 further
enhanced the ISROR’s claim to be the only representative body left on the
Tunisian political scene.
The newly established ISROR council was soon presented with two bills
already prepared by the Experts’ Committee, the ﬁrst carrying regulations of
elections to the CA, and the second on the establishment of an Independent High
Authority for the Elections (al-Hay’a al-‘Ulya al-Mustaqilla li-l-Intikhabat, or
ISIE, its French acronym). Both were fast-tracked to deliberation on account of the
urgency to proceed to elections by the mid-summer date that the president had
announced. These were only two of the six main pieces of legislation elaborated
and approved by the ISROR14—what Ben ‘Ashour blogged as ‘the six acts of
liberation’.15
The ISROR opted for direct election of members to the CA according to a
closed-list proportional representation system within 4- to 10-seat districts. Lists
had to be presented with alternation of a male and a female candidate, and could
not include former ruling party ﬁgures who held party or government posts, or
ﬁgures who supported Ben Ali’s candidature to the 2014 presidential elections.
The government then issued a decree deﬁning electoral districts and allocating
seats (along the fairly strict rules set by the ISROR, De´cret 1088/2011-3/8/2011).
The ISROR also extended its long-hand on the electoral commission, the ISIE;
even if ISIE members were all appointed by arreˆt of the Prime Minister, it was the
ISROR that actually selected them.16
Elections of the CA were deferred from mid-summer (24 July 2011) to mid-
autumn (23 October 2011), but were preceded by a pre-election agreement among
the main political parties (the 11 still on the ISROR plus Al-Nahda, which had left
14 The act regulating the electoral commission, the ISIE (De´cret-Loi 27/2011-18/4/2011), the act regulating the
elections to the Constituent Assembly (De´cret-Loi 35/2011-10/5/2011), the act regulating freedom of association
(De´cret-Loi 87/2011-24/9/2011), the act regulating the establishment and operation of political parties (De´cret-
Loi 88/2011-24/9/2011), the act regulating press freedom (De´cret-Loi 115/2011-2/11/2011), the act regulating
freedom of the other media (De´cret-Loi 116/2011-2/11/2011).
15 Les six lois de la libe´ration, in Yadh Ben Achour, ‘La transition de´mocratique en Tunisie’, Le Blog de Yadh
Ben Achour, 26 October 2012, http://yadhba.blogspot.ch/2012/10/la-transition-democratique-en-tunisie_26.
html, accessed 9 April 2014.
16 See art. 8 of De´cret-Loi 27/2011 (18 April 2011).
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certainly different worldview on state/Islam relations. Labelling it an Islamist
party and placing it in the same category with the Brotherhood’s FJP does not add
clarity to the mix.
The goalpost for the parliamentary elections was the absolute majority required
to elect members to the CA. According to the amendments passed in March 2011,
the absolute majority of elective members of both houses was required; since the
total number of these elective members was 678, the absolute majority required to
elect the CA was 340. In the Lower House, the Brotherhood scored very well both
in the PR and the F*PTP seats carrying a total of 235 seats (127 PR, 108 F*PTP),
whereas the Salaﬁs did better in the PR seats carrying a total of 123 seats (96 PR,
27 F*PTP), and the New Wafd only 38 (36 PR, 2 F*PTP). Adding the Upper
House seats, the Brotherhood could then count on 340 MPs, Salaﬁs on 168 and
New Wafd on 52. Even if it had a sufﬁcient number of votes to elect the full CA,
the FJP decided to join forces with al-Nur.
As even a quick look at the provision requiring an absolute majority may
suggest, the second-degree election produced a ticket-like list of candidates,
where the FJP and al-Nur decided on who had to represent whom and in what
numbers. The ticket was pushed through, against the resentment of minor forces,
which boycotted the vote and later withdrew from the CA. This ﬁrst CA was
short-lived, as the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in April 2012 that
electing MPs to the CA contravened the interim constitution of March 2011.
An agreement on the number of seats to be allotted to each constituency of
Egyptian society was reached across the political spectrum, but the designation
of the ﬁgures to ﬁll these posts rested with the same majority that voted for the
ﬁrst CA; the second CA, elected in June 2012, faced the same challenges as the
ﬁrst one, including boycotts, withdrawals and threats of judicial dissolution. The
second CA licensed a text in a fast-tracked fashion that generated widespread
mockery on 30 November 2012. A referendum with low turnout approved the
text, which was promulgated by President Mursi in late December 2012. The
second CA was later declared to have been invalidly elected by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in early June 2013, but with no effect on the 2012
constitution.
After the ouster of Mursi in early July 2013, the 2012 constitution was
suspended, and an interim constitution issued by the interim president (the
president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, ‘Adli Mansur). Mansur, a Mubarak
appointee to the court in 1992, had been appointed by Mursi to be the president of
the same court on 1 July 2013. When Commander-in-Chief and Minister of
Defence ‘Abd al-fattah al-Sisi announced on television the removal of Mursi, he
also announced the appointment of Mansur as interim president. On 4 July Mansur
had to swear his oath ﬁrst as president of the SCC, and then as interim president of
Egypt.
A few days later, on 8 July, Mansur issued a constitutional declaration carrying
a temporary constitution to regulate the interim period until amendments to the
2012 constitution were proposed by a committee of 10 jurists (the C-10), and
approved by a committee of 50 ﬁgures appointed by him to represent all sectors of
Egyptian society (the C-50). Two years of transition had suddenly been obliterated
and a new Big Bang phase had started, with the interim president (a proxy?)
appropriating it. The ﬂow of appointments and authority to amend the 2012
constitution came solely from the interim president, and what is more striking is
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military rule. All the other political forces campaigned against the amendments,
but the amendments passed by a landslide on 19 March 2011. The Big Bang
capture of the transition was thus complete, and it took several legal shenanigans
and ultimately a direct army intervention to undo it.
After the referendum had ensured the elections-ﬁrst approach, the ensuing
transition target became the electoral law. In the meantime, however, on 16 April
2011, the Supreme Administrative Court dissolved the former ruling party, the
National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati, NDP). Negotiations
over the electoral law were then conducted between SCAF and various political
actors—mainly parties (including the newly founded Freedom and Justice Party,
FJP, the Brotherhood’s political arm), but also non-party organisations. Three
draft laws were put forward by SCAF in May, June and September 2011, each
incorporating some of the suggestions proposed earlier by the political forces. The
ﬁnal draft featured a ‘1/3–2/3’ mixed electoral system, where one-third of the
seats were to be contested in ﬁrst(-of-each-category)19-past-the-post (F*PTP)
districts by independent candidates, and two thirds were to be assigned according
to proportional representation among closed party lists. Parties opposed the
restriction to also place candidates in F*PTP districts and the prohibition for
F*PTP district winners to later join a political party, claiming that allowing only
independents to run in F*PTP districts and preventing the winners from later
afﬁliating to parties would help to perpetuate the electoral dynamics of the old
regime. The restriction and the prohibition were removed from the ﬁnal text,
which ultimately led the Supreme Constitutional Court to declare the electoral law
unconstitutional and dissolve parliament in June 2012, just days ahead of the
runoffs for the presidential elections. The electoral law retained the 50 per cent
quota for ‘workers and peasants’, but not the quota for female candidates (only
requiring each list to have at least one woman on it).20
Parliamentary elections were held over a three-month span from late November
2011 to late February 2012 (totalling ﬁve rounds or 20 polling days).21 The
Brotherhood-led coalition carried the day with more than 10 million votes, but the
biggest surprise were the 7.5 million votes for the Salaﬁ coalition, which kept quite
a distance from the third contender, the NewWafd (2.4 million). The results of the
Lower House suddenly projected to the centre of the political scene a previously
neglected player: the Salaﬁ coalition led by the al-Nur party—a player difﬁcult to
locate, with no record in parliamentary politics, unclear political positioning and a
19 This oddity can be explained with the 50 per cent quota reserved for ‘workers and peasants’ (which was
maintained from the previous electoral regulations). As a consequence, each ‘individual’ district was to elect two
candidates: the ‘worker and peasant’ with the highest number of votes within her category, and the ‘professional’
with the highest number of votes within her category. Every voter had two votes on the ‘individual’ ballot, and
one vote on the PR ballot.
20 A full account of the electoral reforms during the transition (and before) can be found in Sahar F. Aziz,
‘Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt’s Election Laws’, The George Washington International Law
Review, 45(1) (2013), pp. 1–83.
21 May Elsayyad and Shima’a Hanafy looked at the voting preferences for secular/Islamist parties in the ﬁrst
parliamentary elections in Egypt and showed a correlation between illiteracy rates and preferences for Islamists,
and levels of poverty and preferences for secular forces (which could also suggest patterns of old voter
mobilisation from the pre-2011 era). They also show that the ‘bandwagon’ effect of the sequential voting had
minimal impact on voter behaviour. See ‘Voting Islamist or Voting Secular? An Empirical Analysis of Voting
Outcomes in “Arab Spring” Egypt’, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper Series,
2013-01 (2013).
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certainly different worldview on state/Islam relations. Labelling it an Islamist
party and placing it in the same category with the Brotherhood’s FJP does not add
clarity to the mix.
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al-Jalil, Gaddaﬁ’s former Minister of Justice, and the Executive Board of the NTC
was chaired by Mahmud Jibril, a close friend and aid of Gaddaﬁ’s son and heir
designate, Sayf al-Islam.
Even before liberation, the NTC expanded its membership to include newly
controlled areas and adopted a constitutional declaration (I‘lan Dusturi, 3 August
2011), which regulated the transitional phase in detail (art. 30). The NTC was to
(1) expand its membership, and (2) after liberation (2.1) move its headquarters to
Tripoli, (2.2) appoint an interim government tasked with (2.2.1) drafting an
electoral law, (2.2.2) establishing an electoral commission, and (2.2.3) calling for
elections to a 200-member-strong assembly within an eight-month timeframe. The
NTC would then (3) disband, and within 30 days the newly formed General
National Council (al-Mu’tamar al-Watani al-‘Amm, GNC) was to (4.1) appoint a
new government, and (4.2) choose a constitution-making body to draft a
constitution in 60 days.24 The draft constitution had then to be approved both (5.1)
by the GNC (without any majority requirement), and (5.2) by popular referendum
with a two-thirds majority, then (5.3) ratiﬁed by the constitution-making body, and
(5.4) signed25 by the GNC. Art. 30 goes further in regulating the aftermath; the
GNC within 30 days (6.1) had to issue an electoral law, and (6.2) call for general
elections within six months. The electoral process had to be (6.3) governed by the
NTC-appointed electoral commission, and (6.4) conducted under the supervision
of the judiciary, and the monitoring of the UN and other international and regional
organisations. And, ﬁnally, (7) the GNC would disband after having conﬁrmed the
results of the elections. The constitutional Big Bang moment seemed to be over
before it even started, ably captured by the members of the NTC. But only if we
freeze the frame in the mid-summer of 2011, before liberation.
The NTC did expand its membership, and after liberation it even tried to
overcome its local imprint by appointing as chair of its Executive Board a member
of a prominent family of Western Libya, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Kib, who served from
late November 2011 until a government was formed after the ﬁrst general
elections in the summer of 2012.
Challenges to the NTC came from all directions.26 Institutionally, the NTC was
criticised for hosting too many last-minute defectors, being torn by internal
rivalries and maintaining a geographical unbalance in favour of Eastern Libya.
The NTC was also under constant and unrelenting pressure from militia leaders
who wanted a say in government or refused to recognise its authority (and disarm),
from Islamists who either felt under-represented or were squarely building
alternative discourses of legitimate governance, and also local (and even ethnic)
cleavages—most notably, Eastern Libyan leaders established themselves as the
Council of Cyrenaica in the spring of 2012 and started confronting the central
NTC government.
24 The constitutional declaration opts for language that allows broad interpretation: ‘choosing’ (ikhtiyar) instead
of ‘electing’ or ‘appointing’, and ‘constitution-making body’ (hay’a ta’sisiyya) instead of ‘assembly’ or
‘committee’ (art. 30).
25 Here the texts employs again: yu‘tamad (passive form) as in 5.1.
26 Sawani and Pack attribute responsibility for the declining legitimacy of central authorities to the NTC itself,
and its response strategy to the many challenges brought against it. Youssef Sawani and Jason Pack, ‘Libyan
Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Qadhaﬁ: The Islamist, Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges’, The
Journal of North African Studies, 18(4) (2013), pp. 523–543. One could actually reverse the argument by
considering how—in the face of all the internal and external challenges and the weak institutions to work with—
the transitional government has managed to navigate the turbulent waters and carry on.
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that—conversely—in the eyes of Egyptian voters Mansur played a fairly ancillary
role in day-to-day decision-making.22
Narrowly construing the President’s broad directives, the C-10 drafted
amendments to the 2012 constitution that did not touch the latter’s core. In doing
so, however, the C-10 allowed institutional interests to pervade the operation, thus
placing the judiciary at the very heart of constitutional design by requiring its
intervention at every turn. After completing the drafting, the C-10 sent the
proposed amendments to the President, who selected and appointed the members
of the wider committee charged with discussing the proposed amendments, the
C-50. The composition of the C-50 suffered from the same lack of balance as the
previous two CAs, in that one ideological current was over-represented. Whereas
in the ﬁrst and second CAs that over-represented current was one of political Islam
(in its broad variants), in the latter’s case it was secular/nationalist.
In stark contrast to the conservative reading of the President’s directives by the
C-10, the C-50 interpreted its role extensively; it did not limit itself to discussing
the amendments proposed by the C-10, but it engaged in re-discussing all the
provisions of the 2012 constitution. The C-50 operated in sub-committees based
on the sections of the 2012 constitution; this prevented a full reconsideration of the
overall structure, allowing for similarities to be traced all the way back to the 1971
text (since the second CA operated on the same assumption of textual continuity).
The C-50 ﬁnal text was purged from the excesses of the provisions introduced by
the C-10 to entrench the institutional interest of the judiciary in the constitutional
design, but it carries clear marks of all the group interests that the president had
empowered through appointment. The ﬁnal text also carries clear marks of the
inability of C-50 members to decide on many crucial issues; this can be detected in
the many decisions delegated to ordinary legislation (both in areas of fundamental
rights and institutional design), and can in turn be attributed to the awareness of the
shaky legitimacy behind the committee and its operation. As has been argued
elsewhere,23 this feature need not necessarily be considered adversely; especially
in the context of a transition, the ﬂexibility of the text (in this case by weak
entrenchment) has had illustrious supporters.
The constitutionally mandated referendum took place in January 2014, amidst a
very polarised political climate, which put the approval rate of the voters at 98.1
per cent. The turnout was low but slightly beyond the previous referendum on the
constitution, from 32.9 to 38.1 per cent of eligible voters.
A Murkier (Yet More Promising) Big Bang between Tunisia and Egypt:
Libya
In Libya, the assassination of Gaddaﬁ and fall of Sirte in October 2011 signalled
the beginning of the transition, but the process had started earlier in February 2011
when the National Transitional Council (al-Majlis al-Watani al-Intiqali, NTC) was
formed and its original 33 members proclaimed it in early March 2011 the only
legitimate representative of Libya. The chairman of the NTC was Mustafa ‘Abd
22 On the occasion of the bomb attack on the Home Secretary, Egyptian state television broadcast ﬁrst the
deploration by the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence, then moved on to the following news item:
‘also the President deplores . . . ’.
23 Gianluca Parolin, ‘On the Virtues of Inconclusiveness: The Egyptian Constitution of 2014’, IAI OpMed,
January 2014, http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/GMF-IAI/Op-Med_24.pdf, accessed 11 April 2014.
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new amendment to the constitutional declaration (Amendment #7 of 11 March
2014). The roadmap foresaw two scenarios:28 (a) either the CA succeeded in
ﬁnalising a draft within 120 days from its ﬁrst session (scheduled for 14 April 2014
but delayed until further notice because of protests blocking the airport of al-
Bayda’), or (b) not, in which case a third phase of the transition would open,
holding elections for a new assembly (to be called the House of Representatives).
According to Amendment #7, the draft constitution no longer needs to be
approved by the GNC; it will be immediately submitted to a popular referendum,
and it will become the new constitution only if approved by at least two-thirds of
the votes cast (as previously decided), and with the consensus of ethnic minority
members on the provisions affecting ethnic minorities—a last-minute offer to
Amazigh, Tuareg and Tubu leaders to abandon their boycott of the CA.
Amendment #7 also left to the House of Representatives the decision on how to
select the president.
The opening ceremony of the CA (popularly known as the C-60, Lajnat al-
sittin) did eventually take place on 21 April 2014 in al-Bayda’. Less than a month
later, on 18 May 2014, General Khalifa Hiftar declared the GNC dissolved and
that the GNC functions should be assumed by the CA.
Big Bang Captures: Success Stories and Their Costs
Capturing the Big Bang moment of the constitution-making process does not
necessarily mean that the constitution will look exactly as desired, just as
the existence of a particular individual, group or institutional interest in the
constitution-making process does not mean that a particular design choice will be
found in the ﬁnal text. Capturing the Big Bang moment, however, does guarantee
an advantage in allowing certain interests to play a larger role in the process.
Regardless of their countless differences, all the post-2011 North African
experiences show how decisions on (1) ‘who’ should write the constitution and (2)
‘when’ were the two key choices made by actors who ranged on the political
spectrum from regime holdovers to non-representative bodies.
The (3) ‘how’ was inescapable: elections. Direct or indirect, it had to be
elections. If we were to pull the zoom in, however, we would see that all the
elements that make a difference in elections were safely kept in the hands of those
who captured the Big Bang: dates, requirements, electoral system and districting.
Independent electoral commissions were formed in all three jurisdictions to
guarantee that such decisions were ﬁrmly implemented, and would win
international commendation.29
But just as every cloud has a silver lining, indicators point to the vitality of the
drive for political participation that precipitated the revolutions and that can ﬁnd
its way through the patronising machinations of old regimes or ‘national’ elites.
Considering the role of these latter actors in the roadmapping also challenges the
28 What follows is how the roadmap is popularly understood and explained by politicians and the media, even if
the provisions of Amendment #7 are far less clear. It should come as no surprise as it is a repeatedly amended long
provision (art. 30).
29 Normative statements populate the world of international—often self-appointed—‘advisers’ on constitutional
and electoral design. However, measuring the success of a transitional system on the merits of electoral change is
taking it to a whole new level, especially when ignoring the power dynamics behind electoral design. See John
M. Carey and Andrew Reynolds, ‘The Impact of Election Systems’, Journal of Democracy, 22(4) (2011),
pp. 36–47.
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In early 2012, before the general elections to the GNC, the NTC decided to
substantiate the ambiguous ‘choose a constitution-making body to draft a
constitution’ of art. 30 (point 4.2 here) in an amendment to the constitutional
declaration of August 2011. In a bid to conquer the hearts of federalists, the
constitution-making body was now to be formed by the GNC ‘along the lines of
the 1951 body that drafted the ﬁrst Libyan constitution after independence’:
a body of 60 members—20 from each region (Cyrenaica, Fezzan and
Tripolitania)—to be selected by GNC members outside their ranks. Deliberations
were set at 2/3s plus one of members (41 votes) in order to guarantee that at least
one member from each region is on board.27 This was the ﬁrst of a series of six
amendments to the constitutional declaration in three years (Amendment #1 of 13
March 2012). Appeasing Islamists did not require formal amendments;
procrastinating over elections, a few public statements and a self-inﬂicted decline
in popularity of the competing narrative of Islamic governance all contributed to
shelving the Islamist threat to the NTC.
In June 2012, the timeframe for the elections to the GNC was extended
(Amendment #2 of 10 June 2012), and just before the elections—and pending a
boycott threat—the NTC agreed on establishing the election of the constitution-
making body (Amendment #3 of 5 July 2012). On 7 July 2012 elections to the
GNC were held, on 8 August a formal handover from the NTC to the GNC was
celebrated, and after several failed attempts at government formation by Mustafa
Abu Shaqur, on 14 November 2012 the liberal ‘Ali Zaydan took ofﬁce. In the
meantime, another amendment ﬁxed the majority required for a list of legislation
areas to 120 members (60 per cent; Amendment #4 of 1 September 2012).
In February 2013, the Constitutional Court declared Amendment #3 to be
unconstitutional on procedural grounds, because of lack of quorum. A few weeks
later, however, the GNC re-introduced the amendment, signalling how it
represented a building block of the political arrangement sustaining the whole
institutional architecture of the transition. The GNC also introduced a provision to
prevent the court from invalidating the lustration law that the GNC was about to
pass, and ﬁxed the majority requirement to 101 votes (absolute majority;
Amendment #5 of 11 April 2011). In view of the implementation of the lustration
law, President Muhammad al-Maqrif resigned in May 2013 and the Berber Nuri
Abu Sahmayn was sworn in on 25 June 2013.
As the 18-month second phase of the transition was drawing near without a
constitutional text on the horizon (8 August 2012–7 February 2014), an extension
to the GNC was ﬁrst negotiated and approved by the GNC (Amendment #6 of 5
February 2014). The agreement was short-lived and political confrontations
started heating up again both in the council and on the streets, and eventually led to
the sacking of Prime Minister ‘Ali Zaydan on 11 March 2014, who then ﬂed to
Europe. Meanwhile, elections to the constitution-making body were held ﬁrst on
20 February 2014 amidst extremely low voter turnout and extremely high street
violence, which prevented polling in a number of locations. A second and third
round were called to ﬁll the 13 empty seats (including the ones deserted because of
ethnic-minority boycotts).
A new roadmap was proposed by the February Commission (Lajnat Fibrayir),
established within the GNC, and its suggestions were expressly referred to in a
27 Art. 30 of the constitutional declaration of 3 August 2011, as amended on 13 March 2012.
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new amendment to the constitutional declaration (Amendment #7 of 11 March
2014). The roadmap foresaw two scenarios:28 (a) either the CA succeeded in
ﬁnalising a draft within 120 days from its ﬁrst session (scheduled for 14 April 2014
but delayed until further notice because of protests blocking the airport of al-
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28 What follows is how the roadmap is popularly understood and explained by politicians and the media, even if
the provisions of Amendment #7 are far less clear. It should come as no surprise as it is a repeatedly amended long
provision (art. 30).
29 Normative statements populate the world of international—often self-appointed—‘advisers’ on constitutional
and electoral design. However, measuring the success of a transitional system on the merits of electoral change is
taking it to a whole new level, especially when ignoring the power dynamics behind electoral design. See John
M. Carey and Andrew Reynolds, ‘The Impact of Election Systems’, Journal of Democracy, 22(4) (2011),
pp. 36–47.
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forces—on the left and the right of the spectrum—and the marginalised). Egypt’s
re-capturing and immediate entrenchment in a new constitution, coupled with a
severe crackdown on political participation, seems to suggest that the political
space has been and will be sealed off for quite some time. A deeper understanding
of Big Bang capturing seems to be one of the ways to bring a little drizzle to the
parade of continuity, since the current framing of constitutional change allows for
the limitation of political participation and the ensuing inhibition of change.
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simpliﬁed label of non-negotiated regime changes, used to contrast the post-2011
North African transitions with most of the post-1989 regime changes in Eastern
Europe.30 The low turnout ﬁgures seem to suggest that voters do not intend to
legitimate such machinations with their participation in elections that are fair to
international standards but fail to fulﬁl their promise of representation. Lately, a
number of laudable research efforts have been addressing the marginalising effects
of elections on a variety of social groups—not just women, youth and minorities,
but also the less educated and rural citizens.31
Success stories of transitions are currently narrated along the lines of stability,
often at the expense of political participation.32 Stability becomes the buzzword
masking the operation of continuity at the expense of change—one of the main
demands when revolutions suddenly opened the arena of political participation.
A strain of literature in comparative constitutional law and politics currently
argues in favour of limitations to political participation either in the form of
democratic self-preservation mechanisms33 or by allowing non-democratic
players a say in democratic transitions.34 The democratic commitment of those
enforcing the self-preservation mechanisms or the non-democratic players is
obviously something that those in favour of limiting political participation cannot
guarantee. In the short term, stability seems to be directly related to the degree of
success of capturing the Big Bang, and therefore adversely related to the degree of
openness to political participation.
The two phases of the Tunisian transition guaranteed success to the soft-handed
class operation of continuity by enhancing its legitimacy: whereas during the ﬁrst
phase there was a handover from old regime ﬁgures to (old) elite ones, in the
second phase these (old) elite ﬁgures strove to guarantee an advantage to their
fellows in the drafting stage while disengaging from the old regime. All at the
expense of the openness of the political space to newcomers. Heavy-handed
captures of the Big Bang moments in Egypt deprived these operations of their
most-needed good: legitimacy. Continuity and stability were obtained by
suppressing political opposition and stiﬂing participation, under both the 2012 and
the 2014 constitutions. The Libyan case is an important addition because it shows
repeated and continuous failure in securing the Big Bang moment; while Big Bang
capturing has been more successful in Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya the presence of
multiple and fractured power centres is preventing it. In that sense, Libya’s
perspectives on short-term stability may be slim, but the openness of its political
space is more robust.
What are the costs of the success stories to the east and west of Libya? Tunisia’s
political space has been entirely occupied on the one hand by (old) elite ﬁgures
recast in new parties and on the other hand by Al-Nahda, who have now
entrenched their positions in state institutions (at the expense of all other political
30 Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (2nd edn) (New York: Foundation Press,
2006), pp. 278–280.
31 See the Transitional Governance Project at http://www.transitionalgovernanceproject.org, in particular the
work of Ellen Lust, who is also focusing on representing political preferences rather than cleavages.
32 Ann Lesch, ‘Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’, Middle East Policy, 21(1) (2014),
pp. 62–74. Even Nathan Brown falls into the trap, but by doing so, he recognises that ‘transitions are not designed
but politically shaped’, in ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013), p. 56.
33 This usually goes under the heading of ‘militant democracy’. Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Fragile Democracies’,
Harvard Law Review, 120(6) (2007), pp. 1405–1415.
34 Ozan Varol, ‘The Democratic Coup d’E´tat’, Harvard International Law Journal, 53(2) (2012), pp. 292,
293–294.
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the status quo. This dynamic has been highlighted in many studies, which have
found the king’s particular position to be the biggest beneﬁciary of this interplay
between continuity and change.1 This paper builds on that literature to examine the
overlapping of the two tendencies in the case of decentralisation reform by
contrasting its characteristics and political function before and after the
mobilisations of 2011, offering a novel analysis of the effects that local politics
and regional adjustments have had on national politics in a historical perspective.
Four factors make the case study of regionalisation reform interesting. The ﬁrst
is that MENA countries have some of the most centralised government structures
in the world,2 making the Moroccan commitment to regionalisation an unusual
case.3 Second, this particular reform served as a ‘bridge’ for other reforms because
of its crucial position vis-a`-vis international requirements, such as requests for
greater local autonomy from the European Union, and domestic challenges, such
as the Western Sahara question. Third, despite its relevance, the project shifted
from a publicly debated issue to a matter primarily held in the king’s hands,
ignored by the larger public. The fourth and last factor is the reform’s timely
falling priority on the political agenda, which coincided with the eruption of
protests in the country. These aspects make the project of advanced regionalisation
an interesting lens to highlight the co-existence of change and continuity before
and after the impact of the Arab uprisings, particularly as the uprisings themselves
have been a crucial factor in determining such continuities and changes.
This paper ﬁnds that, paradoxically, the burst of protests demanding change was
a key factor in fostering the continuity of the king’s power. In particular, it is
argued that the absence of demands for greater regionalisation and decentralisa-
tion among the protesters’ key requests in Morocco and the low interest that other
institutional actors, such as the government, had in this issue allowed the king to
consolidate himself as the unique driving force behind the reform. In addition, he
succeeded in patronising the reform of power distribution in the national territory,
a political measure that has always been considered a marker of democratisation.
He became the only political personality able to control the reform process,
thereby guaranteeing the balance of continuity and change, maintaining the nature
of the political system and his prominence within it.
The paper is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst provides a general outline of
the project of advanced regionalisation, introducing its characteristics and
analysing the role of King Mohammed VI in its development and design. The
second section contrasts the current project with previous ones, highlighting
adjustments and constants in policy evolution. The ﬁnal section examines the
reactions of social and political actors to the ﬁnal project during the aftermath of
the uprisings. Those reactions are relevant not only because they symbolise the
actual and concrete impact of the reforms on social constituencies, but also
1 George Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects’, The Journal of North African
Studies, 16(4) (2011), pp. 507–532. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and
Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’,Globalizations, 8(5) (2011), pp. 647–653.
2 Mehmet S. Tosun and Serdar Yilmaz, ‘Centralization, Decentralization and Conﬂict in the Middle East and
North Africa’, Middle East Development Journal, 2(I) (2010), pp. 1–14.
3 In the case of Africa, attempts at decentralisation have been deﬁned as ‘disappointing’. See: James S. Wunsch,
‘Analyzing Self-organized Local Governance Initiatives: Are there Insights for Decentralization Reforms?’,
Public Administration and Development, 33 (2013), p. 221. See also Tyler Dockovick and Rachel Beatty Riedl,
Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Final Report and Summary of Findings (USAID:
Washington, 2010).
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of a Lampedusian Reform
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ABSTRACT This article examines the project of advanced regionalisation in
Morocco, in which the KingMohammed VI plays a key role. Through a comparative
analysis of the adjustments and resiliencies of the project, contrasted with previous
regionalisation reforms, the article contends that contention dynamics in Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt have had a relevant impact on the way in which the project made
its way in theMoroccan institutional sphere. The article ﬁnds that the eruption of the
Arab Uprisings in North Africa and protests in Morocco has been a key factor in
paradoxically fostering the king’s power, allowing him to consolidate himself as the
unique driving force behind the reform of regional administration.
The decision to undertake a project of advanced regionalisation in Morocco was
announced by King Mohammed VI in January 2010, well before street protests
ousted dictators in Tunisia and Egypt and spread to Morocco. At that time, the
reform was presented to the public as a new phase of Morocco’s regionalisation
policy and as a strategy for modernising the country. However, the public
presentation of the ﬁnal project was ofﬁcially made when the ﬁrst Moroccan
demonstrations had already taken place. The project was used to justify the need
for a constitutional reform, which was the king’s main response to popular
demands for democracy, social justice and the end of corruption. In that context of
political turmoil, his inauguration of the advanced regionalisation project passed
largely unnoticed by most political parties and civil society organisations, though
they had previously taken part in the public debate about it. Likewise, the project
was temporarily dropped from the political agenda of the current government,
which took three years to propose a draft law for the implementation of the reform.
Only a few activist groups and political parties based in speciﬁc territories, where
regional differences are relevant and traditionally present, continued in the interim
to demand institutional recognition of regional particularism, a greater degree of
self-government and the legalisation of regional parties—a norm which is absent,
anyway, from the ﬁnal draft of the advanced regionalisation project.
The unfolding of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Morocco has highlighted a number of
contradictions, such as the simultaneous promotion of change and maintenance of
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1 George Joffe´, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects’, The Journal of North African
Studies, 16(4) (2011), pp. 507–532. Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and
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which had to implement some forms of decentralisation due to international
organisations’ conditions.7 The Moroccan monarchy had to start planning
decentralisation policies in the 1990s. Despite the high number of studies on the
topic, there is a tendency to prioritise issues of local governance and economic
development to the detriment of any analysis of regionalisation policy within
broader institutional and historical perspectives.8 Despite the attention given to
Morocco’s decentralisation and regional model after its 1997 regional reform and
the announcement of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara,9 other
signiﬁcant issues such as the historical trajectory of the regionalisation policy, its
role in Moroccan politics and its impact on civil society activism deserve further
examination. This article tries to ﬁll these gaps by examining both the policy’s
historical unfolding and, consequently, the continuities and changes that
characterise its latest version, as well as its repercussions on the social and
political spheres in the context of national and regional political instability.
Regionalisation has been a central policy for the Moroccan regime for two
reasons. Firstly, it has often been considered the solution to the regime’s problems
when it comes to the Western Sahara conﬂict and to European requirements in the
framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, which imposes, among several other
measures, greater decentralisation to the involved parties. It has also represented
an efﬁcient instrument to manage internal power distribution among local elites.10
Secondly, it has political signiﬁcance insofar as it has been rhetorically used by the
king as an instrument for his legitimisation as promoter of change and national
modernisation.11
However, in Morocco the regionalisation policy has never led to signiﬁcant
changes in the power structure of the state. From an historical perspective, regions
7 Sylvia Bergh, ‘Inclusive Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms and the Redeployment of State Power: The
Case of the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) in Morocco’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(3)
(2012), pp. 410–426; Christopher Reesa and Farhad Hossain, ‘Perspectives on Decentralization and Local
Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries’, International Journal of Public Administration, 33(12–
13) (2010), pp. 581–587.
8 Michel Rousset, La de´concentration re´gionale au Maroc: une avance´e signiﬁcative (Paris: CNRS, 2003);
Myriam Catusse, Raffaele Cattedra and Mohammed Idrissi Janati, ‘Decentralisation and its Paradoxes in
Morocco’, in Barbara Driusken, Franck Mermier and Heiko Wimmen (eds.), Cities of the South (London: Saqi
Books, 2007), pp. 113–135; Charles Saint-Prot et al. (eds.), Vers un mode`le marocain de re´gionalisation. E´tat,
territoire et de´veloppement dans un pays e´mergent. (Paris: CNRS, 2010).
9 Miguel de Larramendi, ‘La cuestio´n del Sahara Occidental como factor de impulso del proceso de
descentralizacio´n marroquı´’, Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterra´neos 9 (2010), pp. 132–141; Yossef
Ben-Meir, ‘Morocco’s Regionalisation Roadmap and the Western Sahara’,World Affairs, 14(2) (2010), pp. 92–
112; Amina El-Messaoudi, ‘Le projet d’autonomie dans la re´gion du Sahara: une pratique institutionnelle
avance´e’, Revue d’administration locale et de de´veloppement 107 (2012), pp. 35–50; Marina Ottaway,
‘Morocco: “Advanced Decentralization” Meets the Sahara Autonomy Initiative’, View Points 27 (Washington:
Wilson Center, 2013).
10 Raquel Ojeda, ‘Descentralizacio´n y democracia en el marco del Estado marroquı´’, in Carmelo Pe´rez (ed.), La
Sociedad civil, derechos humanos y democracia en Marruecos (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2006),
pp. 27–50. George Joffe´, ‘Sovereignty and the Western Sahara’, The Journal of North African Studies, 15(3)
(2010), pp. 375–384; Paul Smoke, ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges’,
Public Administration and Development, 23 (2003), pp. 7–16.
11 ‘This is a watershed moment, the start of a structural project which, hopefully, will mark a turning point in
territorial governance [ . . . ] I also want it to be the beginning of a new dynamic towards a thorough institutional
reform [ . . . ] Viewed from this angle, the extensive regionalisation we want to achieve is not a mere technical or
administrative procedure, but rather a major initiative for the overhaul and modernization of state structures and
for the achievement of integrated development’. Mohammed VI’s speech to the nation, January 3, 2010. All royal
speeches are available at http://www.map.ma/fr/ (accessed September 18, 2014). Other states have used
decentralisation in a similar vein, Hubert Ouedrago, ‘Decentralisation and Local Governance: Experiences from
Francophone West Africa’, Public Administration and Development, 23 (2003), pp. 97–103.
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because they highlight the conﬂictual environment brought about by the protests,
which impacted the way in which the project made its way through the
institutional political sphere.
The methodology deployed encompasses discourse analysis, the study of
ofﬁcial documents generated by the Moroccan state, political parties, associations,
social and political groups, and ﬁeldwork observations. There is a focus on
governance structures and policy-making processes because the very form of
institutions helps explain continuity and change in policies. As neo-institutionalist
theory demonstrates, the resilience of certain forms of governance determines the
likelihood of a break with the past, and this seems particularly true when it comes
to the role institutions play in decision- and policy-making processes.4 The focus
on the monarchy and royal commissions is thus useful to highlight the strength of
path-dependent policy development5 and its connection to the broader issue of the
resilience of authoritarianism. Morocco is not the only authoritarian regime using
agendas of institutional reform and controlled change to maintain power, however.
Indeed, the vast literature on authoritarian resilience has spot-lit the role of reforms
in strengthening and renovating authoritarianism, and the regionalisation project
in Morocco is a good example of how authoritarians can beneﬁt from ‘fostering
change’.
Finally, we deploy a model for policy analysis based on six criteria crucial to the
policy itself. We will use them to assess the degree of regional autonomy
established by advanced regionalisation6: democratisation (a region’s degree of
representation and institutional legitimacy); human and ﬁscal resources (a region’s
capacity for thoroughly exercising its competences); good governance (the
management of public affairs effectively and efﬁciently, and attentiveness to
citizens’ demands) and agenciﬁcation (the presence and role of ad hoc agencies for
public governance); transfer of power from state to regions (number and nature of
competencies transferred); tutelle (state supervision of regions’ affairs and
management) and regional division (criteria used to establish regional
demarcation). By contrasting these criteria against the policy’s content, we aim
to offer a broader assessment of its performance in terms of the continuities and
changes it reveals in relation to the pre 2011 status quo.
The King’s Regionalisation and Its Impact on the Authoritarian System
Scholars have examined regionalisation and decentralisation policies in North
Africa for a number of reasons. In particular, the issue acquired relevance as a
consequence of the adoption of neo-liberal reforms by North African regimes,
4 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life’,
American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), pp. 738–749; Guy B. Peters, Institutional Theory: The New
Institutionalism in Political Science (London: Cassels, 1999).
5 Historical institutionalism and the notion of path-dependence have been criticised for not explaining change
(see Ian Greener, ‘The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies’, Politics, 25(1) (2005), pp. 62–72) and
emphasising the resilience of policies or structures after institutional decisions. See: Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and
Desmond King, ‘The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conﬂict in Historical Institutionalism’, The Journal
of Politics, 67(4) (2005), pp. 1275–1300.
6 Regional autonomy is deﬁned as the region’s legal competence and capability to regulate and manage its own
internal affairs autonomously, following the principle of subsidiarity and within the frames of the constitution and
law. See: Jean Van Cauwenberghe, ‘Suivi du cadre de re´fe´rence pour la de´mocratie re´gionale’, Congre´s des
pouvoirs locaux et re´gionaux. Conseil de l’E´urope. http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/PDF/Rapport/
EXPERTS_ETRANGERS/EE_USSG_01.pdf (accessed September 18, 2014).
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which had to implement some forms of decentralisation due to international
organisations’ conditions.7 The Moroccan monarchy had to start planning
decentralisation policies in the 1990s. Despite the high number of studies on the
topic, there is a tendency to prioritise issues of local governance and economic
development to the detriment of any analysis of regionalisation policy within
broader institutional and historical perspectives.8 Despite the attention given to
Morocco’s decentralisation and regional model after its 1997 regional reform and
the announcement of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara,9 other
signiﬁcant issues such as the historical trajectory of the regionalisation policy, its
role in Moroccan politics and its impact on civil society activism deserve further
examination. This article tries to ﬁll these gaps by examining both the policy’s
historical unfolding and, consequently, the continuities and changes that
characterise its latest version, as well as its repercussions on the social and
political spheres in the context of national and regional political instability.
Regionalisation has been a central policy for the Moroccan regime for two
reasons. Firstly, it has often been considered the solution to the regime’s problems
when it comes to the Western Sahara conﬂict and to European requirements in the
framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, which imposes, among several other
measures, greater decentralisation to the involved parties. It has also represented
an efﬁcient instrument to manage internal power distribution among local elites.10
Secondly, it has political signiﬁcance insofar as it has been rhetorically used by the
king as an instrument for his legitimisation as promoter of change and national
modernisation.11
However, in Morocco the regionalisation policy has never led to signiﬁcant
changes in the power structure of the state. From an historical perspective, regions
7 Sylvia Bergh, ‘Inclusive Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms and the Redeployment of State Power: The
Case of the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) in Morocco’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(3)
(2012), pp. 410–426; Christopher Reesa and Farhad Hossain, ‘Perspectives on Decentralization and Local
Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries’, International Journal of Public Administration, 33(12–
13) (2010), pp. 581–587.
8 Michel Rousset, La de´concentration re´gionale au Maroc: une avance´e signiﬁcative (Paris: CNRS, 2003);
Myriam Catusse, Raffaele Cattedra and Mohammed Idrissi Janati, ‘Decentralisation and its Paradoxes in
Morocco’, in Barbara Driusken, Franck Mermier and Heiko Wimmen (eds.), Cities of the South (London: Saqi
Books, 2007), pp. 113–135; Charles Saint-Prot et al. (eds.), Vers un mode`le marocain de re´gionalisation. E´tat,
territoire et de´veloppement dans un pays e´mergent. (Paris: CNRS, 2010).
9 Miguel de Larramendi, ‘La cuestio´n del Sahara Occidental como factor de impulso del proceso de
descentralizacio´n marroquı´’, Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterra´neos 9 (2010), pp. 132–141; Yossef
Ben-Meir, ‘Morocco’s Regionalisation Roadmap and the Western Sahara’,World Affairs, 14(2) (2010), pp. 92–
112; Amina El-Messaoudi, ‘Le projet d’autonomie dans la re´gion du Sahara: une pratique institutionnelle
avance´e’, Revue d’administration locale et de de´veloppement 107 (2012), pp. 35–50; Marina Ottaway,
‘Morocco: “Advanced Decentralization” Meets the Sahara Autonomy Initiative’, View Points 27 (Washington:
Wilson Center, 2013).
10 Raquel Ojeda, ‘Descentralizacio´n y democracia en el marco del Estado marroquı´’, in Carmelo Pe´rez (ed.), La
Sociedad civil, derechos humanos y democracia en Marruecos (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2006),
pp. 27–50. George Joffe´, ‘Sovereignty and the Western Sahara’, The Journal of North African Studies, 15(3)
(2010), pp. 375–384; Paul Smoke, ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges’,
Public Administration and Development, 23 (2003), pp. 7–16.
11 ‘This is a watershed moment, the start of a structural project which, hopefully, will mark a turning point in
territorial governance [ . . . ] I also want it to be the beginning of a new dynamic towards a thorough institutional
reform [ . . . ] Viewed from this angle, the extensive regionalisation we want to achieve is not a mere technical or
administrative procedure, but rather a major initiative for the overhaul and modernization of state structures and
for the achievement of integrated development’. Mohammed VI’s speech to the nation, January 3, 2010. All royal
speeches are available at http://www.map.ma/fr/ (accessed September 18, 2014). Other states have used
decentralisation in a similar vein, Hubert Ouedrago, ‘Decentralisation and Local Governance: Experiences from
Francophone West Africa’, Public Administration and Development, 23 (2003), pp. 97–103.
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because they highlight the conﬂictual environment brought about by the protests,
which impacted the way in which the project made its way through the
institutional political sphere.
The methodology deployed encompasses discourse analysis, the study of
ofﬁcial documents generated by the Moroccan state, political parties, associations,
social and political groups, and ﬁeldwork observations. There is a focus on
governance structures and policy-making processes because the very form of
institutions helps explain continuity and change in policies. As neo-institutionalist
theory demonstrates, the resilience of certain forms of governance determines the
likelihood of a break with the past, and this seems particularly true when it comes
to the role institutions play in decision- and policy-making processes.4 The focus
on the monarchy and royal commissions is thus useful to highlight the strength of
path-dependent policy development5 and its connection to the broader issue of the
resilience of authoritarianism. Morocco is not the only authoritarian regime using
agendas of institutional reform and controlled change to maintain power, however.
Indeed, the vast literature on authoritarian resilience has spot-lit the role of reforms
in strengthening and renovating authoritarianism, and the regionalisation project
in Morocco is a good example of how authoritarians can beneﬁt from ‘fostering
change’.
Finally, we deploy a model for policy analysis based on six criteria crucial to the
policy itself. We will use them to assess the degree of regional autonomy
established by advanced regionalisation6: democratisation (a region’s degree of
representation and institutional legitimacy); human and ﬁscal resources (a region’s
capacity for thoroughly exercising its competences); good governance (the
management of public affairs effectively and efﬁciently, and attentiveness to
citizens’ demands) and agenciﬁcation (the presence and role of ad hoc agencies for
public governance); transfer of power from state to regions (number and nature of
competencies transferred); tutelle (state supervision of regions’ affairs and
management) and regional division (criteria used to establish regional
demarcation). By contrasting these criteria against the policy’s content, we aim
to offer a broader assessment of its performance in terms of the continuities and
changes it reveals in relation to the pre 2011 status quo.
The King’s Regionalisation and Its Impact on the Authoritarian System
Scholars have examined regionalisation and decentralisation policies in North
Africa for a number of reasons. In particular, the issue acquired relevance as a
consequence of the adoption of neo-liberal reforms by North African regimes,
4 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life’,
American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), pp. 738–749; Guy B. Peters, Institutional Theory: The New
Institutionalism in Political Science (London: Cassels, 1999).
5 Historical institutionalism and the notion of path-dependence have been criticised for not explaining change
(see Ian Greener, ‘The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies’, Politics, 25(1) (2005), pp. 62–72) and
emphasising the resilience of policies or structures after institutional decisions. See: Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and
Desmond King, ‘The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conﬂict in Historical Institutionalism’, The Journal
of Politics, 67(4) (2005), pp. 1275–1300.
6 Regional autonomy is deﬁned as the region’s legal competence and capability to regulate and manage its own
internal affairs autonomously, following the principle of subsidiarity and within the frames of the constitution and
law. See: Jean Van Cauwenberghe, ‘Suivi du cadre de re´fe´rence pour la de´mocratie re´gionale’, Congre´s des
pouvoirs locaux et re´gionaux. Conseil de l’E´urope. http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/PDF/Rapport/
EXPERTS_ETRANGERS/EE_USSG_01.pdf (accessed September 18, 2014).
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pressures. Indeed, the European Union’s requirements imposed on Morocco in the
framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the 2007–2013 Action Plan EU-
Morocco and the Advanced Status agreements18 were particularly pressing in
asking the monarchy to proceed with regionalisation. Moreover, the insistence of
some states, such as France and the United States, to ﬁnd a solution to the Western
Sahara question through decentralisation was strong. There were a number of
additional issues that the regionalisation project meant to address, such as
providing a political framework within which the Moroccan Autonomy Plan could
be credible and admissible,19 helping new elites to emerge and replace traditional
leaders, and renovating the legitimacy of political institutions.
The tactic of setting up ad hoc institutions or commissions at the margins of the
Parliament and government has frequently been employed in Moroccan history to
address strategic questions. It has allowed the monarchy to drive the organisation
of internal pluralism from above.20 This strategy, adopted by Mohammed VI to
satisfy his preference for technocratic government while remaining the main
driver of all political processes, mirrors the king’s idea of authority. The idea is of
an ‘executive monarchy’ that governs and controls the limit of what is politically
permissible. In such a context, in the last two decades royal speeches have become
the main reference for social and political stakeholders, the dynamo of all change
and the core around which consensus on policies is constructed.21 In a similar vein,
advanced regionalisation was often referred to in royal speeches as a pivotal policy
for the state, along with the reform of the judiciary system, extensive devolution
and the establishment of a new social charter22 through which the king aimed to
consolidate good governance, deﬁned as ‘the key to democracy and
development’,23 and modernise the state.24 This whole reform agenda was placed
within the framework of a controlled political opening initiated in the 1990s with
the so-called alternance, which still continues, consistent with the king’s political
vision.
The creation of the CCR followed a top-down dynamic of control and allowed
the king to situate himself at the top of the reform process, which originated and
developed outside the Parliament and its procedures. It was also the king who
established the speciﬁc guidelines and fundamental pillars the CCRmust follow in
its work. These are: a strong commitment to the nation’s sacred and immutable
18 These requirements were the demand of structural reform and modernisation of the judiciary system. Irene
Ferna´ndezMolina and Rafael Bustos, ‘Elestatuto avanzado de UE-Marruecos y la presidencia espan˜ola de la UE’,
Memorandum Opex, January 26, 2010, http://www.falternativas.org/opex/documentos/memorandos/
memorando-opex-n1-135-2010-el-estatuto-avanzado-ue-marruecos-y-la-presidencia-espanola-de-la-ue
(accessed September 18, 2014); Agh Attila, ‘Regionalisation as a Driving Force of EU Widening: Recovering
from the EU “Carrot Crisis” in the East’, Europe-Asia Studies, 62(8) (2010), pp. 1239–1266.
19 Kristina Kausch, Morocco’s ‘Advanced Status’: Model or Muddle?, FRIDE Policy Brief, 43 (2010) http://
www.fride.org/download/PB43_Morocco_advance_status_ENG_mar10.pdf (accessed September 18, 2014).
20 Fre´de´ric Vairel, ‘Protesting in Authoritarian Situations: Egypt and Morocco in Comparative Perspective’, in
Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds.), Social Movements, Mobilisation, Contestation in the Middle East and
North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 33–48; Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘Los consejos
consultivos: gobierno sin representacio´n y diplomacia paralela’, in Thierry Desrues and Hernando de Larramendi
(eds.), Mohamed VI. Polı´tica y cambio social en Marruecos (Co´rdoba: Almuzara, 2011), pp. 34–41.
21 Maria Angustias Parejo and Laura Feliu, ‘Identidad y regionalizacio´n: los actores polı´ticos marroquı´es ante la
reforma constitucional de 2011’, Revista de Investigaciones Polı´ticas y Sociolo´gicas, 12(3) (2013), pp. 109–126.
22 Speech at the opening of parliament, September 2009, Speech on the 56th anniversary of the Revolution of the
King and the People, August 2009, and Speech to the nation on the 10th Anniversary of the Day of the Throne,
July 30, 2009.
23 Speech to the nation on the 10th Anniversary of the Day of the Throne, July 30, 2009.
24 Speech to the nation, January 3, 2010.
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appeared for the ﬁrst time in 1971 as a means to respond to the country’s needs for
development and growth. Despite being economically inefﬁcient, the regional
model implemented after 1971 was politically very efﬁcient in controlling
peripheral dynamics through the renewal of local elite networks. The makhzen12
has indeed been able to control local elites through various mechanisms operating
in the regional sphere, and in particular by appointing local governors, by
accepting the duplication of ofﬁces to allow candidates to be elected members of
regional councils and the national Parliament at the same time, and by supporting
rural notables.13 Although the regions received legal recognition as territorial
entities in the 1992 constitutional reform, the regional model continued unrevised
until a second regional reform was implemented as part of the 1996 constitutional
reform and the 1997 regional law. The 1997 regional law established 16 regions
with the goal of breaking down the country’s old cultural, historical, linguistic and
tribal identities.14
Regions had a weak legislative initiative and limited powers. Both
regionalisation processes of 1992 and 1997 showed that Moroccan regional
policy was characterised by deconcentration rather than decentralisation of power,
because of the limited transfer of competencies and human and ﬁnancial resources
from the central state to the regions.15 The main idea behind both models was to
maintain a centralised state to control the political system and preserve the
country’s territorial integrity, cohesion and homogeneity by leaving the regions
with no political or economic power.16
On 3 January 2010, king Mohammed VI publically announced the creation of
the Consultative Commission on Regionalism (CCR) and entrusted this body with
the task of preparing a project that would lay the foundations for a future
decentralisation plan.17 This project would constitute the third phase of Morocco’s
regionalisation policy, known as advanced regionalisation. Through this new
process the Moroccan state was complying with various foreign and domestic
12 Francesco Cavatorta and Vincent Durac deﬁne the makhzen as an ‘informal governing alliance between the
monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs operating as the
unelected and unaccountable decision-makers in the country beyond the control of the elected government’ (Civil
Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism, London: Routledge, 2010), p. 57.
13 Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marruecos. El proceso de regionalizacio´n. (Sevilla: Instituto Andaluz
de Administracio´n Pu´blica-Junta Andalucı´a, 2002).
14 The 1997 regional law divided Northern Morocco into three distinct regions. In this respect, the two Rif
provinces, Nador and Al Hoceima, both with strong regional identities, were separated. Lo´pez and Larramendi,
‘Sahara y regionalizacio´n’, cit.; Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marruecos, cit.; Saint-Prot et al., Vers un
mode`le marocain de re´gionalisation. E´tat, territoire et de´veloppement dans un pays e´mergent, cit.
15 In Moroccan institutional history, largely inﬂuenced by the French tradition, the representatives of the central
power at the local level are called ‘de´concentre´es’ whereas the local elected authorities are called ‘de´centralise´es’.
‘Decentralisation’ refers here to the transfer of competencies and resources to local elective authorities, while
‘deconcentration’ refers to administrative decentralisation. Following Rees and Hossein, who offer a typology of
decentralisation distinguishing between deconcentration, delegation, privatisation and devolution, this paper uses
the following deﬁnition: decentralisation as devolution, which involves the creation or strengthening of local
units of government that, to a large extent, operate outside the direct control of the central authority. Rees and
Hossein, ‘Perspectives on Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries’, cit.
See also Rousset, La de´concentration re´gionale au Maroc, cit. and Catusse, Cattedra and Janati, ‘Decentralisation
and its paradoxes in Morocco’, cit.
16 Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marrueco, cit.; Pieter Good, Ben Derudder and Frank Witlox, ‘The
Regionalization of Africa: Delineating Africa’s Subregions Using Airline Data’, Journal of Geography, 110(5)
(2011), pp. 179–190.
17 Mohammed Benyahya, ‘Le roi Mohammed VI et l’ide´e de re´gionalisation’, in Saint-Prot et al., Vers un mode`le
marocain de re´gionalisation, cit.: 59–68; M. El Yaagoubi, ‘La notion de re´gionalisation avance´e dans les
discours royaux’, Revue marocaine d’administration locale et de de´veloppement. Collection Textes et
Documents, 71 (2010), pp. 12–41.
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pressures. Indeed, the European Union’s requirements imposed on Morocco in the
framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the 2007–2013 Action Plan EU-
Morocco and the Advanced Status agreements18 were particularly pressing in
asking the monarchy to proceed with regionalisation. Moreover, the insistence of
some states, such as France and the United States, to ﬁnd a solution to the Western
Sahara question through decentralisation was strong. There were a number of
additional issues that the regionalisation project meant to address, such as
providing a political framework within which the Moroccan Autonomy Plan could
be credible and admissible,19 helping new elites to emerge and replace traditional
leaders, and renovating the legitimacy of political institutions.
The tactic of setting up ad hoc institutions or commissions at the margins of the
Parliament and government has frequently been employed in Moroccan history to
address strategic questions. It has allowed the monarchy to drive the organisation
of internal pluralism from above.20 This strategy, adopted by Mohammed VI to
satisfy his preference for technocratic government while remaining the main
driver of all political processes, mirrors the king’s idea of authority. The idea is of
an ‘executive monarchy’ that governs and controls the limit of what is politically
permissible. In such a context, in the last two decades royal speeches have become
the main reference for social and political stakeholders, the dynamo of all change
and the core around which consensus on policies is constructed.21 In a similar vein,
advanced regionalisation was often referred to in royal speeches as a pivotal policy
for the state, along with the reform of the judiciary system, extensive devolution
and the establishment of a new social charter22 through which the king aimed to
consolidate good governance, deﬁned as ‘the key to democracy and
development’,23 and modernise the state.24 This whole reform agenda was placed
within the framework of a controlled political opening initiated in the 1990s with
the so-called alternance, which still continues, consistent with the king’s political
vision.
The creation of the CCR followed a top-down dynamic of control and allowed
the king to situate himself at the top of the reform process, which originated and
developed outside the Parliament and its procedures. It was also the king who
established the speciﬁc guidelines and fundamental pillars the CCRmust follow in
its work. These are: a strong commitment to the nation’s sacred and immutable
18 These requirements were the demand of structural reform and modernisation of the judiciary system. Irene
Ferna´ndezMolina and Rafael Bustos, ‘Elestatuto avanzado de UE-Marruecos y la presidencia espan˜ola de la UE’,
Memorandum Opex, January 26, 2010, http://www.falternativas.org/opex/documentos/memorandos/
memorando-opex-n1-135-2010-el-estatuto-avanzado-ue-marruecos-y-la-presidencia-espanola-de-la-ue
(accessed September 18, 2014); Agh Attila, ‘Regionalisation as a Driving Force of EU Widening: Recovering
from the EU “Carrot Crisis” in the East’, Europe-Asia Studies, 62(8) (2010), pp. 1239–1266.
19 Kristina Kausch, Morocco’s ‘Advanced Status’: Model or Muddle?, FRIDE Policy Brief, 43 (2010) http://
www.fride.org/download/PB43_Morocco_advance_status_ENG_mar10.pdf (accessed September 18, 2014).
20 Fre´de´ric Vairel, ‘Protesting in Authoritarian Situations: Egypt and Morocco in Comparative Perspective’, in
Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds.), Social Movements, Mobilisation, Contestation in the Middle East and
North Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 33–48; Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘Los consejos
consultivos: gobierno sin representacio´n y diplomacia paralela’, in Thierry Desrues and Hernando de Larramendi
(eds.), Mohamed VI. Polı´tica y cambio social en Marruecos (Co´rdoba: Almuzara, 2011), pp. 34–41.
21 Maria Angustias Parejo and Laura Feliu, ‘Identidad y regionalizacio´n: los actores polı´ticos marroquı´es ante la
reforma constitucional de 2011’, Revista de Investigaciones Polı´ticas y Sociolo´gicas, 12(3) (2013), pp. 109–126.
22 Speech at the opening of parliament, September 2009, Speech on the 56th anniversary of the Revolution of the
King and the People, August 2009, and Speech to the nation on the 10th Anniversary of the Day of the Throne,
July 30, 2009.
23 Speech to the nation on the 10th Anniversary of the Day of the Throne, July 30, 2009.
24 Speech to the nation, January 3, 2010.
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appeared for the ﬁrst time in 1971 as a means to respond to the country’s needs for
development and growth. Despite being economically inefﬁcient, the regional
model implemented after 1971 was politically very efﬁcient in controlling
peripheral dynamics through the renewal of local elite networks. The makhzen12
has indeed been able to control local elites through various mechanisms operating
in the regional sphere, and in particular by appointing local governors, by
accepting the duplication of ofﬁces to allow candidates to be elected members of
regional councils and the national Parliament at the same time, and by supporting
rural notables.13 Although the regions received legal recognition as territorial
entities in the 1992 constitutional reform, the regional model continued unrevised
until a second regional reform was implemented as part of the 1996 constitutional
reform and the 1997 regional law. The 1997 regional law established 16 regions
with the goal of breaking down the country’s old cultural, historical, linguistic and
tribal identities.14
Regions had a weak legislative initiative and limited powers. Both
regionalisation processes of 1992 and 1997 showed that Moroccan regional
policy was characterised by deconcentration rather than decentralisation of power,
because of the limited transfer of competencies and human and ﬁnancial resources
from the central state to the regions.15 The main idea behind both models was to
maintain a centralised state to control the political system and preserve the
country’s territorial integrity, cohesion and homogeneity by leaving the regions
with no political or economic power.16
On 3 January 2010, king Mohammed VI publically announced the creation of
the Consultative Commission on Regionalism (CCR) and entrusted this body with
the task of preparing a project that would lay the foundations for a future
decentralisation plan.17 This project would constitute the third phase of Morocco’s
regionalisation policy, known as advanced regionalisation. Through this new
process the Moroccan state was complying with various foreign and domestic
12 Francesco Cavatorta and Vincent Durac deﬁne the makhzen as an ‘informal governing alliance between the
monarch, his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs operating as the
unelected and unaccountable decision-makers in the country beyond the control of the elected government’ (Civil
Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism, London: Routledge, 2010), p. 57.
13 Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marruecos. El proceso de regionalizacio´n. (Sevilla: Instituto Andaluz
de Administracio´n Pu´blica-Junta Andalucı´a, 2002).
14 The 1997 regional law divided Northern Morocco into three distinct regions. In this respect, the two Rif
provinces, Nador and Al Hoceima, both with strong regional identities, were separated. Lo´pez and Larramendi,
‘Sahara y regionalizacio´n’, cit.; Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marruecos, cit.; Saint-Prot et al., Vers un
mode`le marocain de re´gionalisation. E´tat, territoire et de´veloppement dans un pays e´mergent, cit.
15 In Moroccan institutional history, largely inﬂuenced by the French tradition, the representatives of the central
power at the local level are called ‘de´concentre´es’ whereas the local elected authorities are called ‘de´centralise´es’.
‘Decentralisation’ refers here to the transfer of competencies and resources to local elective authorities, while
‘deconcentration’ refers to administrative decentralisation. Following Rees and Hossein, who offer a typology of
decentralisation distinguishing between deconcentration, delegation, privatisation and devolution, this paper uses
the following deﬁnition: decentralisation as devolution, which involves the creation or strengthening of local
units of government that, to a large extent, operate outside the direct control of the central authority. Rees and
Hossein, ‘Perspectives on Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries’, cit.
See also Rousset, La de´concentration re´gionale au Maroc, cit. and Catusse, Cattedra and Janati, ‘Decentralisation
and its paradoxes in Morocco’, cit.
16 Ojeda, Polı´ticas de descentralizacio´n en Marrueco, cit.; Pieter Good, Ben Derudder and Frank Witlox, ‘The
Regionalization of Africa: Delineating Africa’s Subregions Using Airline Data’, Journal of Geography, 110(5)
(2011), pp. 179–190.
17 Mohammed Benyahya, ‘Le roi Mohammed VI et l’ide´e de re´gionalisation’, in Saint-Prot et al., Vers un mode`le
marocain de re´gionalisation, cit.: 59–68; M. El Yaagoubi, ‘La notion de re´gionalisation avance´e dans les
discours royaux’, Revue marocaine d’administration locale et de de´veloppement. Collection Textes et
Documents, 71 (2010), pp. 12–41.
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Assessing the Advanced Regionalisation Project: Improvements and Inertias
The regional system proposed in the advanced project is an example of the
complexity of Moroccan politics, insofar as improvements to previous regional
models coexist with certain constants, with the consequence of preserving the
political dynamics and values of the Moroccan political system.
According to the king’s speeches, the ‘advanced regionalisation’ reform does
not respond to any ethnic, cultural or confessional pressures. Instead, it is a step in
the trajectory of state consolidation, which is a continuum, through decentralisa-
tion and local democracy. This is quite evident in the ﬁnal project drafted by the
CCR and made public in February 2011 as required by the king. It is both very
detailed and of very broad scope, and it can easily be accessed through the
Internet.34 The accessibility of the ﬁnal project somehow contrasts with the fact
that the commission, like many other institutions working on key political issues in
Morocco, emerged through the king’s ‘goodwill’, distant from any representative
principles or control exerted by elected Moroccan institutions.35
In this section, we analyse the changes and the continuities of the advanced
regionalisation project, following two main criteria: ﬁrst, we examine the ofﬁcial
objectives declared in the project and second, the degree of autonomy this new
version of the project grants to the regions. In order to assess them, we contrast the
latest project against the previous regional models, as outlined in the 1996
constitutional reform and the 1997 regional law.
Changes introduced by the project of advanced regionalisation
In order to analyse the changes introduced by the advanced regionalisation project
and its persisting continuities, six issues are examined: the democratisation of the
regions; the amount of power transferred to the regions; human and ﬁscal
resources, with a speciﬁc focus on the local ﬁscal system and interregional
solidarity; good governance and agenciﬁcation; the scope of control exerted by the
Ministry of Interior; and regional border divisions.
Three crucial aspects in democratising the regions are the electoral system, the
status of the members of regional parliaments and the executive power of the
president of the regional council. The novelties introduced pave the way to
democratising regional institutions because they aim to foster consideration for the
demands raised by local and territorial constituencies. As for the regional electoral
system, elections are direct universal suffrage with proportional formula. The
project rules that, beyond elected members, national MPs selected from the
regional constituency, the president of the regional chamber of commerce and
trade union members can also attend the sessions of the regional Parliament as
consultants.36 The president of the regional council cannot be a member of the
national Parliament at the same time, in contrast with the 1997 regional model.37
The new constitutional reform, approved in the referendum in July 2011, requires
that at least three-ﬁfths of the total number of regional MPs must attend for a
34 See: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
35 Mohammed Tozy, ‘Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace’, Journal of Democracy, 19(1) (2008), pp. 34–41.
36 The broader attendance to regional parliaments responds to EU’s requirements and establishes links between
regional and central institutions.
37 ‘Rapport sur la re´gionalisation avance´e’ (RRA), Book I, 12 (2011). Available at: http://www.
regionalisationavancee.ma/PageFR.aspx?id¼8 (accessed September 18, 2014).
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values (the unity of the state, the nation and the territory); the principle of
solidarity; a balanced distribution of resources between the central power and local
authorities; and the adoption of an extensive devolution within the framework of
an efﬁcient system of territorial governance based on harmony and convergence.25
The monarch also called for ‘a wholly Moroccan regionalisation model, based on
the country’s speciﬁcities’,26 rejecting the idea of establishing a ‘mere imitation’
or replication of other countries’ experiences, such as the German or Spanish
territorial systems, which had been a strong reference in the past.27 The CCR was
headed by Omar Azziman, who had different appointments at ministerial level.
He was Ambassador to Spain when appointed chair of the commission, composed
of 21 members with different proﬁles, mainly technocrats with no intention of
crossing the red lines established by the king.28
Although formally the CCR was the only institution responsible for designing
the new regional model for the country, some space for bottom-up interaction was
created, allowing social and political actors to take part in the process.29 Thus,
over the 14 months the CCR was operative, it received 124 written and oral
proposals focusing on three main issues30: the re-organisation of regional political
institutions31; the relationship between centre and periphery32; and the boundaries
of the future regions.33 Outside ofﬁcial channels, the creation of the CCR also
provoked intense activity, whereby political parties, local associations and groups
organised their own meetings and debates on the issue. These autonomous
initiatives were motivated by a refusal to participate in the consultative sessions
organised by the CCR, considered to be an expression of the top-down nature of
political reforms in the country. Public attention to the reform decreased, however,
as uprisings erupted in North Africa and spread to Morocco.
25 Ibidem.
26 Ibid.
27 Lo´pez and Larramendi, ‘Sahara y regionalizacio´n’, cit.; Mohammed Benyahya (ed.), Re´gions et
re´gionalisation en Droit marocain et en Droit compare´ (Rabat: Publications de la Revue Marocaine
d’administration locale et de de´veloppement, 2010); Benyahya (ed.), L’Autonomie Re´gionale. L’initiative
marocaine a` la lumie`re des expe´riences e´trange`res d’autonomies re´gionales (Rabat: Publications de la Revue
Marocaine d’administration locale et de de´veloppement, 2010).
28 Three lawyers, one political scientist, one geographer, one sociologist, three members associated with regional
business environment, two members from the ﬁnancial sector, one specialist of planning and public policies, and
three members from local governance, civil society actors were also part of the Commission.
29 To consult the list of stakeholders: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
30 To consult the proposals: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
31 Most of the documents submitted suggested the establishment of a direct electoral system to elect regional
presidents and councils; an increase in the region’s executive and legislative powers; the creation and the
abolition of speciﬁc regional institutions, such establishing as an Observatory for regionalisation in which
representatives of civil society would be present and the elimination of the Wali or the regional governor; and the
modiﬁcation of the regional ﬁnancial system and budget system, in order to allow the regions to have more
control over their resources.
32 A signiﬁcant number of proposals exalted the need to redeﬁne the powers and competencies of certain
authorities, such as the Wali, the establishment of new channels of communication and coordination between the
central government and the regions, as well as the modiﬁcation of the territorial representation system within state
organs and institutions.
33 Concerning the regional boundaries, a signiﬁcant number of proposals argued that the regionalisation process
could be the basis for promoting the country’s cultural diversity and Moroccan plurality. Regarding the Western
Sahara, only a very few political parties, such as the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), Party of Progress
and Socialism (PPS) and Uniﬁed Socialist Party (PSU) addressed the issue proposing the creation of an
asymmetric territorial model, with different levels of regionalisation and a special status for the territory in
conﬂict.
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national Parliament at the same time, in contrast with the 1997 regional model.37
The new constitutional reform, approved in the referendum in July 2011, requires
that at least three-ﬁfths of the total number of regional MPs must attend for a
34 See: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
35 Mohammed Tozy, ‘Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace’, Journal of Democracy, 19(1) (2008), pp. 34–41.
36 The broader attendance to regional parliaments responds to EU’s requirements and establishes links between
regional and central institutions.
37 ‘Rapport sur la re´gionalisation avance´e’ (RRA), Book I, 12 (2011). Available at: http://www.
regionalisationavancee.ma/PageFR.aspx?id¼8 (accessed September 18, 2014).
NALYSIS OF L MPEDUSIAN REFORM
53
values (the unity of the state, the nation and the territory); the principle of
solidarity; a balanced distribution of resources between the central power and local
authorities; and the adoption of an extensive devolution within the framework of
an efﬁcient system of territorial governance based on harmony and convergence.25
The monarch also called for ‘a wholly Moroccan regionalisation model, based on
the country’s speciﬁcities’,26 rejecting the idea of establishing a ‘mere imitation’
or replication of other countries’ experiences, such as the German or Spanish
territorial systems, which had been a strong reference in the past.27 The CCR was
headed by Omar Azziman, who had different appointments at ministerial level.
He was Ambassador to Spain when appointed chair of the commission, composed
of 21 members with different proﬁles, mainly technocrats with no intention of
crossing the red lines established by the king.28
Although formally the CCR was the only institution responsible for designing
the new regional model for the country, some space for bottom-up interaction was
created, allowing social and political actors to take part in the process.29 Thus,
over the 14 months the CCR was operative, it received 124 written and oral
proposals focusing on three main issues30: the re-organisation of regional political
institutions31; the relationship between centre and periphery32; and the boundaries
of the future regions.33 Outside ofﬁcial channels, the creation of the CCR also
provoked intense activity, whereby political parties, local associations and groups
organised their own meetings and debates on the issue. These autonomous
initiatives were motivated by a refusal to participate in the consultative sessions
organised by the CCR, considered to be an expression of the top-down nature of
political reforms in the country. Public attention to the reform decreased, however,
as uprisings erupted in North Africa and spread to Morocco.
25 Ibidem.
26 Ibid.
27 Lo´pez and Larramendi, ‘Sahara y regionalizacio´n’, cit.; Mohammed Benyahya (ed.), Re´gions et
re´gionalisation en Droit marocain et en Droit compare´ (Rabat: Publications de la Revue Marocaine
d’administration locale et de de´veloppement, 2010); Benyahya (ed.), L’Autonomie Re´gionale. L’initiative
marocaine a` la lumie`re des expe´riences e´trange`res d’autonomies re´gionales (Rabat: Publications de la Revue
Marocaine d’administration locale et de de´veloppement, 2010).
28 Three lawyers, one political scientist, one geographer, one sociologist, three members associated with regional
business environment, two members from the ﬁnancial sector, one specialist of planning and public policies, and
three members from local governance, civil society actors were also part of the Commission.
29 To consult the list of stakeholders: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
30 To consult the proposals: http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/ (accessed September 18, 2014).
31 Most of the documents submitted suggested the establishment of a direct electoral system to elect regional
presidents and councils; an increase in the region’s executive and legislative powers; the creation and the
abolition of speciﬁc regional institutions, such establishing as an Observatory for regionalisation in which
representatives of civil society would be present and the elimination of the Wali or the regional governor; and the
modiﬁcation of the regional ﬁnancial system and budget system, in order to allow the regions to have more
control over their resources.
32 A signiﬁcant number of proposals exalted the need to redeﬁne the powers and competencies of certain
authorities, such as the Wali, the establishment of new channels of communication and coordination between the
central government and the regions, as well as the modiﬁcation of the territorial representation system within state
organs and institutions.
33 Concerning the regional boundaries, a signiﬁcant number of proposals argued that the regionalisation process
could be the basis for promoting the country’s cultural diversity and Moroccan plurality. Regarding the Western
Sahara, only a very few political parties, such as the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), Party of Progress
and Socialism (PPS) and Uniﬁed Socialist Party (PSU) addressed the issue proposing the creation of an
asymmetric territorial model, with different levels of regionalisation and a special status for the territory in
conﬂict.
RAQUEL OJEDA GARCI´A AND A´NGELA SUA´REZ COLLADO
52
30450.indd   53 29/05/15   3:35 PM
CONTINUITy AND CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS
54
it can also help strengthen clientelistic networks, therefore representing a threat to
democratic accountability.
Continuities in the regional policy
The project has remained within the borders of what the king would accept, and has
tried not to jeopardise his authority. Ideally, it will pave the way to modernisation
and decentralisation, making possible the achievement of an effective change in
power distribution. However, when it comes to implementation and political
meaning, the project not only respects the ‘red lines’ drawn out in previous
reforms but also further strengthens central authority and national unity. Enduring
state guardianship and regional divisions are two examples of this continuity.
State guardianship has been present in the process of decentralisation since the
1996 constitutional reform. Indeed, despite statements claiming that state control
would be reduced, the current project explicitly refers to the need for the central
authority’s a priori approval of the regional council’s agenda and the budget law.
Approval and revisions of development plans also require the a priori approval of
the central government.46
Among the debated aspects of this new regional system, the thorniest is regional
borders and divisions.47 The centrality of this issue is also pointed to in the project
itself, but the CCR declared that it was ‘faithful to the royal line’, and denied that
regional traditions or political regionalism exist inMorocco.48 Indeed, according to
the projectMorocco is characterised by a territorial structure that is ‘uniﬁed and of a
high level of integration under the aegis of a monarchy in symbiosis with its
people’.49 Therefore, ‘advanced regions’ seem to be a mere institutional and
functional structure for the CCR, which also established the ‘deontology’ the
regional entities have to respect: efﬁciency, homogeneity, functionality,
accessibility and proximity, proportionality and balance.50 Under these criteria,
the number of regions falls from 16 to 12. In this context of reducing the number of
regions and protecting centralism, the Western Sahara is included as part of the
Moroccan state and divided into three sub-regions. The CCR has made huge efforts
to justify and explain territorial divisions in general.51 However, less effort has
been devoted to explaining the council’s criteria in splitting the Western Sahara.
Additional continuities with the previous regional model persist. This is the case
for the lack of political power granted to the regions and the prohibition on
establishing regional parties; the maintenance of state guardianship over regional
councils; the integration of local elites in national political life; and the
reafﬁrmation of Moroccan sovereignty on disputed territories, such as the Western
Sahara.
This examination of the advanced regionalisation project suggests that the
reform achieves the objective of transforming the territorial administration and
governance through the establishment of regions, but keeps the powers of the
46 RRA, Book I, 23 (2011).
47 Rousset, Quelle autonomie pour quelle re´gion? Le projet marocain de re´gionalisation: de´ﬁs et perspectives,
(Paris: Association Maroc De´veloppement, 2010), p. 4.
48 RRA, Book I, 5, 7, 8 and 11 (2011).
49 RRA, Book I, 31 (2011).
50 RRA, Book I, 32 (2011).
51 See, for instance, the long discussion and analysis of socio-economic and demographic data justifying
territorial division: RRA, Book II, 127–200 (2011).
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parliamentary session to be considered valid. Finally, the new project provides the
president of the regional council with the necessary power to implement the
council’s decisions, withdrawing this from the Wali.38 These measures coincide
with one of the traditional demands of local representatives.39
The regional model proposed in the project also affects other territorial entities,
such as prefectures and provinces, reframing the territorial structure of power.
In this regard, despite increasing the responsibility of prefectures and provinces40
and establishing a non-hierarchical relationship between various territorial
entities, the role of the regional council will be predominant in issues related to
regional development.41 In particular, it is up to the region to propose urban and
rural development plans as well as plans organising territory.
The ﬁscal system is considered a key sector in determining the success of the
decentralisation process. The project of advanced regionalisation opens with a
plea for optimisation of ﬁnancial resources, and forecasts the creation of new
regional tax authorities. The goal is not to increase the tax burden (currently at 26
per cent in Morocco), but rather to ensure that payment falls on the users of the
large infrastructures (such as airports or large train stations). The regional council
can obtain loans only from the Municipal Equipment Fund (which also counts
private banks among its members), the organisation funding territorial entities.42
The commission thus ruled that regions obtaining important ﬁnancial resources
from the fund will be responsible for the management of their own regional issues.
It is worth emphasising that the ﬁnancial power of the regions has historically been
very weak.43
Finally, the advanced regionalisation project seeks to improve public
management. For this purpose it proposes the creation of an agency under the
control of the regional council, responsible for supporting investment projects
from a technical point of view. This agency, the Regional Projects Agency, will be
a legal organism with ﬁnancial and management autonomy.44 Therefore, the new
tendencies in public management include a step further towards ‘the hollowing out
of the state’,45 with the option of ‘emptying the content and action of public
administrations’, always under the presumption of inefﬁciency, and the creation of
other ad hoc bodies. Ideally, the agenciﬁcation of public management offers a
series of advantages, such as the reduction of bureaucratic inertia. However, it also
has risks. It can indeed lead to a duplication of structures and to overlapping
responsibilities, thus paradoxically leading to further bureaucratisation. Moreover,
38 The Walis have the same powers than governors at the provincial level, as they represent state authority in the
territory. Sylvia Bergh examined the power of governors over local governments, after various liberalisation
processes took place in Morocco. See: Sylvia Bergh, ‘Inclusive Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms and
the Redeployment of State Power’, cit.
39 Royaume du Maroc-Ministe`re De L’Inte´rieur, La de´concentration corollaire de la de´centralisation, VIIe`me
Colloque National des Collectivite´s Locales (Rabat: Ministe`re de l’Inte´rieur, 1998).
40 In order to improve deconcentration, prefectures and provinces will drive inter-municipality projects and will
implement regional programs. RRA, Book II, 29 (2011).
41 RRA, Book I, 15 (2011).
42 RRA, Book I, 18 (2011).
43 In 2009, the state funding transferred to local entities was distributed in the following way: 49 per cent went to
urban areas, 25 per cent to the rural communities, 19 per cent to the provinces and prefectures, and only 7 per cent
to the regions. These data demonstrate the state’s effort to control and integrate the areas perceived as more
problematic, namely urban areas.
44 RRA, Book I, 20.
45 Brinton Milward and Keith Provan, ‘What Does the “Hollow State” Look Like?’, in Barry Bozeman (ed.),
Public Management: State of the Art (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 309–322.
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president of the regional council with the necessary power to implement the
council’s decisions, withdrawing this from the Wali.38 These measures coincide
with one of the traditional demands of local representatives.39
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The ﬁscal system is considered a key sector in determining the success of the
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control of the regional council, responsible for supporting investment projects
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series of advantages, such as the reduction of bureaucratic inertia. However, it also
has risks. It can indeed lead to a duplication of structures and to overlapping
responsibilities, thus paradoxically leading to further bureaucratisation. Moreover,
38 The Walis have the same powers than governors at the provincial level, as they represent state authority in the
territory. Sylvia Bergh examined the power of governors over local governments, after various liberalisation
processes took place in Morocco. See: Sylvia Bergh, ‘Inclusive Neoliberalism, Local Governance Reforms and
the Redeployment of State Power’, cit.
39 Royaume du Maroc-Ministe`re De L’Inte´rieur, La de´concentration corollaire de la de´centralisation, VIIe`me
Colloque National des Collectivite´s Locales (Rabat: Ministe`re de l’Inte´rieur, 1998).
40 In order to improve deconcentration, prefectures and provinces will drive inter-municipality projects and will
implement regional programs. RRA, Book II, 29 (2011).
41 RRA, Book I, 15 (2011).
42 RRA, Book I, 18 (2011).
43 In 2009, the state funding transferred to local entities was distributed in the following way: 49 per cent went to
urban areas, 25 per cent to the rural communities, 19 per cent to the provinces and prefectures, and only 7 per cent
to the regions. These data demonstrate the state’s effort to control and integrate the areas perceived as more
problematic, namely urban areas.
44 RRA, Book I, 20.
45 Brinton Milward and Keith Provan, ‘What Does the “Hollow State” Look Like?’, in Barry Bozeman (ed.),
Public Management: State of the Art (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993), pp. 309–322.
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non-legalisation of regional parties has been a major criticism of the project, as
certain groups, like the Movement for the Autonomy of Rif (MAR), have been
struggling for their legalisation for years. To challenge this prohibition, the
creation of the so-called Rif Party for Solidarity was announced in April 2011.58
In addition, since October 2011, when a revolt took place in Ait Bouayach (Al
Hoceima province), generating a cycle of local repression and contestation,
symbols that directly question the Moroccan political and territorial system, such
as the ancient ﬂag of the Republic of the Rif, have increasingly been carried by
young protestors.59 This is done to express not only their commitment to the
‘autonomist cause’, but also their dissatisfaction with the soft reforms adopted by
the state, which are considered insufﬁcient and superﬁcial.60
The scant public attention61 given to the regionalisation project after 2011
protests and constitutional reform suggests that it was not a priority for the main
institutional actors, except for the king. The delay in approving the regionalisation
law demonstrates that neither the current government (which has been in power
since November 2011) nor the main political parties have made effort to accelerate
its implementation.62 This three-year period of deﬁcient institutional interest has
been counterbalanced by the king, who in January 2013 recovered the
regionalisation process by ordering the Economic, Social and Environmental
Commission (ESEC) to facilitate the realisation and implementation of advanced
regionalisation in the ‘southern provinces’, as Morocco calls Western Sahara.63
Following the royal order, the ESEC issued a report, the ‘New Development
Model for the Southern Provinces’,64 which does not introduce any substantial
change to the original project or the 2011 constitutional regulations regarding
regional reform. Indeed, it mainly focuses on how to achieve greater economic
development, respecting the distribution of competences, conditions and terms
outlined in the advanced regionalisation project and the 2011 constitution. The
report thus seems to be one step further in the state’s strategy of merely
normalising the Western Sahara situation, with no political solution in sight,
despite internal and external pressure. It is no coincidence that the advanced
regionalisation project does not consider the international border, the territorial
division demanded by the Sahrawi, or the social, economic and labour-related
issues of the Non-autonomous Territory of Western Sahara.65 On the contrary,
state control over the population and repression of certain political actors, such as
human rights associations, has risen.
58 Fieldwork observation.
59 Fieldwork and participant observation in the region.
60 This observation is one of the results of our ﬁeldwork in the region.
61 ‘Le rapport de la commission Azziman sur la re´gionalisation porte´ disparu’, Libe´ration, May 29, 2014, http://
www.libe.ma/Le-rapport-de-la-commission-Azziman-sur-la-regionalisation-porte-disparu_a50672.html
(accessed September 18, 2014).
62 Upcoming general elections are however pressurising actors to take action. The government has indeed sent
the draft law to political parties on the 19 June 2014. Parties formulated their amendments by the 19 July 2014.
63 Ottaway, ‘Morocco: “Advanced Decentralization” Meets the Sahara Autonomy Initiative’, cit.
64 Regional Development Model for the Southern Provinces. Concept Note, December 2012. Available at http://
www.ces.ma/Pages/Accueil.aspx (accessed September 18, 2014).
65 Anna Theoﬁlopoulou, ‘Morocco’s New Constitution and the Western Sahara Conﬂict: A Missed
Opportunity?’, The Journal of North African Studies, 17(4) (2012), pp. 687–696. The Moroccan policies in
the Western Sahara have produced deep inequalities within the population. In 2010, the people living in the camp
of Gdeim Izik demanded the end of inequality between Sahrawi and Moroccan people living in the Western
Sahara.
ANALYSIS OF A LAMPEDUSIAN REFORM
57
central state unchanged. At a broader level, it reinforces the position of the king as
the main political actor deciding how, when and what kind of change can be
produced.
The Impact and Controversies of the Regionalisation Project in Contentious
Times
The issue of territorial power-sharing forcefully emerged in other North African
countries, beyond Morocco, after the 2011 uprisings started. This is for instance
the case in Libya, where the leaders of the Cyrenaica region claimed their right to
self-government and the establishment of a federal system.52 In Morocco, the
discussion over territorial power-sharing appeared before protests erupted.
However, protests and the announcement of the creation of an Advisory
Commission for Constitutional Reform (CCRC) captured the attention of political
parties, organisations, institutions and citizens, who thus focused on issues such as
the role of the monarchy, the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary.53 From that moment on, regionalisation and decentralisation became
residual demands. Paradoxically, they remained relevant only for the king and for
social and political groups from those areas where autonomist and regionalist
demands are present, like in Northern Morocco and the Rif region. This is the case
for Amazigh (Berber) activist groups and some far leftist parties.54
In the case of the Rif, since 2008 activist groups have been demanding further
decentralisation and the establishment of a regional autonomous entity and a
federal system in Morocco.55 After the publication of the ﬁnal report by the CCR,
these groups have continued debating regionalisation and the ﬁnal project. In the
meantime, protests and demonstrations with a strong autonomist nature have
become more and more frequent, encouraged by the contentious environment of
the broader region and by the disillusion caused by the CCR’s ﬁnal report.56
In fact, the ﬁnal CCR proposal met with a number of criticisms from Rif-based
activists in relation to two main aspects: territorial delimitation and the non-
legalisation of regional parties. Regarding the ﬁrst issue, the CCR divides the north
of Morocco into two different regions. This separation clashes with the territorial
conception that the Rif autonomist movement argues for.57 Secondly, the
52 Youssef Sawania and Jason Pack, ‘Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Qadhaﬁ: The Islamist,
Regionalist, and Amazigh Challenges’, The Journal of North African Studies, 18(4) (2013), pp. 523–543.
53 Inmculada Szmolka, ‘¿La quinta ola de democratizacio´n? Cambio polı´tico sin cambio de re´gimen en los paı´ses
a´rabes’, Polı´tica y sociedad 50(2) (2013), pp. 893–935; Vincent Durac, ‘Protest Movements and Political
Change: An Analysis of the “Arab Uprisings” of 2011’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 31(2) (2013),
pp. 175–193.
54 Angela Sua´rez Collado, El movimiento amazigh en el Rif: identidad, cultura y polı´tica en las provincias de
Nador y Alhucemas (PhD dissertation, Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid, 2013); Bruce Maddy-Weitzman,
‘Arabization and Its Discontents: The Rise of the AmazighMovement in North Africa’, The Journal of the Middle
East and Africa, 3(2) (2012), pp. 109–135.
55 Among them are some local sections of national parties, trade unions and human right associations such as
Annahj Addimocrati, the Moroccan Workers’ Union and the Moroccan Association of Human Rights, the
majority of Amazigh associations in the Rif, local associations focused on culture, development, and regional
memory, and other non-legal groups such as Movement for the Autonomy of Rif (MAR) and Northern Morocco
Forum for Human Rights.
56 This observation is one of the results of our ﬁeldwork in the region.
57 Some groups claim the ‘Great Rif’, which covers Northern Morocco, from the Atlantic coast to the Algerian
border, and from the Mediterranean coast to the Rif Mountains, while others claim the territory formed by the
provinces of Al Hoceima and Nador along with certain parts of Taza and Berkane, a territory based exclusively on
linguistic criteria.
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From Reform to Resistance:
Universities and Student Mobilisation
in Egypt and Morocco before and
after the Arab Uprisings
FLORIAN KOHSTALL*
ABSTRACT University students played a pivotal role in the Arab uprisings in
2011. This article explores the link between reform policies and social
mobilisation through a comparison of university reforms and student protests in
Egypt and Morocco. It argues that both—the fabrication of social policies and the
formation of protest—are rooted in the speciﬁc political conﬁguration of
authoritarian regimes. Egypt and Morocco have both embarked on
internationalising higher education, but the monarchy was more successful in
embracing change through a more pluralistic type of governance. Hence,
Morocco was able to escape the disruptive dynamics of the uprising, unlike Egypt,
which was more reluctant to establish a new type of governance.
Introduction
When Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak had to step down in February 2011 after
18 days of popular protest, university presidents announced that state security
guards would be removed from campuses. This was only one step towards meeting
student demands, an attempt to avoid street protests spilling over into campuses.
Once President Muhammad Mursi was removed from power in July 2013,
university presidents demanded that their own security guards be authorised to
arrest students on campus. While in 2011 higher education was one of the ﬁrst
sectors to embrace a wider policy of liberalisation, it was the ﬁrst to adopt the new
security regime put in place by the military two years later.
This article argues that higher education is an instructive sector in which to
observe the dynamics of change and continuity in the wake of the Arab uprisings.
A comparison between university reforms in Egypt and Morocco will provide us
with a better understanding of how different regimes adjusted to domestic and
international pressure and how they succeeded or failed in limiting the scale of
protest. Like Tunisia, the Egyptian ‘republic’ underwent sweeping changes
through the uprising. While the military institution tried to guarantee the
continuity of the regime, a popular uprising that lasted for only 18 days managed
to remove Mubarak from ofﬁce. In Morocco the outcome of the 2011 protest cycle
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Conclusion
The regionalisation project, initially exalted as the greatest reform of the decade in
Morocco, was ironically relegated to a minor position by social protest and
political contestation demanding change, as increasing territorial autonomy was
not included among the demands of the rebellious street.
Despite some improvements in electoral procedures and representation quota,
the advanced regionalisation project highlights the Moroccan authoritarian state’s
fear of carrying out an actual decentralisation and transferring political functions
to regional entities, which might claim rights to cultural, linguistic and historical
diversity. In the frame of an unstable North African context, the Moroccan state
reacted by continuing with its Lampedusian style of change, establishing
commissions and initiating reforms to meet social demands, while real change is
only given in homeopathic doses.66 The advanced regionalisation project was
developed in an authoritarian context by a commission with no democratic
legitimacy. Two years after the presentation of the project and its constitutional
incorporation in 2011, the regional model is still in the king’s political laboratory,
as yet not implemented. The king’s philosophy of small steps, waiting for the right
moment to introduce reforms, may explain this delay. If not, it results from the
Moroccan tradition of undertaking long-standing reform processes that allow the
monarchy to remain the central actor promoting and capitalising on reforms and
controlled political change.
In sum, the project contains some innovations which constitute a change and
even an improvement when contrasted with previous iterations, such as direct
election of all members of the regional council, the implementation of decisions
by the president of the regional council, and new channels for citizen participation.
Yet there has been no motion towards more economic and political autonomy for
the regions, whereby regional councils would be able to collect taxes and reduce
state guardianship. The advanced regionalisation project strengthens the process
of decentralisation and deconcentration but does not complete it. It is not the ﬁrst
time that regional reform and decentralisation has been used in ofﬁcial discourse
to renovate state legitimacy. The monarch designed the regional reform and
beneﬁtted from the limited changes it introduces, allowing other state and social
actors to be involved in the process but only as consultants. The continuity in the
regional reform is reﬂected in the respect for the red lines established by the king,
evident in the limited transfer of power to the regions, non-recognition of cultural
particularism, and the maintenance of the unitary system and integrity of the
national territory.
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This article argues for a more careful assessment of reform policies and protests.
The question is not about the absence or ineffectiveness of reforms, but about the
way reforms are designed and implemented.10 As Tocqueville put it, ‘the most
dangerous moment for a government is when it starts to reform’.11 Change in
policymaking risks becoming a major cause of discontent. Still, the question is not
about reform per se, but about speciﬁc ways in which these reforms are carried out.
Even if their effect in terms of policy outcome may be low, processes of
policymaking allow us to observe certain changes, such as how regimes build new
coalitions or reinforce ties with certain constituencies and marginalise others.
If reforms do not immediately trigger unrest and uprisings, they can still spread the
seeds.
By taking higher education policy and student protests as an example, I contrast
how Egypt and Morocco have decided upon and implemented speciﬁc reform
policies and how the public has reacted to these reforms since the end of the 1990s.
My approach is informed by the study of public policy, a very popular approach in
‘Western’ political science that has however been widely neglected in Middle
Eastern studies.12 In recent years policymaking has become one of the most useful
areas to question the classic distinction between democratic and autocratic
regimes. In both regime types the realm of politics—competition for power—has
been challenged by the emergence of new movements and new forms of
mobilisation. At the same time the realm of policies—the distribution of public
resources—has witnessed new types of governance through the establishment of
speciﬁc policy forums, the selection of speciﬁc ‘stakeholders’, the role of experts,
and decision-making on multiple levels, from local to international.13 New forms
of governance have contributed to blur the boundaries between democratic and
authoritarian regimes.14 And while there is no direct cause-effect relation between
reform and resistance, changes in policymaking and dynamics in social
mobilisation are often linked.15 Through the analysis of a speciﬁc policy sector,
this article aims to closely explore these links and understand how change in a
policy sector affects regime stability.
Comparisons between Morocco and Egypt have a prominent place in Middle
Eastern studies. Numerous authors have emphasised the greater reform ﬂexibility
of monarchies compared to republics.16 This article demonstrates that this reform
ﬂexibility is also grounded in the speciﬁc types of governance that each regime has
10 For a similar approach, though more concentrated on macro-economic reforms, see Nadine Mourad Sika,
‘Dynamics of Development and Uprisings in the Arab World’,Mediterranean Quarterly, 24(4) (2013), pp. 43–67.
11 Alexis de Tocqueville, L’Ancien Re´gime et la Re´volution (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), pp. 171–172.
12 Aude Signoles, ‘Re´forme de l’Etat et transformation de l’action publique. Approche par les politiques
publiques’, in Elizabeth Picard (ed.), La politique dans le monde arabe (Paris: Armin Colin, 2006), pp. 239–261;
Florian Kohstall, ‘Coope´ration international et consolidation autoritaire: Les re´formes de l’enseignement
supe´rieur. Le cas de l’E´gypte et du Maroc’ (Doctoral thesis, Universite´ Aix Marseille III and Freie Universita¨t
Berlin, Aix-en-Provence and Berlin, 2009), http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/diss/receive/FUDISS_thesis_
000000036138, accessed 16 September 2014.
13 Michel Camau and Gilles Massardier (eds), De´mocraties et autoritarismes. Fragmentation et hybridation des
re´gimes (Paris: Karthala, 2009).
14 Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Convergence of Governance. Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World and
Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?’, Middle East Critique, 19(3) (2010), pp. 217–232.
15 Michel Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques: La dynamique des mobilisations multi-sectorielles (Paris:
Presses de Science Po, 2009).
16 Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Kings for All Seasons: How the
Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring’, Analysis Paper (Doha: Brookings Doha Center, 24
September 2013).
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was limited to constitutional reform and anticipated elections that left the reins of
power and the prerogatives of the monarchical institution largely untouched.
These very different outcomes and the scale of the uprisings raise the question of
how these regimes administer reform and how they tame resistance to it.
While many observers have emphasised rising social inequalities and
grievances as triggers of mass protest,1 the question of why regimes with similar
socioeconomic backgrounds are more or less vulnerable to social discontent is yet
to be described. A comparison of higher education reform alone will not explain
why Egypt and Morocco have been differently affected by waves of protests, but it
can illustrate how two authoritarian regimes rely on different forms of governance
and how this relates to different forms of resistance. Scholars of Middle Eastern
politics have often dismissed reforms as window dressing2 or deplored their
absence.3 Yet North African regimes have constantly tried to adapt to social
changes through reforms, even before the uprising. While higher education
systems in these countries are plagued by overcrowding and low quality, they have
not resisted the worldwide trend towards internationalisation, especially when it
comes to using international examples for university reform.4 This illustrates how
authoritarian regimes, despite their apparent stability and inertia, have proved
relatively ﬂexible in adapting to speciﬁc features of the global economy.
As Paola Rivetti shows in the introduction to this issue, change and stability in
Middle Eastern and North African countries have often been investigated either
through theoretical approaches to democratisation, or studies on authoritarian
regime stability.5 Within the frame of these approaches, analyses of sector policies
have largely concentrated on the missing link between economic and political
liberalisation. Reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus did not necessarily
contribute to the emergence of a new middle class asking for political liberties, but
rather to ‘networks of privilege’6 and ‘crony capitalists’7 on the one hand, and
increasing restrictions on freedom and modes of demobilisation on the other.8
These studies, despite their important contributions to the discipline, tend to pay
little attention to the resistance against these reforms and the unintended
consequences they might produce in different political contexts.9
1 Robert Springborg, ‘The Precarious Economics of Arab Springs’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 53(6)
(2011), pp. 85–104.
2 Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, ‘“Waiting for Godot”: Regime Change without Democratization in
the Middle East’, International Political Science Review, 25(4) (2004), pp. 371–392.
3 This is especially true for international donor organisations like the World Bank. See World Bank (ed.), The
Road Not Travelled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North Africa, Mena Development Report
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008).
4 The word ‘internationalisation’ has many different applications, from student mobility to joint teaching
programmes. Here I refer to internationalisation as a convergence of reform agendas in countries with very
different higher education systems and the transfer of reform receipts from one country to another. See Johnston
D. Bruce, Worldwide Reforms in the Financing and Management of Higher Education (Boston, MA: The
International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, 1998).
5 See Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity and Change before and after the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco.
Regime Reconﬁguration and Policymaking in North Africa’, this issue.
6 Steven Heydemann (ed.), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Press, 2004).
7 Hamouda Chekir and Ishac Diwan, ‘Crony Capitalism in Egypt’, Working Paper no. 250, Center for
International Development at Harvard University (CID), 2012.
8 Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: IB Tauris, 2001).
9 On the unintended consequences of neoliberal reform, though with a rather normative connotation on the effect
on democratisation, see Paul Aarts and Francesco Cavatorta (eds), Civil Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in
Authoritarian Contexts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013).
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Mubarak’s liberalisation policy, their privileged status did not prevent them
rebelling against the regime. On the contrary, the huge gap between the Western-
style education they received at the American University in Cairo (AUC) or
German University in Cairo (GUC), and the often archaic type of politics
promoted by the regime (a characteristic that became visible in 2010 with the
fraudulent parliamentary elections and the regime’s reaction to the Alexandria
church bombing in 2011), seemed an important catalyst for protest.21
Despite the rather unexpected nature of the uprising and the fact that students
were not the only group that made it succeed, it is possible to track student
mobilisation back to the development of higher education in Egypt. Until the end
of the 1970s political factions of Islamists, communists and Nasserists were very
active on campus. But in 1979 President Sadat limited the participation of students
and professors in inner-university decision-making circles and dissolved the
National Student Union (NSU). In each university, student unions continued to
exist, but Sadat’s successor, Mubarak, put university elections under judicial
supervision and reinforced the prerogatives of security forces on campuses in an
attempt to curtail Islamist forces.22 Thus, student activism evolved in alternative
forms of organisation outside the formal politics of student representation. From
the 2000s, student mobilisations concentrated mainly on foreign policy issues like
the third Iraq war or the second Palestinian Intifada. These events contributed to a
reinvigoration of student groups, as well as to the emergence of Kifaya, Egypt’s
most impactful protest movement during the 2000s.23 In March 2005, when
Mubarak announced competitive presidential elections for the ﬁrst time, a new
group of professors was formed, called the ‘9 March Movement’. Its establishment
marked the emergence of a new wave of professor and student activism, which
started to address university-related issues. The 9 March Movement mobilised
against speciﬁc measures of the Higher Education Enhancement Program (HEEP),
the government’s reform plan for public universities. In addition, important
advocacy groups like the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression
(AFTE) successfully challenged university administrations with legal cases
against the exclusion of politically active students and the presence of state
security guards on campus.24 At least since 2005 the university developed into an
important site where protest culture could develop under Mubarak. Neither higher
education reform nor student protest can be identiﬁed as a direct cause of the 2011
uprising, but they prepared the universities for it. When various organisations
called for protest on 25 January, students and professors quickly responded.
As well as the 6 April Movement—a key organisation behind the uprising that was
also very well represented on campus—the 9 March Movement was among the
ﬁrst groups to join the protests. Many protest marches on 25 and 28 January started
in front of university gates before joining the masses in Tahrir.25
21 Florian Kohstall, ‘Die a¨gyptische Revolution als Generationenkonﬂikt: Studierende und Professoren auf dem
Tahrir-Platz und in den Universita¨ten’, in Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber (eds), Revolution und
Regimewandel in A¨gypten (Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 2013), pp. 185–208.
22 Iman Farag, ‘L‘Universite´ e´gyptienne: enjeux de modes de mobilisation’, Monde arabe Maghreb-Machrek,
127 (1992), pp. 65–83.
23 Fre´de´ric Vairel, ‘Protesting in Authoritarian Situations: Egypt and Morocco on Comparative Perspectives’, in
Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and
North Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 27–42.
24 Author’s interview with a representative of AFTE (Cairo, 2013).
25 Kohstall, ‘Die a¨gyptische Revolution als Generationenkonﬂikt’.
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established in the past decade. It starts with an assessment of the role of students in
Egypt’s 25 January uprising to understand how a speciﬁc sector became a
mobiliser for revolt. The ﬁrst section is dedicated to Egypt only, due to the
prominent role that Egyptian students played in Mubarak’s removal and the
visibility they have gained through the uprising. The second and third sections
contrast approaches to reform in higher education in Egypt and Morocco since the
end of the 1990s. The fourth section demonstrates how change in higher education
is related to a speciﬁc political conﬁguration and how this conﬁguration shapes the
evolution of reform and protest pre- and post-2011.
The study builds on a long-term observation of university reforms in both
countries, mainly between 1998 and 2006. I have conducted numerous interviews
with stakeholders and examined ofﬁcial documents in order to understand how
these reforms have been prepared and implemented with the support of
international organisations. In particular, I have studied the composition and
working methods of reform commissions that Egypt and Morocco set up to
comply with the political conditionality of good governance demanded by the
World Bank (WB). In addition, in 2011 I began conducting numerous
conversations with student representatives and professors in Egypt that have
provided me with insights into their participation in different cycles of protest.
Student Protest in Egypt: From Pockets of Resistance to Multi-sectorial
Uprising
It is widely accepted that the young were the decisive ingredient in the 2011
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. This attributes an important role to students and
graduates.17 However, it is difﬁcult to identify them as an isolated group among
the masses that took to the streets between 25 January and 11 February. The
18 days of the uprising can be seen as a multi-sectorial mobilisation:18 members of
very different sectors of society took to the streets to protest against Mubarak’s
authoritarian rule. Workers and professionals also played important roles. While
these groups often organised separate marches from workplaces or syndicates,
they quickly joined the general demands and slogans (‘Bread, freedom and social
justice’), instead of formulating speciﬁc agendas. Students often went to protests
as ‘friends’, not as a homogenous protest group.19 Merging into the general protest
and overcoming speciﬁc demands helped to make the uprising successful.20
It is important to note the multi-sectorial nature of the uprising, not only to
avoid overestimating the role of students, but also to understand how different
student groups overcame the many cleavages that usually kept them apart (socially
and politically). Mobilisation was not limited to speciﬁc political groups or to
students from state universities. Students from the relatively recently created
private universities, who mostly come from wealthy households, joined the protest
in large numbers. While their families counted among the beneﬁciaries of
17 Michael Hoffmann and Amaney Jamal, ‘The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities’,
Middle East Law and Governance, 4 (2012), pp. 168–188.
18 Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques; on the Egyptian case, see Marie Vannetzel, ‘L’e´mergence d’une
mobilisation multisectorielle en E´gypte: des pre´misses contextuelles au basculement situationnel’, Working
Paper (Paris: Sciences Po, CERI, 2011).
19 Author’s interview with student representatives of Ain Shams University (Cairo, 2012).
20 Mona El-Gobashy, ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution’, Middle East Report and Information Project
(MERIP), 258(41) (2011).
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power through these concessions, their moves also illustrate how the regime
quickly lost control over the university sector once it entered into a cycle of protest
and ‘political crisis’.29
Egypt’s Higher Education Reform: Privatised and Piecemeal
Having shown how students from different social backgrounds joined forces and
how they could reach important concessions from university leaders, it is worth
looking back at Egypt’s higher education reform between 2000 and 2010. While
there may be no direct link between higher education policy and the uprising, we
can identify three factors that contributed to the emergence of pockets of
resistance and the possible defection of university leaders. First, Egypt fostered the
development of a parallel education system by authorising private universities.
These universities undermined the regime’s discourse on free and equal access to
higher education and questioned the social contract that presented education as a
driver for social mobility. Second, the government was too weak to set up a
comprehensive framework for reform and provide an alternative vision to the pre-
existing social contract. Third, given the corporatist nature of the state and its
strong reliance on international support, it was not able to build a consensus for
reform.
Since the mid-1990s, internationalisation emerged as both a driver and
buzzword for reform in Egypt, jointly promoted by foreign funding agencies and
domestic reform entrepreneurs. In 1999, in cooperation with the WB, the Ministry
of Higher Education and Scientiﬁc Research organised an international
symposium of university stakeholders. Foreign experts presented so-called best
practice examples from various Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and developing countries, and domestic experts were asked
to develop a national reform strategy.30 The event is a good example of how
international experts inform policymaking in Egypt. The WB had already
supported education reform on various levels through different projects and now
considered preparing a loan for higher education. However, it ﬁrst wanted a strong
commitment on the part of Egypt’s government to implement the reform through a
comprehensive and participatory approach.31
In order to achieve this, the minister, Mouﬁd Shehab, established a National
Committee for Higher Education Reform, including 25 stakeholders from the
university. Access to the decision-making process was very limited, however. The
minister relied mainly on a team composed of engineering professors that had
already worked together with the WB on a pilot project to reform engineering
faculties. He also called upon senior university ofﬁcials, former ministers and
powerful businessmen. Although the WB emphasised the participatory approach
of this committee, the Egyptian government did not include members of
opposition parties or grassroots organisations. Instead, the minister relied on sector
elites and foreign experts to draw up the reform plan. The few representatives of
29 Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques.
30 Supreme Council of Universities (Egypt) (ed.), Higher Education Enhancement Program—International
Symposium, 2 volumes (Cairo: Ministry of Higher Education and Scientiﬁc Research, 1999).
31 See in particular World Bank, Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, DC: The World
Bank, 1994); World Bank, Building Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Higher Education (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2002).
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The mass student mobilisation during the uprising should therefore not be
portrayed as a ‘sudden uprising’, but in continuity with contentious campus
politics and in connection to the regime’s attempts to reform and control
universities. The rupture between the small-scale protest then and the large-scale
mobilisation during the 18 days consists in a qualitative change in the protest
itself. While protest had previously existed in pockets of resistance and only
occasionally spilled out of campuses, after 25 January it reached far beyond and
quickly united with other sectors of society. On the one hand the students’ role in
the uprising was built on accumulated protest capital: through campus activism,
students had already gained important protest experience. This became crucial to
sustain the large-scale mobilisation. Many of the more passive students and
professors quickly joined the masses once they witnessed the ﬁrst success of the
uprising. On the other hand, by joining other groups, students could push their
mobilisation beyond the campus and their demands far beyond the university. As a
consequence, they could at least temporarily have a real impact on the evolution of
higher education. The overthrow of Mubarak opened a new window for academic
freedom, an issue that had been neglected in his higher education reform policies.
Once Mubarak was toppled, protests mainly revolved around demands to
remove senior university ofﬁcials such as deans and presidents.26 At the privately
owned GUC, students asked for the right to establish their own student union.
AUC students demanded a reduction in tuition fees and insights into the
university’s budget. One main achievement, however, was the revival of the NSU,
the organisation banned by Sadat in the late 1970s. Freshly elected student
representatives from all Egyptian universities re-established the NSU in August
2011, and started to draft a proposal for a new bylaw on student representation.27
This was not adopted until Mursi came to power. Consequently, students close to
the Muslim Brotherhood who won the student elections in 2012 controlled its ﬁnal
draft. Still, in 2011, straight after the uprising, the main demands concentrated on
greater participation and reactivating the open student politics that had
characterised the university system until the late 1970s.
The multi-sectorial uprising that spread from streets to campuses also quickly
contributed to a change in the strategy of certain university elites that were for a
long time the gatekeepers of the regime’s higher education policy. Shortly after
Mubarak stepped down, university presidents decided to remove state security
guards from campuses,28 announced free elections for student bodies and
eradicated symbols, such as name plaques, associated with the old regime. These
moves, although tentative, show a common understanding between students and
university leaders that crucial issues had been ignored in the higher education
reforms of the previous decade, despite their obviously very different motivations
in reacting to the uprising. If university leaders successfully tried to maintain
26 At Cairo University, protests focused on the dismissal of the dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication,
whom the students accused of being a fervent defender of Mubarak’s regime. A leaﬂet circulating in Tahrir
Square stated that the pashas and beys of the old regime should be removed from university administrations. See
‘The Students of Revolutionary Egypt’, Revolutionary Egypt, 2 (2011), p. 3, http://www.tahrirdocuments.org,
accessed 16 September 2014.
27 David Matthews, ‘Revolutionary Road’, Times Higher Education, 20 April 2012, http://www.
timeshighereducation.co.uk/419736.article, accessed 27 August 2014.
28 A court had already decided in 2010 that state security forces had to be banned from campus, but under
Mubarak’s rule the court decision was never implemented, as university presidents were not accorded the
necessary means to replace them with university guards.
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power through these concessions, their moves also illustrate how the regime
quickly lost control over the university sector once it entered into a cycle of protest
and ‘political crisis’.29
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buzzword for reform in Egypt, jointly promoted by foreign funding agencies and
domestic reform entrepreneurs. In 1999, in cooperation with the WB, the Ministry
of Higher Education and Scientiﬁc Research organised an international
symposium of university stakeholders. Foreign experts presented so-called best
practice examples from various Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and developing countries, and domestic experts were asked
to develop a national reform strategy.30 The event is a good example of how
international experts inform policymaking in Egypt. The WB had already
supported education reform on various levels through different projects and now
considered preparing a loan for higher education. However, it ﬁrst wanted a strong
commitment on the part of Egypt’s government to implement the reform through a
comprehensive and participatory approach.31
In order to achieve this, the minister, Mouﬁd Shehab, established a National
Committee for Higher Education Reform, including 25 stakeholders from the
university. Access to the decision-making process was very limited, however. The
minister relied mainly on a team composed of engineering professors that had
already worked together with the WB on a pilot project to reform engineering
faculties. He also called upon senior university ofﬁcials, former ministers and
powerful businessmen. Although the WB emphasised the participatory approach
of this committee, the Egyptian government did not include members of
opposition parties or grassroots organisations. Instead, the minister relied on sector
elites and foreign experts to draw up the reform plan. The few representatives of
29 Dobry, Sociologie des crises politiques.
30 Supreme Council of Universities (Egypt) (ed.), Higher Education Enhancement Program—International
Symposium, 2 volumes (Cairo: Ministry of Higher Education and Scientiﬁc Research, 1999).
31 See in particular World Bank, Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience (Washington, DC: The World
Bank, 1994); World Bank, Building Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Higher Education (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2002).
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draft. Still, in 2011, straight after the uprising, the main demands concentrated on
greater participation and reactivating the open student politics that had
characterised the university system until the late 1970s.
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Egypt’s higher education reform in the 2000s was thus characterised by the
state’s limited capacity to set up a framework to reform public universities,
resulting in a very selective approach to introducing internationalisation. Not only
was its inclusion of stakeholders limited, but it was also selective in reducing
international reform receipts to purely technocratic measures, establishing an
accreditation body without autonomy and adopting a grant-based approach with
limited outreach. While the government integrated buzzwords such as ‘building
centres of excellence’, ‘quality assurance’ and ‘ranking’ into its discourse, it did
not grant state universities the autonomy to compete in the international higher
education market. Security considerations, such as the control of students and
professors on campus, and the very centralised governance of universities allowed
only for very limited reform.
This selective approach to internationalisation opened up new pockets of
resistance. It not only spread discontent among students and professors, but also
weakened the trust of sector elites in the regime’s capacity to reform. Through a
persisting discourse of reform only partially implemented, students and professors
became aware of the contradictory nature of Egypt’s distorted version of
internationalised higher education. It exacerbated conﬂict between those who
wanted to introduce reform and those who feared for their privileges. In addition,
the new market of private universities widened the gap between public and private
education. The reform process did not provide channels for those disappointed by
the reform. The protest and resistance described above were thus closely linked to
the changes affecting higher education in the lead-up to the 2011 uprising.
Morocco: More Comprehensive Reform through Extended Pluralism
The crisis of higher education and the trend towards internationalisation are not
unique to Egypt. All North African countries, with the exception of Libya, have
undertaken important steps to reform their universities. An outstanding example is
Morocco, which has embarked on various reforms to become a close neighbour of
the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Comparing Morocco’s approach to
higher education reform with the Egyptian experience helps us to understand that
it is not reform or change per se that contributes to student protest, but rather the
way reform is operated. Compared to Egypt, Morocco’s higher education policy is
built on a different university system and has not given priority to establishing
private universities.35 More importantly, however, it tried to integrate stakeholders
into the decision-making process, putting in place a more comprehensive type of
reform.
The origins of Morocco’s current higher education reform can be traced back to
the mid-1990s when King Hassan II tried to integrate the socialist opposition party
into the government, shortly before his sonMuhammad VI succeeded him in 1999.
After assigning the leader of the socialist USFP (Union Socialiste des Forces
Populaires) party, Abderrahmane Youssouﬁ, to government responsibilities, he
announced the establishment of the Special Commission for Education and
Training (COSEF). This commission was composed of senior ofﬁcials from all
political parties and professional syndicates as well as representatives of non-
35 To date, Al Akhawayn is the only private university operating in Morocco. In contrast to Egypt, a division
between elite and mass education is not new to Morocco due to the coexistence of state universities and special
engineering and management schools built on the French model of Grandes E´coles.
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student and professor syndicates were all closely linked to Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party (NDP).32 Because of the government’s direct control over these
syndicates, they failed to channel the demands of university stakeholders in the
process and gain support for unpopular reform measures.
Reforms that sprang from the internationalisation strategy were manifested in
two ways: the establishment of private universities (so-called special universities
or gamaat khasat) and the HEEP (Higher Education Enhancement Program) to
reform state universities. In 1994 the Egyptian government had already
promulgated a law that authorised the creation of private universities. In 1997
four universities were established through private funding for the ﬁrst time. While
professional syndicates refused to recognise the diplomas given by these
institutions, businessmen received cheap land in Cairo’s outskirts to establish new
universities. International funding institutions showed interest in investing in this
new market of higher education. After the ﬁrst wave of ‘Egyptian-owned private
universities’, another wave of private universities built on foreign models
emerged, including the GUC, l’Universite´ Francaise de l’E´gypte (UFE), Al-
Ahram Canadian University and the British University in Egypt (BUE). Today, at
least 22 universities operate as ‘privately founded’ compared to 18 state
universities.33 Most of them were created in the period between 2002 and 2010, in
the framework of the neoliberal reform boom boosted by Mubarak’s son Gamal
and his team.
While private universities mushroomed in the 2000s, the reform strategy for
state universities, initiated at the aforementioned symposium, had little effect on
improving higher education. Projects to increase university staff salaries and
create a new legislative framework for universities were dropped, as both the
government and the WB feared the ﬁnancial burden and political controversy.
Instead they focused on a grant-based approach that would create incentives
instead of resistance, at least in the short term. Faculty members could now apply
for funding with projects aimed at designing new study programmes, reorganising
faculties’ management and introducing new teaching technologies. This reform
went relatively smoothly, but it had only a limited effect on improving the system.
Faculties that suffer less from overcrowding, such as engineering, science and
medicine, tended to win stakes in the project, while the faculties of commerce, law
and literature, that enrol 70 per cent of state university students, remained largely
untouched. Reform became more controversial with a second project, aimed at
establishing a National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of
Education (NAQAAE), built on the Anglo-Saxon accreditation model. Here, it
was not clear how an ‘independent body’ could now monitor universities without
having administrative, ﬁnancial or pedagogical autonomy. The establishment of
this national body fuelled the aforementioned 9 March Movement. While its
protest could only postpone the establishment of the agency, a new university law
presented in 2007 enabling universities to raise their own funding provoked wide
resistance and was consequently never adopted.34
32 Kohstall, Coope´ration internationale et consolidation autoritaire.
33 See the list of Egyptian universities on the site of the governmental Research, Development and Innovation
Programme (RDI): http://www.rdi.eg.net/DocumentLibrary/Documents/Universities%20%20Institutions%
20List.pdf, accessed 27 August 2014.
34 Iman Farag, ‘Going International: The Politics of Educational Reform in Egypt’, in Andre´ Mazawi and Ronald
Sultana (eds), Education and the Arab World: Political Projects, Struggles and Geometrics of Power (London:
Routledge [World Year Book of Education], 2009), pp. 283–299.
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Instead they focused on a grant-based approach that would create incentives
instead of resistance, at least in the short term. Faculty members could now apply
for funding with projects aimed at designing new study programmes, reorganising
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went relatively smoothly, but it had only a limited effect on improving the system.
Faculties that suffer less from overcrowding, such as engineering, science and
medicine, tended to win stakes in the project, while the faculties of commerce, law
and literature, that enrol 70 per cent of state university students, remained largely
untouched. Reform became more controversial with a second project, aimed at
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32 Kohstall, Coope´ration internationale et consolidation autoritaire.
33 See the list of Egyptian universities on the site of the governmental Research, Development and Innovation
Programme (RDI): http://www.rdi.eg.net/DocumentLibrary/Documents/Universities%20%20Institutions%
20List.pdf, accessed 27 August 2014.
34 Iman Farag, ‘Going International: The Politics of Educational Reform in Egypt’, in Andre´ Mazawi and Ronald
Sultana (eds), Education and the Arab World: Political Projects, Struggles and Geometrics of Power (London:
Routledge [World Year Book of Education], 2009), pp. 283–299.
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solution. The new minister had no choice but to adopt it if he wanted to move
forward with reform.40 The introduction of LMD illustrated that civil society actors
and sector elites called into these expert commissions were able to considerably
impact the policy reform, as long as the authority of the king remained untouched.
The reformwas presented as a necessity with no alternative to associatingMorocco
with the EHEA.41 While the Egyptian government was accused by many
academics and professors of relying heavily on theWB and bowing to international
pressure, Morocco could diffuse such criticism relatively well.
This more comprehensive approach notwithstanding, Morocco’s higher
education reform was also very controversial. Many professors saw the LMD
reform as a top-down decision they were forced to cope with. They felt disregarded
by a reform that would not improve teaching conditions or student mobility
between universities.42 Lacking substantial investments in infrastructure and
payments, the new degrees only served faculties suffering less from overcrowding
and already beneﬁting from cooperation with European universities. However,
protest against the reform remained sporadic and isolated. Before 2011, student
protests took place in speciﬁc faculties and centred on corporatist demands such as
tuition fees and the material conditions of students. After 2011 several initiatives
emerged advocating a comprehensive reform of the education system. But the
National Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM), which once represented the large
majority of Moroccan students, remained in a deadlock due to the conﬂict between
Islamist and leftist factions. While students and graduates played an important role
in the 2011 protests, UNEM could not use them to gain ground. Students indeed
participated in protests through channels not directly linked to the university.
In sharp contrast with Egypt, the 2011 protests inMorocco remainedmore localised
and more strongly grounded in political afﬁliations. While the 20 February
movement successfully galvanised protest inMorocco after the uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt, it depended on the support of existing political parties and NGOs. This
factor inhibited the spill-over into a more lasting multi-sectorial uprising and made
the movement more vulnerable to the palace’s reform responses.43
Another factor that limited the scale of the protests that emerged out of
universities was that many former student activists and professors critical of
the regime had been co-opted through the aforementioned ‘commission politics’,
the regime’s discourse on social policy reform and ‘democratic transition’ in the
decade preceding the Arab uprisings. Various royal initiatives such as education
reform and subsequent initiatives such as the reform of the personal status law and
the vast operation of the National Initiative for Human Development integrated
many professors and university leaders as experts into the realm of power.44
In conclusion, Morocco’s higher education reform also opened up pockets of
resistance. But the palace carefully established ties with sector elites during this
40 Author’s interview with a member of the expert committee (Aix-en-Provence, 2009).
41 Abdelfettah Benchenna, ‘L’appui de la France a` la Re´forme de l’Enseignement supe´rieur au Maroc: quelles
ﬁnalite´s et quels enjeux?’, Journal of Higher Education in Africa/Revue de l’enseignement supe´rieur en Afrique,
7(1–2) (2009), pp. 121–140.
42 Ahmed Ghouati, ‘Re´forme LMD au Maghreb: e´le´ments pour un premier bilan politique et pe´dagogique’,
Journal of Higher Education in Africa/Revue de l’enseignement supe´rieur en Afrique, 7 (1–2) (2009), pp. 61–77.
43 Ahmed Benchemsi, ‘Feb20’s Rise and Fall: A Moroccan Story’, Le Blog de Ahmed Benchemsi, 17 February
2013, http://ahmedbenchemsi.com/feb20s-rise-and-fall-a-moroccan-story, accessed 27 August 2014; Fre´de´ric
Vairel, ‘“Qu’avez-vous fait de vos vingt ans?” Militantismes marocains du 23 mars (1965) au 20 fe´vrier (2011)’,
L’Anne´e du Maghreb, VIII (2012), pp. 219–238.
44 Vairel, ‘“Qu’avez-vous fait de vos vingt ans?”’.
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governmental organisations (NGOs) active in the education sector. The
commission was meant to establish a national consensus on education policy, in
particular on the most controversial issues, such as language and free education.36
After four months of debate, the parties presented the Charter on Education and
Training, intended to serve as a ‘moral compass’ for education policy regardless of
which party would be in government.37
The decision-making process in Morocco differed signiﬁcantly from that in
Egypt as far as pluralism and representation were concerned. By integrating the
country’s most important political parties and syndicates, the palace could pretend
to represent the diversity of Morocco’s political landscape and, above all, integrate
different political currents from leftist to Islamist into the political process. While
the king closely monitored the commission proceedings, most political parties,
syndicates and experts accepted the palace’s tutelage. Through this type of
inclusion into the policy process, the palace built a buffer for contentious politics.
Powerful syndicates like the National Syndicate for Higher Education (SNEsup)
entered the realm of politics through participation in the COSEF and, in exchange,
they had to refrain from protest at least temporarily. Internal divisions plagued
syndicates as a consequence. COSEF was also a mechanism of divide and rule in
the king’s hands.
In Morocco, the comprehensive approach of ‘commission politics’ has had
tangible effects on policy outcomes. It enabled the palace to re-establish strong ties
with sector elites. Unlike Egypt, where reform was introduced through ﬁnancial
incentives for the faculty, Morocco’s university reform started with a change in
universities’ leadership. After all political parties approved a new university law in
2000, a new system for selecting university presidents and faculty deans was
implemented. Faculty members suggested three candidates through elections, but
the ﬁnal selection of the candidate was left to the palace. Through this new
selection process the palace afﬁrmed its direct control over universities, all by
making university presidents the main actors of the reform. While in Egypt the
responsibility for reform rested mainly on the central government, meaning that
any resistance would be directed against it, in Morocco implicating university
presidents could localise protest and thus make it easier to diffuse.38
A good example of how university reform under this new system worked is the
introduction of the so-called LMD (Licence, Master, Doctorat) system in 2003.39
This international model acted like a ‘magic wand’ for a reform that had long been
debated. Since the approval of the new university law in 2000, the Ministry of
Higher Education had set up several commissions and committees to discuss the
establishment of a new pedagogical framework for universities. Different models
were considered, but no consensus was reached. When the minister had to step
down in 2002 an expert committee composed of university professors seized the
opportunity to ﬁnalise the pedagogical reform draft, endorsing the LMD as the best
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PhD (Doctorat) system to all European universities.
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socialist USFP leader government responsibility. Only one year later the king
created COSEF, presenting himself as the only reform champion in the country.
Thus, in reacting to the 2011 protests, Mohamed VI deployed a ‘governance
toolkit’ that had already proved successful under the rule of his father and had
even improved during the past decade.
This type of governance builds on a unique type of pluralism, one of political
parties and civil society organisations beneath the supremacy of the king.
It enables the palace to present itself as the agenda-setter of reform and to
constantly re-establish ties with political and sector elites. As F. Gregory Gause
has argued, it is not necessarily a unique legitimacy or functional superiority that
makes monarchies better at adjusting to international norms and new actors in the
political arena.48 Rather, the Moroccan monarchy draws on an extraordinary
ability to build new coalitions, integrate new actors and extend its pluralism when
necessary. This makes it much more difﬁcult for opposition to organise and
materialise. Political parties’ hunger to run affairs leaves an important impression
of change, which for a large part of the population neutralises resistance.
In addition, political parties and associations channel popular demands and diffuse
protest.
In the past decade, theWB asked the governments in Egypt andMorocco to take
on a participatory approach to comprehensively preparing and implementing
reforms. But only Morocco expanded the realm of decision-making to political
parties and civil society representatives. On the contrary, Egypt remained in a
deadlock, in which only sector and business elites close to the ruling party were
included. This illustrates Egypt’s inability to operate the necessary changes to
governance due to its existing political conﬁguration. While the Moroccan
monarchy can tolerate a vibrant scene of concurring political parties and civil
society organisations, the Egyptian republic was bound to de facto one-party rule.
Under a system in which the president had to rely on the party that gained the
parliamentary majority, party pluralism was only a tool to give one-party rule a
democratic appearance.49 Pluralism could only exist within professional
syndicates and the ruling elite itself, both tied to the state through corporatist
arrangements. The decision-making process in higher education illustrates that no
opposition party—either legal or illegal but tolerated like the Muslim
Brotherhood—had an impact on reform. Instead, the minister surrounded himself
with businessmen, selected university representatives and senior ofﬁcials from the
NDP. This type of governance was too weak to make reform comprehensive.
It served the NDP’s core constituency and ignored political and social groups
emerging outside the party’s sphere of inﬂuence.
Morocco’s greater reform ﬂexibility should not be confused with a system of
democratic governance. On the contrary, the king’s constant endeavour to
integrate new actors into the realm of governance only stabilises his own
hegemony. The system is a way to co-opt emerging actors from political parties
and civil society organisations. It is also a way of depoliticising the struggle for
reform in the name of a more technocratic type of global governance.50 This
system had a lasting effect on political mobilisation in the last decade. As Fre´de´ric
48 Gause, ‘Kings for All Seasons’.
49 Maye Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999).
50 Be´atrice Hibou, ‘Le Mouvement du 20 fe´vrier, le Makhzen et l’Antipolitique: L’Impense´ des Reformes au
Maroc’ (Paris: Les dossiers du CERI, May 2011).
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process. Before confronting the university with change, the palace fabricated a
consensus on the future directions of reform. It efﬁciently promoted a new
university law and reorganised universities from the top through the selection of
new presidents. Finally, it presented reform through the LMD system as an
international constraint. By doing so it was successful in building a buffer against
protest. In particular, the wide stakeholder participation in the reform process was
important to spread responsibility for reform on multiple shoulders. In Morocco,
reform kept university leaders, professors and students busy, while in Egypt it
widened the gap between reform-oriented faculty members and those resisting it.
Different Types of Governance and the Continuity of Speciﬁc Political
Conﬁgurations
Comparing Egypt’s and Morocco’s higher education reform shows that both
countries have undertaken several steps to adjust universities to a global education
market. But the comparison also reveals important contrasts in how the two
regimes have prepared and implemented reforms. While Morocco chose a more
inclusive decision-making process, Egypt’s reform process remained piecemeal
due to its limited capacity to integrate different stakeholders. Those contrasts are
not unique to university reform; they illustrate the distinct types of governance the
two regimes established prior to the uprisings.
In Morocco, the palace’s ﬂexibility in responding to popular demands with
spectacular reforms remains the most important silencer of protest and the politics
of commissions became the palace’s favourite instrument for monitoring reforms.
Other types of reform, such as the personal status law (Mudawana), were prepared
under similar conditions.45 The palace has repeatedly relied on this system,
whereby representatives from political parties and civil society are hand-picked by
the king in order to administer change and expand the
. . . dense fabric of political ‘intermediaries’: actors inside and outside of the institutional
sphere . . . that serve as links between the centre of power and society: a buffer
contributing to the consensual management of change and, in moments of crisis, helping
to dilute responsibilities, absorb criticism or take the blows.46
To tame the 20 February protest in 2011, the king established the Consultative
Commission for the Reform of the Constitution that prepared the constitutional
changes adopted via referendum in June 2011. Moreover, he accelerated the
establishment of the Economic and Social Council, reactivated the National
Initiative for Human Development and granted more independence to the National
Council on Human Rights. In combination with anticipated parliamentary
elections and the subsequent change in government—entrusted for the ﬁrst time to
the Islamist Justice and Development Party leader Abdelilah Benkirane—this
strategy effectively weakened the 2011 protests.47 Morocco’s education reform
started with a similar move, when the current king’s father, Hassan II, gave the
45 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ‘Woman, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle over the Personal Status
Law’, Middle East Journal, 59(3) (2005), pp. 394–410.
46 Irene Ferna´ndez Molina, ‘The Monarchy vs. the 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political
Change in Morocco?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(3) (2011), pp. 435–441, at p. 436.
47 Anouar Boukhars, ‘The Lesson from Morocco and Jordan: Reform or Perish’ (Washington, DC: Middle East
Institute, 1 September 2011), http://www.mei.edu/content/lesson-morocco-and-jordan-reform-or-perish,
accessed 27 August 2014.
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political process) limited the regime’s ability to prepare for necessary changes.
Even after Mubarak stepped down, no serious attempt was undertaken by the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces to engage civil society and protest groups in an
institutionalised form of negotiation. Through limited changes to the constitution
and a quick passage to elections, the military attempted to reactivate the political
regime constructed under Mubarak’s predecessors Gamal Abdel Nasser and
Anwar El-Sadat.
To conclude, one could say that Morocco embraced continuity through change,
while Egypt had to go through change because of continuity. It remains to be seen
to what extent the uprising in Egypt will have a lasting effect on the political
conﬁguration and on the way reforms are prepared and implemented. So far, it
seems that the political conﬁguration will survive not only the constraints imposed
by the internationalisation of higher education, but also the transformations that
affected the country in the aftermath of the uprisings. As far as higher education is
concerned, many of the changes students achieved after the uprising have been
quickly reversed. As early as 2011, most of the university presidents in power were
able to preserve their positions despite the temporary introduction of elections.
In 2014, President Abdelfattah Sisi decided that presidents and deans would be
nominated again, not elected. In addition to strong continuity in terms of the
individuals and institutions that shape the country, the security regime in
universities and elsewhere has been revitalised. As long as universities are merely
considered a security issue and not a space for learning and scientiﬁc research, real
change in higher education will not happen and internationalisation will remain a
buzzword rather than a paradigm for change.
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Vairel shows, some of Morocco’s protest leaders are the inheritors of the constant
struggle with the monarchy, but nowadays they are profoundly integrated into the
political institutions the monarchy set up. The politics of commissions has opened
new channels of participation for these former protest leaders. Consequently they
act more as intermediaries for the king than as catalysts for the newly formed
protest movements.51 For those not yet included, such as the diploˆme´s choˆmeurs,
one of Morocco’s most prominent movements, protest becomes a means to get
access to the system rather than change it.52 This illustrates that the constant
reactivation of Morocco’s political conﬁguration through new instruments of
governance determines its capacity for reform, but also has an impact on the forms
and scale of social mobilisation.
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article I argued that comparing higher education reforms
in Egypt and Morocco enables us to draw a more nuanced picture of change and
continuity in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’. Through the comparative analysis of
policy reform, we could explore how reform in one sector opened up pockets of
resistance and how these pockets could become, or not, the seeds of larger protests.
As a result, the article demonstrated that Egypt’s limited reform capacity in higher
education was one factor that contributed to the uprising. In contrast, Morocco
seemed equipped to contain pockets of protest and thereby limit the scale of the
uprising. To draw a more comprehensive picture of the link between social
reforms and the uprising in Egypt it would be necessary to conduct a similar
analysis on other sectors and understand how contention in different sectors could
ﬁnally lead to a multi-sectorial uprising where students, workers and liberal
professions joined forces.
But apart from exploring the link between social reform and social
mobilisations, policy analysis could also identify changes and continuities before
and after the Arab uprisings. The study of policy reform demonstrates that while
Morocco appears to be a haven of stability compared to Egypt and Tunisia, this
stability is related to its capacity to constantly adapt its mode of governance. Its
political conﬁguration allows for greater participation of political parties and civil
society in reform processes. Thus, compared to Egypt, the Moroccan monarchy
could more easily face the challenges presented by the internationalisation of
higher education and, apparently, by the uprising in 2011.
The 25 January uprising in Egypt also illustrates the government’s failure to
introduce change to its system of governance. To be successful the uprising
needed the multi-sectorial character described above. But therefore it was
important that sector elites were easily convinced of the likely deterioration of the
regime. In the absence of meaningful change to the system of governance, the
younger generation, university elites and large parts of the middle class apparently
shared this perception.53 Thus, Egypt’s political conﬁguration (a de facto one-
party system that acted as civil counterpart to the military’s control over the
51 Vairel, ‘“Qu’avez-vous fait de vos vingt ans?’”.
52 Montserrat Emperador Badimon, ‘Ou` sont les diploˆme´s choˆmeurs? Un exemple de pragmatisme protestataire a`
l’e´poque du 20 fe´vrier’, Conﬂuences Me´diterrane´e, 78 (2011), pp. 77–91.
53 Hazem Kandil, ‘Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?’,Mediterranean Politics, 17(2)
(2012), pp. 197–215.
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younger generation, university elites and large parts of the middle class apparently
shared this perception.53 Thus, Egypt’s political conﬁguration (a de facto one-
party system that acted as civil counterpart to the military’s control over the
51 Vairel, ‘“Qu’avez-vous fait de vos vingt ans?’”.
52 Montserrat Emperador Badimon, ‘Ou` sont les diploˆme´s choˆmeurs? Un exemple de pragmatisme protestataire a`
l’e´poque du 20 fe´vrier’, Conﬂuences Me´diterrane´e, 78 (2011), pp. 77–91.
53 Hazem Kandil, ‘Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?’,Mediterranean Politics, 17(2)
(2012), pp. 197–215.
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political and social forces to oppose them, some of which are still linked to the
power structures of the authoritarian past, as the Egyptian case highlights. The
persistence and even deepening of the economic crisis, together with the absence of
immediate material beneﬁts for large strata of the population, has led the parties
now in power to be accused of incompetence and unaccountability, which is a point
that alsoHaniehmakes in his contribution to this special issue.3 A sort of longing for
the relative economic stability of the pre-revolutionary period has also re-emerged.
This occurs at a time of high volatility with members of the former ruling elite
attempting to come back on the scene, claiming to be the only individuals capable of
dealing with the inefﬁcacious squabbling between the new political contenders.
As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian case is the most extreme example of this
dynamic, with the return of the military as ultimate decision-maker in the political
struggle, but the Libyan case also points to the messiness of post-authoritarian
politics and the longing for a degree of stability and security. Thus, while much has
certainly changed following the fall of Mubarak, Ben Ali and other dictators in the
region, there are also a number of continuities that affect states and politics.4
Tunisia has much in common with these regional transitional trends,
demonstrating both change from and continuity with its past. This article makes a
fundamental claim from which an analysis of both change and continuity derives.
It suggests that the process of regime change with the institutionalisation of the
Islamist party Al-Nahda is the outcome of a long nation-building process and that it
might not as revolutionary as it ﬁrst seemed. While the revolution gave the
opportunity to a conservative middle class to be included within the structures of
power through its political representative, Al-Nahda, marking a changewith the past,
this has come at the price of the continuing neglect of Tunisia’s disenfranchised, who
remain excluded from power-sharing dynamics in continuity with the past.
At the beginning of the 1980s, two broad different trends occupied the scene of
the opposition camp in Tunisia: Islamist and liberal. Their ideological disputes and
confrontations emerged in the context of the political struggle for democratisation,
but the two camps did not manage to cooperate successfully to provide a viable
alternative to the regime in place. By the end of the 1980s, the conﬂict between the
two became in fact so intense that the self-deﬁned secular liberal parties largely
stood with the regime against the Islamists.5 This confrontation between Islamists
and liberals does not simply have an ideological dimension; it also coincided with
a social class conﬂict. Different social classes in Tunisia have been struggling
since independence to be included in the process of state-building. In the nation-
building process, class struggle does not only produce the domination of one class
over another.6 The dominant class also develops a national narrative for its own
3 EmmaMurphy, ‘The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy’,Mediterranean Politics, 16(2)
(2011), pp. 299–305. See also: AdamHanieh, ‘Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual? Continuity and Change in
the post-2011 IMF and World Bank Engagement with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt’, British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
4 Goldberg Ellis, ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak’, Foreign Affairs, February 11, 2011 (http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/67416/ellis-goldberg/mubarakism-without-mubarak, accessed September 18, 2014).
5 Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up?
Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 38
(3) (2011), p. 335.
6 I refer here to Antonio Gramsci’s classical theory of hegemony, which examines how the dominant class builds
an ideological apparatus in order to establish and strengthen its hegemony through ideology. Antonio Gramsci,
Quaderni del carcere. Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura, Vol. II (Torino: Einaudi, 1948–1951),
p. 9.
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process of institution-building through the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion
that have their origin in the Bourguibian period. While Al-Nahda compromised
with opposition secular parties accomplishing the integration of a moderate
Islamist middle-class excluded from power since independence, continuous
political mobilisation and urban revolt in parallel with the liberalisation of the
public space gave birth to a new radical Islamic subject, Ansar al-Sharia, which
represents disenfranchised lower classes that remain excluded from enjoying the
beneﬁts of the revolution. The article highlights how this exclusion is in continuity
with Tunisia’s modern history, where the threat of radical Islamism has often been
deployed to mystify social class exclusion.
Introduction
Following the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisia has been undergoing a difﬁcult democratic
transition.1 The ﬁnal outcome of this process might not be the liberal-democratic
system that many external observers wished for, although the approval of a new
constitution in early 2014 suggests that this outcome might not be as far-fetched as
it ﬁrst seemed. Whatever the ultimate institutional outcome, the fall of the regime
opened up spaces for the participation of citizens, political parties, civil society
groups and social movements to mobilise and advance their visions of the future.
The country moved rapidly towards a new political and social framework in which
freedom of expression, in sharp contrast with the past, is an untouchable hallmark.
This change into a ‘democracy’ is however less than coherent and different
outcomes to the 2011 revolution are still possible.2 Similarly to the other countries
that witnessed revolutionary changes, different political and social trends have
appeared in Tunisia, often contradicting one another. From a regional perspective,
there are a number of elements that stand out. The emergence of Islamist parties as
the leading actors in the region has led to the creation of a coalition of different
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appointed government, which drew legal legitimacy from what has been deﬁned as
the ‘general consensus’,9 elaborated a new institutional plan. Under the pressure of
the revolutionary street, the old constitution, the ruling party—the RCD—and the
department of the political police were dissolved. The same revolutionary
movement provided, in exchange, the necessary legitimacy for the transitional
government to accomplish the mission of leading the country towards the
foundational democratic election of the Constituent Assembly (CA). In parallel to
the government, a representative Assembly for the realisation of the goals of the
revolution (ISROR, its French acronym) was formed including a large spectrum of
political views, guaranteeing a degree of pluralism in the process. Although the
attempt at framing regime change as a democratic process was not new in
Tunisia,10 this time a genuine democratic praxis was developed. In fact, through
the ﬁrst transparent elections in the country’s history, the election of the CA was
the evidence of a radical change in the traditional process of Tunisia’s state-
building.
As a nation-state, Tunisia was born out of independence from France in 1956;
the idea of nation was the ideological underpinning of the nationalist movement.
Similar to other countries of the region, nationalism was the outcome of the
liberation struggle against the coloniser. Those involved in the process of nation-
building after independence came from the middle class and the French education
system, which provided them with the ideological tools to build the new state.
Chief among the dominant ideals this middle class held was modernity,
understood as the overcoming of both economic and social underdevelopment,
which was believed to be the product of backward institutions and social habits
such as religious faith.11
This new middle class constituted the backbone of the bureaucracy in
independent Tunisia and utilised nationalism and a progressive idea of
modernisation to legitimise the institutions of the state.12 Bourguiba framed this
drive towards modernisation through the marginalisation of Islam, relegating it to
the private sphere, and through the injection of secular practices and Western-
oriented economic and social institutions into the public sphere. Despite its
authoritarian nature, which characterised Ben Ali’s time as well, many secular-
modernist Tunisians shared the goal of developmental modernisation and felt that
Islamism was an obstacle to it. In reality, the generation that struggled for
independence against France was split in two factions, both of which were
nevertheless committed to the idea and goal of modernisation. One faction was led
by Bourghiba and the other by Salah Ben Youssef.13 The Bourghibian faction
prevailed in this internal struggle and isolated its adversary. The visions these
factions had for Tunisia’s future, however, had different cultural underpinnings,
9 The ‘general consensus’ was the expression deployed by Tunisian jurists to legally justify the new government
and the new assembly’s mandates, which lasted longer than the two months provided for in the constitution.
10 Lisa Anderson, ‘Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy: The Tunisian national pact of 1988’,Government
and Opposition, 26(2) (1991), pp. 244–260.
11 Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 1999).
12 James Bill, ‘Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 3(4) (1972), pp. 417–434; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and EmmaMurphy, ‘Transformation of
the Corporatist State in the Middle East’, Third World Quarterly, 17(4) (1996), pp. 753–772. See also Michael
Ayari, S’engager en regime autoritaire: Gauchistes et Islamistes dans la Tunisie inde´pendante (The`se de
Doctorat, Universite´ Paul Ce´zanne Aix-Marseille III, 2009).
13 Kenneth Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 249.
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purposes, in order to secure its hegemony, engendering dynamics of inclusion and
exclusion. In Tunisia, the modern nation state was built on the basic principle of
modernisation. In order to realise it, the national leadership needed a unifying
ideology in which national belonging was translated into a myth based on national
identity, the tunisianite´. Inclusion into the national ethos was and still is the
condition for the success of the process of democratisation. Thus, the conﬂicting
dynamics that emerged after regime change in 2011 must be explained as a process
in which the new and old powers struggle one against the other; the new emerging
powers ﬁght to be included, the older ones to exclude the former. In short, the heirs
of Bourguibian nationalism, allied with liberal and left-wing parties, have used the
ideological tool of ‘modernity’ to exclude since at least the 1970s the ‘new kids on
the block’—the Islamists—from shaping the national narrative and ethos of the
modern Tunisian state, labelling them as ‘backward.’ However, through both
electoral legitimacy and political moderation,7 the Islamists have now entered the
political system and in some ways accepted the concept of tunisianite´, signalling a
rupture with the past and striking an uneasy compromise with sectors of the
secular left.
The process of radicalisation of the disenfranchised youth, on the contrary, is
part of the struggle of marginalised social classes to be included in the ‘Nation’.8
Their exclusion from the nation-building process and institutions of governance,
and particularly from the beneﬁts of the economy, is the most powerful indicator
of what has not changed in Tunisia. Thus, change and continuity can be explained
in the framework of a transitional process whereby new and old actors are trying to
ﬁnd a deal to live with each other in a democratic country, where one can
legitimately take part without annihilating the other.
The notions of change and continuity are deployed to examine the Tunisian
transition at both elite and grassroots levels. In the ﬁrst part of the article, I follow
the evolution of the inclusion/exclusion dynamic focusing on the middle class and
its transformations throughout Tunisian history since independence. In the second
part, I focus on Ansar al-Sharia, a radical Salaﬁ movement that emerged in the
aftermath of the Jasmine revolution. I propose that the conservative Islamist-
leaning middle-class is keener on compromise and accepts continuity with the past
for the sake of inclusion, whereas AST can be seen as a social movement working
towards the mobilisation of the disenfranchised for radical change.
Inclusion in and Exclusion from the Process of Institution-building
Since the January 14th revolution, political elites struggled to ﬁnd a constitutional
solution to the vacuum of power caused by the departure of the president. A newly
7 Alaya Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation: 1980–2008’, The Journal of
North African Studies, 14(2) (2009), pp. 257–272; Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, ‘Moderation through
Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party’, Democratization,
20(5) (2013), pp. 857–875.
8 Despite more recent ﬁndings on the middle class leaning towards radical Islamism, previous studies point to
the connection between on the one side Salaﬁsm and radical Islamic movements and, on the other side, social
exclusion and disenfranchised social groups. Gilles Kepel (Le prophe`te et Pharaon. Les mouvements islamistes
dans l’Egypte contemporaine (Paris: La De´couverte, 1984) explains, for example, how the emergence of radical
Islamic movements in the 1970s was the effect of rural migration towards the city and consequent social
exclusion. Patrick Haenni, L’ordre des Caids: conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire (Paris: Karthala, 2005)
also reaches similar conclusions after his ethnographic research in one poor neighbourhood of Cairo. For the case
of Algeria, see Louis Martinez, The Algerian civil war, 1990–98 (Chicago: Columbia University Press, 2000).
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modernists. Crucially, they are by implication challenging the middle-class
compromise upon which the new Tunisia is being constructed. This has resulted in
the re-emergence of old repressive practices, representing continuity with the past,
when it comes to dealing with challengers who claim that they are not included in
this revised concept of tunisianite´ and are therefore excluded from both its
material and identity beneﬁts.
The ‘Deep State’ and the Institutional Democratic Praxis
In post-Ben Ali’s Tunisia, institution-building began with the experience of the
Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution. It was the ﬁrst time in Tunisian
history that councils were gathering and discussing freely and democratically.19 In
addition to political representatives, human rights groups, feminist organisations
and the bar association also participated, along with young bloggers and
representatives from the ‘remote’ regions of inner Tunisia.20 After the October
2011 elections, the ANC (the constitutional assembly) became the real arena of
political conﬂict. In this phase of the process, and for the ﬁrst time in the history of
the country, all different cultural and political traditions gathered and debated
foundational issues.21
However, the institutional process of change engendered by the 2011 uprising
was limited to a speciﬁc social class: the middle class. In part this reﬂects how
negotiated political transitions work: dealing with rules and procedural
mechanisms ﬁrst to the detriment of regulating and solving economic and social
conﬂicts. It would be impossible to deal with social conﬂicts in a democratising
country, when the institutions of the state need to be rebuilt amidst great volatility;
they are left for later, once the political system is stable. This type of transitions
favours democratic liberty over wealth redistribution, with the middle class being
both the protagonist and the beneﬁciary of it.22 In Tunisia, the majority of the
population was side-lined by this process, partly because material preoccupations
were prioritised over debates about institutions and procedural mechanisms, and
partly because the process itself failed to include them by focusing emphatically
on identity and rules rather than economics. The revolutionary process expressed
the frustration of both a new generation and a marginalised social class that
remained on the margins of the institutional process of democratic transition. Most
of those involved in Tunisia’s negotiated transition23 either belong to an older
generation or represented, like Al-Nahda, those who wanted to compromise in
order to be integrated into the national project. The collaboration between the
liberals who opposed Ben Ali’s authoritarianism but not his secular modernisation
project, and the Islamists started in the mid 2000s, when Al-Nahda’s moderation
19 Sami Zemni, ‘The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making’,
Mediterranean Politics (2014. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.
874108#.VCmdGPldWpA
20 Representatives from the regions of the interior were invited because of the important role they played during
the uprising and because they represent the socio-economic divide existing in the country. Such developmental
divide has been recognised as one of the main sources of social injustice.
21 Rym Abidi, vice-president of a network of development associations, interview with the author, Tunis
September 29, 2013.
22 As also noted by Giuseppe di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990).
23 Gianluca Parolin, ‘Constitutions against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa’, British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
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with Bourguiba’s faction looking to Atatu¨rk’s model and being inﬂuenced by
French rationalism, whereas the Yousseﬁst faction was aligned with pan-Arabism
and looked at the experience of Nasser. After independence, Bourguiba got rid of
Ben Youssef and the so-called ‘Zeitunian heritage’,14 because it was in conﬂict
with Bourguiba’s radically secular vision of modernisation. In fact, the Zeitunian
sheikhs were considered the highest representatives of the old social order and as
such they were perceived to be against modernisation. It followed that the part of
the middle class aligned with Ben Youssef was marginalised from enjoying the
spoils of power.15 The transitional process of 2011 has included contestation of the
Bourguibian conception of tunisianite´,16 with the old Islamic/pan-Arabic ethos
resurfacing and ﬁnding new legitimacy thanks to the arrival of Al-Nahda to power.
Thus, while the social and political modernist-nationalist bloc17 seemed to be
the real loser of the transitional process, the traditionally excluded Islamists
became the largest political movement in the country. Partially reprising Ben
Youssef’s nationalist discourse and agenda, they demanded a more democratic
process of institution-building through Al-Nahda and, in part, the Congress for the
Republic Party.18 Thus, it seemed that the post 2011 democratisation process
ﬁnally included those social groups previously excluded.
The conﬂict between the nationalist middle-class (over-represented in the
bureaucratic and repressive apparatuses, and enjoying an enormous ideological
prestige) and the Islamic conservative middle class was the main obstacle to
democratisation and inclusive state-building in post-independence Tunisia. The
2011 revolution permitted a sort of reconciliation between these two ideologically
different middle classes. It is the compromise between them that drives the
Tunisian transition today. This compromise constitutes a genuine change with
respect to the past because there is agreement, albeit implicit and at times
contested, that the Islamist ethos has to be integrated and has to contribute to the
new democratic Tunisia.
The delicate balance between these two opposite forces—Islamic and secular—
is in many ways the factor determining the balance between change and continuity
in post-revolution Tunisia. One the one hand, there is continuity in the sense that
despite pluralism, or possibly because of it, the struggle between Islamism and the
French-inspired modernism with its emphasis on laicite´ is still very much present,
as the debates around contested issues like individual freedoms show. On the other
hand, there is also signiﬁcant rupture with the past because traditional Islamism
has become multifaceted and diverse, and the effort that Al-Nahda and the
modernists are making to ﬁnd a compromise to secure Tunisia’s democratic future
is challenged by other powerful, more radical Islamist forces. These groups are not
only challenging the contents of the compromise between Al-Nahda and the
14 Interestingly enough, after the 2011 revolution, this representation changed and today the Zeitunian tradition is
regarded as the ﬁrst reformist movement of Tunisia. Malika Zeghal, ‘Competing Ways of Life: Islamism,
Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition’, Constellations, 20(2) (2013), pp. 254–274.
15 Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Haugbølle, ‘The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia
Under Ben Ali’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 179–195.
16 Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity’, Political Studies 50
(3) (2002), pp. 497–513.
17 I refer here to those people who took advantage from inclusion in the colonial system and were able to better
interpret the need of modernisation as an essential aspect of the anti-colonial struggle.
18 The party was founded in Paris in 2001 by the human rights activist Moncef Marzouki, who is today the
President of the Republic. This party was the backbone of the political alliance that supported the Al-Nahda-led
government.
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modernists. Crucially, they are by implication challenging the middle-class
compromise upon which the new Tunisia is being constructed. This has resulted in
the re-emergence of old repressive practices, representing continuity with the past,
when it comes to dealing with challengers who claim that they are not included in
this revised concept of tunisianite´ and are therefore excluded from both its
material and identity beneﬁts.
The ‘Deep State’ and the Institutional Democratic Praxis
In post-Ben Ali’s Tunisia, institution-building began with the experience of the
Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution. It was the ﬁrst time in Tunisian
history that councils were gathering and discussing freely and democratically.19 In
addition to political representatives, human rights groups, feminist organisations
and the bar association also participated, along with young bloggers and
representatives from the ‘remote’ regions of inner Tunisia.20 After the October
2011 elections, the ANC (the constitutional assembly) became the real arena of
political conﬂict. In this phase of the process, and for the ﬁrst time in the history of
the country, all different cultural and political traditions gathered and debated
foundational issues.21
However, the institutional process of change engendered by the 2011 uprising
was limited to a speciﬁc social class: the middle class. In part this reﬂects how
negotiated political transitions work: dealing with rules and procedural
mechanisms ﬁrst to the detriment of regulating and solving economic and social
conﬂicts. It would be impossible to deal with social conﬂicts in a democratising
country, when the institutions of the state need to be rebuilt amidst great volatility;
they are left for later, once the political system is stable. This type of transitions
favours democratic liberty over wealth redistribution, with the middle class being
both the protagonist and the beneﬁciary of it.22 In Tunisia, the majority of the
population was side-lined by this process, partly because material preoccupations
were prioritised over debates about institutions and procedural mechanisms, and
partly because the process itself failed to include them by focusing emphatically
on identity and rules rather than economics. The revolutionary process expressed
the frustration of both a new generation and a marginalised social class that
remained on the margins of the institutional process of democratic transition. Most
of those involved in Tunisia’s negotiated transition23 either belong to an older
generation or represented, like Al-Nahda, those who wanted to compromise in
order to be integrated into the national project. The collaboration between the
liberals who opposed Ben Ali’s authoritarianism but not his secular modernisation
project, and the Islamists started in the mid 2000s, when Al-Nahda’s moderation
19 Sami Zemni, ‘The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making’,
Mediterranean Politics (2014. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.
874108#.VCmdGPldWpA
20 Representatives from the regions of the interior were invited because of the important role they played during
the uprising and because they represent the socio-economic divide existing in the country. Such developmental
divide has been recognised as one of the main sources of social injustice.
21 Rym Abidi, vice-president of a network of development associations, interview with the author, Tunis
September 29, 2013.
22 As also noted by Giuseppe di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990).
23 Gianluca Parolin, ‘Constitutions against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa’, British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
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and looked at the experience of Nasser. After independence, Bourguiba got rid of
Ben Youssef and the so-called ‘Zeitunian heritage’,14 because it was in conﬂict
with Bourguiba’s radically secular vision of modernisation. In fact, the Zeitunian
sheikhs were considered the highest representatives of the old social order and as
such they were perceived to be against modernisation. It followed that the part of
the middle class aligned with Ben Youssef was marginalised from enjoying the
spoils of power.15 The transitional process of 2011 has included contestation of the
Bourguibian conception of tunisianite´,16 with the old Islamic/pan-Arabic ethos
resurfacing and ﬁnding new legitimacy thanks to the arrival of Al-Nahda to power.
Thus, while the social and political modernist-nationalist bloc17 seemed to be
the real loser of the transitional process, the traditionally excluded Islamists
became the largest political movement in the country. Partially reprising Ben
Youssef’s nationalist discourse and agenda, they demanded a more democratic
process of institution-building through Al-Nahda and, in part, the Congress for the
Republic Party.18 Thus, it seemed that the post 2011 democratisation process
ﬁnally included those social groups previously excluded.
The conﬂict between the nationalist middle-class (over-represented in the
bureaucratic and repressive apparatuses, and enjoying an enormous ideological
prestige) and the Islamic conservative middle class was the main obstacle to
democratisation and inclusive state-building in post-independence Tunisia. The
2011 revolution permitted a sort of reconciliation between these two ideologically
different middle classes. It is the compromise between them that drives the
Tunisian transition today. This compromise constitutes a genuine change with
respect to the past because there is agreement, albeit implicit and at times
contested, that the Islamist ethos has to be integrated and has to contribute to the
new democratic Tunisia.
The delicate balance between these two opposite forces—Islamic and secular—
is in many ways the factor determining the balance between change and continuity
in post-revolution Tunisia. One the one hand, there is continuity in the sense that
despite pluralism, or possibly because of it, the struggle between Islamism and the
French-inspired modernism with its emphasis on laicite´ is still very much present,
as the debates around contested issues like individual freedoms show. On the other
hand, there is also signiﬁcant rupture with the past because traditional Islamism
has become multifaceted and diverse, and the effort that Al-Nahda and the
modernists are making to ﬁnd a compromise to secure Tunisia’s democratic future
is challenged by other powerful, more radical Islamist forces. These groups are not
only challenging the contents of the compromise between Al-Nahda and the
14 Interestingly enough, after the 2011 revolution, this representation changed and today the Zeitunian tradition is
regarded as the ﬁrst reformist movement of Tunisia. Malika Zeghal, ‘Competing Ways of Life: Islamism,
Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition’, Constellations, 20(2) (2013), pp. 254–274.
15 Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Haugbølle, ‘The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia
Under Ben Ali’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 179–195.
16 Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity’, Political Studies 50
(3) (2002), pp. 497–513.
17 I refer here to those people who took advantage from inclusion in the colonial system and were able to better
interpret the need of modernisation as an essential aspect of the anti-colonial struggle.
18 The party was founded in Paris in 2001 by the human rights activist Moncef Marzouki, who is today the
President of the Republic. This party was the backbone of the political alliance that supported the Al-Nahda-led
government.
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continuities with Ben Ali’s regime. First, the Interior Minister referred to the anti-
terrorism legislation, an instrument that had been prominent in ‘legalising’ Ben
Ali’s repression against the Islamists and, more generally, political opponents.
Second, the whole scene reminded many of a similar press conference held in
1992, when representatives of the security apparatus showed evidences of Al-
Nahda’s involvement in terrorist activities and outlawed it. The labelling of AST
as a terrorist organisation resulted in a ban on its public activities and made its
membership illegal.30 Symbolically, the old bureaucracy was ‘showing off’ and
taking revenge on the protagonists of the revolutionary change.
The Same Old Story: Pragmatic Islamists and the Modern Middle Class
versus a New Mobilisation
As described in the previous section, street mobilisation demonstrates that
elements of change and continuity overlap, as Paola Rivetti suggests in the
introduction to this special issue.31 The demand for democracy is nothing new in
Tunisia’s history, as the tentative democratic process of late 1980s demonstrates.32
The liberals were part of the generation and social class that shared the ethos of the
Bourghibian national project based on tunisianite´, and had beneﬁted from
independence. Later, this group was joined by the old Marxist-Leninist generation,
converted now to liberal-democracy. Until 2011, political struggles took place
within the same social class and did not entail any deviation from the
‘modernisation project’, as inspired by rationalism and secularism with an
emphasis on Tunisia being different from the rest of the Arab world. Ben Ali came
to power in 1987 promising that the process of nation state-building would not
derail from such developmental modernity, including democratisation and the
protection of liberties. Therefore, the process seemed to evolve towards its
‘natural’ outcome: the consolidation of a democratic system based on a deal
reconciling the two opposite parties within the same social class, sharing a similar
vision of the world. Ben Ali’s objective was to formalise a democratic social
contract, a goal which had been frustrated in the past by Bourguiba’s autocratic
resilience.
The apparently linear evolution of this middle-class reconciliation was
interrupted by the Islamists. They emerged as a major political force in the
moderately free elections of 1989, but the regime, refusing to grant them political
legitimacy, decided to repress them with the backing of the majority of the other
political groupings. The marginalisation of the Islamists was framed as ‘a struggle
for civilisation’; the Islamists became the obstacle to the evolution of the modern
state and the deployment of any means against them was justiﬁable. More than two
decades later, Al-Nahda’s big opportunity arose in the context of the revolutionary
process of 2011, which was followed by a transparent electoral process and the
formation of a new government with the party at its helm.
Doubtless, the victory of Al-Nahda constitutes a change, but not a fundamental
one. It also represents the accomplishment of a long-term political process, as the
party members had already internalised the concept of tunisianite´. When the
30 Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laaˆrayedh’, cit.
31 Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime
Reconﬁguration and Policy-making in North Africa’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
32 Lisa Anderson, ‘Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy’, cit.
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process intensiﬁed.24 The institution-building process in post-revolutionary
transition has created the conditions for such a process of collaboration and
compromise to be completed. Al-Nahda has become a conservative moderate
party inspired by Islamic values,25 shedding its radicalism.
However, the uprising activated a new social subject, largely composed of
radical, young disenfranchised people. The deﬁnition of this revolutionary subject
as a speciﬁc political actor is problematic. In the aftermath of the fall of Ben Ali,
debates about who would deserve the title of ‘revolutionary subject’ heated
up. While it was agreed that society as a whole adhered to the revolutionary
outcome, there was little doubt that the ‘youth’, or ‘the revolting generation’, was
the protagonist of the uprising. More speciﬁcally, it was so for those who were in
the streets during the uprising clashing with police. In fact, through physical
confrontation with the security apparatus, they were the ones responsible for the
collapse of Ben Ali’s regime.26 This speciﬁc group did not have a political or
ideological frame of action, but was motivated by frustration. When the transition
went on into the ‘normality’ phase, they were unable to ﬁnd a party representing
their interests, and in general they refused to engage in the institutional process.27
Though they have not organised into a party or a formal movement, this group of
marginalised youth continued to exist on the public scene and the revolutionary
success they obtained provided them with enough conﬁdence to think they could
challenge the system. Thus, this new subject is composed of the revolutionary and
marginalised youth that, in the post-revolutionary context, holds the rest of society
accountable for not sharing the material and, equally important, identity and
intangible beneﬁts of the revolution. This new subject can be subsumed under the
label of a type of activism that many Tunisians did not even suspect could develop
locally, namely jihadi Salaﬁsm.28
Despite representing a rupture with the past, the emergence of jihadi Salaﬁsm
also highlights a point of continuity with pre 2011 Tunisia, in particular for
the way in which those who dissent from the content and buzzwords of the
mainstream, national project are treated by authorities. After the revolution, the
middle-class compromise between former rivals on what modernisation and
democracy mean for Tunisia, was under threat from those who dissent on the
content and forms of such a political project. As before the revolution, the reaction
of the establishment has been political marginalisation and repression.
One example is representative of this repressive praxis. At the end of August
2013, the Interior Minister declared Ansar al-Sharia (AST, the jihadi Salaﬁ group)
a terrorist organisation,29 highlighting a number of practical and symbolic
24 Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation’, cit.
25 Luca Ozzano, ‘The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties’,
Democratization, 20(5) (2013), pp. 807–830.
26 Amin Allal, ‘Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier!’, Politique Africaine 1 (2011), pp. 53–67;
Paola Rivetti, ‘The Journey of Protests in the Mediterranean and Beyond: A Discussion About and For Social
Movements’, Jadaliyya, July 27, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13051/the-journey-of-protests-in-
the-mediterranean-and-b (accessed August 27, 2014).
27 From now onwards, the article contains observations and statements resulting frommy ethnographic ﬁeldwork.
28 Fabio Merone, ‘Salaﬁsm in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia’, Jadaliyya, April 11,
2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salaﬁsm-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-
(accessed August 27, 2014).
29 Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laaˆrayedh: ‘Nous avons de´cide´ de classer Ansar al-Charia comme une organisation
terroriste’, Nawaa/Politics, August 27, 2013. http://nawaat.org/portail/2013/08/27/ali-laarayedh-nous-avons-
decide-de-classer-ansar-al-charia-comme-une-organisation-terroriste/ (accessed August 27, 2014).
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continuities with Ben Ali’s regime. First, the Interior Minister referred to the anti-
terrorism legislation, an instrument that had been prominent in ‘legalising’ Ben
Ali’s repression against the Islamists and, more generally, political opponents.
Second, the whole scene reminded many of a similar press conference held in
1992, when representatives of the security apparatus showed evidences of Al-
Nahda’s involvement in terrorist activities and outlawed it. The labelling of AST
as a terrorist organisation resulted in a ban on its public activities and made its
membership illegal.30 Symbolically, the old bureaucracy was ‘showing off’ and
taking revenge on the protagonists of the revolutionary change.
The Same Old Story: Pragmatic Islamists and the Modern Middle Class
versus a New Mobilisation
As described in the previous section, street mobilisation demonstrates that
elements of change and continuity overlap, as Paola Rivetti suggests in the
introduction to this special issue.31 The demand for democracy is nothing new in
Tunisia’s history, as the tentative democratic process of late 1980s demonstrates.32
The liberals were part of the generation and social class that shared the ethos of the
Bourghibian national project based on tunisianite´, and had beneﬁted from
independence. Later, this group was joined by the old Marxist-Leninist generation,
converted now to liberal-democracy. Until 2011, political struggles took place
within the same social class and did not entail any deviation from the
‘modernisation project’, as inspired by rationalism and secularism with an
emphasis on Tunisia being different from the rest of the Arab world. Ben Ali came
to power in 1987 promising that the process of nation state-building would not
derail from such developmental modernity, including democratisation and the
protection of liberties. Therefore, the process seemed to evolve towards its
‘natural’ outcome: the consolidation of a democratic system based on a deal
reconciling the two opposite parties within the same social class, sharing a similar
vision of the world. Ben Ali’s objective was to formalise a democratic social
contract, a goal which had been frustrated in the past by Bourguiba’s autocratic
resilience.
The apparently linear evolution of this middle-class reconciliation was
interrupted by the Islamists. They emerged as a major political force in the
moderately free elections of 1989, but the regime, refusing to grant them political
legitimacy, decided to repress them with the backing of the majority of the other
political groupings. The marginalisation of the Islamists was framed as ‘a struggle
for civilisation’; the Islamists became the obstacle to the evolution of the modern
state and the deployment of any means against them was justiﬁable. More than two
decades later, Al-Nahda’s big opportunity arose in the context of the revolutionary
process of 2011, which was followed by a transparent electoral process and the
formation of a new government with the party at its helm.
Doubtless, the victory of Al-Nahda constitutes a change, but not a fundamental
one. It also represents the accomplishment of a long-term political process, as the
party members had already internalised the concept of tunisianite´. When the
30 Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laaˆrayedh’, cit.
31 Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco: Regime
Reconﬁguration and Policy-making in North Africa’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
32 Lisa Anderson, ‘Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy’, cit.
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as a speciﬁc political actor is problematic. In the aftermath of the fall of Ben Ali,
debates about who would deserve the title of ‘revolutionary subject’ heated
up. While it was agreed that society as a whole adhered to the revolutionary
outcome, there was little doubt that the ‘youth’, or ‘the revolting generation’, was
the protagonist of the uprising. More speciﬁcally, it was so for those who were in
the streets during the uprising clashing with police. In fact, through physical
confrontation with the security apparatus, they were the ones responsible for the
collapse of Ben Ali’s regime.26 This speciﬁc group did not have a political or
ideological frame of action, but was motivated by frustration. When the transition
went on into the ‘normality’ phase, they were unable to ﬁnd a party representing
their interests, and in general they refused to engage in the institutional process.27
Though they have not organised into a party or a formal movement, this group of
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success they obtained provided them with enough conﬁdence to think they could
challenge the system. Thus, this new subject is composed of the revolutionary and
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accountable for not sharing the material and, equally important, identity and
intangible beneﬁts of the revolution. This new subject can be subsumed under the
label of a type of activism that many Tunisians did not even suspect could develop
locally, namely jihadi Salaﬁsm.28
Despite representing a rupture with the past, the emergence of jihadi Salaﬁsm
also highlights a point of continuity with pre 2011 Tunisia, in particular for
the way in which those who dissent from the content and buzzwords of the
mainstream, national project are treated by authorities. After the revolution, the
middle-class compromise between former rivals on what modernisation and
democracy mean for Tunisia, was under threat from those who dissent on the
content and forms of such a political project. As before the revolution, the reaction
of the establishment has been political marginalisation and repression.
One example is representative of this repressive praxis. At the end of August
2013, the Interior Minister declared Ansar al-Sharia (AST, the jihadi Salaﬁ group)
a terrorist organisation,29 highlighting a number of practical and symbolic
24 Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation’, cit.
25 Luca Ozzano, ‘The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties’,
Democratization, 20(5) (2013), pp. 807–830.
26 Amin Allal, ‘Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier!’, Politique Africaine 1 (2011), pp. 53–67;
Paola Rivetti, ‘The Journey of Protests in the Mediterranean and Beyond: A Discussion About and For Social
Movements’, Jadaliyya, July 27, 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13051/the-journey-of-protests-in-
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27 From now onwards, the article contains observations and statements resulting frommy ethnographic ﬁeldwork.
28 Fabio Merone, ‘Salaﬁsm in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia’, Jadaliyya, April 11,
2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11166/salaﬁsm-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-a-member-of-
(accessed August 27, 2014).
29 Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laaˆrayedh: ‘Nous avons de´cide´ de classer Ansar al-Charia comme une organisation
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process, as the party did not interpret or represent their radicalism. In addition,
they were not interested in the debate about tunisianite´, with its corollary of the
reiﬁcation of tolerance and pluralism as characteristics inextricably linked to what
it means to be Tunisian. Most of them found a way to express their political and
anti-system radicalism in the salaﬁst mouvance.
This radicalisation and class divide are not new in Tunisia, because the
processes of nation and state-building themselves entail class struggle. Each
period of transformation in the recent history of the country has corresponded to
attempts on the part of a speciﬁc social class to enter the political game in order to
share the national contract and, at least partially, power. This was the case for the
Intifada of 1983, the so called ‘bread revolt’, when ‘for the ﬁrst time lower classes
entered national history’.38 This same tumultuous group was in the background
during the last period of Bourghiba’s rule and in the early 1990s, when the clash
between the Islamists and the state took place. It did not mature, though, as a social
movement until the opening up of the public sphere after the fall of Ben Ali. The
success of the uprising, symbolised by the collapse of the dictatorship, and the
emergence of a new Islamic paradigm after the revolution, gave them the chance
to become a social and political movement.
If we look at post-revolutionary social and generational cleavages, there is little
doubt that so far the transitional institutional process has failed in integrating this
disenfranchised social group. The ones that took over the political scene belong to a
different generation (the one of the 1980s) and to a different social class,
representing in some ways a factor of continuity with the past. The basic political
request of the middle class in power today was democracy and not material
beneﬁts, which, comparatively speaking, they never genuinely lacked.39 As
explained above, in the context of Tunisian modern history, they represent a
generation who has been waiting for decades to join in the process of building the
modern Tunisian nation-state. In order to do so, they learned that there is nothing
better than democracy. This belief is shared by liberals, leftists and moderate
Islamists alike.40 Because of the failure of this democratic-oriented process in the
1980s, the country suffered from two decades of frozen social and political
activities. The revolution made it possible for these actors to return to the scene and
resume their roles, while others were left behind. Once again, it is worth
highlighting that there is nothing odd about the Tunisian transition insofar as the
requirements of ‘crafting democracy’ demand that social conﬂicts are frozen in
favour of an almost exclusive focus on mechanisms and procedures to ensure
liberty, as Gianluca Parolin alsomakes clear in his contribution to this special issue.
Those who participated and still participate in street politics and those who took
the power after Ben Ali’s departure are not the same. They do not share any
common ground socially, geographically or generationally. The low electoral
turnout at the October 2011 election suggests that the youth and a signiﬁcant part
of the society were at least sceptical of the liberal democratic process, largely
unknown to them. Indeed, in parallel with the institutional process, another social
38 This is according to Heithem Chabouni, former member of the Communist party, today Nidaa party. Interview
with the author, Tunis Spring 2011.
39 During the 1990s and 2000s, there was a general consensus on the fact that the growth of the middle class was
one of the outcomes of the economic growth. However, this was only partially true and lasted only till 2008, when
the international ﬁnancial crisis began to impact on Tunisia too.
40 This became evident in 2005, when modernist, Leftist and Islamist groups came together to form the
Democratic Front. They shared a common interest in a democratic reform of the system.
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Nahdaouis came to power, they were representatives of an old generation with
little to no radical strength.33 By the time it won the elections, Al-Nahda was no
longer representing either the rebellious, revolutionary young generation or the
project of establishing an Islamic state. Indeed, the moderate Islamic party
represents a conservative social middle class that has always been keen to support
and assimilate to the national project in exchange for material beneﬁts and some
references to their Islamic, conservative values. Of course, from an institutional
point of view, Al-Nahda’s electoral victory represents a big shift in the balance of
power within the national political elite. However, socially it was not the real
novelty. As mentioned earlier, the actual change is that the uprising allowed for the
mobilisation of new and rebellious street actors that stand out as new social and
political subjects.
The revolutionary process was the consequence of a deep split within society
along a social class divide,34 and the generational cleavage overlapped with it to a
signiﬁcant extent. More than suffering from the absence of democracy, young
people from lower social classes suffered from what can be described as social
exclusion. Although they emerged as a visible actor during and after the uprising,
this disenfranchised youth has however been present on the public scene for a
decade, thanks to its role in contesting the regime. Under Ben Ali’s rule, these
youngsters were known by the security apparatus for clashing with police during
football matches,35 and it is no coincidence that the ﬁrst songs of freedom, deﬁant
of the regime, were shouted without fear in stadiums.36 These young people
expressed their rejection of the system by rioting with the police when the
circumstances made it possible or by escaping from the country, dreaming of the
European Eldorado. When they talked about freedom, they did not think of
freedom of elections or multi-party politics, but the freedom to realise their dreams
that sometimes are as simple as to have enough money to get married.37 Most of
their hatred was directed against the police because it represents both repression
and corruption at the same time. Policemen or RCD’s local patrons were present in
their lives as living symbols of what kept the repressive system working and of
corruption. It should not be a surprise that this cohort of young people was not
really interested in the establishment of a democratic system after the revolution.
Neither were they interested in the strengthening of a democratic, gradual
integration of the moderate Islamic party Al-Nahda into the institution-building
33 According to Zied Krishen, chief editor of the daily newspaper al-Maghreb, ‘the revolution saved Nahda from
a sure political death’ (Interview with the author, Tunis, Winter 2012); Graham Usher, ‘The Reawakening of
Nahda in Tunisia’, MERIP online, April 30, 2011. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero043011?utm_
source¼ twitterfeed&utm_medium ¼ twitter (accessed August 28, 2014).
34 Although bloggers constituted a challenge to the regime and their actions came to international attention, the
‘real revolution was in the streets while we were behind the screen of a PC’ (interview with the author, Soﬁene
Bel Haj, Tunis, Spring 2011). While most of the people that took part in the clashes overwhelmingly represented
the lower strata of the society, the urban middle/high class participated in different types of mobilisation. They did
not share either political sensibility or material concerns. These key differences emerged after the fall of the
regime, when limitations to the establishment of a cohesive and unique revolutionary front became evident. See
also Rivetti, ‘The Journey of Protests in the Mediterranean and Beyond’, cit.
35 Larissa Chomiak and John Entelis, ‘The Making of North Africa’s Intifadas’,Middle East Report, 259 (2012),
pp. 8–15.
36 Revolutionary and revolting artistic expressions, such as rap and break dance, or the organised presence of
football fans in stadiums seem to be the typical ‘venues’ for the disenfranchised youth to express frustration and
unhappiness with the status quo.
37 Wassim, a young man from Khetmine, Bizerte province, an area where emigration to Italy has been very strong
in the last decade. Interview with the author, Khetmine, November 2010.
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process, as the party did not interpret or represent their radicalism. In addition,
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requirements of ‘crafting democracy’ demand that social conﬂicts are frozen in
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liberty, as Gianluca Parolin alsomakes clear in his contribution to this special issue.
Those who participated and still participate in street politics and those who took
the power after Ben Ali’s departure are not the same. They do not share any
common ground socially, geographically or generationally. The low electoral
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of the regime, were shouted without fear in stadiums.36 These young people
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circumstances made it possible or by escaping from the country, dreaming of the
European Eldorado. When they talked about freedom, they did not think of
freedom of elections or multi-party politics, but the freedom to realise their dreams
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their lives as living symbols of what kept the repressive system working and of
corruption. It should not be a surprise that this cohort of young people was not
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‘real revolution was in the streets while we were behind the screen of a PC’ (interview with the author, Soﬁene
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The large Islamic wave that came out from the post-revolutionary process was
an explosion that burst out as a consequence of the long-standing repression of all
forms of organised Islamism, whether political or not. Islamism was the
expression of this disenfranchised youth that appeared in the aftermath of the
revolution, which had succeed in revolting and toppling down Ben Ali but failed to
turn its radicalism into a political project. During the ﬁrst two years of the
transition and until the attack on the American Embassy in September 2012, the
control of the state was rather weak, and this exposed lower-class neighbourhoods
to a new type of socialisation that empowered Salaﬁ youth.48 Further frustrated by
the lack of material beneﬁts deriving from the revolution they contributed to bring
about, this youth found a strong spiritual motivation in Salaﬁst militancy. The
territorial identity of Salaﬁsts is rooted in neighbourhoods, where a strong degree
of solidarity between them and the inhabitants is detectable, despite the fact that
groups of radical Salaﬁsts may interfere with the private life of the people and with
their traditional creed.49 This identity overlap between the Salaﬁsts and the people
from lower class neighbourhoods is further strengthened by the repression the
central state is carrying out against Salaﬁsm. This was the case for the Minister of
Interior’s campaign against AST, a move that motivated the supporters of a big
soccer team to declare their support for AST with a statement,50 despite the
apparent contradiction between soccer fans and Salaﬁsts’ expected behaviour.
More than a religious group, AST was in this case perceived as a movement
representing the youth coming from a speciﬁc, lower-class socio-economic
background.51 This young generation of Tunisians is looking for instruments of
political expression, yet avoiding all institutional and conventional ones: ‘civil
society’ associations and mainstream political parties are indeed perceived as too
distant.
Then, it appears rather indisputable that AST was the group that most beneﬁtted
from this activism, which is and remains outside of an institutional framework.
Indeed, most of the AST members have that same social background: they do not
speak in the name of the disenfranchised, they are part of them.52 The daily
practices of social life in the neighbourhoods, which generally are male-dominated
and gender segregated spaces, made it easier for these young activists to accept
48 I have witnessed this process myself since 2011 during my ﬁeldwork. This is especially true in the outskirts of
Tunis, in areas such as Dahwar Hisher, Ettadhamen, Ibn Khaldoun, El Kram, and Yasminette, or in other cities
such as Sousse, Menzel Bourghiba, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Keirouan.
49 The most disturbing practice of these groups of puritans is the so-called vigilantism or, in theological terms, the
‘amr bil maaruf wa annahi an al-munker’ (‘bidding the good and forbidding the evil’). In the aftermath of the
revolution, actions such as disturbing theatre representations or punishing particular behaviours in the
neighbourhood, created a wide discontent among the population. After a debate over the opportunity of
encouraging or discouraging such activities, the leaders of AST forbade the Salaﬁ youth to commit such actions.
50 Les supporteurs de l’EST et du CA au congre`s de Ansar al-Charia,Direct Info, May 16, 2013. http://directinfo.
webmanagercenter.com/2013/05/16/les-supporters-de-lest-et-du-ca-au-congres-dansar-al-chariaa/ (accessed
August 28, 2014).
51 See Mosaiquefm ‘Ansar al Sharia prevoit des confrontations avec la police avec le support des supporteurs de
football’, May 16, 2013, in Arabic. http://goo.gl/Nx5ePt (accessed August 28, 2014).
52 There is an on-going debate on whether the AST represents a speciﬁc social class or not. Although the AST
members I met during my ﬁeldwork do not generally recognise a speciﬁc social class background and dislike the
term muhammishun (which is utilised to as a pejorative by the rest of society), there is no doubt that most of them
come from speciﬁcally poor urban areas. Of course, as the Jihadi Salaﬁ trend is an ideological one, virtually
anyone could adopt it regardless of social class belonging. In fact, we are not using this category as a deterministic
one. Attempts to reach more educated and middle class constituencies are strategically advanced by AST.
However, the fact that it has been isolated after the crackdown, with no support by any other class but
constituencies from lower class neighbourhoods, strongly suggests that up to now, AST’s interclass reach is weak.
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dynamic developed to ‘include’ a chunk of this socially marginalised youth.
A large and spontaneous process of Islamisation of society, which had already
begun to be evident in the later years of Ben Ali’s regime,41 emerged from below.
If different degrees of Islamic belonging ﬁtted different social groups, the one that
best interpreted and represented the antagonism and the radicalism of
disenfranchised youth was Jihadism. Jihadism is not representative of a social
class in the Marxist sense, and this youth cannot be equated with working class
either because it does not have an organised political relevance, but is an
expression of subalternity and alienation.42
Ansar al-Sharia as the Expression of a New Social Movement
Ansar al-Sharia (AST) is the new youth social movement that emerged from the
revolutionary process.43 It inherited, from the past decade, the ‘mythological’
enterprise of Al-Qaeda’s mujahedeen, but it adapted it to the new liberal and
democratic scenario of post-Ben Ali Tunisia. As surprising as it may be, the jihadi
movement is not a novelty in Tunisia. Even though the dictatorship had been
particularly repressive of Islamic radicalism, a new generation of Islamists
resurfaced in Tunisia since the beginning of the 2000s.44 Despite the lack of
awareness of its existence among ordinary Tunisians, who discovered their own
radical Islamists after the revolution, jihadism was a form of identity for the latest
generation of the revolting youth. As argued by Stefano Torelli et al., the events of
Soliman in 2007 were a powerful reminder of this.45 A group of jihadist coming
from Algeria penetrated into Tunisia and got logistic support from a relatively
large network of people in Sidi Bouzid, Sousse and Tunis. Even more signiﬁcant
was the participation of an important group of Tunisians in the international jihadi
movement. Many of them were imprisoned under the anti-terrorism law of 2003,
which was supported by the US administration and swiftly adopted by Ben Ali’s
regime. AST originated from Tunisian detention centres as a project incubated
over a long period of time.46 It indeed represented a factor of continuity with a
struggle that part of the Tunisian youth had consciously undertaken for over a
decade. However, despite its earlier existence, this jihadi project was transformed
by the unexpected uprising in 2011. Thus, a completely new Islamic radical
project was founded, rooted in dawa (call) instead of qital (ﬁght).47
41 Rikke Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia’,
Middle East Report, 262 (2012), pp. 20–25.
42 I refere here to Spivak’s conceptualisation of subalternity, see Gayatri Chakravortty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern
Speak?’, in Rosalind C. Morris (ed.), Can the Subaltern Speak? Reﬂections on the History of an Idea (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 21–77.
43 Anne Wolf, ‘An Islamist ‘Renaissance’? Religion and Politics in Post-revolutionary Tunisia’, The Journal of
North African Studies, 18(4) (2013), pp. 560–573.
44 Daveed Garteistein-Ross, Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s long game, ICCT Research paper, 2013. http://www.icct.
nl/download/ﬁle/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al-Sharia-Tunisia’s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf (accessed August 28,
2014).
45 Stefano Torelli, Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Salaﬁsm in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities
for Democratization’, Middle East Policy, 19(4) (2012), pp. 140–154.
46 Hassen Breik, responsible for Dawa in Ansar Al-Sharia. Interview with the author, Yasminette October 10,
2012.
47 See: Merone, ‘Interview with Hassen Ben Brik: Islamic state but not through violence... for now’, September
24, 2012, in Italian (http://nena-news.globalist.it/Detail_News_Display?ID¼35486&typeb ¼ 0&24-09-2012–
Intervista-Hassan-Ben-Brik-Stato-islamico-non-con-la-forza–per-ora-, accessed August 28, 2014). In this
interview, Hassein Breik, AST’s person in charge for Dawa, expresses this idea very clearly.
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41 Rikke Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia’,
Middle East Report, 262 (2012), pp. 20–25.
42 I refere here to Spivak’s conceptualisation of subalternity, see Gayatri Chakravortty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern
Speak?’, in Rosalind C. Morris (ed.), Can the Subaltern Speak? Reﬂections on the History of an Idea (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 21–77.
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44 Daveed Garteistein-Ross, Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s long game, ICCT Research paper, 2013. http://www.icct.
nl/download/ﬁle/Gartenstein-Ross-Ansar-al-Sharia-Tunisia’s-Long-Game-May-2013.pdf (accessed August 28,
2014).
45 Stefano Torelli, Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘Salaﬁsm in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities
for Democratization’, Middle East Policy, 19(4) (2012), pp. 140–154.
46 Hassen Breik, responsible for Dawa in Ansar Al-Sharia. Interview with the author, Yasminette October 10,
2012.
47 See: Merone, ‘Interview with Hassen Ben Brik: Islamic state but not through violence... for now’, September
24, 2012, in Italian (http://nena-news.globalist.it/Detail_News_Display?ID¼35486&typeb ¼ 0&24-09-2012–
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nationalism, and it was understood as a positive identity factor that pushed the
middle class to assume the leadership of the nation-building process. This
leadership had historically been the outcome of a political conﬂict, symbolised by
the two characters of the liberation movement, Bourghiba and Ben Youssef.
The post-revolutionary process is also one of ‘street politics,’ in the sense of the
participation of social movements not conventionally organised into civil society
associations or political parties. Once again, we see factors of continuity and
change overlapping. The concept of street politics is useful to explain the
emergence of the Jihadi Salaﬁst movement, which appeared during the transitional
period as a new social and political actor. It represents a completely new
generation that has little to no relation with the Islamic movement represented by
today’s moderate, Nahdaoui middle class. However, jihadism and radical
Islamism represent in today’s Tunisia those disenfranchised social classes which
ﬁnd themselves at the bottom of the social ladder. AST is also the largest social
and youth movement on the national scene. It represents a factor of continuity in
modern Tunisian history as it is the heir of radical Islamism, which was already
present and repressed under Ben Ali’s rule, but it also represents a rupture with this
radical tradition. Thanks to the 2011 uprising, it had the opportunity to organise
into a proper movement, occupying most of the public space in working class
neighbourhoods of Tunisian biggest cities.
The nation-building process is the general framework in which factors
associated with change and continuity take on an explanatory value in
understanding the Tunisian transition. Ultimately, Tunisia’s transitional process
will only be accomplished when all social classes will ﬁnd a way to express
themselves without being perceived as threatening to the society and the state.
This is not only a power struggle but also a process of class inclusion and
exclusion.
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AST’s ideological framework. The AST movement sublimates the strong
masculine relationships typical of those social spaces, and charges them with
further spiritual value. The mosque comes to replicate the social function of the
cafe´s in these working class neighbourhoods.53 The male groups of young people
hanging around for hours in the neighbourhoods were transformed into the jamaa,
explicitly referring to the ﬁrst pious Muslim community. Such identiﬁcation with a
‘special group’ of elected individuals allowed these young men to ﬁnally
overcome the enormous social complex they suffer from vis-a`-vis the bourgeoisie,
which had treated them as backwards and failed men.54
While this process of Salaﬁsation contains elements of change and continuity,
the reaction of the state and political elite to it has to be fully ascribed to the
category of the continuity with the past. When Ali Laraayedh (the then-Prime
Minister and one of the most prominent leaders of Al-Nahda) declared AST a
terrorist organisation, there was concern but not surprise. Indeed, since the
demonstration in front of the American Embassy that degenerated into the assault
on 15 September 2012,55 security preoccupations have been prioritised over
freedom of expression. One of the consequences of the unique climate of freedom
that Tunisia had experienced for one and a half year following the fall of Ben Ali,
was the strengthening of the tension between the people’s right to freely express
their political and religious beliefs, and the institutions’ duty of safeguarding the
general public interests. The jihadist phenomenon, because of the genuine security
concerns it created, was considered the perfect scapegoat, providing the old
authoritarian apparatus with an opportunity to return to the scene and take action.
Although Tunisia seems today more mature for a democratic evolution, there is
still the temptation, as occurred 20 years ago, to order the security apparatus to
manage the social and political conﬂict. Change and continuity are the two key
elements that explain these two co-existing tendencies towards, on the one side,
open debate and, on the other side, repression, both of which have interfered in the
ongoing transitional process.
Conclusion
The Tunisian democratic transition that began in the aftermath of the 2011
uprising is another step of a long process of state-building. The main actors of this
process represent those political and social groups that emerged from the 1980s
and struggled to participate in the management of national institutions, namely the
liberals and the Islamists. But, as this article argues, further fragmentation has
taken place and new social actors emerged in the aftermath of the revolution, along
with the unfolding of the institution-building process. Indeed, the main contention
of this article is that behind the political struggle there is class struggle. Sharing the
ideology of tunisianite´, the ofﬁcial national rhetoric invented by Bourguiba,
implies accepting cultural references typical of a newmiddle class that appeared at
the beginning of the twentieth century. Tunisianite´ was the mantra of Tunisian
53 Spending time in the cafe´s with friends is a widespread social activity in these neighbourhoods.
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nationalism, and it was understood as a positive identity factor that pushed the
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This unrest built upon previous instances of labour protest in Tunisia’s interior
provinces, especially an eight-day strike of phosphate miners in 2008.2 After Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali had ﬂed in January 2011, it became clear that the UGTT had
played an important role in protests that facilitated his ouster. Egypt, likewise,
witnessed an increase in labour protests beginning in the mid 2000s in response to
effects of neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s. Indeed, while the number of labour
protests hovered around 100 per year between 1998 and 2003, they nearly tripled
between 2007 and 2011.3 Once protests against Hosni Mubarak began, workers
became the frontline of popular mobilisation against his rule. Joel Benin4 and
Marie Duboc5 suggest that the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions’
endorsement of protests on 6 February prompted military defection from
Mubarak.
In Arab states that experienced continuity and not change, unions participated in
the protests that shook authoritarian rule. In Bahrain, workers in a Shia union
allied with the opposition, al-Wefaq, took to the streets. Over 4500 unionists were
ﬁred for protesting.6 In Jordan, members of professional syndicates—doctors and
lawyers—joined protests organised by the Muslim Brotherhood.7 Although
scholars have begun to recognise the role of unions especially in Tunisia8 and
Egypt,9 few articles examine Morocco where the unrest of 2011 resulted in the
resilience of monarchical rule. Unlike studies that concentrate on cases of change,
this article analyses a case of continuity, Morocco, to show how unions exploited
the unrest to strategically advance their material interests. Leveraging the
instability of protests organised by youth activists (the February 20th Movement),
the unions mobilised to secure the material demands of their members,
predominately public employees—teachers, doctors, nurses, and government
clerks. Drawing on a cache of Arabic primary documents from local newspapers
and labour unions collected from ﬁeldwork, I recount the events that ignited labour
unrest among such public employees, and trace how negotiations proceeded
between the unions and the regime. In doing this, the article investigates how
labour syndicates used the unrest of 2011 to draw concessions from Morocco’s
2 Larbi Choukiha and Vincent Geisser, ‘Retour sur la re´volte du bassin minier. Les cinq lecons politiques d’un
conﬂit social ine´dit’, L’Anne´e du Maghreb, 6 (2010), pp. 5–10. Eric Gobe, ‘The Gafsa Mining Basin Between
Riots and a Social Movement’, Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman-IREMAM
(2011), pp. 11–20.
3 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp.127–128.
4 Joel Beinin, ‘The Rise of Egypt’s Workers’, Carnegie Papers (June 2012), pp. 7–8.
5 Marie Duboc, ‘Challenging the Trade Union, Reclaiming the Nation’, in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), Beyond the
Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2014), pp. 245–246.
6 Reese Erlich, ‘Bahrain Labor Unions Split over Uprising’, Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting, December 13,
2012, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/bahrain-uprising-islamic-militant-labor-union-split-protest (accessed
July 26, 2014).
7 Fida Adely, ‘The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan’, Middle East Report, 264 (2012). http://
merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan (accessed September 18, 2014).
8 Sami Zemni, ‘From Socio-Economic Protest to National Revolt: The Labor Origins of the Tunisian
Revolution’, in Nouri Gana (ed.), The Making of the Tunisian Revolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2013), pp. 127–146.
9 Hesham Sallam, ‘Striking Back at Egyptian Workers’, Middle East Report, 259 (2011), pp. 1–4. http://www.
merip.org/mer/mer259/striking-back-egyptian-workers (accessed September 18, 2014). Joel Beinin, ‘Workers,
Trade Unions, and Egypt’s Political Future’,Middle East Research and Information Project (2013), pp. 1–4; Dina
Bishara, ‘The Power of Workers in Egypt’s 2011 Uprising’, in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds.), The
Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond (Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2012), pp. 83–103.
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ABSTRACT This article investigates how public employee unions mobilised to
take advantage of Morocco’s Arab uprising. Leveraging their positions as
operators of public institutions, these unionists exploited the unrest to strategically
advance their interests. Two points emerge from this account of state—labour
relations in Morocco. First, a spike in labour contestation began in early 2010,
presaging the unrest that rocked Moroccan cities in 2011. Second, the unions
secured their demands through traditional tactics of labour mobilisation—joining
street protests, exaggerating material demands, and threatening negotiation
walkouts. This strategy, however, became more efﬁcacious during the Arab
uprising. Fearing urban riots that had historically grown from labour protests
since the 1980s, regime elites conceded to union demands, many of which they had
previously rejected in the 2000s.
Change and continuity became important keywords in academic research related
to the Arab uprisings, and early studies connected them to either regime collapse
or, on the contrary, regime survival. Initially cases of continuity were neglected
because studying authoritarian persistence, the status quo, was less interesting than
researching regime change, proto-democratisation—especially in light of
ostensibly successful mobilisations in Tunisia and Egypt. Yet even in countries
where protests did not force leaders from power, important micro-political
changes did occur in a macro-political context of continuity. There were winners
and losers, political actors that gained from the uprisings and those that lost.
That is, even in cases of continuity like Morocco, the protests created
opportunities for actors to seek and secure their interests, even though such unrest
did not cause regime collapse.
One such political actor that asserted itself during the Arab uprisings was
organised labour—members and leaders of trade unions. Across the Arab world,
labour participated in the protests that gripped the region. In Tunisia, where the
uprisings originated, unionists from the Union Ge´ne´rale Tunisienne du Travail
(UGTT) mobilised alongside Mohammed Bouazizi’s family and jobless youths in
Sidi Bouzid, before protests spread to Gafsa and Gabe`s, and, ﬁnally, Tunis.1
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This unrest built upon previous instances of labour protest in Tunisia’s interior
provinces, especially an eight-day strike of phosphate miners in 2008.2 After Zine
el-Abidine Ben Ali had ﬂed in January 2011, it became clear that the UGTT had
played an important role in protests that facilitated his ouster. Egypt, likewise,
witnessed an increase in labour protests beginning in the mid 2000s in response to
effects of neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s. Indeed, while the number of labour
protests hovered around 100 per year between 1998 and 2003, they nearly tripled
between 2007 and 2011.3 Once protests against Hosni Mubarak began, workers
became the frontline of popular mobilisation against his rule. Joel Benin4 and
Marie Duboc5 suggest that the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions’
endorsement of protests on 6 February prompted military defection from
Mubarak.
In Arab states that experienced continuity and not change, unions participated in
the protests that shook authoritarian rule. In Bahrain, workers in a Shia union
allied with the opposition, al-Wefaq, took to the streets. Over 4500 unionists were
ﬁred for protesting.6 In Jordan, members of professional syndicates—doctors and
lawyers—joined protests organised by the Muslim Brotherhood.7 Although
scholars have begun to recognise the role of unions especially in Tunisia8 and
Egypt,9 few articles examine Morocco where the unrest of 2011 resulted in the
resilience of monarchical rule. Unlike studies that concentrate on cases of change,
this article analyses a case of continuity, Morocco, to show how unions exploited
the unrest to strategically advance their material interests. Leveraging the
instability of protests organised by youth activists (the February 20th Movement),
the unions mobilised to secure the material demands of their members,
predominately public employees—teachers, doctors, nurses, and government
clerks. Drawing on a cache of Arabic primary documents from local newspapers
and labour unions collected from ﬁeldwork, I recount the events that ignited labour
unrest among such public employees, and trace how negotiations proceeded
between the unions and the regime. In doing this, the article investigates how
labour syndicates used the unrest of 2011 to draw concessions from Morocco’s
2 Larbi Choukiha and Vincent Geisser, ‘Retour sur la re´volte du bassin minier. Les cinq lecons politiques d’un
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uprisings originated, unionists from the Union Ge´ne´rale Tunisienne du Travail
(UGTT) mobilised alongside Mohammed Bouazizi’s family and jobless youths in
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Bellin terms ‘contingent democrats’, ready to protest if regimes do not acquiesce
to their material demands.18
In Morocco, public employees have spearheaded labour mobilisations. Without
such unionists, the regime’s core institutions—schools, hospitals, courts,
ministries, and municipalities—would not function. They are integral to
implementing its policies and programs. That is, public employees who strike
or protest do not, like private sector unionists, reduce ﬁrm proﬁts. Their stoppages,
by contrast, cut into the political capital of regimes, which accrue it over time with
citizens through the consistent and successful provision of public services. Strikes
from public employees threaten regimes because they endanger their ‘ruling
bargain’ with citizens, who expect consistency in service delivery in a trade for
political loyalty.19
A question remains, however. Why would a regime take public employee
unions’ threats to strike seriously? Such threats may be cheap-talk without the
backing of labour muscle in street protests. Because of a historical continuity in
Moroccan politics, the regime could tell that these strike threats of 2011 were
credible. This continuity is that urban violence has often been associated with (and
grown from) such labour mobilisations. In most instances, unions did not organise
urban violence intentionally. Rather, the unions’ mobilisations—strikes, protests,
and marches—created opportunities for such unrest to outburst, conjuring latent
violence from some of urban society’s most marginalised groups. Beginning with
French colonialism and continuing until today, such groups—slum dwellers,
uprooted migrants, and the unemployed lumpenproletariat—have bandwagoned
onto union-organised protests, increasing their size and surliness. Many labour
protests began peacefully but ended violently, transforming into riots that spun out
of control. In 1988, William Zartman coined the term the ‘anomic threat’ to
describe how these marginalised groups, if given the opportunity to join labour
mobilisations, could wreak instability.20 By recognising that their protests could
provoke such semi-spontaneous violence, labour unions gained the ability to not
only strike but also threaten to strike to elicit concessions from the regime.
Regime leaders, in response, molliﬁed union anger and reduced opportunities for
such urban riots to outburst.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I establish a baseline by showing that,
since colonialism, urban riots have accompanied labour mobilisations in Morocco,
helping unions garner concessions. This tactic originated with protests against
French imperialists in the 1930s and continued until the end of King Hassan II’s
reign in 1999. Second, I demonstrate how a spike in union unrest developed in
Morocco in early 2010, and, then, how these labour protests continued in spring
2011 during the Arab uprisings. Third, I explain how unions used state–labour
negotiations in April 2011, what was known as the ‘social dialogue’ (al-hiwar
al-ijtima’i), to force concessions from the regime and its loyalist Prime Minister,
Abbas el-Fassi. To conclude, I discuss why these concessions should be
considered a victory for the unions and not a strategy of co-optation executed by
18 Bellin, ‘Contingent Democrats’, cit., pp. 175–205.
19 Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2005),
pp. 213–214.
20 WilliamZartman, ‘Opposition as Support of the State’,BeyondCoercion (NewYork: Croom-Helm, 1988), p. 71.
Also: Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity andChangeBefore andAfter theUprisings in Tunisia, Egypt andMorocco: Regime
Reconﬁguration and Policy-making in North Africa’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
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authoritarian regime, working to enhance unionists’ material conditions in a
context of political continuity.
This article contributes two main points. The ﬁrst point is that Morocco’s
syndicates utilised familiar tactics—joining street protests, exaggerating material
demands, and threatening negotiation walkouts. Because of the instability of the
Arab uprisings, however, these tactics of state–labour relations became especially
effective: the regime exerted itself to placate union demands.10
The second point is more empirical, less theoretical. Tracing the sequenced
history of labour mobilisation, this article demonstrates that union unrest augured
youth-led demonstrations of spring 2011. In the ﬁrst eight months of 2010, months
before the outbreak of Tunisia’s protests, labour strikes and demonstrations
increased by eight per cent nationally in Morocco.11 This statistic signiﬁes that
labour-organised protests, which epitomized discontent with the socio-economic
status quo, presaged the demonstrations of the February 20th Movement.
Demonstrating that union unrest, empirically, preceded Morocco’s uprising
suggests that the proliferation of social media applications, such as Facebook and
Twitter, ampliﬁed underlying socio-economic frustration, but did not initiate
unrest. This ﬁnding engages theories that identify social media as either, at most, a
cause for the Arab uprisings or, at least, a device integral for collective action.12
Throughout the developing world, strikes from labour unions, generally, and
public employees, speciﬁcally, have wrought instability in authoritarian regimes.
Especially when such regimes refuse to give material concessions, unions have
protested to threaten regime change. In South Korea, unionists mobilised against
the regime in the 1980s on behalf of democratisation to secure laws that increased
private sector wages.13 Over 10 years, their strikes raised wages by 250 per cent;
British unionists achieved similar gains over 70 years.14 In Brazil, public
employee unions mobilised to bring about a new regime that pledged to increase
their autonomy and their members’ wages. When the new state led by Jose´ Sarney
cut public salaries, the public employees struck to cause a ‘paralysis of essential
public services’.15 In Poland, likewise, public employees—especially in education
and healthcare—supported the Gdan´sk shipbuilders who struck for
democratisation.16 Counting strikes in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1993,
one study calculated that public employee unions were ‘the most protest-prone’
labour group, rallying members to defend their material interests during
democratisation.17 Unions, especially those of public employees, are what Eva
10 The ‘regime’ is deﬁned not only as Morocco’s elected government, headed by loyalist Prime Minister Abbas
el-Fassi (2007–2011), but also the palace and royal advisors. It may oversimplify to treat them as one, but, in
practical terms, they jointly decide whether to offer concessions to labour unions.
11 ‘irtifaa’a ‘adad al-idrabaat ﬁ sinah 2010 binisbah 8 ﬁ al-miah muqaarinah bisinah’, al-massae, 1285 (August
11, 2010), p. 8.
12 Examples: Marc Lynch, ‘After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab
State’, Perspective on Politics, 9(2) (2011), p. 306; Philip Howard and Muzzamil Hussain, ‘The Role of Digital
Media’, Journal of Democracy, 22(3) (2011), pp. 35–48.
13 Eva Bellin, ‘Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries’,
World Politics, 52(2) (2000), p. 201.
14 Alice Amsden, ‘South Korea’s Record Wage Rates’, Industrial Relations, 29 (1990), p. 81.
15 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems’, World Development,
21(8) (1993), p. 1362.
16 David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990),
pp. 94–95.
17 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, ‘Contentious Politics in New Democracies’, World Politics, 50(4) (1998),
p. 558.
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Bellin terms ‘contingent democrats’, ready to protest if regimes do not acquiesce
to their material demands.18
In Morocco, public employees have spearheaded labour mobilisations. Without
such unionists, the regime’s core institutions—schools, hospitals, courts,
ministries, and municipalities—would not function. They are integral to
implementing its policies and programs. That is, public employees who strike
or protest do not, like private sector unionists, reduce ﬁrm proﬁts. Their stoppages,
by contrast, cut into the political capital of regimes, which accrue it over time with
citizens through the consistent and successful provision of public services. Strikes
from public employees threaten regimes because they endanger their ‘ruling
bargain’ with citizens, who expect consistency in service delivery in a trade for
political loyalty.19
A question remains, however. Why would a regime take public employee
unions’ threats to strike seriously? Such threats may be cheap-talk without the
backing of labour muscle in street protests. Because of a historical continuity in
Moroccan politics, the regime could tell that these strike threats of 2011 were
credible. This continuity is that urban violence has often been associated with (and
grown from) such labour mobilisations. In most instances, unions did not organise
urban violence intentionally. Rather, the unions’ mobilisations—strikes, protests,
and marches—created opportunities for such unrest to outburst, conjuring latent
violence from some of urban society’s most marginalised groups. Beginning with
French colonialism and continuing until today, such groups—slum dwellers,
uprooted migrants, and the unemployed lumpenproletariat—have bandwagoned
onto union-organised protests, increasing their size and surliness. Many labour
protests began peacefully but ended violently, transforming into riots that spun out
of control. In 1988, William Zartman coined the term the ‘anomic threat’ to
describe how these marginalised groups, if given the opportunity to join labour
mobilisations, could wreak instability.20 By recognising that their protests could
provoke such semi-spontaneous violence, labour unions gained the ability to not
only strike but also threaten to strike to elicit concessions from the regime.
Regime leaders, in response, molliﬁed union anger and reduced opportunities for
such urban riots to outburst.
This article proceeds as follows. First, I establish a baseline by showing that,
since colonialism, urban riots have accompanied labour mobilisations in Morocco,
helping unions garner concessions. This tactic originated with protests against
French imperialists in the 1930s and continued until the end of King Hassan II’s
reign in 1999. Second, I demonstrate how a spike in union unrest developed in
Morocco in early 2010, and, then, how these labour protests continued in spring
2011 during the Arab uprisings. Third, I explain how unions used state–labour
negotiations in April 2011, what was known as the ‘social dialogue’ (al-hiwar
al-ijtima’i), to force concessions from the regime and its loyalist Prime Minister,
Abbas el-Fassi. To conclude, I discuss why these concessions should be
considered a victory for the unions and not a strategy of co-optation executed by
18 Bellin, ‘Contingent Democrats’, cit., pp. 175–205.
19 Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2005),
pp. 213–214.
20 WilliamZartman, ‘Opposition as Support of the State’,BeyondCoercion (NewYork: Croom-Helm, 1988), p. 71.
Also: Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity andChangeBefore andAfter theUprisings in Tunisia, Egypt andMorocco: Regime
Reconﬁguration and Policy-making in North Africa’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).
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authoritarian regime, working to enhance unionists’ material conditions in a
context of political continuity.
This article contributes two main points. The ﬁrst point is that Morocco’s
syndicates utilised familiar tactics—joining street protests, exaggerating material
demands, and threatening negotiation walkouts. Because of the instability of the
Arab uprisings, however, these tactics of state–labour relations became especially
effective: the regime exerted itself to placate union demands.10
The second point is more empirical, less theoretical. Tracing the sequenced
history of labour mobilisation, this article demonstrates that union unrest augured
youth-led demonstrations of spring 2011. In the ﬁrst eight months of 2010, months
before the outbreak of Tunisia’s protests, labour strikes and demonstrations
increased by eight per cent nationally in Morocco.11 This statistic signiﬁes that
labour-organised protests, which epitomized discontent with the socio-economic
status quo, presaged the demonstrations of the February 20th Movement.
Demonstrating that union unrest, empirically, preceded Morocco’s uprising
suggests that the proliferation of social media applications, such as Facebook and
Twitter, ampliﬁed underlying socio-economic frustration, but did not initiate
unrest. This ﬁnding engages theories that identify social media as either, at most, a
cause for the Arab uprisings or, at least, a device integral for collective action.12
Throughout the developing world, strikes from labour unions, generally, and
public employees, speciﬁcally, have wrought instability in authoritarian regimes.
Especially when such regimes refuse to give material concessions, unions have
protested to threaten regime change. In South Korea, unionists mobilised against
the regime in the 1980s on behalf of democratisation to secure laws that increased
private sector wages.13 Over 10 years, their strikes raised wages by 250 per cent;
British unionists achieved similar gains over 70 years.14 In Brazil, public
employee unions mobilised to bring about a new regime that pledged to increase
their autonomy and their members’ wages. When the new state led by Jose´ Sarney
cut public salaries, the public employees struck to cause a ‘paralysis of essential
public services’.15 In Poland, likewise, public employees—especially in education
and healthcare—supported the Gdan´sk shipbuilders who struck for
democratisation.16 Counting strikes in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1993,
one study calculated that public employee unions were ‘the most protest-prone’
labour group, rallying members to defend their material interests during
democratisation.17 Unions, especially those of public employees, are what Eva
10 The ‘regime’ is deﬁned not only as Morocco’s elected government, headed by loyalist Prime Minister Abbas
el-Fassi (2007–2011), but also the palace and royal advisors. It may oversimplify to treat them as one, but, in
practical terms, they jointly decide whether to offer concessions to labour unions.
11 ‘irtifaa’a ‘adad al-idrabaat ﬁ sinah 2010 binisbah 8 ﬁ al-miah muqaarinah bisinah’, al-massae, 1285 (August
11, 2010), p. 8.
12 Examples: Marc Lynch, ‘After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab
State’, Perspective on Politics, 9(2) (2011), p. 306; Philip Howard and Muzzamil Hussain, ‘The Role of Digital
Media’, Journal of Democracy, 22(3) (2011), pp. 35–48.
13 Eva Bellin, ‘Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries’,
World Politics, 52(2) (2000), p. 201.
14 Alice Amsden, ‘South Korea’s Record Wage Rates’, Industrial Relations, 29 (1990), p. 81.
15 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems’, World Development,
21(8) (1993), p. 1362.
16 David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990),
pp. 94–95.
17 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, ‘Contentious Politics in New Democracies’, World Politics, 50(4) (1998),
p. 558.
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On 20 March 1955, Moroccan unionists declared their independence from the
CGT, founding the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT). The UMT was the ﬁrst
union autonomous from European leadership, and played a crucial role expelling
French imperialists. The union claimed control over 650,000 workers,25 though its
membership likely numbered around 576,000.26 This number exceeded those for
Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, where 200,000, 150,000, and 45,000 workers
unionised, respectively.27 From the year it was established, 1955, until the year of
independence, 1956, the UMT organized 1987 separate protests that mobilised
76,486 workers.28 The unions’ ability to organize large-scale strikes and protests,
which rallied the urban masses to the nationalist cause, expedited Morocco’s
independence to which the French conceded in November 1956.
Independence, however, did not realise all labour demands. Although power
had been transferred to Moroccans, the material conditions of unionists remained
dire, as under colonialism. Between 1956 and 1957, the unions launched 542
different strikes to vocalise their discontent.29 The main stronghold of labour was
public employees, whose wages had been frozen after independence. Early
statistics indicated that such public employees constituted about 38 per cent of
UMT unionists.30 In June 1961, such functionaries spearheaded a nation-wide
strike that called for wage increases and legal protections for workers within the
new constitution.
Recognising unionists’ role in the independence struggle, and responding to
their strikes, the regime conceded to public employees’ demands and added pro-
labour laws to the 1962 constitution. These laws created labour complaint courts,
restricted work of children, created a minimum wage, and established an agency to
enforce wage agreements.31 Socialists within the elected government, like Mehdi
Ben Barka, had pushed for unionist priorities in the constitution. When these
socialists left the elected government, they created a party with close ties to the
UMT. The socialists advanced unionist interests in parliament, whereas the
unionists mobilised socialist voters in elections. Because of rivalries between
socialist and union leaders, however, the two organisations split ways in 1963.
Realising that losing UMT support hurt politically, the socialists would ally with
other unions—the Confe´de´ration De´mocratique du Travail (CDT) and the
Fe´de´ration De´mocratique du Travail (FDT)—in later decades.
Beginning in 1964, Morocco’s economy declined—a result of low phosphate
prices and few non-phosphate exports. Reacting, the regime cut spending,
shrinking salaries for public employees and reducing budgets for public
institutions. In January 1965, teachers unionised in the UMT-initiated protests in
Morocco’s major cities, with Casablanca as the epicentre of the labour
mobilisation. Discontent with recent economic changes, about 10,000
unemployed workers and students joined the teachers’ demonstration in
25 Eqbal Ahmad, ‘Trade Unionism’, in Carl L. Brown (ed.), State and Society in Independent North Africa
(Baltimore: The Middle East Institute, 1966), p. 175.
26 Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Boston: Little Brown, 1970),
pp. 175–194.
27 Moore, Politics in North Africa, cit., pp. 175–194; Anthony Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Mauritania
(Lanham: Scarecrow, 1996), p. 275.
28 Ibid. Moore, p. 193.
29 Clement and Paul, ‘Trade Unions’, cit., p. 21.
30 Douglas Ashford, Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 280–281.
31 Ibid. Ahmad, p. 174.
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the regime. What is clear is that although the Arab uprisings did not alter
Morocco’s macro-politics, preserving the continuity of monarchical rule, unions
drove change in its micro-politics. By recognising that the threat of their
mobilisations could incite urban riots, the syndicates won major material demands
of public employees, including better monthly wages, retirement pensions, and
professional promotions.
Union Unrest and Urban Riots, 1930s–2000s
Since colonialism, labour mobilisations have provoked urban violence that has
prompted Morocco’s non-democratic overlords, whether French ofﬁcials or
regime elites, to grant material concessions. In 1943, Morocco’s ﬁrst union
emerged—the Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Travail (or ‘CGT’). The CGT
developed from a coalition of European and Moroccan workers, often members
of the French Communist Party. Coordinating in a series of strikes in the 1930s,
these workers had won concessions from the French authorities. One strike, of
over 4000 workers in the public phosphate mines, led to higher wages, better
working conditions, and a 48-hour work week.21 Similar labour protests erupted in
later years, in Fes, Casablanca, Meknes, and Khouribga, and especially in the
sectors of railroads, postal services, and phosphate mining. Even during this early
era, public employees—phosphate miners, railroad conductors, and postal
clerks—provided the labour movement’s core.
As calls for national independence intensiﬁed in the late 1940s, some Europeans
feared the inﬂuence of Moroccans within the CGT. They tried to exclude them
from the syndicate but failed.22 Not all Moroccans, likewise, thought that locals
and Europeans should cooperate within the same union. Over time, these
nationalists changed their opinions after realising what street power the union
possessed. It could channel discontent of the urban masses to expedite
independence, and consequently the ﬁght for the control of the CGT reﬂected
the national struggle for independence. In 1951, the ﬁrst Moroccan Muslim
became Secretary General of the CGT and later, Morocco’s king publicly
acknowledged the unionists’ role in resisting French hegemony, declaring them a
‘distinguished vanguard’ in the nationalist struggle.23
Events of the 1950s showed how the unionists earned the king’s ‘vanguard’
moniker by launching protests to force the withdrawal of French forces. On May
Day 1951, the unionists organised a large protest in which they tussled with the
colonial police in Casablanca. Next, in December 1952, Morocco’s unionists
responded with more force, organising a march in Casablanca to protest the
assassination of a Tunisian labour leader. The night prior, nationalist leaders told
unionists to ‘gather weapons’ and, at the march’s end, the unionists attacked the
colonial police with axes and clubs.24 Because the union’s march had attracted
malcontents from throughout Casablanca who were drawn into the protest, it
transformed into a riot, leading to the death of hundreds.
21 Jean-Francois Clement and Jim Paul, ‘Trade Unions and Moroccan Politics’,MERIP Reports (October 1984),
p. 21.
22 Abd al-Jalil Abumajed, al-niqabaat bilmaghrib, (Casablanca: Ouragan Communication, 2008), pp. 20–21.
23 Joseph Salazar, ‘Mohamed V: The Tangiers Speech’, African Yearbook of Rhetoric, 2(3) (2001), p. 23.
24 Daniel Zisenwine, The Emergence of Nationalist Politics in Morocco (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 206–
208.
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26 Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Boston: Little Brown, 1970),
pp. 175–194.
27 Moore, Politics in North Africa, cit., pp. 175–194; Anthony Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Mauritania
(Lanham: Scarecrow, 1996), p. 275.
28 Ibid. Moore, p. 193.
29 Clement and Paul, ‘Trade Unions’, cit., p. 21.
30 Douglas Ashford, Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 280–281.
31 Ibid. Ahmad, p. 174.
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moniker by launching protests to force the withdrawal of French forces. On May
Day 1951, the unionists organised a large protest in which they tussled with the
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21 Jean-Francois Clement and Jim Paul, ‘Trade Unions and Moroccan Politics’,MERIP Reports (October 1984),
p. 21.
22 Abd al-Jalil Abumajed, al-niqabaat bilmaghrib, (Casablanca: Ouragan Communication, 2008), pp. 20–21.
23 Joseph Salazar, ‘Mohamed V: The Tangiers Speech’, African Yearbook of Rhetoric, 2(3) (2001), p. 23.
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imprisoned.36 Although the unionists had paid a high price, their strike achieved
its aims—most price controls were reinstated. From the riots of 1981, Morocco’s
regime learned that unionists harboured grievances with the economic system and
would enlist the support of the urban masses to force concessions.
In 1984, protests organised by students in response to World Bank austerity
measures spread throughout the country and lasted for about two weeks, becoming
violent when they reached urban areas. Over 400 protestors died. Most deaths
occurred in Nador and Te´touan, two marginalised cities in Morocco’s northeast.
By contrast, Casablanca and Rabat—areas with many public employees and other
unionists—were quiet. After the 1979 and 1981 riots, the unions had according to
David Seddon ‘worked out a compromise with the government’ and, hence, felt
little reason to support the student protests.37 The regime had raised the salaries of
public employees while, concurrently, it had implemented other austerity
measures, like increasing school fees (which had ignited the riots). Although the
unions had won greater concessions when their protests attracted the support of the
urban masses, that relationship was neither automatic nor reciprocal. The unions
used the support of the lumpenproletariat but would not, necessarily, give it in
return.
In the 1990s theWorld Bank, again, pressured the regime to implement reforms.
Over 112 state-owned industries were opened to private investors.38
The combination of new efﬁciencies with import competition eliminated factory
jobs, reducing the number of unionists in manufacturing.39 Structural adjustment
of the 1990s weakened Morocco’s labour movement, especially in manufacturing.
Reforms occurred to public sector services, though less substantially. Foreign
companies began rubbish collection, water management, and electricity delivery
in Casablanca, Tangier, and several other cities. Despite these changes, however,
the hiring of public employees did not abate and, by the 1990s, their salaries
constituted over half of the national budget’s total expenditures.40 Salaries for
public employees within local governments, speciﬁcally, became the budget’s
largest expenditure, surpassing even military spending.41 Public employee
unionists beneﬁted from reticence to fully privatise public services, which
necessitated more hiring—this meant new recruits to bolster unions.
Unions vocalised opposition to privatisation of public services in a showdown
with the regime on 14 December 1990. Demanding higher wages as
compensation, the CDT and other unions called a national strike, planning
protests in urban areas—Tangier, Marrakech, Meknes, and Fes. In Fes, CDT
unionised teachers organised the initial demonstration, which was peaceful.
It evolved into a riot, as Susan Waltz describes, when it was ‘fed by the outrage’ of
restless youth and uprooted migrants who ‘were frustrated in their attempts to ﬁnd
decent employment’.42 For two days, 20,000 rioters swarmed the streets, causing
36 Entelis, Culture and Counterculture, cit., p. 93.
37 Seddon, ‘Riot and Rebellion in North Africa’, in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), Power and Stability in the Middle
East (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp. 115–118.
38 Myriam Catusse, Le Temps des entrepreneurs: Politique et transformations du capitalisme au Maroc (Paris:
Larose, 2008).
39 Laetitia Cairoli, ‘Garment Factory Workers in the City of Fez’, Middle East Journal, 53(1) (1999), p. 29.
40 Guilain Denoeux, ‘Morocco’s Economic Prospects: Daunting Challenges Ahead’, Middle East Policy, 2
(2001), pp. 75–77.
41 ‘maouraad al-hasabaat’, Majalat al-aouaal (April 2, 2011), p. 22.
42 SusanWaltz,Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995), p. 128.
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Casablanca, increasing its intensity and ballooning its size.32 The peaceful
protestors turned into violent rioters. Fearing the urban riot might threaten the
regime’s stability, the king issued orders to repress, leading to the death of over
400. Subsequently the regime imposed a state of emergency and rescinded many
of the spending cuts, hoping to pre-empt future unrest.
Because Morocco’s constitution guarantees freedom to form unions, several
new ones sprang up in the 1970s—despite the state of emergency. Often unions
afﬁliated with political parties, like the Istiqlal’s Union Ge´ne´rale des Travailleurs
du Maroc (UGTM) and the Islamists’ Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc
(UNTM). ‘It became fashionable’, as Clement Henry describes, for all parties to
create ‘union appendages’.33 The parties experienced difﬁculty mobilising the
urban masses, and realised that the unions—with their grassroots inﬂuence—could
exert pressure on the regime through strikes and protests in ways the parties never
could alone.
In 1979, unionists again mobilised after the state of emergency, which
continued until 1977. When Morocco’s trade deﬁcit increased unexpectedly, the
regime responded by implementing austerity measures to boost exports and lower
wages. Protesting these decisions, which increased prices of basic goods through
subsidy reductions, a new labour union formed—the CDT. Through organising
strikes, especially among public employees of education, mines, and railways, the
CDT and other unions pressured the elected government to raise wages to
compensate for price increases. When the strikes of these unionists grew larger,
and attracted sympathizers from the urban masses, then the regime dispersed them
violently. Initially, the regime refused to concede and, when the unionists took to
the streets in Casablanca, the police responded by jailing 688 unionists, ﬁring 708
teachers, and dismissing 178 healthcare workers. However, sensing that labour
mobilisation was increasing, the prime minister issued a legal concession to
forestall conﬂict. After consulting royal advisors, he acquiesced by raising the
minimum wage of such workers by 30 per cent.34 Through their strikes, and the
threat that the urban masses might join them, the unions garnered concessions
from the regime.
1979, however, was not the end of the labour unrest. The syndicates mobilised
again in 1981, what would become one of Morocco’s bloodiest urban riots. That
May, the regime eliminated a series of price controls, causing living costs to
increase dramatically. On 18 June, the UMT called a citywide strike in
Casablanca, and, the next day, the CDT ordered a nationwide strike. On 21 June, a
protest of unionists occurred in Casablanca—the march advanced through
shantytowns and collected a following of malcontents, who transformed it into a
mob riot. For four days, the rioters destroyed property, ransacked stores, and
attacked ‘symbols of public authority’ until the army intervened, killing 645 and
injuring thousands.35 Victims were buried in seven mass graves, hidden until
2005. The regime also repressed unionists. Leaders from all of the unions were
arrested but those of the CDT were targeted, with 100 of its provincial bosses
32 David Seddon, ‘The Politics of Adjustment in Morocco’, in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley, eds., Structural
Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 241.
33 Ibid. Moore, p. 184.
34 Seddon ‘Winter of Discontent’, Middle East Report (1984), p. 4, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer127/winter-
discontent (accessed September 18, 2014).
35 John Entelis, Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics (New York: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 92–
93.
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36 Entelis, Culture and Counterculture, cit., p. 93.
37 Seddon, ‘Riot and Rebellion in North Africa’, in Berch Berberoglu (ed.), Power and Stability in the Middle
East (London: Zed Books, 1989), pp. 115–118.
38 Myriam Catusse, Le Temps des entrepreneurs: Politique et transformations du capitalisme au Maroc (Paris:
Larose, 2008).
39 Laetitia Cairoli, ‘Garment Factory Workers in the City of Fez’, Middle East Journal, 53(1) (1999), p. 29.
40 Guilain Denoeux, ‘Morocco’s Economic Prospects: Daunting Challenges Ahead’, Middle East Policy, 2
(2001), pp. 75–77.
41 ‘maouraad al-hasabaat’, Majalat al-aouaal (April 2, 2011), p. 22.
42 SusanWaltz,Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995), p. 128.
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Casablanca, increasing its intensity and ballooning its size.32 The peaceful
protestors turned into violent rioters. Fearing the urban riot might threaten the
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of the spending cuts, hoping to pre-empt future unrest.
Because Morocco’s constitution guarantees freedom to form unions, several
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afﬁliated with political parties, like the Istiqlal’s Union Ge´ne´rale des Travailleurs
du Maroc (UGTM) and the Islamists’ Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc
(UNTM). ‘It became fashionable’, as Clement Henry describes, for all parties to
create ‘union appendages’.33 The parties experienced difﬁculty mobilising the
urban masses, and realised that the unions—with their grassroots inﬂuence—could
exert pressure on the regime through strikes and protests in ways the parties never
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continued until 1977. When Morocco’s trade deﬁcit increased unexpectedly, the
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forestall conﬂict. After consulting royal advisors, he acquiesced by raising the
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injuring thousands.35 Victims were buried in seven mass graves, hidden until
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arrested but those of the CDT were targeted, with 100 of its provincial bosses
32 David Seddon, ‘The Politics of Adjustment in Morocco’, in Bonnie Campbell and John Loxley, eds., Structural
Adjustment in Africa (London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 241.
33 Ibid. Moore, p. 184.
34 Seddon ‘Winter of Discontent’, Middle East Report (1984), p. 4, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer127/winter-
discontent (accessed September 18, 2014).
35 John Entelis, Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics (New York: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 92–
93.
MATT BUEHLER
94
30450.indd   95 29/05/15   3:35 PM
CONTINUITy AND CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS
96
Union Demands, Regime Reticence: 2007–2009
Because of their government’s unfulﬁlled policy promises, the socialists lost seats
in the 2007 elections and became a junior partner in the cabinet, retaining few
ministries. The elections brought to power a loyalist prime minister with an
aristocratic pedigree, Abbas al-Fassi. Few anticipated he would take labour
concerns of economic inequality seriously.
In Fassi’s ﬁrst months in ofﬁce, these expectations were conﬁrmed when his
administration offered a reform package, which would have increased wages by 10
per cent over three years. Rejecting the offer, the syndicates criticised it as meagre
given that living costs rose 16 per cent annually. Moreover, the unions’ calls for
reforms for retirement pensions and the promotion system went unanswered in
Fassi’s proposal.49 Fassi’s meagre proposal became even stingier after the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis, however. With fewer European tourists and phosphate exports,
Morocco’s tax revenues declined and its national debt (as a percentage of gross
domestic product) soared—from 47.3 in 2008 to 56.8 by 2011. Facing these
serious economic problems, the Fassi administration retracted its plan to consider
increasing public salaries.
Not only macro-economic conditions but also internal inﬁghting obstructed the
unions from securing their material demands. In the UMT, Morocco’s largest
union, a struggle developed between the syndicate’s bureaucratic leadership and
its radical members, who wanted the former to be more assertive. In the FDT, a
politician who aspired to be the socialist party’s president interfered in the union’s
internal elections. 77 unionists opposed him, drafting a protest petition.50 In the
UNTM, the Islamists’ union, a dispute developed between two leaders—
Mohamed Yatim and Abdelssalam al-Ma’ati. The latter sued the former for
allegedly misusing union funds. Ma’ati’s lawsuit was a ploy to take over the union:
The ‘basic issue’, one unionist explained, was that Yatim’s faction ‘controlled the
union, and the other wing didn’t have a foothold in it’.51 What these internal
conﬂicts indicated was that the unions were in bargaining position of weakness,
not of strength, vis-a`-vis the regime. As labour unrest escalated before the Arab
uprising, however, this changed: A window of opportunity opened in which unions
could press for their demands and, ultimately, secure new concessions.
Morocco’s Mobilisation: Union Unrest in the Arab Uprising
Drawing inspiration from Egypt and Tunisia, where labour protests had spiked in
the late 2000s, Morocco’s public employee unions began to mobilise to assert their
demands. Overcoming their inﬁghting, they prepared to use their positions as
operators of public institutions to elicit concessions from Morocco’s regime.
Morocco’s regime feared not only the stoppages in the provision of public services
that would result from strikes but also the urban riots that had grown from such
labour mobilisations in the past.
49 Jawad Ghasaal, ‘al-hiwaar al-ijtima’ai yatajhu nahou al-baab al-masdoud’, at-Tajdid, 1430 (July 15, 2009),
p. 3.
50 Youssef Esskat, ‘fadrilayioun yutaaliboun al-itihaad biraf’a al-yad ‘an markazitihim’, as-Sabah, 3381
(February 24, 2011), p. 3.
51 Ismaa’ail Rawahi, ‘Tajmeed al-hisaab al-banki liniqaabat al-itihaad al-watani lilshugal’, as-Sabah, 3285
(February 11, 2011), p. 8.
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$15 million in damage. Unrest had grown violent because, in preceding months,
real incomes of Fes families had dropped by nearly 30 per cent.43 The union
mobilisation provided the opportunity for the outburst of this urban discontent,
with violent consequences.44 Like in 1981, the regime punished the unionists for
the riot. Fearing that imprisoning labour leaders might reignite violence, the
regime stalled in confronting them directly. Using a controversial newspaper
interview the CDT leader had given as a pretext, regime authorities imprisoned
him for two years beginning in April 1992.45
Again, however, urban violence that had grown from union protests produced
material results. Ten days after the Fes riots, the king called upon the elected
government to devise concessions that would alleviate discontent. The minimum
wage was increased by 15 per cent. Regime leaders opened negotiations with the
unions and agreed, by February 1991, to accede to additional material demands
and new ‘social allowances’, including raising state salaries and hiring more
public employees.46
When the socialists entered elected government in 1998, the unions initially
beneﬁted when their new prime minister promulgated a pro-worker labour code.
Yet, the socialists did little else to resolve the socio-economic frustration felt by
the unionists or the urban masses. Beginning in the 2000s, this angst began to boil
over with protests occurring in dozens of medium-sized towns with low public
investment, notably Bouarfa, Sefrou, and Sidi Ifni.47 Diverging over these
protests, Rabat-based labour leaders called for patience hoping for socialist-led
reforms, whereas provincial bosses encouraged unionists to protest. Working
alongside civil society activists who protested for rights of political detainees and
against rising living costs, local unionists in these towns mobilised. Often, a union
ofﬁce was a space of coordination in which these oppositional actors convened,
planned a march route, and departed ensemble.48 In Bouarfa, over 10,000 citizens
protested in May 2007. In Sefrou, street protests in September 2007 vocalised
anger at reductions in bread subsidies. In Sidi Ifni, local unionists protested with
unemployed graduates who blockaded the port. Although the regime neither
met all of the demands of these towns’ protestors or local unionists, it offered
limited concessions to calm the unrest—free water in Bouarfa, new price controls
in Sefrou, and funds to spur employment in Sidi Ifni. Afraid to estrange their
socialist allies, labour leaders did not endorse these protests of the 2000s. By 2007,
however, the unions became disillusioned that they could collaborate with the
socialists in formal politics to implement reform.
43 George Joffe´, ‘Elections and Reform in Morocco’, in Richard Gillespie (ed.),Mediterranean Politics: Volume
1 (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 223.
44 Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conﬂict in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge, 2005), pp. 134–135.
45 Waltz, Human Rights and Reform, cit., p. 128.
46 Abdellatif Moutadayene, ‘Economic Crises and Democratization in Morocco’, Journal of North African
Studies, 6(3) (2001), p. 82.
47 Koen Bogaert, ‘The Revolt of Small Towns: The Meaning of Morocco’s History and Geography of Social
Protests’, African Political Economy (2014), p. 9. Karine Bennaﬂa and Badimon Emperador, ‘Le Maroc Inutile.
Rede´couvert par l’action publique: les cas de Sidi Ifni et Bouarfa’, Politique Africaine, 120 (2010), pp. 73–78.
48 Bogaert and Emperador, ‘Imaging the State through Social Protest: State Reformation of Unemployed
Graduates in Morocco’, Mediterranean Politics, 16(2) (2011), p. 250.
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promotion system, and wage increases to create a minimum wage of 3500 dirhams
per month ($430.00).60
Other unionised workers mobilised in solidarity with public employees
throughout January 2011. The phosphate miners’ union, a syndicate historically
known for its militancy, struck on 28 January to protest the regime’s
noncompliance with labour law 6500, which mandated health insurance and
retirement pensions for miners.61 Tax collectors struck for 48-hours on 30 and 31
of January, wanting to vocalise ‘collective grievances’ and defend ‘the right of
employees to express their discontent’.62 Fruit and vegetable vendors in
Casablanca’s open-air bazar also struck, rallying in solidarity for the public
employees.63 Reacting to surging domestic labour unrest, and increasing
instability in neighbouring Arab states, the prime minister announced his interest
in a dialogue with the unions, though his plans were inchoate: Neither a meeting
date was chosen nor its agenda set.64 Concerns arose that such protests—if left
unchecked—could spiral out of control because unions would draw the urban
masses into the fray, like labour unrest of 1981 and 1990.
Beginning on 20 February 2011, protests sprang up across Morocco organised
by the country’s youth movement, the February 20th Movement for Change.
Protests occurred in 53 different cities with 238,000 participants. Casablanca and
Rabat saw the largest mobilisations where 16,000 and 8,000 protestors,
respectively, took to the streets. Demonstrations repeated in March and April
but declined in May, June, and July.65 In some cities marginalised by the regime,
such as Hoceima, Tangier, Larache, protests featured fewer participants but were
violent, leading to 5 protestor deaths, 128 protestor injuries, and 107 destroyed
buildings.66
Pressuring the Fassi administration to open negotiations, Morocco’s public
employee unions endorsed the demonstrations of 20th February; unionists ﬂooded
the protests. Unionists held signs that criticized the king’s economic counsellor,
Mounir Majidi, and called for the nationalization of royal business conglomerates,
like the Societe Nationale d’Investissement.67 As the mainstay of the crown’s
private fortunes, such conglomerates control businesses in many economic
sectors, including such enterprises as the country’s largest bank, AttijariWafa
Bank, and its biggest dairy producer, Centrale Laitie`re. Although the activists of
the February 20th Movement were the organisers of the protests, and the unionists
were only participants, the latter used them as an opportunity to assert their
material demands to the regime. While Morocco’s protests did not reach the size
of those in Tunisia and Egypt, they did cause considerable unrest and posed a
threat to stability unseen since the urban riots of the 1980s.
60 Hajar al-Maghli, ‘nijah al-idrabaat bilwathifah al-‘aumumiha faaq 80 ﬁ al-miah’, as-Sabah, 3369 (Febraury 10,
2011), p. 5.
61 Ihssane Elhaﬁdi, ‘niqaabat al-phosophat taftah malaf al-taghtiyya al-sahaiyya bilqataa’a’, as-Sabah, 3358
(January 28, 2011), p. 4.
62 ‘niqaba maaliyya talouh bilidraab limudat 48 saa’aa’, al-masasae, 1354 (January 29–30, 2011), p. 3.
63 Said Boukazoul, ‘naqabaat bisouk al-jumla tad’aou ila idraab khilal maars’, as-Sabah, 3382 (February 15,
2011), p. 5.
64 Ihssane Elhaﬁdi, ‘al-wazir al-aoual yatadakhal liwaqif al-ihtiqaan al-ijtimaa’ai’, as-Sabah, 3367 (February 8,
2011), p. 2.
65 Youssef Akdim et. al. ‘C¸a ne fait que commencer . . . ,’ Telquel, 462 (February 26, 2011), p. 19.
66 Mustapha Sehimi, ‘La Grande Peur’, Maroc Hebdo International, (February 24, 2011), p. 21.
67 Ibid. Akdim et al., p. 21.
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In the ﬁrst eight months of 2010, months before the Arab uprising began in
Tunisia, labour strikes and protests increased in Morocco by eight per cent
nationwide.52 Workers struck in 139 different public ofﬁces, including ministries,
municipalities, schools, hospitals, and courts. Over 18,453 workers mobilised,
which often included occupying their desks, shutting down all activity at their
workstations, and holding rallies at their ofﬁces.53 Early strikes included one on 26
October 2010 at Morocco’s public television station, in which journalists protested
over rumours of privatisation. A second important mobilisation occurred on 3 and
4 November 2010 when public employees called a nationwide strike. The unions
achieved an 85 per cent participation rate in which public employees occupied
their desks and workstations, halting all activity for 48 hours.54 In some provinces,
such as Oriental, participation rates climbed to 93 per cent.55 However unlike past
instances of labour mobilisation, in which the regime had conceded to union
demands, the regime resisted. On 17 December 2010, Morocco’s Minister of
Finance asserted that the decision to raise wages laid ‘in the hands of the
government’ and ‘not in those of anybody else’.56 Alluding to the Fassi
administration’s earlier offer to increase wages which the unions had rejected, the
minister emphasized that now, for the 2011 budget, there were more important
priorities—roads, water, and electricity.57
As public unrest increased in Egypt and Tunisia in January 2011, Morocco’s
unions used this atmosphere to ratchet up pressure on the Fassi administration.
Announced the last week of December 2010, the syndicates organised public
employees for a 72-hour strike—8 to 10 January 2011—across all government
ofﬁces. Public employees hoped that their stoppages would convince the regime to
concede, seeking to avoid disruption in public service delivery and urban riots that
could emerge from such protests. Appearing on public television, the Islamist
union’s chief criticised the Fassi administration for its unwillingness to increase
beneﬁts for unionists. He held Fassi ‘fully responsible’ for the escalating labour
unrest. Fassi had shown ‘no desire to steer the social dialogue toward tangible
beneﬁts’ for public employees, he asserted.58 Nationally, over 80 per cent of
public workers joined the strike. Strike participation was highest in Sidi Ifni and
Saﬁ where 95 and 90 per cent of public employees, respectively, ceased working.
On 10 January, the strike concluded with a large public protest in front of the
Ministry of Public Works in Rabat, where 1000 unionists delivered a statement to
the prime minister in which they demanded that he ‘abide by previous agreements
from negotiations’.59 The statement also asserted other union demands—extra
compensation for public employees in remote communities, reforms for the
52 Ibid. ‘irtifaa’a’, al-massae (1285), p. 8.
53 Ibid. ‘‘irtifaa’a’, al-massae (1285), p. 8.
54 ‘Gre`ve: guerre des chiffres et des mots’, Telquel (October 6–12, 2010), p. 8.
55 Ibid. Telquel, p. 8.
56 Jamal Bourﬁsi, ‘Mezouar: al-hakouma layst must’ada lilraf’a al-ujour’, as-Sabah, 3322 (December 17, 2010),
p. 1.
57 Ibid. Bourﬁsi, p. 1.
58 Khaled al-Suti, ‘al-niqaabi Mohamed Yatime yuhamal al-hakouma masoul al-idrabaat wa al-ihjiqaan al-
ijtimaa’ai’, at-Tajdid, 2565 (January 28–30, 2011), p. 3.
59 ‘niqabaat kafathat idrabaat wataniyyah ﬁ al-t’aliym wa al-sahah wa al-damaan al-ijtimaa’ai wa al-qataa’aaat
aukhrah’, as-Sabah, 3369 (February 10, 2011), p. 1.
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of the meeting room. In a press conference, the unionists asserted that the Fassi
administration had declined ‘to come to the meeting with projects or proposals’ to
satisfy the unions.75 The government refused to offer ‘answers to union demands’,
especially regarding issues of wage increases and professional promotions.
By walking out of the social dialogue, the Islamist unionists signalled to the
regime that, if their demands were not met, they would recommence protests and
join the CDT in boycott. Fearful that a union walkout might ignite new urban
unrest, Fassi’s negotiation team drafted concessions on 9 April 2011. Changes
were proposed for the minimum wage, retirement pensions, and professional
promotions, yet their details were unclear. The minimum wage would be raised
beginning in July 2011 from 2110 dirhams per month (about $260.00) by 500
dirhams ($62.00) for public employees. Reforms to the pension and promotion
systems were left vague, though the Fassi team agreed to freeze the income tax at
38 per cent.
Rather than accepting Fassi’s package of concessions, however, the unions
rejected it. Given regional instability and the regime’s fear of urban riots, the
unions thought that they could push for more beneﬁts. That is, although the public
employees had compelled the regime to offer concessions, they thought they could
elicit a better deal. Every union proposed its own package of concessions.
The UMT put forth a generous plan, including a minimum wage increase of 1390
dirhams and an income tax of 35 per cent. The UNTM, meanwhile, asked for an
890-dirham increase with a tax of 33 per cent. The CDT proposed a 700-dirham
increase, a tax of 34 per cent, and a raise of retirement pensions by 50 per cent.76
Facing these rival proposals, the Fassi administration expressed little enthusiasm;
there was little reason to grant a package of concessions if the unions, themselves,
could not harmonise their material demands.
To overcome these coordination problems, the unions convened on 15 April
2011 and prepared a concessions package that they would present to the regime, a
‘portfolio of common demands’.77 Morocco’s ﬁve main unions—the UMT, FDT,
UGTM, UNTM, and CDT—signed the portfolio of demands. On this list, a
number of familiar demands appeared—the unions called for a boost in wages,
600 or 700 dirhams monthly which would be instated, retroactively, to January
2011.78 Their portfolio of demands also included increases to retirement pensions,
set at 600 dirhams monthly, to 1000. Finally, 33 per cent of public employees
would be promoted, retroactive to January 2011, to compensate for backlogs.
In the ﬁnal round of negotiations, held on 26 April 2011, the Fassi
administration granted many concessions far more generous than its original
proposal of reforms. Through coordinated action, Morocco’s unions secured most
of their material demands, which included retirement bonuses, professional
promotions, and wage raises. The Fassi administration adopted the unions’ plan
for pensions; retired public employees would receive an unprecedented 70 per cent
more monthly (i.e. from 600 dirhams per month to 1000 dirhams). The Fassi team
also conceded to the unions’ plan for changes to the promotion system—33 per
75 Murad Thaabi, ‘insihaab wafd al-itihaad al-watani lilshugal bilmaghreb min jalisat al-hiwaar al-ijtimaa’ai
bisubub khalifaat bayna al-niqabaat wa al-hakouma’, al-massae, 1414 (April 9–10, 2011), p. 3.
76 S. Ali, ‘Morocco Launches Labor Talks’, Maghrabia.com, April 15, 2011. http://magharebia.com/en_GB/
articles/awi/features/2011/04/15/feature-03 (accessed July 27, 2013).
77 ‘malif al-mutaalib al-mushtaarikah’, Union Archival Document, pp. 1–15.
78 Hajar al-Maghli, ‘thlaath markaziyaat niqaabiyyah tarf’a saqif al-mutaalib’, as-Sabah, 3427 (April 19, 2011),
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Eliciting Concessions: State–Labour Negotiations of April 2011
To resolve the spike in labour strikes of 2010, and prevent the urban riots that may
have grown from the protests of spring 2011, Fassi announced on 21 February
2011 that state-labour negotiations would be opened. According to one local
journalist, the regime sought ‘social peace at any price’, and would likely concede
to union demands to placate their anger.68 Held in April 2011, these talks were
known as the ‘social dialogue’ and involved regime representatives (a Fassi
negotiation team) and four unions—the UMT, FDT, UGTM, and UNTM.
Manoeuvring to enhance its bargaining position, the Fassi team announced that
talks would begin on 5 April after a cooling-off period.
Union anger did not subside, however; unionists continued protests between
March 23 and 31. In front of Parliament, unemployed graduates staged a sit-in.
Beside the Ministry of Health, medical professionals protested for better
compensation and promotions.69 Teachers organised the most important
demonstration, which became ‘the largest teachers’ protest in Moroccan history’.
Unionized teachers descended on the Ministry of Education on 26 March 2011.
Over a thousand teachers arrived to assert their demands, but, unlike the protests of
February in which policemen had shown restraint, they lashed out this time: Over
65 teachers suffered injuries; one died from head wounds.70 One teacher
condemned the regime’s brutality in a newspaper editorial, asserting that ‘we must
defend the dignity of teachers’ and remember these ‘ﬂagrant abuses of human
rights’.71
Reacting to assaults on unionists, and seeking to improve their bargaining
positions with the regime, the syndicates released statements in early April 2011
before negotiations began. The unions pressured the regime, threatening to
recommence protests if their material demands were not met. The UNTM’s
Secretary General declared that the Fassi administration must give ‘tangible
answers to core labour demands, and, principally, wage increases’.72 The FDT’s
chief emphasised that ‘the governmentmust give signals regarding wage increases
and professional promotions’ to calm strikers.73 The CDT boycotted the social
dialogue: ‘The regime’, it stressed, delayed negotiations through ‘forming
committees’ and ‘debating the meeting agenda’.74 Once state–labour negotiations
began, the CDT’s boycott exerted pressure on the regime from the outside while
the other unions asserted their demands from the inside. The ﬁrst two rounds of
talks—held on 5 and 7 of April—produced no tangible results, because regime
negotiators had not prepared a package of concessions for labour.
The unions moved next, wrenching the wrist of their negotiation partner—the
Fassi administration. In the middle of negotiations, the Islamist union stormed out
68 Youssef Akdim, ‘La Paix Sociale a` tout prix’, Telquel, 461 (February 19–25, 2011), p. 30.
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to promote their language and culture, after decades of marginalisation. Did the
situation of unionists parallel that of feminist and Amazigh activists in which
broader objectives of democratisation were surrendered for narrow factional
interests?
The answer to this question is no. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt where
protestors, a priori, demanded regime change, this did not occur in Morocco
where they emphasised regime reform. Rather than occupying public squares for
days to oust autocrats, Moroccans’ activities were episodic. Protestors convened
once per month to demonstrate, then departed at the day’s end. Unions, similarly,
did not call for regime change but rather agitated for greater beneﬁts, which had
been denied in previous years. Unions began their strikes and protests with the aim
of winning new beneﬁts and, when they did secure concessions, they ceased their
contestation. Past episodes of labour protest in Moroccan history had created
opportunities for urban riots to outburst, and unions exploited this palpable legacy
to realize their present-day material interests.
While much research related to the Arab uprisings examines larger questions of
regime change or continuity, this analysis has taken a different tack. It has shown
how Morocco’s public employees secured a victory that brought about smaller,
though important, changes—better wages, larger pensions, and more promotions.
By understanding how social movements—such as organised labour—used the
unrest to secure their material interests without driving regime collapse, scholars
gain a more complete understanding of the importance of the Arab uprisings,
especially for states where protests did not cause structural change.
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cent of employees would be promoted. Regarding wages, the salaries of private
sector workers would get a 330-dirham boost implemented gradually, between
July 2011 and July 2012. This would set the minimum wage at 2437 per month
(about $300.00). The unions had secured a far larger salary increase, 330 dirhams,
than the amount speciﬁed in the original Fassi plan, 211 dirhams. The biggest
wage increase was for public employees, however. Those workers who had
initiated and spearheaded labour protests against the regime beginning in early
2010 would get the largest bonus, 600 dirhams more per month.
Although unionists were not the only citizens who called for changes to the
royal business conglomerates, concessions made after the Arab uprising
responded to their demands. The palace agreed to relinquish 38 and 51 per cent
of its shares in Morocco’s largest dairy and biscuit producers, respectively.79 It
also sought a buyer for Morocco’s biggest bank, though retained 48 per cent of its
shares.80 These concessions show that public employees—teachers, doctors,
nurses, and government clerks—emerged as victors from Morocco’s Arab
uprising of 2011. Afraid that sustained labour participation in protests could
provoke urban riots, as it frequently had between the 1930s and 2000s, the regime
acquiesced to calm syndicate anger.
Conclusion
The preceding narrative has illustrated how labour unions utilised unrest stemming
from Morocco’s Arab uprising to articulate their interests, exert pressure on their
regime, and secure their material demands. To this aim, unions of public
employees leveraged their inﬂuence as operators of state institutions—schools,
hospitals, municipalities, and ministries. Their strikes in such institutions not only
disrupted the consistency of public service delivery but also raised the spectre of
urban riots, a phenomenon that had grown from protests of public employees
throughout Moroccan history. Building off regime fear of such riots, the unions
obtained major beneﬁts for their supporters and improved their material
conditions.
Critics of the above interpretation of state–labour relations during Morocco’s
uprising may view the material concessions given to unionists not as a victory for
the labour unions, but rather as one for the regime. That is, such sceptics may see it
as a strategy of co-optation used to buy-off the unions and distract them from
pursuing a broader political project, such as regime change or democratisation.
Co-optation, as a method of regime control, was used in Morocco both historically
and during the uprisings.81 In the Moroccan context, co-optation often occurs
when the monarchy distributes beneﬁts or rights to a group or faction directly in
exchange for commitments of political loyalty.82 Feminists, for example, rallied
around the monarch in 2004 after he supported progressive family laws. Amazigh
activists, likewise, increased their support for the king after he founded an institute
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80 Ibtis Abouharia, ‘Attijariwafa Bank: Financial Communication 2013’, Attijariwafa Bank, (2013), p. 2.
81 On co-optation, see: Lise Storm, Party Politics and the Prospects for Democracy in North Africa (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2014), pp. 4–6.; Ahmed Benchemsi ‘Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition’, Journal of
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79 ‘King of Investments’, September 28, 2013. http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/09/mohammed-vi-king-
investments/ (accessed July 24, 2014).
80 Ibtis Abouharia, ‘Attijariwafa Bank: Financial Communication 2013’, Attijariwafa Bank, (2013), p. 2.
81 On co-optation, see: Lise Storm, Party Politics and the Prospects for Democracy in North Africa (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2014), pp. 4–6.; Ahmed Benchemsi ‘Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition’, Journal of
Democracy, 23(1) (2012), p. 60.
82 Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, ‘Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic transition?’, Carnegie
Papers, 71 (2006), p. 13.
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Arabic). First, the article focuses on the persistence of Tunisia’s tourist model, a
successful combination of ‘Sun, Sand and Sea’. This is particularly interesting
considering the fact that, over the years, the resistance of this sector to change has
gone hand in hand with the resilience of political power. Second, this article
elaborates on the continuity in the representation of Tunisian tourism as the pivot
of a continuing process of change, which has been ideally going on since late
1980s. Such change, the article contends, is however a rhetorical instrument as the
tourist industry has largely remained untouched over the years, although shrinking
economic beneﬁts for investors and persisting territorial problems suggest that
new strategies should be implemented. These two dimensions are intertwined and
reinforce each other. The persistence of the same touristic model suggests that
policy-makers are unable or unwilling to come up with new strategies, despite
their rhetorical commitment to reform. As a consequence, such continuity
strengthen the model, which also is increasingly isolated from changes because it
upholds abroad the idea of a stable and safe Tunisia, able to cope with political
crises and adapt to economic reforms5 —another element of continuity with Ben
Ali’s era.
The article concludes by observing that although the crisis of the touristic sector
has been hidden over the years because the narrative of success had to prevail,
political instability has highlighted the contradictions within the sector,
stimulating a more open debate on development, democracy and economic
growth.
Methodology
The case of Tunisian tourism is relevant to this special issue for three reasons. First
is the deep penetration of interests in the tourist sector within the Tunisian ruling
elite. Second, the Tunisian case shows how the construction of a fragmented
system of governance, characterised by autonomous powerful institutions, created
in different periods and with few institutional linkages, has allowed them, at least
since the late 1980s, to act for the maximisation of interests for the categories that
they represented and not for the beneﬁt of the sector as a whole. Third is the
negative impact that the chaotic development of the sector has had not only on the
territory, but in addressing authoritarianism and a particular model of
development.
This article relies on ﬁeldwork and semi-structured interviews carried out in
Tunisia between 2013 and 2014. In total 32 in-depth interviews have been
conducted, and some of them have been repeated. The research has been realised
in two phases. First, in order to reconstruct the historical memory of the tourist
sector (how it has developed over the years, to what mechanisms it has responded,
which logics prevailed . . . ), former operators, managers and ministries of tourism
have been interviewed. During the second phase, the attention was focused on the
post-revolutionary period with the goal of grasping the ongoing dynamics within
the industry. Therefore former civil servants, tourist operators such as hotel
managers, travel agents, trainers, and the managers of the current governing bodies
5 The World Bank considers tourism a key sector in Tunisia’s development and has suggested over the years a
number of reforms (coastal zone management plans, cultural heritage preservation). World Bank, Country
Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000. Available on the World Bank archives: http://goo.gl/G0DpQC (accessed
August 13, 2014).
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ABSTRACT By the end of the 1960s Tunisia had developed a very aggressive
tourism policy designed to encourage foreign private investment in the sector.
In fact tourism became one of the ﬂagships of Tunisian development, strongly
contributing to re-invent the international reputation of Tunisia as an open,
‘democratic and liberal’ country. Even if the political scenario has changed after
the ‘Jasmine revolution’, continuity seems to prevail in the tourism sector.
This paper focuses on this continuity, examining two speciﬁc dimensions: the
persistence of Tunisia’s tourist model and the continuity in the representation of
Tunisian tourism as the pillar of an everlasting process of change.
Introduction
Since the 1970s, the tourist industry has been one of the ﬂagships of Tunisian
developmental efforts. Crucial to overall economic growth strategy, it also served
the purpose of strengthening Tunisia’s reputation as an open country, attuned to
the values of modernity. However, despite the resilience of the narrative of
grandeur1 Ben Ali deployed to celebrate economic progress linked to tourism, the
sector is in crisis.2 Indeed, the decrease in tourism revenues after regime change
and political turmoil between 2010 and 20143 has negative consequences on the
national economy as a whole.4 Since 2011, Tunisia has been going through
signiﬁcant change, but a closer examination of the tourist industry suggests that
dynamics of continuity prevail over change despite the sector’s need for reform.
This article examines such continuity by considering two thawabit (constant, in
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elite. Second, the Tunisian case shows how the construction of a fragmented
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in different periods and with few institutional linkages, has allowed them, at least
since the late 1980s, to act for the maximisation of interests for the categories that
they represented and not for the beneﬁt of the sector as a whole. Third is the
negative impact that the chaotic development of the sector has had not only on the
territory, but in addressing authoritarianism and a particular model of
development.
This article relies on ﬁeldwork and semi-structured interviews carried out in
Tunisia between 2013 and 2014. In total 32 in-depth interviews have been
conducted, and some of them have been repeated. The research has been realised
in two phases. First, in order to reconstruct the historical memory of the tourist
sector (how it has developed over the years, to what mechanisms it has responded,
which logics prevailed . . . ), former operators, managers and ministries of tourism
have been interviewed. During the second phase, the attention was focused on the
post-revolutionary period with the goal of grasping the ongoing dynamics within
the industry. Therefore former civil servants, tourist operators such as hotel
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tourism plays in it. The questions these studies ask relate to the meaning and the
politics of development, its models and objectives, and the way tourism merges
with political and economic elites’ interests.12 Following on from this, scholars
have analysed a number of connections existing between tourism and political
phenomena.
Consequently, different approaches emerged. Some scholars rely on the
positivist view that tourism is a sort of ‘magic formula’ to bring about and promote
virtuous processes of democratisation and development. Elaborating on
modernisation theory, this view considers that tourism is not only a tool to
promote development, but also an instrument to accelerate economic and political
processes stimulating transitions to democracy.13 Other scholars expose the
problematic nature of such claims by elaborating on Goldworthy’s14 critique of
development theories and by highlighting that the theoretical link between tourism
and development simply may not be consistent with the reality on the ground.15
Scholars of the Middle East have contributed to the debate by examining the
connection between authoritarian resilience and tourism, noting that the
transformation of the sector after privatisation and neo-liberal reforms during
the 1990s has strengthened authoritarianism, with the ruler’s circles beneﬁtting
from economic reforms. In the case of Egypt, Richter and Steiner highlighted how
revenues originating from tourism were not shared with the wider public but
distributed among the members of closed ‘networks of privilege’.16 This ﬁnding
also speaks to the scholarship examining the causes of the Arab Uprisings, as the
outburst of popular discontent is strongly linked to the missing redistribution of
wealth and the ‘predatory’ attitude of elites in the region.17
The development of the tourist sector in Tunisia has followed a similar
trajectory. In particular, during the Ben Ali’s era, the predatory attitude of the
elites and the president’s closest circles, exacerbated by liberalisation policies,
was paradoxically accompanied by the strengthening of the regime domestically
and internationally.18 Indeed, pre 2011 Tunisian regime deployed a representation
of Tunisia as a successful country gradually moving towards democratisation.
Tourism, represented as a ‘developmental miracle’, became one of the pivots of
such a representation,19 as demonstrated, for example, by the high incidence of
Tunisia tourism contribution on GDP from 1990 to 2013 compared to other larger
countries in the Mediterranean Region such as Turkey and Egypt (Table 1).
12 Frances Brown and Derek Hall, ‘Tourism and Development in the Global South: The Issues’, Third World
Quarterly, 29(5) (2008), pp. 839–849.
13 Telfer, ‘The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory’, in Sharpley and Telfer (eds.), Tourism and
Development, cit., pp. 35–79.
14 David Goldsworthy, ‘Thinking Politically about Development’, Development and Change, 19(3) (1988),
pp. 505–530.
15 Jennifer Briedenhann and Eugenia Wickens, ‘Tourism Routes as a Tool for the Economic Development of
Rural Areas: Vibrant Hope or Impossible Dream?’, Tourism Management, 25(1) (2004), pp. 71–79.
16 Richter and Steiner, ‘Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt’, cit.
17 Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprisings (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2013); Angela Joya, ‘The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Potential for
Democratic Politics’, Review of African Political Economy, 129 (2011), pp. 367–386.
18 Beatrice Hibou, ‘Domination and Control in Tunisia: Economic Levers for the Exercise of Authoritarian
Power’, Review of African Political Economy, 108 (2006), pp. 185–206.
19 Hazbun, ‘Images of Openness, Spaces of Control: The Politics of Tourism Development in Tunisia’, The Arab
Studies Journal (2007/2008), pp. 10–35. Karen Pfeifer, ‘How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt Became
IMF Success Stories in the 1990s’, Middle East Report, 29(1) (1999), pp. 23–27.
AN ENDURING ‘TOURISTIC MIRACLE’ IN TUNISIA
107
of the sector have been interviewed. In addition, participant observation was
carried out during speciﬁc initiatives6 to track down the evolving top-down
relationship between national bodies and local actors.
Tourism and Politics in Tunisia
Tourism is considered a key sector in the world economy. According to the United
Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), in the last 10 years, the turnover
connected to international tourism has increased exponentially and reached, in
2012, $1075 billion (against $1042 billion in 2011 and $575 billion in 2000).
Similarly, the number of people travelling for tourism has constantly increased
exceeding 1 billion in 2012, with 1035 million tourists crossing borders against
995 million in 2011.7 Tourism represents 5 per cent of global GNP and
signiﬁcantly contributes to the global labour market as almost 7 per cent of jobs
worldwide are tourism-related.8 However, such an increase in tourism-related
activities creates problems in terms of territorial management, exploitation of
natural resources and poor employment conditions for the local labour force.
These critical reﬂections resonate in the case of developing countries in particular.
Documents released by international organisations dealing with tourism, such as
the UNWTO and the World Bank, show that tourism-related policies have become
more and more normative and prescriptive, de facto one of the instruments
advancing the neo-liberal economic order.9
Because of its economic relevance, tourism is a highly sensitive political issue
too. Medium and long-term effects of tourism-related policies strongly impact
local and national development, affecting the elites as well as ordinary citizens.
Thus control over the sector, the policies elaborated for its development and the
social and cultural dynamics it originates appeals to a number of state and non-
state actors, which take part in complex negotiations related to the governance of
tourism. However, despite its politically charged nature, tourism has appealed to
scholars mainly for its economic and ﬁnancial aspects. Consequently, the
scholarship has traditionally neglected the political dimension of tourism and the
role of the state in it.10 Studies have linked tourism and development, focusing in
particular on the role of multinational companies and Foreign Direct Investments
(FDIs) in sustaining growth and stimulating development. Only few scholars and
experts have paid attention to the link between tourism and the social, political and
economic conditions of the countries under consideration.11 In other words, while
much attention has been paid to tourism as an engine of development, more recent
studies question the very notion of development, also touching upon the role
6 The days of the ‘Cafe´ du Patrimoine’, Heritage Day celebrations in Kef and other initiatives in the Kef region.
7 UNWTO, Tourism Highlights. 2013 Edition (http://goo.gl/FQ0sYg, accessed March 24, 2014).
8 Estimated from available data. Though tourism is often referred to as the largest sector in the global economy,
its exact size is impossible to determine as it has no clear delimitation.
9 Donald Hawkins and Shaun Mann, ‘The World Bank’s Role in Tourism Development’, Annals of Tourism
Research, 34(2) (2007), pp. 348–363.
10 As also Waleed Hazbun pointed out: ‘Globalisation, Reterritorialisation and the Political Economy of Tourism
Development in the Middle East’, Geopolitics, 9(2) (2004), pp. 310–341.
11 See: Raoul Bianchi, ‘Towards a New Political Economy of Global Tourism’, in Richard Sharpley and David
Telfer (eds.), Tourism and Development. Concepts and Issues (Cleverdon: Channel View), p. 271; Colin Hall,
Tourism and Politics: Power, Policy and Place (London: Chichester, 1994) and Thomas Richter and Christian
Steiner, ‘Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt: Insights into the Sectorial Transformations of a
Neo-patrimonial Rentier State’, Third World Quarterly, 29(5) (2008), pp. 939–959.
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modernisation theory, this view considers that tourism is not only a tool to
promote development, but also an instrument to accelerate economic and political
processes stimulating transitions to democracy.13 Other scholars expose the
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Scholars of the Middle East have contributed to the debate by examining the
connection between authoritarian resilience and tourism, noting that the
transformation of the sector after privatisation and neo-liberal reforms during
the 1990s has strengthened authoritarianism, with the ruler’s circles beneﬁtting
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outburst of popular discontent is strongly linked to the missing redistribution of
wealth and the ‘predatory’ attitude of elites in the region.17
The development of the tourist sector in Tunisia has followed a similar
trajectory. In particular, during the Ben Ali’s era, the predatory attitude of the
elites and the president’s closest circles, exacerbated by liberalisation policies,
was paradoxically accompanied by the strengthening of the regime domestically
and internationally.18 Indeed, pre 2011 Tunisian regime deployed a representation
of Tunisia as a successful country gradually moving towards democratisation.
Tourism, represented as a ‘developmental miracle’, became one of the pivots of
such a representation,19 as demonstrated, for example, by the high incidence of
Tunisia tourism contribution on GDP from 1990 to 2013 compared to other larger
countries in the Mediterranean Region such as Turkey and Egypt (Table 1).
12 Frances Brown and Derek Hall, ‘Tourism and Development in the Global South: The Issues’, Third World
Quarterly, 29(5) (2008), pp. 839–849.
13 Telfer, ‘The Evolution of Tourism and Development Theory’, in Sharpley and Telfer (eds.), Tourism and
Development, cit., pp. 35–79.
14 David Goldsworthy, ‘Thinking Politically about Development’, Development and Change, 19(3) (1988),
pp. 505–530.
15 Jennifer Briedenhann and Eugenia Wickens, ‘Tourism Routes as a Tool for the Economic Development of
Rural Areas: Vibrant Hope or Impossible Dream?’, Tourism Management, 25(1) (2004), pp. 71–79.
16 Richter and Steiner, ‘Politics, Economics and Tourism Development in Egypt’, cit.
17 Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprisings (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2013); Angela Joya, ‘The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Potential for
Democratic Politics’, Review of African Political Economy, 129 (2011), pp. 367–386.
18 Beatrice Hibou, ‘Domination and Control in Tunisia: Economic Levers for the Exercise of Authoritarian
Power’, Review of African Political Economy, 108 (2006), pp. 185–206.
19 Hazbun, ‘Images of Openness, Spaces of Control: The Politics of Tourism Development in Tunisia’, The Arab
Studies Journal (2007/2008), pp. 10–35. Karen Pfeifer, ‘How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt Became
IMF Success Stories in the 1990s’, Middle East Report, 29(1) (1999), pp. 23–27.
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more and more normative and prescriptive, de facto one of the instruments
advancing the neo-liberal economic order.9
Because of its economic relevance, tourism is a highly sensitive political issue
too. Medium and long-term effects of tourism-related policies strongly impact
local and national development, affecting the elites as well as ordinary citizens.
Thus control over the sector, the policies elaborated for its development and the
social and cultural dynamics it originates appeals to a number of state and non-
state actors, which take part in complex negotiations related to the governance of
tourism. However, despite its politically charged nature, tourism has appealed to
scholars mainly for its economic and ﬁnancial aspects. Consequently, the
scholarship has traditionally neglected the political dimension of tourism and the
role of the state in it.10 Studies have linked tourism and development, focusing in
particular on the role of multinational companies and Foreign Direct Investments
(FDIs) in sustaining growth and stimulating development. Only few scholars and
experts have paid attention to the link between tourism and the social, political and
economic conditions of the countries under consideration.11 In other words, while
much attention has been paid to tourism as an engine of development, more recent
studies question the very notion of development, also touching upon the role
6 The days of the ‘Cafe´ du Patrimoine’, Heritage Day celebrations in Kef and other initiatives in the Kef region.
7 UNWTO, Tourism Highlights. 2013 Edition (http://goo.gl/FQ0sYg, accessed March 24, 2014).
8 Estimated from available data. Though tourism is often referred to as the largest sector in the global economy,
its exact size is impossible to determine as it has no clear delimitation.
9 Donald Hawkins and Shaun Mann, ‘The World Bank’s Role in Tourism Development’, Annals of Tourism
Research, 34(2) (2007), pp. 348–363.
10 As also Waleed Hazbun pointed out: ‘Globalisation, Reterritorialisation and the Political Economy of Tourism
Development in the Middle East’, Geopolitics, 9(2) (2004), pp. 310–341.
11 See: Raoul Bianchi, ‘Towards a New Political Economy of Global Tourism’, in Richard Sharpley and David
Telfer (eds.), Tourism and Development. Concepts and Issues (Cleverdon: Channel View), p. 271; Colin Hall,
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generating a debt crisis in the sector.23 Along with the absence of political will to
reform the sector, this explains the lack of resources available to diversify
Tunisia’s tourist model.24
Data suggest that the tourist sector in Tunisia has historically been regarded as a
pillar of development, with both the state and private actors investing in it. This led
to the establishment of a well-equipped industry difﬁcult to be transformed
signiﬁcantly and seemingly able to sustain the country even at turbulent times.
Indeed, the overarching hypothesis of this article is that, despite broader changes
in national politics with Ben Ali’s fall, there is continuity in the model of tourism
Tunisia presents. Such continuity is problematic today because of the relative
crisis of the sector, caused by political turmoil and economic unsustainability.25
The following section examines two thawabit in the tourist industry, contrasting
Table 3. Investments Per Regions in Tunisia 2011/2012.
8 months 2011 8 months 2012 Evol. %
Period Amount % Amount % Total Evol.
East 1444.3 MDT 67.6 2107.4 MDT 79.8 45.9
West 692.5 MDT 32.4 534.3 MDT 20.2 222.8
Total 2136.8 MDT 100 2641.7 MDT 100 23.6
Source: Our elaboration on Agence de Promotion de l’Industrie et de l’Innovation (Tunis).
Table 4. Evolution of the Accommodation Capacity (1965–2011).
Number of structures Bed capacity
Average bed capacity
for structure
Years Number AAGR% Number AAGR% Number AAGR%
1965 85 – 8726 – 102.6 –
1971 226 165.9 41252 372.5 182.5 78.0
1981 336 48.7 75847 83.9 225.7 23.7
1991 532 58.3 123188 62.4 231.6 2.6
2001 755 41.9 205605 66.9 272.3 17.6
2008 837 10.9 238495 16.0 285.0 4.6
2009 856 02.3 239890 0.05 280.2 20.01
2010 856 0.0 241528 0.06 282.1 0.06
2011 861 0.58 242146 0.25 281.2 20.31
Source: ONTT- Ofﬁce National du Tourism Tunisien. If not otherwise speciﬁed, all ONTT data are
taken from Le tourisme Tunisien en chiffres (Tunis: ONTT), a report the ONTT releases
every year.
AAGR: Annual average rate of growth.
23 Frida Dahmani, ‘Pourquoi le tourisme ne fait plus recette’, Jeune Afrique, October 1, 2010 (http://goo.gl/
zEMJjV, accessed September 30, 2014) but also Khaled Boumiza, Tourisme: Endette´ et revendicatif,
WebManagerCenter, September 21, 2003 (http://goo.gl/og0CSi, accessed August 31, 2014).
24 This is evident in the classiﬁcation of beds available per type of tourism. For example in 2010, according to
ONTT, 210,508 beds were available for ‘seaside’ tourism while 15,172 for ‘city’ tourism. See: ONTT, Le
tourisme en chiffres (Tunis: ONTT, 2011).
25 Ridha Lahmar, ‘La confusion tourisme-hoˆtellerie persiste!!’, Re´alite´s, July 17, 2013 (http://goo.gl/2uUGkZ,
accessed August 31, 2014).
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In addition, over time the sector has been the object of several legal initiatives
(Table 2) that favoured FDIs and established new governance actors.20
The dark side of this interventionism is the huge environmental and social costs
incurred, as international organisations repeatedly underlined.21 This is
exempliﬁed in the uneven development of Tunisian regions, whereby the coastal
areas in the North and East beneﬁtted from the promotion of tourism to the
detriment of Western areas—a trend that is still continuing, as emerges from
Table 3 which summarises the investments in the regions of Tunisia between 2011
and 2012.
Furthermore, the growth of the tourist sector led to an overestimation of its
potential, resulting in the continuous construction of new accommodation
facilities (see Table 4) and in a situation of market saturation.22 In turn this has led
to an increase in the number of hotel owners borrowing money to survive, thus
Table 1. Travel and Tourism Total Contribution to GDP 1990–2013 (%).
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 4.5 4.5 6.2 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.2 8
Egypt 9.6 11.5 14 19 17.5 14.5 14.8 12.6
Israel 8.4 8.7 9.8 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.3
Jordan 25.3 22.9 20.7 21.8 23.7 20.3 21.4 20.3
Lebanon 5.9 4 1.1 29 27.9 22.5 19.9 19.2
Libya 3.3 3.7 5.2 7.2 4.4 5.5 6.7 6.2
Morocco 9.1 10 12.1 18.5 19.3 19.2 19.2 18.7
Syria 7.5 15.5 13.9 14.4 19.6 18.2 12.9 10.6
Tunisia 12.8 16.1 19.7 19.4 17.5 14.7 15.6 15.1
Turkey 6.8 8.2 10.6 12.2 10.2 11.6 11.9 12.3
Source: Our elaboration on World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC).
Table 2. Juridiﬁcation of Touristic Sector in Tunisia 1956–2012.
Type
Bourguiba
(1956–1987)
Ben Ali
(1987–2011)
Post Ben Ali
until 2012
Laws 18 46 1
Law decrees 5 – –
Governmental Decrees 36 98 9
Local decrees (ordinances) 23 79 6
Notiﬁcations – 3 –
Total 82 226 16
Source: Our elaboration on CNUDST (www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/) and Journal Ofﬁciel de la Re´publique
Tunisienne (JORT) (www.iort.gov.tn/).
20 Two laws, in particular, were crucial for the gradual process of liberalisation of the sector. The decree 66–339
(approved February 2, 1966) and the law 69–35 (June 6, 1969) were aimed to encourage the building of new
hotels and had a relevant role in attracting private investments.
21 See, for example, World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000, cit. but also World Bank,
Country Assistance Strategy Report, August 13, 2007 (http://goo.gl/743x6R, accessed June 15, 2014).
22 Wafa Khlif, ‘L’hoˆtellerie tunisienne: radioscopie d’un secteur en crise’, L’Anne´e du Maghreb, 1 (2006),
pp. 375–394.
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generating a debt crisis in the sector.23 Along with the absence of political will to
reform the sector, this explains the lack of resources available to diversify
Tunisia’s tourist model.24
Data suggest that the tourist sector in Tunisia has historically been regarded as a
pillar of development, with both the state and private actors investing in it. This led
to the establishment of a well-equipped industry difﬁcult to be transformed
signiﬁcantly and seemingly able to sustain the country even at turbulent times.
Indeed, the overarching hypothesis of this article is that, despite broader changes
in national politics with Ben Ali’s fall, there is continuity in the model of tourism
Tunisia presents. Such continuity is problematic today because of the relative
crisis of the sector, caused by political turmoil and economic unsustainability.25
The following section examines two thawabit in the tourist industry, contrasting
Table 3. Investments Per Regions in Tunisia 2011/2012.
8 months 2011 8 months 2012 Evol. %
Period Amount % Amount % Total Evol.
East 1444.3 MDT 67.6 2107.4 MDT 79.8 45.9
West 692.5 MDT 32.4 534.3 MDT 20.2 222.8
Total 2136.8 MDT 100 2641.7 MDT 100 23.6
Source: Our elaboration on Agence de Promotion de l’Industrie et de l’Innovation (Tunis).
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taken from Le tourisme Tunisien en chiffres (Tunis: ONTT), a report the ONTT releases
every year.
AAGR: Annual average rate of growth.
23 Frida Dahmani, ‘Pourquoi le tourisme ne fait plus recette’, Jeune Afrique, October 1, 2010 (http://goo.gl/
zEMJjV, accessed September 30, 2014) but also Khaled Boumiza, Tourisme: Endette´ et revendicatif,
WebManagerCenter, September 21, 2003 (http://goo.gl/og0CSi, accessed August 31, 2014).
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hotels and had a relevant role in attracting private investments.
21 See, for example, World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy, March 28, 2000, cit. but also World Bank,
Country Assistance Strategy Report, August 13, 2007 (http://goo.gl/743x6R, accessed June 15, 2014).
22 Wafa Khlif, ‘L’hoˆtellerie tunisienne: radioscopie d’un secteur en crise’, L’Anne´e du Maghreb, 1 (2006),
pp. 375–394.
ROSITA DI PERI
108
30450.indd   109 29/05/15   3:35 PM
CONTINUITy AND CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS
110
During this phase, few traders’ families were leading the sector, such as the
Fourati, Khe´chine, Allani and Miled from their home region of Kairouan (located
inland from the Sousse-Monastir tourism area).36 These families often became
involved in the industry by managing state-owned hotels, and later developed the
ﬁrst private hotel chains of Tunisia37 thanks to the quasi-monopoly on the industry
they enjoyed.38 However, private ownership did not change the broader model
Tunisian tourism was built upon. In fact, the type of tourism the country appealed
to, as well as the infrastructures available, concurred in strengthening the existing
‘Fordist’ model.
Even the enforcement of aggressive privatisation plans, the so-called inﬁtah,
during the 1970s did not question this model. The inﬂux of Gulf and European
capitals resulted in the creation of business partnerships with non-Tunisian
partners, which integrated the country into the regional economic environment,
weakening state control.39 This process resulted in Tunisian tourism becoming
dependent on international tour-operators and investors, to the point that the latter
began to buy stakes in hotels and created joint consortia, such as the CTKD
(Consortium Tuniso-Koweı¨tien de De´veloppement), or speciﬁc credit programs of
the African Bank for Development.40 The presence of private and international
capital in the tourist industry however did not stimulate the restructuring of the
sector, as it continued to expand by relying on the existing modus operandi.
The liberalisation of the tourist industry was encouraged by Ben Ali after his
ascent to power in 1987.41 It was presented as a means to insert Tunisia in the
global market and to attract new foreign capitals and investments. After a period of
crisis during the last years of Bourguiba’s mandate, due to political instability and
severe ﬁnancial stabilisation plans, the tourist industry recovered during the ﬁrst
years of Ben Ali’s rule. The expansion was due to the inclusion of Tunisia in the
Structural Adjustment Plans and the full convertibility of the TD.42 This positive
development was also facilitated by the ﬂourishing of private investments during
the 1990s. Indeed, the 1992 investment code allowed new entrepreneurial actors,
the so-called promoteurs, to emerge and later, between 1994 and 1996, a newer
investment code promoted the jeunes promoteurs and further facilitated
investment procedures.43 This growth helped Ben Ali to promote Tunisia as a
regional tourist destination. As one interviewee put it, ‘during the 1990s, it seemed
that tourism was the only preoccupation of the Prime Minister and his
entourage’.44 Another interviewee highlighted that, between 1986 and 1992, state
36 Mohamed Bergaoui, Tourisme et voyages en Tunisie: Le temps des pionniers, 1956–1973 (Tunis: Mohamed
Bergaoui, 2003). See also Abdelaziz Barrouhi, ‘La grande famille du tourisme’, Jeune Afrique, March 30, 2009
(http://goo.gl/0KpLV3, accessed July 11, 2014).
37 Interview with Ahmed Smaoui, former Ministry of Tourism, Tunis, March 18, 2014.
38 Interview with Lotﬁ Rahmouni, April 26, 2013; Author’s discussion with tourist guides during the meeting
‘Journe´e des Associations du Patrimoine, du Tourisme& de l’Environnement’, Dar Bach Hamba, Tunis, April 27,
2013.
39 According to the Ministry of Planning, from 1962 to 1971, public investments in tourism fell from 88.9 per
cent to 9 per cent while private investments grew from 11.1 per cent to 91 per cent. Re´trospectives de´cennales
1962–1971, Publication du Ministe`re du Plan (Tunis: 1972).
40 Interview with Abdellatif Taboubi, tourism professionalt, Tunis, April 28, 2013.
41 See the VII (1987–1991) and VIII (1992–1996) plans of development. Ministe`re du Plan, Le VIIeme Plan et
Ministe`re du Tourisme et de l’Artisanat, VIIIeme Plan.
42 See Robert King, ‘The Political Logic of Economic Reform in Tunisia’, in Azzedine Layachi (ed.), Economic
Crisis and Political Change in the North Africa (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 107–128.
43 Interview with Gueddiche Romdhane, Tourism Consultant, Tunis, April 24, 2013 and March 18, 2014.
44 Interview with Gueddiche Romdhane, April 24, 2013.
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the periods before and after the uprisings: the persistence of the touristic-
developmental model and the persistence of tourism as the means to promote the
image of a ‘new’ Tunisia both domestically and abroad. Despite contending that
continuity has prevailed over change, the analysis also highlights that some
change is taking place. Indeed, continuity is not a homogenous, granitic block and
change has to be acknowledged even if it does not question the broader touristic
model the Tunisian governments have been enforcing for decades, despite changes
in the international tourism market.
Thawabit in the Persistence of the Touristic Model
Tunisia pioneered the industry of tourism in the Arab world.26 Since
independence, the tourist industry was considered a priority and the Bourguiba
regime established new institutions to strengthen and control the sector,27 giving
tourism a crucial role in national development plans.28 Indeed, tourism not only
generated revenues by bringing foreign currency into the country and stabilising
macro-economic indicators,29 but also realised Bourguiba’s postcolonial vision of
an ‘open country’, more attuned to Western values than other post-colonial Arab
republics. Tunisia’s touristic model was built upon the so-called ‘3S’ (Sea, Sun
and Sand), whose typical representation is the Tanit, a seaside accommodation
intended for European, middle-class mass tourists.30
Between 1962 and 1972,31 successive development plans prioritised the
development of the sector. Despite indicating the state as responsible for its take-
off,32 the tourist sector could avoid collectivisation and beneﬁtted from private
investments due to its strategic role in the economy.33 The result was the
development of an industry characterised by mass tourism and huge infrastructural
investments available for building accommodations; a model that could be
labelled ‘Fordist’.34 The growth of the sector was impressive. Between 1962 and
1971, the number of beds increased by 372.5 per cent and in 1970, the sector
contributed to the GDP with 31.6 million Tunisian Dinar (TD) in foreign receipts,
thus covering 48.7 per cent of the national trade deﬁcit.35
26 Interview with Lofti Belaif, tourist guide, Tunis, April 26, 2013.
27 Ammar Aloui, ‘Re´volution et tourisme en Tunisie. Le secteur touristique en Tunisie avant et apre`s le
“Printemps arabe”’, in Rosita Di Peri, Raffaella Giordana (eds.), Revolution Without Revolutions? The
Challenges of Tourism Sector in Tunisia (Bologna: I Libri di Emil, 2013), pp. 103–168. Interview with Lotﬁ
Rahmouni, Director of the Institut des Hautes Etudes touristiques de Sidi Dhrif, Sidi Dhrif, April 26, 2013;
interview with Chantal Khadira, Manager of the Hotel Majestic, Tunis, April 27, 2013. Interview with Yihad
Elloumi, economic consultant, Tunis, March 19, 2014.
28 See: Secre´tariat d’Etat au Plan et aux ﬁnances, Perspectives de´cennales de de´veloppement 1962–1971 (Tunis:
1961).
29 Jean Mohammed Chapoutot, ‘Tourisme, Alternative a` l’ame´nagement en Tunisie’, Revue d’e´conomie
re´gionale et Urbaine, 4 (1990), pp. 511–522.
30 Maxime Weigert, Le tourisme en Tunisie. Les de´ﬁs a` l’heure de la transition de´mocratique, Les Notes de
l’Ipemed, 12 (2012), p. 8.
31 The 3-year development plans here considered are: 1962–1964, 1965–1968 and 1969–1972.
32 Ammar Aloui, Le tourisme international en Tunisie: De´veloppement, compe´titivite´, dans l’espace
me´diterrane´en. Bilan et strate´gie alternative (Universite´ Aix-Marseille III: Centre des Hautes e´tudes du
Tourisme, 1986).
33 Commission National Sectorielle du Tourisme et du Thermalisme (CNSTT), L’Evolution du Tourisme en
Tunisie, Retrospective (1961–1971) (Tunis: CNSTT, 1972).
34 Interview to a former manager in the tourism sector, Tunis, April 21, 2013.
35 Robert Poirier, ‘Tourism and Development in Tunisia’, Annals of Tourism Research, 22(1) (1995),
pp. 157–161.
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ascent to power in 1987.41 It was presented as a means to insert Tunisia in the
global market and to attract new foreign capitals and investments. After a period of
crisis during the last years of Bourguiba’s mandate, due to political instability and
severe ﬁnancial stabilisation plans, the tourist industry recovered during the ﬁrst
years of Ben Ali’s rule. The expansion was due to the inclusion of Tunisia in the
Structural Adjustment Plans and the full convertibility of the TD.42 This positive
development was also facilitated by the ﬂourishing of private investments during
the 1990s. Indeed, the 1992 investment code allowed new entrepreneurial actors,
the so-called promoteurs, to emerge and later, between 1994 and 1996, a newer
investment code promoted the jeunes promoteurs and further facilitated
investment procedures.43 This growth helped Ben Ali to promote Tunisia as a
regional tourist destination. As one interviewee put it, ‘during the 1990s, it seemed
that tourism was the only preoccupation of the Prime Minister and his
entourage’.44 Another interviewee highlighted that, between 1986 and 1992, state
36 Mohamed Bergaoui, Tourisme et voyages en Tunisie: Le temps des pionniers, 1956–1973 (Tunis: Mohamed
Bergaoui, 2003). See also Abdelaziz Barrouhi, ‘La grande famille du tourisme’, Jeune Afrique, March 30, 2009
(http://goo.gl/0KpLV3, accessed July 11, 2014).
37 Interview with Ahmed Smaoui, former Ministry of Tourism, Tunis, March 18, 2014.
38 Interview with Lotﬁ Rahmouni, April 26, 2013; Author’s discussion with tourist guides during the meeting
‘Journe´e des Associations du Patrimoine, du Tourisme& de l’Environnement’, Dar Bach Hamba, Tunis, April 27,
2013.
39 According to the Ministry of Planning, from 1962 to 1971, public investments in tourism fell from 88.9 per
cent to 9 per cent while private investments grew from 11.1 per cent to 91 per cent. Re´trospectives de´cennales
1962–1971, Publication du Ministe`re du Plan (Tunis: 1972).
40 Interview with Abdellatif Taboubi, tourism professionalt, Tunis, April 28, 2013.
41 See the VII (1987–1991) and VIII (1992–1996) plans of development. Ministe`re du Plan, Le VIIeme Plan et
Ministe`re du Tourisme et de l’Artisanat, VIIIeme Plan.
42 See Robert King, ‘The Political Logic of Economic Reform in Tunisia’, in Azzedine Layachi (ed.), Economic
Crisis and Political Change in the North Africa (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 107–128.
43 Interview with Gueddiche Romdhane, Tourism Consultant, Tunis, April 24, 2013 and March 18, 2014.
44 Interview with Gueddiche Romdhane, April 24, 2013.
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30 Maxime Weigert, Le tourisme en Tunisie. Les de´ﬁs a` l’heure de la transition de´mocratique, Les Notes de
l’Ipemed, 12 (2012), p. 8.
31 The 3-year development plans here considered are: 1962–1964, 1965–1968 and 1969–1972.
32 Ammar Aloui, Le tourisme international en Tunisie: De´veloppement, compe´titivite´, dans l’espace
me´diterrane´en. Bilan et strate´gie alternative (Universite´ Aix-Marseille III: Centre des Hautes e´tudes du
Tourisme, 1986).
33 Commission National Sectorielle du Tourisme et du Thermalisme (CNSTT), L’Evolution du Tourisme en
Tunisie, Retrospective (1961–1971) (Tunis: CNSTT, 1972).
34 Interview to a former manager in the tourism sector, Tunis, April 21, 2013.
35 Robert Poirier, ‘Tourism and Development in Tunisia’, Annals of Tourism Research, 22(1) (1995),
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After Ben Ali’s fall, the model has not undergone signiﬁcant changes.
Investments remain unbalanced to the beneﬁt of coastal areas.49 The ongoing
increase in the number of beds and facilities suggests that the new government still
relies on a model characterised by perennial hotel construction, with no
consideration for market saturation. Pre-uprisings development plans are still
running and, for instance, the XI development plan (2007–2011) foresees
investments in facilities for 2.3 billion of TD (1.35 billion of Euros). Its ﬁnal goal
is to build some 25,000 new beds, reaching by the end of 2011 a total of 258,000
beds available.50 Moreover, the ministers of tourism in charge since 2011 (5 until
today), although aware of the difﬁculties of the sector,51 seem to act on the basis of
short-term priorities, with the goal of ‘saving the summer tourist season’.52
The initiatives they promoted so far are based on old recipes. For example, the
campaign ‘I Love Tunisia’, launched in the aftermath of the uprisings to save the
tourist season of 2011 and developed by a French advertisement company, has
been criticised because it proposed again a ‘mass tourism recipe’, based on a
model of development considered obsolete.53 The Ministry of Tourism’s plan
titled ‘La strate´gie du tourisme tunisien a` l’horizon 2016’ does not only lack an
overall and comprehensive strategy,54 but was issued in 2009, before the
revolution. The government has not updated this document yet, and it constitutes
the only institutional strategy elaborated in the realm of tourism. As pointed out by
the former director of the ONTT Habib Ammar, this plan has at least two
weaknesses: it pays no attention to the territory and lacks a strategy that looks at
Tunisian tourism as part of the broader regional context.55 Political parties also
seem to lack long-term perspective. For example, Al-Nahda considers tourism an
important factor for the national economy but does not propose any strategy to
improve or change the current model. It broadly points to the necessity to elaborate
a shared tourism national policy in order to overcome the crisis.56 It must be
emphasised, however, that Minister Amel Karboul, appointed in January 2014, is
attempting to stimulate the public discourse on tourism, debating the extant model
49 Author’s interviews realised with different tourism professionals at the 19th Salon du Tourisme Tunisien
(MIT), el Kram, April 24–27, 2013.
50 ‘Tourisme inte´gre´, mode d’emploi’, Jeune Afrique, September 30, 2007 (http://goo.gl/h0HW3x, accessed
August 13, 2014).
51 See, for example, the declaration of ex-Minister Elyes Fakhfakh who repeatedly stressed the need to revive
Tunisian tourism, whose weaknesses date back to the period before the revolution. Oualid Dachraoui, ‘Interview
de Mr Elye`s Fakhfakh, nouveau ministre tunisien du tourisme’, 00216Mag, December 29, 2011(http://goo.gl/
MmFidv accessed July 11, 2014).
52 See: Amel Karboul ﬁrst speech as Minister of Tourism, Youtube, January 30, 2014 (http://goo.gl/YW3QFmti,
accessed August 3, 2014).
53 Ali Gargouri, ‘Ou` sont passe´s les fonds investis pour promouvoir le tourisme tunisien?’, Nawaat, October 8,
2011 (http://goo.gl/dNmDoy, accessed July 12, 2014).
54 The plan establishes the following principles: diversiﬁcation of tourism; creation of a new communication
system useful to advertise tourism; a marketing plan; ﬁnancing the sector through an ad hoc investment plan. The
aim is make of Tunisia one of the main tourist destinations in the world. See also the document on the strategic
vision of Tunisian tourism at http://goo.gl/J6Hjmz (accessed July 10, 2014).
55 ‘Interview to Habib Ammar’, WebManagerCenter, April 14, 2011 (http://goo.gl/lnQfTH, accessed July 11,
2014).
56 Interview with MohammedKhouja, Tunis, April 17, 2014. For Al-Nahda’s electoral programme see http://goo.
gl/NvL6J6 (accessed May 21, 2014).
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investment plans and the 1992 code facilitated the inﬂux of private capitals by
nearly 300 million of dollars.45 In the period corresponding to the Tenth Economic
and Social Development Plan (2000–2006) the growth of investments in the
tourist industry was around 5 per cent, amounting to, according to the ONTT, 1.9
billion of euros (Table 5).
The seemingly never-ending growth of investments available for the
construction of new facilities46 (Table 4), the huge proﬁts for domestic and
international investors and the increase in jobs generated by the sector led to the
crystallisation of the Tunisian touristic and developmental model. Although
during Ben Ali’s mandates attempts were made to diversify the industry by
investing in integrated tourist complexes such as Port el Kantaoui, or in areas with
a weaker tourist vocation, as the Sahara region, the touristic model has remained
largely unchanged. The model however presented a number of weaknesses such as
its dependence on European tourism and investments, which have both suffered
from the economic crisis in recent years. In addition, recent political instability in
North Africa also discouraged tourists to visit Tunisia.47 Finally, the presence of
private interests—Ben Ali’s family and closest circles’ interests—prevented the
sector from changing. An evidence of this is the absence of an open sky
agreement. While it would have encouraged investments by low cost airlines, as in
Morocco and Turkey, it could have damaged the monopoly of TunisAir, known to
be part of the business assets of Ben Ali’s family.48
Table 5. Investments in Tourist Industry (Millions of Tunisian Dinars).
Tourist investments Tunisian investments FDIs
1994 397.8 380.8 17
1995 449.1 421 28.1
1996 416.95 368.55 48.4
1997 353.3 330.3 23
1998 307 282.4 24.6
1999 324.68 287.48 37.2
2000 322.45 280.95 41.5
2001 330.86 229.76 101.1
2002 353.3 333.3 20
2003 282.3 263.8 18.5
2004 288.18 267.18 21
2005 246.21 229.44 16.8
2006 204.55 186.55 18
2007 213.18 141.18 72
2008 253.61 55.01 198.6
2009 309.27 223.77 85.5
TOTAL 5052.74 4281.47 771.27
Source: ONTT, Le tourisme en chiffres, 2010.
45 Interview with Ahmed Smaoui, Former Ministry of Tourism, Tunis, March 18, 2014.
46 As reported by Abdellatif Taboubi, in the coastal area between Nabeul to Mahdia more than two thirds out of
the facilities in the country were built in early 2000s (Interview, Tourism Professional, Tunis, April 28, 2013).
47 One interviewee reports that many recently built facilities were left almost empty. This is the case of Port el
Kantaoui (14,000 beds available). Interview with Yiad Elloumi, tourism economic consultant, Tunis, March 19,
2014.
48 ‘Tunisie: La Ve´ritable Nature Du Re´gime De Ben Ali’, Nawaat, January 13, 2011 (http://goo.gl/N4qK2G,
accessed September 30, 2014) and also Weigart, Le tourisme en Tunisie, cit.
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After Ben Ali’s fall, the model has not undergone signiﬁcant changes.
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tourist industry was around 5 per cent, amounting to, according to the ONTT, 1.9
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during Ben Ali’s mandates attempts were made to diversify the industry by
investing in integrated tourist complexes such as Port el Kantaoui, or in areas with
a weaker tourist vocation, as the Sahara region, the touristic model has remained
largely unchanged. The model however presented a number of weaknesses such as
its dependence on European tourism and investments, which have both suffered
from the economic crisis in recent years. In addition, recent political instability in
North Africa also discouraged tourists to visit Tunisia.47 Finally, the presence of
private interests—Ben Ali’s family and closest circles’ interests—prevented the
sector from changing. An evidence of this is the absence of an open sky
agreement. While it would have encouraged investments by low cost airlines, as in
Morocco and Turkey, it could have damaged the monopoly of TunisAir, known to
be part of the business assets of Ben Ali’s family.48
Table 5. Investments in Tourist Industry (Millions of Tunisian Dinars).
Tourist investments Tunisian investments FDIs
1994 397.8 380.8 17
1995 449.1 421 28.1
1996 416.95 368.55 48.4
1997 353.3 330.3 23
1998 307 282.4 24.6
1999 324.68 287.48 37.2
2000 322.45 280.95 41.5
2001 330.86 229.76 101.1
2002 353.3 333.3 20
2003 282.3 263.8 18.5
2004 288.18 267.18 21
2005 246.21 229.44 16.8
2006 204.55 186.55 18
2007 213.18 141.18 72
2008 253.61 55.01 198.6
2009 309.27 223.77 85.5
TOTAL 5052.74 4281.47 771.27
Source: ONTT, Le tourisme en chiffres, 2010.
45 Interview with Ahmed Smaoui, Former Ministry of Tourism, Tunis, March 18, 2014.
46 As reported by Abdellatif Taboubi, in the coastal area between Nabeul to Mahdia more than two thirds out of
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Ben Ali’s attempt at making tourism crucial to his narrative of a new Tunisia
was helped by the fact that the sector emerged from a phase of crisis67 in timely
coincidence with the beginning of his mandate. When Ben Ali ascended to power,
a number of contingent factors allowed the sector to grow again. In 1988, a
signiﬁcant recovery took place with the number of tourists’ arrivals increasing to
3,468,360, compared to 1,874,734 in 1987. Investments in the sector also
increased. However, as Hazbun points out, this growth was not determined by Ben
Ali’s ability rather by external factors such as the economic recovery in Northern
Europe that made Tunisian prices competitive, especially after the 1986 TD
devaluation.68 In addition, the conﬁdence of the market and international
organisations69 in the ability of Tunisia to overcome the crisis helped Ben Ali in
consolidating his image and reputation as the initiator of a successful, new era for
Tunisia. In particular, the 1988 successful summer season helped him to
consolidate tourism as a tool of control over the territory and the population, while
presenting Tunisia as an open and modern country abroad.70 One of the key
strategies deployed by Ben Ali was diversiﬁcation, which was substantiated in the
construction of new resorts, the permission to ﬁlm industry to use locations on the
territory and the attempt to expand Saharan tourism. Such projects were
mediatised thanks to spectacular inauguration’s ceremonies and the creation of
new brands and new product for tourists.71 In the short-term this strategy was
successful, as investments in the sector increased (Table 5) along with tourist’s
arrivals which, according to the ONTT, doubled between 1988 (3,468,360) and
2010 (6,902,749). However, this success story did not solve those issues that have
gradually led to the saturation of the Tunisian tourist market and its crisis.
The second unresolved issue is linked to the belief that tourism would have been
a driving force for the Tunisian economy as a whole. This did not happen.
However, Ben Ali successfully reiterated this belief by, for instance, presenting
the growth of jobs in the tourist sector as an example of the good performance of
the labour market tout court.72 As a consequence, the seemingly never-ending
growth of tourism allowed the regime to shift the attention from the bad
performance of other macro-economic indicators, hiding the economic difﬁculties
67 The crisis was caused by ﬁnancial and political issues: the gradual worsening of the national balance of
payments; decrease in the total amount of investment in tourism (from 64,210 TD 1981 to 3954 in 1986); the
displacement of the PLO in Tunis, followed by the 1985 Israeli bombing; and the escalation of violence between
the government and Islamist forces, which led to bombings in Sousse and Monastir few months before the 1987
coup. These factors concur to explain the pre-1987 crisis of the industry. According to the ONTT tourists arrivals
dropped from 2,002,997 in 1985 to 1,502,092 in 1986 (224.9 per cent). See Jean-Marie Miossec, Le tourisme en
Tunisie un pays en de´veloppement dans l’espace touristique international (The`se de doctorat, Universite´ de Tours
1, 1996), p. 560.
68 Hazbun, Images of Openness, Spaces of Control, cit., pp. 14–15.
69 The signature of a Stand-by Agreement which enacted a series of structural adjustment and stabilisation
programs under the guidance of the IMF and WB, played an important role in this. See: Mohamed Bechri and
Sonia Naccache, ‘The Political Economy of Development Policy in Tunisia’, in Jeffrey Nugent and Hashem
Pesaran (eds.), Explaining Growth in the Middle East. Contributions to Economic Analysis, Vol. 278 (Bradford:
Emerald), pp. 308–334.
70 Hazbun ‘Globalisation, Reterritorialisation and the Political Economy of Tourism’, cit.
71 See, for example: ‘Tijani Haddad, ministre du Tourisme: “Nous avons plusieurs cordes a` notre arc!”’, Jeune
Afrique, July 10, 2005 (http://goo.gl/M4hT74, accessed August 14, 2014).
72 According to the World Bank in 2005 the unemployment rate among young people (15–24 years) was about
the 15 per cent and reaches the 30 per cent in 2009. World Bank Reports 2006–2010 (http://goo.gl/CSWx3f).
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and presenting tourism as ‘everyone’s business’.57 Despite this, many believe that
she will not deliver what she promised.58
Beyond the rhetoric of ‘new-ism’, the ﬁrst issue to remain unsolved is the
diversiﬁcation of touristic products Tunisia could offer. Despite the construction
of the new integrated touristic complexes of Port el Kantaoui and Yasmine
Hammamet,59 which partially conveyed a novel image of the country, the most
common touristic formula for Tunisia remains the all-inclusive package, with
international tour operators promoting it almost uniquely.60 In addition, except for
the promotion of Saharan tourism, the bulk of investments focused on the coast.61
This not only has had negative consequences on the environment, which had
already been heavily exploited, but also created a gap between the ofﬁcial
discourse and what happened on the ground.62
Second Thaw�abit: Tourism as a Part of the Narrative of the ‘New Tunisia’
The second constant is the continuity in the representation of tourism as a
successful economic sector, pivotal to the narrative of the ‘new Tunisia’. In this
regard, the year 1987 is a key date for both Tunisian politics and tourism. Indeed,
under Ben Ali’s rule, tourism became the showcase of the new, post 1987 Tunisia.
He pledged to create a new era based on political pluralism, ending of corruption
and economic growth through integration into the global economy. Tourism was a
crucial element of his strategy and power consolidation. It is no coincidence that
during the ﬁrst council of ministers, which took place 5 days after the coup, the
necessity of launching a new strategy for tourism, was discussed.63 Furthermore,
in 1988 Ben Ali created the Ministry of tourism choosing personally the ﬁrst
minister, Mohamed Jegham, Ben Ali’s friend and expert in the development of big
touristic complexes.64 Since then, positions in the institutions governing the
sector, whose number increased leading to growing bureaucratisation, were highly
contested because of the power coming with them.65 As an interviewee said,
‘Tunisians knew that accessing the tourism bureaucracy under Ben Ali was a way
to control the main levers of the economy’.66
57 See Kamel Bouaouina, ‘Le tourisme, c’est l’affaire de tous !’, Le Temps, June 12, 2014 (http://goo.gl/mG8ddF
accessed September 30, 2014); ‘Consultation nationale sur le Tourisme’, WebManagerCenter, April 5, 2004
(http://goo.gl/GB70if, accessed July 12, 2014).
58 Bouaouina, ‘Notre ministe`re semble avoir . . . ’, Le Temps, June 12, 2014 (http://goo.gl/T1FwZo, accessed July
20, 2014).
59 Interview with Yihad Elloumi, Economic Consultant, Tunis, March 19, 2014. On Hammamet see: Mohamed
Hellal, ‘La marina de la station touristique inte´gre´e Yasmine-Hammamet (Tunisie). Enjeux, conception et
impacts’, L’Information ge´ographique, 4(73) (2009), pp. 6–23.
60 Interview with Ahmed Trabelsi, President de l’Association Patrimoine & Environnement, Tunis, March 14,
2014.
61 Interview with Yihad Elloumi, Tourism Economic Consultant, Tunis, March 19, 2014.
62 Abelala Bounouh, ‘Nouvelles approches en matie`re de protection et de gestion du littorale en Tunisie’,
Me´diterrane´e, 115 (2010), pp. 45–53.
63 ONTT, Le VIIe`me Plan cit., p. 14.
64 Interview with Gueddiche Romdhane, Tourism’s Consultant, Tunis, April 24, 2013.
65 See, for example, the case of Tijani Haddad, Minister of Tourism in 2004, nicknamed ‘Mister Tourism’ for the
numerous positions (and power) he obtained over the years. See: Abdelaziz Barrouhi, ‘Monsieur Tourisme’,
Jeune Afrique, December 12, 2005 (http://goo.gl/OhvqNI, accessed August 31, 2014).
66 Interview, Tunis, April 19, 2013, anonymous source.
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indeed been presented by authorities and, additionally, take place in the
framework of the decentralisation policy, a novelty included in the new
constitution itself. Nevertheless, they have many similarities with the efforts for
tourism diversiﬁcation undertaken during Ben Ali’s era,80 as for instance is the
case of Saharan81 and rural tourism.82
In order to sustain the ‘new-ist’ rhetoric of a new Tunisia and tourist industry,
post 2011 authorities have had the tendency to present the difﬁculties of the sector
as a short-term phenomenon instead of a structural problem, as it happened in pre
2011 Tunisia, thus absolving themselves from accusations of mismanagement.
For instance, the responsibility for the relative crisis the sector is going through is
blamed on the Islamists. They are charged with considering tourism a form of
‘prostitution’, as Marzouki declared.83 This accusation was also helped by violent
confrontations between Salaﬁsts and the Tunisian army84 and by campaigns
discouraging tourists to visit areas considered to be in the hands of Salaﬁsts.85 In a
similar vein, the 2013 visit of the Egyptian preacher Mohamed Hassen to the
touristic district of Hamammet was considered by professionals of the sector as
damaging the image of Tunisia as a safe touristic destination.86
Despite the ‘thawabit’ in presenting tourism as a part of the narrative of a ‘new
Tunisia’, some elements of rupture exist. For example, a relevant effect of the
revolution is that government’s performances are questioned publicly. In an article
published in the online journal ‘Le tourisme Magazine’ in 2013, it is stated that
data and ﬁgures provided the ONTT about tourism-related policies have been
manipulated in order to show that the government’s diversiﬁcation strategy is
successful.87 On the contrary, according to the article, investments in less touristy
areas are not paying off considering that, for example, the region of Gafsa-Tozeur
lost 70 per cent of its tourists (310,919 vs. 998,287 in 2010) and the Tabarka-Ain
Draham region registered a decline of 40 per cent in tourists’ arrivals. Another
example is the growing citizens’ request to participate in the decision-making of
public policies that impact on the population and the territory, a request that is
openly debated. The opening up of decision-making processes could generate, in
the medium or long period, virtuous effects that could not only stop the crisis when
it comes to tourism, but also accelerate Tunisia’s political transition. In addition,
citizens increasingly use their visibility to promote sustainable tourism. This is the
case for the Association for the safeguard of the Medina of Kef, an area that has
80 Sami Yassine Turki, ‘Evolution of Cities and Territories in Tunisia through Parties’ Electoral Programmes and
Civil Society’s Proposal’, Built Environment, 40(1) (2014), pp. 85–100.
81 On the new Saharian Plan of Development see: ‘Tunisie: annonce d’un plan de relance du tourisme saharien’,
Maghreb Emergent, February 21, 2014 (http://goo.gl/DQtUnh, accessed September 30, 2014) and Hamza
Marzouk, ‘Le tourisme saharien, maillon faible du tourisme tunisien’, L’Economiste Maghrebin, December 20,
2013 (http://goo.gl/Q5qcDA, accessed August 31, 2014).
82 On rural tourism, see: ‘La ministre du Tourisme bientoˆt en visite au Kef et a` Jendouba’, Re´alite´s, March 19,
2014 (http://goo.gl/0vnNh8/, accessed September 30, 2014). See also Selima Karoui, ‘Re´ame´nagement du secteur
de l’art dans les re´gions inte´rieures par l’investissement de la socie´te´ civile’, Nawaat, January 9, 2014 (http://goo.
gl/r864q8, accessed August 31, 2014).
83 Marzouki Declaration, July 12, 2012. See: http://goo.gl/OVR5Dp (accessed August 31, 2014).
84 ‘Tunisian Police Arrest 10 Islamists Following Violent Clashes in Kef’, Albawaba News, December 1, 2013
(http://goo.gl/SV5BTj, accessed August 20, 2014).
85 Monia Ghamni, ‘Salaﬁst Resurgence Jeopardises Tunisian Tourism’, Magharebia, April 26, 2013 (http://goo.
gl/f4ldcU, accessed August 31, 2014).
86 See, for example, Wafa Latik, ‘Tunisie: L’arrive´e du pre´dicateur e´gyptien Mohamed Hassan menace-t-elle le
tourisme a` Hammamat ?,’ LeMag, May 2, 2013 (http://goo.gl/Sr1vCF, accessed August 15, 2014).
87 See: ‘Le vrai bilan du tourisme tunisien’, Le tourisme Magazine, November 2, 2013 (http://goo.gl/5BjQi7,
accessed August 31, 2014).
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Tunisia was facing. Despite evidence of the crisis, such as the heavy indebtedness
of hotel owners,73 the prevailing touristic model remained largely untouched.
In early 2000s, despite the crisis of tourism as evidenced by the decline of the
sector’s contribution to the national GDP (Table 1), Ben Ali successfully
presented the crisis as a short-term phenomenon. He did this by downplaying the
lack of a national development strategy for tourism and by blaming external
events, namely the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, 9/11, the 2003 war in
Iraq, and the bombings in Djerba and Casablanca in 2002 and 2003. Although
these events did actually contribute to the decline in the tourists’ arrivals in the
region,74 it should be emphasised that the roots of the relative crisis of Tunisian
tourism were also linked to a lack of long-term strategy. As pointed out by an
interviewee, a former executive of the ONTT, during the 2000s, the doubling of
hotel capacity was not accompanied by broader measures, such as effective
promotion and training. According to him, the political will to address the
weaknesses of the sector was absent, and even some World Bank studies urging
the government to diversify the industry, have never been made public.75
After the fall of Ben Ali, the crisis seems to have burst out in the open and it is
discussed in articles published in the national and international press.76 However,
although the issue entered the public debate, continuity seems to prevail. The new
government in power indeed has not proceeded to diversifying the type of touristic
products Tunisia offers, and the same narrative about tourism and ‘new-ism’ is
still present. In post-Ben Ali Tunisia, indeed, tourism is an instrument to promote
the political transition, which ideally should navigate the country into a new era of
prosperity and democracy. This narrative is also strengthened by the relative
success of Tunisia’s tourist industry if compared to the other countries that went
through turmoil, such as Egypt—a difference that Tunisian authorities
emphasise.77
The narrative of a new Tunisia is substantiated in the attempt to represent
tourism as a ‘clean sector,’ free from those dynamics of patronage prevalent in the
pre 2011 period.78 A strategy to make this come true is replacing ofﬁcers in key-
positions. Examples of this are the nomination of Amel Karbel as Minister of
Tourism, the ﬁrst woman to hold this post, and Mohammed Ali Toumi as the new
Director of FTAV, the Fe´de´ration Tunisienne des Agences de Voyage et de
Tourisme. Toumi emphasised the use of new technologies, the deployment of new
marketing strategies and innovative training methods to enhance the performance
of the sector, thus engendering a feeling of novelty. In his words, ‘the federation
has experienced a real “revolution” with the goal to make it more competitive on
the market and more responsive to the needs of the sector’.79 Another attempt to
foster this new-ist narrative is constituted by efforts of diversiﬁcation. They have
73 On this, see the dossier of the magazine l’Expression, ‘Gros nuages sur le tourisme tunisien’, 39, July 2008 and
Khaled Boumiza, ‘Tourisme: Endette´ et revendicatif’, cit.
74 See, for example, ‘Journe´e du tourisme: Conforter la place de la Tunisie sur les marche´s mondiaux’,
WebManagerCenter, January 1, 2004 (http://goo.gl/sBT4BS, accessed August 3, 2014).
75 Interview, Tunis, February 20, 2014, anonymous source.
76 Kamel Bouaouina, ‘L’ONTT frappe fort: 8 hoˆtels de´classe´s et 19 agences de voyages ferme´es’, Le Temps, July
9, 2014 (http://goo.gl/rUY7R1, accessed August 2, 2014).
77 See, ‘Tourisme: La Tunisie se redresse plus vite que l’Egypte’,Milles et une Tunisie, December 3, 2012 (http://
goo.gl/mnzF7c, accessed August 31, 2014).
78 ‘OT de Tunisie: notre mode`le touristique n’est pas le fruit d’un re´gime politique’, l’Echo Touristique, January
19, 2011 (http://goo.gl/5bov3M, accessed August 31, 2014).
79 Interview with Mohammed Ali Toumi, Tunis, April 29, 2013.
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indeed been presented by authorities and, additionally, take place in the
framework of the decentralisation policy, a novelty included in the new
constitution itself. Nevertheless, they have many similarities with the efforts for
tourism diversiﬁcation undertaken during Ben Ali’s era,80 as for instance is the
case of Saharan81 and rural tourism.82
In order to sustain the ‘new-ist’ rhetoric of a new Tunisia and tourist industry,
post 2011 authorities have had the tendency to present the difﬁculties of the sector
as a short-term phenomenon instead of a structural problem, as it happened in pre
2011 Tunisia, thus absolving themselves from accusations of mismanagement.
For instance, the responsibility for the relative crisis the sector is going through is
blamed on the Islamists. They are charged with considering tourism a form of
‘prostitution’, as Marzouki declared.83 This accusation was also helped by violent
confrontations between Salaﬁsts and the Tunisian army84 and by campaigns
discouraging tourists to visit areas considered to be in the hands of Salaﬁsts.85 In a
similar vein, the 2013 visit of the Egyptian preacher Mohamed Hassen to the
touristic district of Hamammet was considered by professionals of the sector as
damaging the image of Tunisia as a safe touristic destination.86
Despite the ‘thawabit’ in presenting tourism as a part of the narrative of a ‘new
Tunisia’, some elements of rupture exist. For example, a relevant effect of the
revolution is that government’s performances are questioned publicly. In an article
published in the online journal ‘Le tourisme Magazine’ in 2013, it is stated that
data and ﬁgures provided the ONTT about tourism-related policies have been
manipulated in order to show that the government’s diversiﬁcation strategy is
successful.87 On the contrary, according to the article, investments in less touristy
areas are not paying off considering that, for example, the region of Gafsa-Tozeur
lost 70 per cent of its tourists (310,919 vs. 998,287 in 2010) and the Tabarka-Ain
Draham region registered a decline of 40 per cent in tourists’ arrivals. Another
example is the growing citizens’ request to participate in the decision-making of
public policies that impact on the population and the territory, a request that is
openly debated. The opening up of decision-making processes could generate, in
the medium or long period, virtuous effects that could not only stop the crisis when
it comes to tourism, but also accelerate Tunisia’s political transition. In addition,
citizens increasingly use their visibility to promote sustainable tourism. This is the
case for the Association for the safeguard of the Medina of Kef, an area that has
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Tunisia was facing. Despite evidence of the crisis, such as the heavy indebtedness
of hotel owners,73 the prevailing touristic model remained largely untouched.
In early 2000s, despite the crisis of tourism as evidenced by the decline of the
sector’s contribution to the national GDP (Table 1), Ben Ali successfully
presented the crisis as a short-term phenomenon. He did this by downplaying the
lack of a national development strategy for tourism and by blaming external
events, namely the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, 9/11, the 2003 war in
Iraq, and the bombings in Djerba and Casablanca in 2002 and 2003. Although
these events did actually contribute to the decline in the tourists’ arrivals in the
region,74 it should be emphasised that the roots of the relative crisis of Tunisian
tourism were also linked to a lack of long-term strategy. As pointed out by an
interviewee, a former executive of the ONTT, during the 2000s, the doubling of
hotel capacity was not accompanied by broader measures, such as effective
promotion and training. According to him, the political will to address the
weaknesses of the sector was absent, and even some World Bank studies urging
the government to diversify the industry, have never been made public.75
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discussed in articles published in the national and international press.76 However,
although the issue entered the public debate, continuity seems to prevail. The new
government in power indeed has not proceeded to diversifying the type of touristic
products Tunisia offers, and the same narrative about tourism and ‘new-ism’ is
still present. In post-Ben Ali Tunisia, indeed, tourism is an instrument to promote
the political transition, which ideally should navigate the country into a new era of
prosperity and democracy. This narrative is also strengthened by the relative
success of Tunisia’s tourist industry if compared to the other countries that went
through turmoil, such as Egypt—a difference that Tunisian authorities
emphasise.77
The narrative of a new Tunisia is substantiated in the attempt to represent
tourism as a ‘clean sector,’ free from those dynamics of patronage prevalent in the
pre 2011 period.78 A strategy to make this come true is replacing ofﬁcers in key-
positions. Examples of this are the nomination of Amel Karbel as Minister of
Tourism, the ﬁrst woman to hold this post, and Mohammed Ali Toumi as the new
Director of FTAV, the Fe´de´ration Tunisienne des Agences de Voyage et de
Tourisme. Toumi emphasised the use of new technologies, the deployment of new
marketing strategies and innovative training methods to enhance the performance
of the sector, thus engendering a feeling of novelty. In his words, ‘the federation
has experienced a real “revolution” with the goal to make it more competitive on
the market and more responsive to the needs of the sector’.79 Another attempt to
foster this new-ist narrative is constituted by efforts of diversiﬁcation. They have
73 On this, see the dossier of the magazine l’Expression, ‘Gros nuages sur le tourisme tunisien’, 39, July 2008 and
Khaled Boumiza, ‘Tourisme: Endette´ et revendicatif’, cit.
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Shifting Priorities or Business as
Usual? Continuity and Change in the
post-2011 IMF and World Bank
Engagement with Tunisia, Morocco
and Egypt
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ABSTRACT Following the popular uprisings that erupted across North Africa in
2010 and 2011, international ﬁnancial institutions have embarked on a signiﬁcant
re-engagement with governments in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. New lending
arrangements and project initiatives by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, in particular, have emphasised a supposed turn towards pro-poor
policies, social inclusion and public engagement with economic decision-making.
This article analyses the content and logic of IMF and World Bank lending to
these three countries, examining whether this re-engagement represents a
substantive shift away from the neoliberal policies that characterised pre-2011 IFI
relationships with the region.
Not long after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, US President
Barack Obama and other US government spokespeople expressed their approval
of the ‘spirit of peaceful protest and perseverance’ and declared that the United
States would ‘continue to be a friend and partner . . . ready to provide whatever
assistance is necessary . . . to pursue a credible transition to a democracy’.1 Echoed
widely by other Western leaders, these sentiments were soon followed by the
promise of ﬁnancial aid from a range of international institutions and governments
gathered under the umbrella of the Deauville Partnership, an initiative launched at
the May 2011 G8 Summit in France. The Partnership pledged up to US$40 billion
in loans and other assistance towards what they termed the ‘Arab Countries in
Transition’.2 Four key priority areas were identiﬁed as the focus of these funds:
stabilisation, job creation, participation/governance, and political/economic
integration.
*Department of Development Studies, SOAS, University of London. Email: ah92@soas.ac.uk
1 White House Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President on Egypt’, White House, February 11,
2011, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt (accessed May 9, 2011).
2 Sebastian Moffett, Nathalie Boschat and William Horobin, ‘G-8 Pledges $40 Billion for ‘Arab Spring’, Wall
Street Journal, May 28, 2011 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520804576348792147
454956 (accessed December 9, 2013).
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not traditionally beneﬁtted from tourism, which promotes sustainable tourism with
the goals of re-appropriating the cultural heritage of the region and stimulating
local development. However, the activities of the association lack a
comprehensive and integrated strategy aimed to reach out to public institutions.88
This problem relates to the troubled relationship between the national authorities
and local communities, a legacy of state centralisation during the authoritarian
period. Another attempt at inﬂuencing the decision-making process at the micro-
level is the ‘Cafe` du Patrimoine’, where professionals discuss the creation of new
training programs for tourist guides, working conditions as well as challenges to
the protection of the national cultural heritage.89 Discussions about the
preservation of the cultural heritage seem to be promising as they turned out to
be the beginning of broader reﬂections about models of sustainable tourism,
strictly connected to social and economic development.90 Notwithstanding these
promising initiatives, the reform of the tourist sector is still one of the biggest
challenges of the new Tunisia.91
Conclusion
Tourism is a crucial sector in the Tunisian economy and it has a considerable role
in determining economic and political choices. While it is true that, over the years,
tourism has been a signiﬁcant income generator, it is also necessary to consider
that such revenues were generated by an aggressive exploitation of the ‘Tunisian
model’ and consequently of the territory, regardless of the consequences of this
exploitation. Despite the tentative promotion of new forms of tourism, continuity
has prevailed over the years in the maintenance of a deﬁcient touristic model and
in the role assigned to tourism as the pivot of an ongoing, more rhetorical than
actual, process of change. Thus, the thawabit of Tunisian tourism seem to be very
resistant even if, after the revolution, they have become more porous than in the
past thanks to a genuine debate about the future of the sector. Nevertheless, before
and after the revolution likewise, the tourist sector seems to be led by logic of
exploitation and securitisation. Only the claim for a more open and democratic
decision-making process might provide a chance to reverse this problematic trend.
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although negotiations—heavily contested by different social and political forces in
the country—have been repeatedly resumed and put on hold since early 2011.9 All
three countries have been recipients of World Bank loans, with Bank ofﬁcials
closely involved in mapping out the strategic direction of economic policy for the
coming period. While the IMF and World Bank should not be viewed in isolation
from other bilateral and multilateral donors, both institutions are central to
coordinating and leading IFI policy in the region.
Given renewed IFI engagement, this article examines the extent to which IMF
and World Bank strategies have broken with past practice. Does the emphasis on
social inclusion and voice reveal a move away from neoliberal logic, or is this
merely a discursive attempt to better strengthen an appearance of popular ‘buy in’
for unpopular policies? What is the impact of popular mobilisation on IFI
engagement? The article begins by outlining loan negotiations, the key project
sectors targeted by donors, and the major themes of IFI strategic documents for
each of the three countries. It then concludes with a comparative discussion of
these experiences, with the aim of determining the degree of continuity and change
in World Bank and IMF intervention in the area.
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt: WB/IMF Engagement Post 2011
The initial onset of structural adjustment in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt had its
origins in the global downturn of the 1970s and the debt crisis precipitated by the
sharp rise in US interest rates that began in 1979. Morocco was the ﬁrst to sign a
structural adjustment package (SAP) in 1983, followed by Tunisia in 1986, and
Egypt in 1991.10 These SAPs closely resembled those found in other parts of the
world, in which the private sector would be, as the World Bank put it, the ‘engine
of strong and sustained growth’11—a necessary requirement of the ‘new global
economy’ in which ‘rewards . . . go to the most hospitable environments
[for capital investment]’.12 Flowing from this perspective, structural adjustment
measures focused on policies such as the privatisation of state-owned industries;
liberalisation of ownership laws, particularly in the real estate, ﬁnancial and
telecommunication sectors; reduction of subsidies on food and energy; opening up
to foreign investment ﬂows; restructuring of tax regimes; deepening of ﬁnancial
markets; labour market deregulation; and the relaxation of trade barriers.
In the wake of the 2011 uprisings, however, the policies of previous regimes
came under serious challenge from populations marginalised by neoliberal
arrangements. This was a moment, according to the Egyptian economist Wael
Gamal, in which alternatives to neoliberalism ‘were wide open and clear, but
meant a departure from the old policies and therefore would explode the new
political compromise’.13 While the IMF, in its report to the G8 summit at
9 This article was written in Winter-Spring 2013/2014.
10 Jane Harrigan and Hamed El-Said, ‘The Economic Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs in the Middle
East and North Africa: A Case Study of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1983–2004’, Review of Middle East
Economics and Finance, 6(2) (2010), p. 3.
11 World Bank, From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle-East and North
Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), p. 1.
12 World Bank, Trade, Investment, and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Engaging with the
World (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), p. 23.
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Activists from across the region, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, harshly
criticised the negotiations that began between new governments and IFIs in the
wake of the G8 summit. IFI loans and its associated debt were, in the words of one
Tunisian activist, ‘not a secondary question to the ongoing social struggles
confronting the current Tunisian revolution, but at the heart of the struggle, raising
economic, political, and social questions that relate to popular sovereignty and
foreign control, and how we divide the wealth of the country and achieve rights for
all Tunisians’.3 Conﬁrming this conviction, the World Bank itself was to note in
regards to Egypt, that ‘building trust’ was a major task, and that because it ‘provided
large amounts of assistance to Egypt throughout the previous regime, it will be
important to ensure that the Bank Group establishes its reputation’.4 The problem,
according to the Bank, was that ‘the attitude of both the new Government and the
population at large towards IFIs in general and the Bank Group in particular is
uncertain’ and that there exists ‘possible negative sentiments towards IFIs’.5
In this context, a noticeable shift soon became apparent in the content of IFI
documents, with ofﬁcial representatives repeatedly insisting that they had broken
with past practice and would now place much more emphasis on policies aimed at
strengthening voice, transparency and consultation, and improving the living
conditions of marginalised populations. The Deauville Partnership declaration
pledged support for ‘reforms that promote transparency, accountability, and good
governance’ in the Arab world. Likewise, country-speciﬁc strategies produced by
the IMF and World Bank in the wake of the uprisings consistently highlighted
issues of social and economic inclusion as key priorities of IFI policy. In the case
of Tunisia, this new policy emphasis led one usually critical observer, the
Washington DC based Bank Information Center (BIC), to note that the World
Bank’s ‘development narrative has shifted from praise of the high levels of
economic growth . . . to a focus on issues that directly impact people such as
unemployment and public services, and a priority on improving governance and
transparency’.6 The BIC went on to characterise the World Bank as engaging in a
‘concerted effort to respond to the demands of the revolution and to include the
voices of different stakeholders including civil society in its new development
strategies’.7 Appearing to substantiate this perception, IMF Managing Director
Christine Lagarde, also insisted that ‘the IMF is different from the past’ and that it
would now ‘pay speciﬁc attention to the underprivileged, to the poor’.8
In light of these claims of a fresh, pro-poor direction for IFI policy in the Arab
world, this article analyses recent activities of the World Bank and IMF in Egypt,
Tunisia and Morocco. These three countries have been at the forefront of the
renewed IFI engagement in the region. In 2012 and 2013, respectively, Morocco
and Tunisia signed agreements with the IMF; the ﬁrst time in two decades that new
agreements had been concluded. Egypt has not yet agreed to an IMF package,
3 Fathi al-Shamkhy, ‘al maduneeya al-kharajeeya wa al-thawra al-Tunisiyya’ [Foreign Debt and the Tunisian
Revolution], al-thawra dai’ma, 2 (2012), pp. 143–146.
4 World Bank Group, Interim Strategy Note for the Arab Republic of Egypt (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2012), p. 12.
5 Ibid., p. 22.
6 Bank Information Center, ‘The World Bank Group and Tunisia’, March 2013, http://www.bicusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/The-World-Bank-Group-and-Tunisia-FINAL-May-10-2013.pdf, 8 (accessed
September 16, 2014).
7 Ibid.
8 See ‘Update on the Middle East with IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde’, August 3, 2012 IMF Videos,
http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid¼1769369608001 (accessed September 16, 2014).
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although negotiations—heavily contested by different social and political forces in
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10 Jane Harrigan and Hamed El-Said, ‘The Economic Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs in the Middle
East and North Africa: A Case Study of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1983–2004’, Review of Middle East
Economics and Finance, 6(2) (2010), p. 3.
11 World Bank, From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-Led Growth in the Middle-East and North
Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), p. 1.
12 World Bank, Trade, Investment, and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Engaging with the
World (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), p. 23.
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The most important feature to note about the content of the ISN is that this
overall market-ﬁrst logic forms the basis for concrete initiatives to address the
three major goals of the ISN (growth and job creation; social and economic
inclusion; transparency and accountability). As part of achieving ‘growth and job
creation’, for example, Bank intervention aimed at sending ‘a strong signal to
private investors that Tunisia is once again open for business, but this time with a
more transparent and competitive environment’. In order to do this, the Bank
stated that it would support policies that open up the economy, streamline business
regulations, improve competition, and, signiﬁcantly, ‘reduce the onshore-offshore
dichotomy and move towards a level playing ﬁeld across the country’.16 This latter
policy thrust signalled an intent to bring the general conditions for capital
accumulation more in line with those existing in the ‘offshore’ sector—it was to
become a major theme in later discussions around tax rates and corporate
investment incentives (see below). Within this same framework, the World Bank
praised the ‘competitive edge’ that Tunisia’s ‘moderate’ wages provide for
business, and advised the government to resist any pressure to increase wage
levels.17
Another concrete policy highlighted under the goal of ‘growth and job creation’
is labour market deregulation. In this regard, the Bank noted, ‘Tunisia will need to
engage in a series of comprehensive and politically-sensitive reforms’ that
included deregulation of the labour code and increased labour market ﬂexibility.18
Instead of ‘protecting particular jobs’, labour market policy should focus on
supporting workers ‘during periods of transition’—a policy euphemistically
described as a ‘lifecycle approach’.19 Programmes such as AMAL—a scheme
introduced in 2011 to provide assistance to unemployed graduates—were harshly
criticised for their costs to the government. Instead, the World Bank urged that
they be terminated or reforms introduced that limit the period and eligibility of
support, reduce the level of stipends, and restrict any assistance to urban residents
only.20
As part of promoting ‘social and economic inclusion’, the ISN advocated
support for privatisation and the establishment of Public-Private Partnerships
(PPPs) in infrastructure, wastewater, and water supply.21 Indeed, one of the
priority reforms of World Bank loans—which was also part of the policy matrix of
the AfDB’s ‘Economic Recovery and Inclusive Development Loan’ approved on
the same day as the World Bank’s initial DPL—was the adoption of a draft law
relating to PPPs by the Tunisian Council of Ministers, and the issuance of Prime
Ministerial decree to establish a government unit for PPPs.22 The proposed law
was drafted under the guidance of the AfDB and the OECD, and submitted to the
Constituent Assembly in October 2012. In the two rounds of discussion on the law,
deputies strongly objected to the law on the grounds that it would open the
16 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Tunisia, FY13–14’, May 17, 2012 (Washington, DC:
World Bank Group, 2012), p. 16.
17 Ibid., p. 16.
18 Ibid., 18 note 15.
19 Ibid., 18 note 15.
20 Ibid., 18, note 16.
21 Ibid., pp. 16, 20.
22 African Development Bank, ‘Grant Proposal for Financing under the MENA Transitional Fund:
Operationalizing Public Private Partnership in Tunisia’, http://www.menatransitionfund.org/sites/mena_trans_
fund/ﬁles/documents/TN%20AfDB-OECD%20Operationalising%20PPP%20(AfDB%20Project%
20Document).docx, 15 (accessed September 16, 2014).
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Deauville, would continue to lay key priority on supporting ‘an enabling
environment in which the private sector ﬂourishes’,14 popular pressure from below
would demand a reversal of neoliberal policies. In Egypt, protests, strikes and
factory occupations called for the renationalisation of enterprises privatised under
the Mubarak regime, increases in minimum wage levels, and the expansion of
social support to education and health.15 Hundreds of strikes in the education
sector, oil and energy, mining, ports and transport also occurred across Tunisia,
with workers focusing in particular on privatisation and wage levels. In Morocco,
the government was compelled to increase subsidy levels for food and fuel in an
effort to prevent a repeat of its neighbours’ unrest. It is this unprecedented level of
social and political mobilisation across all three countries that provide the context
for a closer examination of World Bank and IMF engagement since 2011.
Tunisia
Despite the fact that the World Bank ranks fourth in total donor support to
Tunisia— behind the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European
Investment Bank (EIB), and the French Development Agency (ADF)—the
institution played a pivotal role in coordinating and developing donor strategy in
the ﬁrst year following the departure of Ben Ali. In June 2011, the WB board
agreed to provide two $500 million Development Policy Loans (DPL) as part of a
$1.3 billion multi-donor package developed in conjunction with the AfDB, the EU
and the ADF. The overall strategy governing this lending programme was later
articulated in the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of May 2012,
intended to cover the term of the country’s new Constituent Assembly and the
transition to an elected government. The ISN highlighted three main goals of the
Bank’s short to medium-term work in Tunisia: (1) sustainable growth and job
creation, (2) social and economic inclusion, (3) strengthening governance: voice,
transparency and accountability.
A close reading of the ISN and associated loans indicates little substantive shift
in the underlying assumptions and logic guiding the Bank’s development strategy.
As the program document for the 2012 Governance, Opportunities and Jobs DPL
notes, World Bank efforts would aim principally at encouraging the Tunisian
government to ‘promote competition and improve the business climate’, through
introducing ‘structural reforms [to] reduce regulatory barriers and administrative
procedures; improving access to funding; as well as equal opportunities for public
and private companies’. The loan objectives placed considerable emphasis on
revising the rules and regulations around investment, and ‘identifying
opportunities for public private partnerships’. Moreover, the Bank praised the
Tunisian government for its overall economic direction, commenting that: ‘the tax
system will be reformed to promote investment and efﬁciency. Capital account
liberalization will encourage FDI and investment across sectors, as well as
partnerships between domestic and foreign companies. The Government is also
committed to deepen integration into the global economy to boost growth’.
14 IMF, Economic Transformation in MENA: Delivering on the Promise of Shared Prosperity, IMF Staff Report
to the G8 Summit (Washington, DC: IMF, 27/5/2011), p. 6. www.imf.org/external/np/g8/pdf/052711.pdf
(accessed September 16, 2014).
15 Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2013), pp. 170–171.
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taxes for consumers (including, most controversially, an increase in vehicle tax);
reform of public enterprises and the pension system; liberalising the investment
environment through offering incentives to the private sector30; cut-backs to
subsidies and associated increases in electricity, gas and fuel prices;
decentralisation of public administration to the local government level; labour
market deregulation; a salary freeze for civil service workers through 2014; and
the ﬁrst steps towards the corporatisation of public banks through excluding them
from the law governing public enterprises.31
In early 2013, social protests emerged in the wake of the government’s attempt
to implement these policies, focusing in particular on the rising cost of living, the
scheduling of new fees and taxes, and cutbacks to subsidy levels. As a
representative of the largest Tunisian trade union, the UGTT, was to note:
‘The IMF is dictating economic policy and people are unhappy because there is no
social justice, freedom or jobs’.32 In March 2013, demonstrations erupted across
the country following an increase in consumer petrol prices by 6.8 per cent, a rise
in the government-controlled price on milk, and the introduction of new taxes on
the sale of alcohol. In the same month, the government imposed a levy of 1 per
cent on salaries above 1700 dinars ($1075) per month, claiming that this was
necessary in order to pay for ongoing subsidies. Throughout 2013, monthly year-
on-year inﬂation averaged more than 6 per cent, with non-administered food prices
reaching 10.0 per cent year-on-year at end-December 2013. These ﬁgures were
back at the peak levels that were reached in 2008 and 2010, prior to the ousting of
Ben Ali.33
Protests against the deterioration in living conditions coincided with a period of
sharp escalation in political violence, notably marked by the assassination of the
respected leftist politicians Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013, and Muhammad
Brahmi on 25 July 2013. Both Belaid and Brahmi had been outspoken critics of the
economic policies of the governing Islamist party, Al-Nahda, and there was
widespread speculation that responsibility for their murders was linked to
movements that were tacitly or directly supported by Al-Nahda. Following large-
scale labour strikes and anti-government protests through the ﬁrst half of 2013, Al-
Nahda agreed to hand over power to a caretaker government in October 2013,
leading eventually to the selection of independent political ﬁgure, Mehdi Jomaa,
as interim Prime Minister in December.34
The formation of a new ‘technocratic’ government was strongly supported by
the IMF and other donors, who openly noted the risk related to ‘setbacks in the
political transition’ and that ‘commitment to program objectives will be tested by
resistance to some necessary but not always popular reforms’.35 In their
programme review of the loan in January 2014, the IMF applauded the
30 This objective was captured by the IMF in the phrase ‘freedom to invest is the norm’. See IMF, ‘Tunisia: Letter
of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’.
May 24, 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2013/tun/052413.pdf, p. 15 (accessed December 22, 2013).
31 IMF, ‘Tunisia: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical
Memorandum of Understanding’, January 28, 2014. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2014/tun/012814.pdf,
p. 13 (accessed February 3, 2014). See also http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1450.pdf (accessed
February 16, 2014).
32 Jubilee Debt Campaign, Tunisia, Case Study 9. http://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Life-
and-debt-C9-Tunisia.pdf, p. 45 (accessed February 3, 2014).
33 IMF, ‘Tunisia First and Second Reviews under the Stand-By Arrangement’, Country Report No. 14/50: p. 6.
34 Jomaa assumed power on January 9, 2014.
35 Ibid., p. 1.
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country’s resources up to exploitation by foreign companies and lead to greater
indebtedness. The government responded by conﬁrming that the law was a
requirement from foreign donors, and pledged to continue to push PPPs through
ministerial decree.23 The heated political struggles around the PPP law points to
both the strategic signiﬁcance of privatisation as well as the overt role played by
IFIs in reworking Tunisian economic policy.
These examples illustrate the manner in which deeply felt social aspirations are
employed by the WB as justiﬁcation for the renewal and deepening of pro-market
measures. This same pattern can also be observed in the ISN’s concluding remarks
on the importance of public consultation and the Bank’s desire to ‘strengthen
partnerships with Tunisian civil society and the private sector through a ‘dialogue
with new stakeholders’.24 This dialogue is set up through consultation sessions
that will constitute ‘an input’ into Bank strategy,25 but contains no obligation to
integrate perspectives that contradict the basic precepts of neoliberal policies.
Not only does this model obfuscate relations of power and the different interests of
‘stakeholders’—implicitly equating the voices of government representatives,
business leaders, women, youth and other organisations—but also appears to be
principally designed to project an image of public endorsement of Bank policy.
The Bank does not disclose how it selects participants in these consultations, nor
does it provide publically available transcripts of what people say. Indeed, the
ISN’s report of these consultation sessions contain only highly abbreviated
paraphrasing that reinforce and conﬁrm the Bank’s general policy prescriptions.26
Perhaps one of the most striking indications of how little popular participation is
actually involved is a World Bank blog established as part of the ISN process and
cited as evidence that the ‘dialogue remains open’.27 Between January 2012 and
January 2013, the blog received a total of four postings from individuals not
working for the Bank itself.
Concurrent with the development of the World Bank strategy, the Tunisian
government was also involved in negotiations with the IMF from early 2011,
culminating in June 2013 with the approval by the IMF Executive Board of a $1.74
billion Stand-By Arrangement for the country. The total amount was to be
disbursed over a 24-month period, with tranche payments dependent on eight
program reviews conducted by the IMF over this time. Among other measures, the
arrangement demanded ‘wage restraint and subsidy reform . . . a comprehensive
reform of tax policy’ and an ‘ambitious structural reform agenda that helps to
rebuild Tunisia’s economic model by promoting private-sector development,
lowering regional disparities, and reducing pervasive state intervention’.28
Speciﬁc policy proposals included a pledge to reduce taxes for the corporate sector
(by seeking a convergence between off-shore and on-shore tax regimes29); raising
23 See: ‘Year 2 of the Tunisian Revolution: Private Proﬁt vs. Public Interest’, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.
org/2013/07/art-572840/ (accessed January 2, 2014).
24 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Tunisia, FY13–14, p. 26.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
26 Ibid., pp. 33–35.
27 Ibid., p. 32. The blog can be found at http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/tunisia-one-year-after-revolution-
which-priorities-should-world-bank-support (accessed September 16, 2014).
28 IMF, ‘IMF Executive Board Approves a 24-month US$1.74 Billion Stand-By Arrangement with Tunisia’,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13202.htm (accessed January 5, 2014).
29 OECD, ‘Analysis of the Tunisian Tax Incentives Regime’, March 2013, Paris. http://www.uscib.org/docs/
Tunisia_Tax_Incentives_Analysis.pdf (accessed December 9, 2013). One proposal put forward by the OECDwas
to implement a ﬂat tax of around 15 per cent (on-shore corporate tax is currently at 30 per cent).
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taxes for consumers (including, most controversially, an increase in vehicle tax);
reform of public enterprises and the pension system; liberalising the investment
environment through offering incentives to the private sector30; cut-backs to
subsidies and associated increases in electricity, gas and fuel prices;
decentralisation of public administration to the local government level; labour
market deregulation; a salary freeze for civil service workers through 2014; and
the ﬁrst steps towards the corporatisation of public banks through excluding them
from the law governing public enterprises.31
In early 2013, social protests emerged in the wake of the government’s attempt
to implement these policies, focusing in particular on the rising cost of living, the
scheduling of new fees and taxes, and cutbacks to subsidy levels. As a
representative of the largest Tunisian trade union, the UGTT, was to note:
‘The IMF is dictating economic policy and people are unhappy because there is no
social justice, freedom or jobs’.32 In March 2013, demonstrations erupted across
the country following an increase in consumer petrol prices by 6.8 per cent, a rise
in the government-controlled price on milk, and the introduction of new taxes on
the sale of alcohol. In the same month, the government imposed a levy of 1 per
cent on salaries above 1700 dinars ($1075) per month, claiming that this was
necessary in order to pay for ongoing subsidies. Throughout 2013, monthly year-
on-year inﬂation averaged more than 6 per cent, with non-administered food prices
reaching 10.0 per cent year-on-year at end-December 2013. These ﬁgures were
back at the peak levels that were reached in 2008 and 2010, prior to the ousting of
Ben Ali.33
Protests against the deterioration in living conditions coincided with a period of
sharp escalation in political violence, notably marked by the assassination of the
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Brahmi on 25 July 2013. Both Belaid and Brahmi had been outspoken critics of the
economic policies of the governing Islamist party, Al-Nahda, and there was
widespread speculation that responsibility for their murders was linked to
movements that were tacitly or directly supported by Al-Nahda. Following large-
scale labour strikes and anti-government protests through the ﬁrst half of 2013, Al-
Nahda agreed to hand over power to a caretaker government in October 2013,
leading eventually to the selection of independent political ﬁgure, Mehdi Jomaa,
as interim Prime Minister in December.34
The formation of a new ‘technocratic’ government was strongly supported by
the IMF and other donors, who openly noted the risk related to ‘setbacks in the
political transition’ and that ‘commitment to program objectives will be tested by
resistance to some necessary but not always popular reforms’.35 In their
programme review of the loan in January 2014, the IMF applauded the
30 This objective was captured by the IMF in the phrase ‘freedom to invest is the norm’. See IMF, ‘Tunisia: Letter
of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’.
May 24, 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2013/tun/052413.pdf, p. 15 (accessed December 22, 2013).
31 IMF, ‘Tunisia: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical
Memorandum of Understanding’, January 28, 2014. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2014/tun/012814.pdf,
p. 13 (accessed February 3, 2014). See also http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1450.pdf (accessed
February 16, 2014).
32 Jubilee Debt Campaign, Tunisia, Case Study 9. http://jubileedebt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Life-
and-debt-C9-Tunisia.pdf, p. 45 (accessed February 3, 2014).
33 IMF, ‘Tunisia First and Second Reviews under the Stand-By Arrangement’, Country Report No. 14/50: p. 6.
34 Jomaa assumed power on January 9, 2014.
35 Ibid., p. 1.
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country’s resources up to exploitation by foreign companies and lead to greater
indebtedness. The government responded by conﬁrming that the law was a
requirement from foreign donors, and pledged to continue to push PPPs through
ministerial decree.23 The heated political struggles around the PPP law points to
both the strategic signiﬁcance of privatisation as well as the overt role played by
IFIs in reworking Tunisian economic policy.
These examples illustrate the manner in which deeply felt social aspirations are
employed by the WB as justiﬁcation for the renewal and deepening of pro-market
measures. This same pattern can also be observed in the ISN’s concluding remarks
on the importance of public consultation and the Bank’s desire to ‘strengthen
partnerships with Tunisian civil society and the private sector through a ‘dialogue
with new stakeholders’.24 This dialogue is set up through consultation sessions
that will constitute ‘an input’ into Bank strategy,25 but contains no obligation to
integrate perspectives that contradict the basic precepts of neoliberal policies.
Not only does this model obfuscate relations of power and the different interests of
‘stakeholders’—implicitly equating the voices of government representatives,
business leaders, women, youth and other organisations—but also appears to be
principally designed to project an image of public endorsement of Bank policy.
The Bank does not disclose how it selects participants in these consultations, nor
does it provide publically available transcripts of what people say. Indeed, the
ISN’s report of these consultation sessions contain only highly abbreviated
paraphrasing that reinforce and conﬁrm the Bank’s general policy prescriptions.26
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January 2013, the blog received a total of four postings from individuals not
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program reviews conducted by the IMF over this time. Among other measures, the
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reform of tax policy’ and an ‘ambitious structural reform agenda that helps to
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lowering regional disparities, and reducing pervasive state intervention’.28
Speciﬁc policy proposals included a pledge to reduce taxes for the corporate sector
(by seeking a convergence between off-shore and on-shore tax regimes29); raising
23 See: ‘Year 2 of the Tunisian Revolution: Private Proﬁt vs. Public Interest’, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.
org/2013/07/art-572840/ (accessed January 2, 2014).
24 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Tunisia, FY13–14, p. 26.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
26 Ibid., pp. 33–35.
27 Ibid., p. 32. The blog can be found at http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/tunisia-one-year-after-revolution-
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http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13202.htm (accessed January 5, 2014).
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Tunisia_Tax_Incentives_Analysis.pdf (accessed December 9, 2013). One proposal put forward by the OECDwas
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participation in decision-making. The main features of the INDH scheme are (i)
the decentralisation of governance through the funding of small-scale social
infrastructure contracts (in areas such as construction, road and street
infrastructure, electricity or water supply, sanitation or solid waste services,
schools, local health centres or community centres, public gardens, sports or other
public facilities, etc.), and (ii) ﬁnancial support for developing small, local
businesses that generate revenues for the local communities.44 From 2006 to 2010,
around $1.2 billion was allocated to the INDH from the national budget, with 20
per cent of this amount coming from foreign donors (notably, the World Bank, the
EU, Saudi Arabia).45
The World Bank has been an enthusiastic supporter of the INDH since its
inception, ﬁrst through a $100 million loan in 2006, and more recently with a $300
million loan in June 2012. Despite the laudable goals of the programme, it has
come under sharp criticism from Moroccan activists and scholars, who have
highlighted the way it has contributed to the monarchy’s ability to ‘exercise
control and co-opt NGOs, inducing the latter to carry out the social functions
entrusted to the state . . . [it] has also created an artiﬁcial and non-independent
civil society sphere that tends to receive signiﬁcant funds and media coverage,
both domestically and externally’.46 Moreover, the program’s primary emphasis
on the decentralisation of ﬁscal administration, and the requirement that recipients
provide a minimum 10 per cent ﬁnancial or in-kind contribution to projects,47 have
further entrenched the shift towards the private provision of services. One clear
example of this is the involvement of one of the world’s largest utilities company,
GDF-Suez, through its subsidiary LYDEC, in the supply of electricity to urban
shantytowns in Morocco.48 LYDEC’s supply is organised through INDH, in which
local small-scale representatives take responsibility for the distribution of services
and collection of payment to slum neighbourhoods. In this manner, as Bogaert has
pointed out, INDH helps to deepen the ‘marketization and privatization of the
social . . . [a process that] implies the relocation of the centre of gravity of welfare
and social development to the private sphere and private actors’.49
In addition to the PMV and INDH, the third major focus of World Bank funding
in the post 2011 period has been a range of policy development and project-
speciﬁc loans framed by the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (2010–2013),
adopted in January 2010. Despite the regional changes that have ensued since that
time, the essential thrust of the CPS has remained the same, although a May 2012
review noted that the Bank would seek to ‘support more ambitious reforms’, with a
particular focus on policies aimed at increasing economic competitiveness,
44 World Bank, ‘Project Appraisal Document for a National Initiative for Human Development 2 Program’, June
4, 2012. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/05/
000350881_20120705105018/Rendered/PDF/674960PAD0REVI0LIC0diclosed07030120.pdf, p. 71 (accessed
December 18, 2013).
45 Koenraad Bogaert, Urban Politics in Morocco: Uneven Development, Neoliberal Government and State
Power, Dissertation, Department of Conﬂict and Development Studies, University of Gent (2011), p. 140.
46 Silvia Colombo, ‘Morocco at the Crossroads: Seizing the Window of Opportunity for Sustainable
Development’, MEDPRO Technical Report 2 (2011). http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/MedPro/MedPro-
technical-paper_02.pdf, p. 9 (accessed September 16, 2014).
47 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for a National Initiative for Human Development 2 Program, p. 65.
48 See World Business Council for Sustainable Development, ‘GDF SUEZ – LYDEC: Household Access to
Energy, Water and Sanitation Services in Greater Casablanca, Case Study’ http://www.wbcsd.org/Pages/
EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID¼14169&NoSearchContextKey ¼ true (accessed February 3, 2014).
49 Bogaert, Urban Politics in Morocco: Uneven Development, Neoliberal Government and State Power, p. 226.
SHIFTING PRIORITIES OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?
127
appointment of a ‘non-partisan Prime Minister [Mehdi Jomaa] . . . and the
formation of a new technocratic government’ as developments that ‘augur well for
a greater focus on economic stabilization and an acceleration of the structural
reform agenda’.36 Indeed, despite ongoing protests, the general trajectory of
Tunisian economic policy has not changed with the political transition. In line with
the IMF agreement, the interim government increased prices of household
electricity and gas by 10 per cent in January 2014, and fuel prices were pegged to
rise by a further 6 per cent in July 2014.37 The 2014 budget also contained
measures for a 25 per cent increase in taxes on vehicles, a measure that would
particularly affect taxi drivers and farmers.38
Morocco
The World Bank has a major funding programme in Morocco that covers three
speciﬁc areas. The ﬁrst of these areas is support for the government’s 2008 Plan
Maroc Vert (Green Morocco Plan, PMV), which sets out the country’s agricultural
plan for the period 2008–2020. The PMV aims to quintuple the value of export-
oriented crops (citrus fruits, olives, fruits, and vegetables) as one of its three main
goals (the other two being to promote private investment in agriculture and to
dismantle the ‘segmented framework’ that stands in the way of private property
rights).39 As part of this projected expansion of exports, the PMV endeavours to
shift land away from staple cereal crops towards citrus and tomato cultivation.
The core vision behind this strategy, as the World Bank noted in a 2012 Concept
Note, is ‘to promote the vertical integration from production to commercialization
of one agri-food chain’40 and represents a ‘major shift from state intervention that
replaces private sector to one that focuses on delivering public goods and services
and developing Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)’.41 According to the consulting
ﬁrm McKinsey and Company, three hundred thousand hectares were initially
earmarked for this transition, and more than half have already been switched to
export crops.42 The World Bank’s support for the PMV was carried out through
two Development Policy Loans worth $205 million in March 2011 and $203
million in March 2013, representing around 18 per cent of the Bank’s total funding
of US$2.2 billion from 2011 to 2014.43
The second major area of World Bank funding to Morocco is support of the
country’s National Initiative for Human Development (INDH). King Muhammad
VI launched this programme in a May 2005 address to the country, with the stated
goals of ﬁghting poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion, and enhancing local
36 Ibid., p. 4.
37 IMF, Tunisia: Letter of Intent, January 28, 2014: p. 9.
38 Following widespread protests against this tax in January 2014, the government agreed to postpone the
measure until conﬁrmation from the legislative branch.
39 See the text of the PMV at Agency for Agricultural Development, Kingdom of Morocco, http://www.ada.gov.
ma/StrategiePMV.php (accessed September 16, 2014).
40 World Bank, Morocco Social and Integrated Agriculture, Project Information Document, Concept Note
(Washington, DC: World Bank, March 4, 2012), p. 1.
41 IBRD, ‘First Development Policy Loan in Support of the Plan Maroc Vert’, February 10, 2011. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/03/17/000333037_20110317000518/
Rendered/PDF/584990PGD0REPL194B01public031151111.pdf, p. 3 (accessed March 5, 2012).
42 Sunil Sanghvi, Rupert Simons, and Roberto Uchoa, ‘Four Lessons for Transforming African Agriculture’,
McKinsey Quarterly (2011), p. 4.
43 Calculated from worldbank.org.
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provide a minimum 10 per cent ﬁnancial or in-kind contribution to projects,47 have
further entrenched the shift towards the private provision of services. One clear
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GDF-Suez, through its subsidiary LYDEC, in the supply of electricity to urban
shantytowns in Morocco.48 LYDEC’s supply is organised through INDH, in which
local small-scale representatives take responsibility for the distribution of services
and collection of payment to slum neighbourhoods. In this manner, as Bogaert has
pointed out, INDH helps to deepen the ‘marketization and privatization of the
social . . . [a process that] implies the relocation of the centre of gravity of welfare
and social development to the private sphere and private actors’.49
In addition to the PMV and INDH, the third major focus of World Bank funding
in the post 2011 period has been a range of policy development and project-
speciﬁc loans framed by the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy (2010–2013),
adopted in January 2010. Despite the regional changes that have ensued since that
time, the essential thrust of the CPS has remained the same, although a May 2012
review noted that the Bank would seek to ‘support more ambitious reforms’, with a
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4, 2012. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/05/
000350881_20120705105018/Rendered/PDF/674960PAD0REVI0LIC0diclosed07030120.pdf, p. 71 (accessed
December 18, 2013).
45 Koenraad Bogaert, Urban Politics in Morocco: Uneven Development, Neoliberal Government and State
Power, Dissertation, Department of Conﬂict and Development Studies, University of Gent (2011), p. 140.
46 Silvia Colombo, ‘Morocco at the Crossroads: Seizing the Window of Opportunity for Sustainable
Development’, MEDPRO Technical Report 2 (2011). http://www.iai.it/pdf/mediterraneo/MedPro/MedPro-
technical-paper_02.pdf, p. 9 (accessed September 16, 2014).
47 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for a National Initiative for Human Development 2 Program, p. 65.
48 See World Business Council for Sustainable Development, ‘GDF SUEZ – LYDEC: Household Access to
Energy, Water and Sanitation Services in Greater Casablanca, Case Study’ http://www.wbcsd.org/Pages/
EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID¼14169&NoSearchContextKey ¼ true (accessed February 3, 2014).
49 Bogaert, Urban Politics in Morocco: Uneven Development, Neoliberal Government and State Power, p. 226.
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Tunisian economic policy has not changed with the political transition. In line with
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rights).39 As part of this projected expansion of exports, the PMV endeavours to
shift land away from staple cereal crops towards citrus and tomato cultivation.
The core vision behind this strategy, as the World Bank noted in a 2012 Concept
Note, is ‘to promote the vertical integration from production to commercialization
of one agri-food chain’40 and represents a ‘major shift from state intervention that
replaces private sector to one that focuses on delivering public goods and services
and developing Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)’.41 According to the consulting
ﬁrm McKinsey and Company, three hundred thousand hectares were initially
earmarked for this transition, and more than half have already been switched to
export crops.42 The World Bank’s support for the PMV was carried out through
two Development Policy Loans worth $205 million in March 2011 and $203
million in March 2013, representing around 18 per cent of the Bank’s total funding
of US$2.2 billion from 2011 to 2014.43
The second major area of World Bank funding to Morocco is support of the
country’s National Initiative for Human Development (INDH). King Muhammad
VI launched this programme in a May 2005 address to the country, with the stated
goals of ﬁghting poverty, illiteracy and social exclusion, and enhancing local
36 Ibid., p. 4.
37 IMF, Tunisia: Letter of Intent, January 28, 2014: p. 9.
38 Following widespread protests against this tax in January 2014, the government agreed to postpone the
measure until conﬁrmation from the legislative branch.
39 See the text of the PMV at Agency for Agricultural Development, Kingdom of Morocco, http://www.ada.gov.
ma/StrategiePMV.php (accessed September 16, 2014).
40 World Bank, Morocco Social and Integrated Agriculture, Project Information Document, Concept Note
(Washington, DC: World Bank, March 4, 2012), p. 1.
41 IBRD, ‘First Development Policy Loan in Support of the Plan Maroc Vert’, February 10, 2011. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/03/17/000333037_20110317000518/
Rendered/PDF/584990PGD0REPL194B01public031151111.pdf, p. 3 (accessed March 5, 2012).
42 Sunil Sanghvi, Rupert Simons, and Roberto Uchoa, ‘Four Lessons for Transforming African Agriculture’,
McKinsey Quarterly (2011), p. 4.
43 Calculated from worldbank.org.
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drawn upon this credit line as of February 2014, it is important to emphasise that it
comes with its own set of conditionalities, expressed in a Letter of Intent sent to
the IMF Executive Board on 27 July 2012. The letter pledges ‘rationalization and
efﬁciency of public spending’ through measures including subsidy and pension
reform, with a targeted 1.6 percentage point drop in the ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP between
2011 and 2013.58 Other planned structural reforms include removing barriers to
business entry, rationalising tariffs, labour market deregulation,59 and preparing
some public enterprises for privatisation.60
Egypt
IFI activities in Egypt have been highly contested over many decades, due to the
widespread perception that organisations such as the World Bank and IMF were
directly complicit with the corruption of the Mubarak regime. After the ousting of
Mubarak, much of the popular ire has centred upon negotiations for a new IMF
loan to Egypt, which began in April and May 2011 during IMF mission visits to
the country. Despite the large social mobilisations around the questions of debt
and social justice, a staff-level agreement was initially concluded on 5 June 2011
between the government and the IMF for a $3 billion loan. Just two weeks later,
however, the Egyptian Finance Minister Samir Radwan announced that plans to
accept the loan had been dropped, with one of his advisors noting that this was a
result of the ‘pressure of public opinion’.61 Discussions nonetheless continued
between the government and the IMF, revolving speciﬁcally around an economic
plan that would form the precondition of any future loan. When the plan was
eventually released in November 2011 due to public pressure, activists noted the
close resemblance between its recommendations and the IMF Article IV
consultation that took place with the Mubarak government in April 2010—
particularly the plans to reduce subsidies and public spending, and introduce a
VAT rather than any progressive tax reform.62
In August 2012—following the election of Muhammad Mursi to the presidency
in June 2012—the Egyptian government made a formal application to the IMF to
resume negotiations on a loan, this time for a new amount of $4.8 billion.
An initial agreement was signed in November 2012, accompanied by an
announcement of austerity measures that met the approval of the IMF.63
Once again, however, a ﬁnal loan agreement did not go ahead. Following protests
over the new taxes and cutbacks to social spending, and more general discontent
with the Muslim Brotherhood government, the Egyptian ﬁnance ministry
announced on 10 December that the IMF loan would be postponed. Nonetheless,
despite this postponement, many of the austerity measures linked to the IMF
agreement remained in place, provoking a record number of protests and strikes.
58 IMF, ‘Morocco Letter of Intent’, July 27, 2012. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2012/mar/072712.pdf, p. 3
(accessed February 9, 2014).
59 IMF, ‘Morocco: Request for an Arrangement under the Precautionary and Liquidity Line’, August 2012. http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12239.pdf, p. 11 (accessed February 9, 2014).
60 Ibid., p. 2.
61 BBC News, ‘Egypt Drops Plans for IMF Loan Amid Popular Distrust’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-13914410 (accessed December 8, 2013).
62 Proceeding of the Panel Discussion, From the Arab revolutions to global austerity trends, April 22, 2013. http://
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2013/04/art-572426/ (accessed December 8, 2013).
63 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, ‘Amended Tax Laws and Postponed Implementation: TheWorst is Yet to
Come’, December 16, 2012. http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2012/12/16/1563 (accessed December 8, 2013).
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governance, cut-backs to the country’s subsidy program, and ‘strengthening
inclusion and voice, particularly of youth and women’.50 The Bank’s
disbursement levels to Morocco reached record levels in 2011 and 2012,51 with
a major emphasis of these loans placed on promoting the use of PPPs within key
sectors. In this regard, loans have included a $136.7 million DPL in June 2012,
which aimed, in part, at the development of PPPs in the urban transit sector,52 a US
$200 million loan in November 2011 for the support of a $1.4 billion PPP in solar
energy (jointly with the EIB, KfW; AfDB and AFD), and a $130 million DPL in
February 2013 to help develop a PPP for solid waste management.
One ﬁnal signiﬁcant example of this stepped-up World Bank intervention in
Moroccan government policy has been the push towards constitutional reform that
embeds ﬁscal austerity as a guiding principle of the state’s ﬁnances and budgetary
processes. The new constitution adopted in 2011 contains an important
requirement that the ‘ﬁnances of the state’ remain ‘in balance’ (Article 77).53
This constitutional requirement on public ﬁnances underpins a new draft Organic
Budgetary Law (OBL), prepared with the assistance of the World Bank,54 which
as its principle goal has the reduction of government spending on wages and
subsidies.55 In a program document for a $200 million loan provided in September
2013 to assist in the development and implementation of budgetary policy, the
Bank explicitly acknowledges the link between constitutional reform and the
structural embedding of neoliberal logic within economic policy making, noting
that ‘the new constitutional requirement’ means that the Government has
committed to reducing budget deﬁcits and accelerating the reform process.56 The
Bank went on to list some of the measures carried out by the Government in line
with these reforms, including a reduction in subsidies for wheat farmers, an
increase in fuel, gasoline and diesel prices, control of government wages, and a 6
per cent reduction in subsidies on wheat.57
As with Tunisia, the activities of the World Bank and other IFIs in Morocco
have been closely coordinated with the IMF, although there has been no speciﬁc
IMF programme launched in the country beyond the annual Article IV
consultations. In August 2012, however, the IMF Executive Board approved a 24-
month Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), valued at around $6.2 billion,
which could be used in the event of a severe balance of payments crisis caused by
deterioration in the international economic situation. While Morocco had not
50 World Bank, ‘Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report for the Period FY10–13’. http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/05/21/000333037_20120521001658/
Rendered/PDF/676940CAS0R2010se0Only090Box369244B.pdf, p. 13 (accessed January 23, 2014).
51 Ibid., p. 8.
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worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/19/000386194_20120719005139/
Rendered/PDF/ICR21870P115650C0disclosed070170120.pdf, p. 12 (accessed January 25, 2014).
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54 IMF, ‘Second Review under the Precautionary and Liquidity Line’, (September 2013), p. 14, note 7. http://
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09170139/Rendered/PDF/721270PGD0Moro0100OUO0900Box379843B.pdf, p. 9 (accessed January 9, 2014).
57 Food subsidies were reduced by 15 per cent in September 2012, while fuel prices were increased by 20 per cent
in June 2012. EBRD, ‘EBRD Supports Expansion in Water Services in Morocco’, January 29, 2014. http://www.
ebrd.com/english/pages/news/press/2014/140129.shtml (accessed February 9, 2014).
ADAM HA IEH
128
30450.indd   128 29/05/15   3:36 PM
CONTINUITy AND CHANGE BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS
129
drawn upon this credit line as of February 2014, it is important to emphasise that it
comes with its own set of conditionalities, expressed in a Letter of Intent sent to
the IMF Executive Board on 27 July 2012. The letter pledges ‘rationalization and
efﬁciency of public spending’ through measures including subsidy and pension
reform, with a targeted 1.6 percentage point drop in the ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP between
2011 and 2013.58 Other planned structural reforms include removing barriers to
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Egypt
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plan that would form the precondition of any future loan. When the plan was
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In August 2012—following the election of Muhammad Mursi to the presidency
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An initial agreement was signed in November 2012, accompanied by an
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Once again, however, a ﬁnal loan agreement did not go ahead. Following protests
over the new taxes and cutbacks to social spending, and more general discontent
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58 IMF, ‘Morocco Letter of Intent’, July 27, 2012. http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2012/mar/072712.pdf, p. 3
(accessed February 9, 2014).
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63 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, ‘Amended Tax Laws and Postponed Implementation: TheWorst is Yet to
Come’, December 16, 2012. http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2012/12/16/1563 (accessed December 8, 2013).
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governance, cut-backs to the country’s subsidy program, and ‘strengthening
inclusion and voice, particularly of youth and women’.50 The Bank’s
disbursement levels to Morocco reached record levels in 2011 and 2012,51 with
a major emphasis of these loans placed on promoting the use of PPPs within key
sectors. In this regard, loans have included a $136.7 million DPL in June 2012,
which aimed, in part, at the development of PPPs in the urban transit sector,52 a US
$200 million loan in November 2011 for the support of a $1.4 billion PPP in solar
energy (jointly with the EIB, KfW; AfDB and AFD), and a $130 million DPL in
February 2013 to help develop a PPP for solid waste management.
One ﬁnal signiﬁcant example of this stepped-up World Bank intervention in
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embeds ﬁscal austerity as a guiding principle of the state’s ﬁnances and budgetary
processes. The new constitution adopted in 2011 contains an important
requirement that the ‘ﬁnances of the state’ remain ‘in balance’ (Article 77).53
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Budgetary Law (OBL), prepared with the assistance of the World Bank,54 which
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Bank explicitly acknowledges the link between constitutional reform and the
structural embedding of neoliberal logic within economic policy making, noting
that ‘the new constitutional requirement’ means that the Government has
committed to reducing budget deﬁcits and accelerating the reform process.56 The
Bank went on to list some of the measures carried out by the Government in line
with these reforms, including a reduction in subsidies for wheat farmers, an
increase in fuel, gasoline and diesel prices, control of government wages, and a 6
per cent reduction in subsidies on wheat.57
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of political parties and Parliamentarians, as well as CSOs and youth leaders, and
. . . make further efforts at outreach and consultations’.71
The Bank deals with these fears over messaging and perception in much the
same manner as it did in the Tunisian and Moroccan cases. The three basic
objectives of the ISN—economic management, jobs, and inclusion—encompass
the broad social aspirations of the 2011 popular movements, but these are to be
achieved primarily through encouraging private sector growth and ﬁscal austerity
measures. This logic is starkly indicated in the list of key expected outcomes of the
Bank’s efforts to achieve these objectives: reduction and phasing-out of subsidies;
an enhanced investment environment measured through an improvement in Doing
Business rankings; deepening of ﬁnancial markets and credit provision;
privatisation (through PPPs) for air, power, energy, telecommunications, road
management, irrigation, and hospitals; trade integration with global markets;
pension reform; and training in entrepreneurship (particularly for women).72 It is
striking that even those measures proposed in order to achieve ‘inclusion’ are
largely framed around private sector growth and ﬁscal austerity, including PPPs,
subsidy and pension reform, and increased incorporation of women into ﬁnancial
markets. Indeed, conﬁrming its absolute commitment to these priorities, the Bank
notes that a key risk to its work in Egypt is the fact that ‘reforms aimed at
improving the environment for private investment may be deeply unpopular’ and
that the Egyptian government may be pressured to ‘respond to public opinion by
introducing re-nationalization or tighter state control over the private sector’.73
Both the Bank’s earlier Country Assistance Strategy (CAS 2006–2009) and the
ISN contain a major focus on the energy sector. Indeed, around two-third of World
Bank project funding since 2011 has gone towards two power projects—$240
million for the Giza North power plant in February 2012 and $585.4 million for the
construction of the Helwan South plant in June 2013.74 In the medium-term, these
projects are explicitly framed by the World Bank as fostering the commercialisa-
tion of electricity generation in Egypt,75 in which power would be produced by
privately owned Independent Power Producers (IPPs), sold to the Egyptian
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC), and then purchased by the consumer.76
A key enabler of this liberalisation process is higher electricity prices through the
removal of energy subsidies and, in this manner, the World Bank’s investment in
the energy sector is closely linked to the goal of subsidy reform. Indeed, the
Project Document for the Helwan South plant emphasises this goal as a key
element of World Bank support, noting that ﬁnal approval of the project had
‘awaited credible ﬁrst steps to be taken by the Government to reform electricity
tariffs and fuel subsidies’,77 which were forthcoming with the increase of
electricity tariffs by a total of 15 per cent under the Mursi government in
November 2012 and January 2013 during negotiations with the IMF.78 The Bank
goes on to note that ‘further electricity tariffs and fuel subsidy reforms’ would be
necessary to achieve full commercialisation of the electricity sector, and that it
71 Ibid., p. 22.
72 See Annex I, ISN, for more detail. Ibid., p. 12.
73 Ibid., p. 22.
74 Calculated by author from World Bank website.
75 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Arab Republic of Egypt, p. 21.
76 Ibid., p. 33.
77 Ibid., p. 12.
78 Ibid., p. 11.
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According to the International Development Centre in Cairo, there was an average
of more than 1100 protests per month in the ﬁrst half of 2013, with a record 9427
protests held during the ﬁrst year of Mursi’s term (July 2012 to June 2013).64
These protests included more than 1000 strikes, 800 sit-ins, over 500 marches, and
campaigns of refusing to pay bills on utilities such as electricity and water.
Throughout this entire period, it was broadly acknowledged that an IMF
package was a necessary prerequisite before wider lending began from other IFIs,
and its absence meant that donor activity was muted through 2011–2013.
The World Bank, for example, funded only eight projects over this period, for a
total value of just over $1.6 billion (compared to $2.17 billion in 2010 alone),65
and stated unambiguously that any signiﬁcant levels of funding—including
Development Policy Loans of up to $1 billion —would be largely dependent upon
Egypt’s acceptance of an agreement with the IMF.66 Likewise, the AfDB
approved only four projects for Egypt in 2011, and none in 2012, commenting in
its 2012 strategy document that ‘development partners are unlikely to come
forward unless an agreement between the IMF and Egypt is reached ﬁrst’.67
The European Investment Bank, through its FEMIP instrument, provided
$512 million worth of loans to Egypt from 2011 to 2013, compared to over
$900 million in 2010 alone. Some support was forthcoming from Saudi Arabia and
Qatar through 2011, but the major promises of ﬁnancial aid made at the Deauville
Summit did not materialise. The signiﬁcance of the IMF package was explicitly
acknowledged by US Secretary of State John Kerry during a visit to Cairo in early
March 2013, in which he commented that Washington would release $190 million
of a pledged $450 million in budget support to Egypt, only on the assurance that
the country would ‘complete the IMF process’.68
Nonetheless, despite the delays in an IMF package, there appears to be a strong
consensus among major IFIs over the direction of donor activities once an
agreement is in place and the political situation has stabilised. This consensus is
clearly expressed in the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note (ISN), issued in May
2012, which covers the Bank’s activities over an 18-month period (June 2012
through December 2013).69 The ﬁrst apparent feature of this report is the Bank’s
major concern over Egyptian public perception around IFIs and the private sector,
and hence the need to ‘work closely with all new political actors, [to] help restore
the conﬁdence of the private sector and improve public perceptions of the private
sector’.70 Moreover, because of the ‘possible negative sentiments towards IFIs’,
the Bank pledged to ‘engage with a broad set of stakeholders, including members
64 Al Ahram, ‘Egypt Protests Hit All Time High During Morsi’s First Year’, February 25, 2013. http://english.
ahram.org.eg/News/74939.aspx (accessed December 9, 2013).
65 Calculated by author from world bank website.
66 World Bank, ‘Interim Strategy Note for the Arab Republic of Egypt’, May 31, 2012. http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/07/000333037_20120607004504/
Rendered/PDF/664430ISN0R2010Ofﬁcial0Use0Only090.pdf, p. 14 (accessed September 16, 2014).
67 AfDB, 2012–2013 Egypt Interim Strategy Note, October 2012. http://www.afdb.org/ﬁleadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Project-and-Operations/2012-2013_-_Egypt_-_Interim_Strategy_Paper.pdf, p. 4 (accessed
December 9, 2014).
68 Rebecca Nelson and Jeremy Sharp, ‘Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress’, Congressional
Research Service, April 29, 2013, p. 14.
69 The ISN replaced an earlier Country Assistance Strategy 2006–2009 (CAS), which had ﬁrst been drafted in
2005 and later extended to end-2011.
70 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Arab Republic of Egypt, p. 12.
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notes that a key risk to its work in Egypt is the fact that ‘reforms aimed at
improving the environment for private investment may be deeply unpopular’ and
that the Egyptian government may be pressured to ‘respond to public opinion by
introducing re-nationalization or tighter state control over the private sector’.73
Both the Bank’s earlier Country Assistance Strategy (CAS 2006–2009) and the
ISN contain a major focus on the energy sector. Indeed, around two-third of World
Bank project funding since 2011 has gone towards two power projects—$240
million for the Giza North power plant in February 2012 and $585.4 million for the
construction of the Helwan South plant in June 2013.74 In the medium-term, these
projects are explicitly framed by the World Bank as fostering the commercialisa-
tion of electricity generation in Egypt,75 in which power would be produced by
privately owned Independent Power Producers (IPPs), sold to the Egyptian
Electricity Holding Company (EEHC), and then purchased by the consumer.76
A key enabler of this liberalisation process is higher electricity prices through the
removal of energy subsidies and, in this manner, the World Bank’s investment in
the energy sector is closely linked to the goal of subsidy reform. Indeed, the
Project Document for the Helwan South plant emphasises this goal as a key
element of World Bank support, noting that ﬁnal approval of the project had
‘awaited credible ﬁrst steps to be taken by the Government to reform electricity
tariffs and fuel subsidies’,77 which were forthcoming with the increase of
electricity tariffs by a total of 15 per cent under the Mursi government in
November 2012 and January 2013 during negotiations with the IMF.78 The Bank
goes on to note that ‘further electricity tariffs and fuel subsidy reforms’ would be
necessary to achieve full commercialisation of the electricity sector, and that it
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has faced much more signiﬁcant resistance from the population and policy has
been more cautious. The levels of strikes, demonstrations and other forms of
popular protest have been high in both countries, and have focused on the question
of IMF/World Bank participation. In the case of Egypt, this opposition has
prevented any conclusion of an IMF deal, despite the apparent consensus around
such an agreement from all sections of the elite.
Indeed, in all three countries, state and business elites have not raised any
signiﬁcant opposition to IFI negotiations or the policies associated with them.
In Tunisia and Egypt, where Islamist forces initially played a dominant role in new
governmental arrangements post 2011, IFI negotiations were to continue along the
same trajectory as under previous rulers, despite the claims of both Al-Nahda and
the Muslim Brotherhood to greater social justice aspirations. In both countries, the
wave of liberalisation policies that took place from mid 2012 to early 2013 was
carried out under the tutelage of these organisations and was widely praised in
World Bank and IMF reports. In Tunisia, the ‘technocratic’ government that
replaced Al-Nahda has continued these policies. The Egyptian case remains in ﬂux
as a result of the political instability and violence that accompanied the overthrow
of MuhammadMursi in mid 2013, but the new cabinet announced in late February
2014 is dominated by Mubarak-era ofﬁcials and old business elites—with the
pivotal ﬁnance and planning ministries held by individuals responsible for
previous negotiations with the IMF.81 In all cases, the continuity in elite attitudes
towards IFI-backed policies on the one hand, and the varied levels of mass
mobilisation on the other, conﬁrms the importance of incorporating popular
struggles into any analysis of political transition.
Moreover, the generalised popular distrust of IFIs is frankly acknowledged by
both the IMF and World Bank, and helps explain their discursive turn towards
issues such as job creation, social inclusion, transparency and governance.
The preceding discussion indicates that this ‘pro-poor’ discourse should not be
understood as a sharp break from earlier policy, but rather represents an attempt to
ensure continuity in the context of problems of perception and legitimacy. Job
creation, for example, is to be achieved through privatisation, further opening up
of the economy to foreign investment and labour market deregulation. Social
inclusion, as the Moroccan and Tunisian cases conﬁrm, is to be operationalised
through the downward displacement of budgetary processes to the local level,
accompanied by privatisation and fee-based service provision. In these and other
examples outlined above, widely held social aspirations are acknowledged as
legitimate priorities, but because their implementation is conceived through the
overarching framework of a market-led policy, their symbolic function is to
reinforce and justify the core neoliberal orientation. The ﬁnal aspect to this
discursive shift is the World Bank/IMF’s greater concern with public perception—
reﬂected in frequent references to stakeholders, consultations, and the need to
build popular support. As was noted above in the Tunisian case, these claims of
greater ‘voice, transparency and accountability’ should be viewed with some
scepticism. They have not altered the basic trajectory of IFI policy in any
signiﬁcant manner, and appear to be primarily aimed at generating a facade of
popular participation and endorsement of IMF/World Bank strategy.
81 See Ahram Online, ‘Ministers in Egypt’s New Cabinet’, March 1, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/95299/Egypt/Politics-/UPDATED-PROFILES-Ministers-in-Egypts-new-cabinet.aspx
(accessed September 16, 2014).
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expected electricity tariffs ‘to increase at 7.5 per cent per annum during FY2014–
2018 . . . and 3 per cent thereafter’.79
Since the ousting of Mursi by the Egyptian military in July 2013, IFI
engagement with the country has slowed while donors await the outcome of the
new political environment. Further negotiations around the IMF package have
been put on hold, with the IMF announcing soon after the overthrow of Mursi that
it would keep its contact with the country on a technical level until the military-led
government received international recognition. Nonetheless, the general strategic
consensus of the IMF and other IFIs remains unchanged. According to the IMF’s
report to the October 2013 Deauville Partnership Ministerial Meeting, the
medium-term strategy necessitated: ‘promoting the role of the private sector [to]
unleash Egypt’s underexploited economic potential . . . The immediate task is to
streamline burdensome regulations, improve access to ﬁnancing, and modernise
insolvency and land management laws . . . removing bottlenecks to investment in
the electricity and transport sectors . . . regaining control of public expenditures,
including reforming energy subsidies and containing the wage bill’.80
Rearticulating Continuities in Political Transition
A comparative examination of each of these three cases indicates little change in
the essential logic of World Bank and IMF involvement in North Africa. All of the
major World Bank/IMF strategic documents and loan agreements continue to be
underpinned by a prioritisation of private-sector-driven growth, ﬁscal austerity
focusing particularly on subsidy and pension reform, and the liberalisation of
ﬁnancial and labour markets. This policy continuity is acknowledged by theWorld
Bank in its ISNs for Tunisia and Egypt, which differ little from the earlier Country
Assistance Strategies that were cancelled following the overthrow of Ben Ali and
Mubarak. In Morocco, the World Bank continues to follow the same Country
Partnership Strategy that it adopted in 2010. IMF agreements with Morocco and
Tunisia are based upon Article IV consultations from prior to 2011, and even in the
case of Egypt—the only country not to agree to an IMF package—the national
plan that forms the precondition of any future IMF agreement is largely drawn
from Article IV recommendations made to the Mubarak government in April
2010.
Nevertheless, despite the strong continuities in both the logic and content of
overall strategy, there are differences in IFI engagement with each country.
In Morocco, the lack of any signiﬁcant regime transformation has meant that IFIs
have continued to build upon earlier projects in the country, linked to the long-
standing country development strategies of the PMV and INDH in which
decentralisation of ﬁscal and administrative authority plays such a prominent role.
Both the World Bank and IMF—working closely with other IFIs—have utilised
calls for greater transparency to deepen attempts to embed market-oriented
policies within the state, reﬂected most sharply in the constitutional reform
process. In Tunisia and Egypt, however, where previous rulers have been ousted
(although a strong degree of elite and regime continuity remains), IFI engagement
79 Ibid., p. 33.
80 IMF, ‘Arab Countries in Transition: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges’, Report to the Deauville
Partnership Ministerial Meeting, October 10, 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/101013.pdf,
p.10 (accessed January 9, 2014).
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has faced much more signiﬁcant resistance from the population and policy has
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81 See Ahram Online, ‘Ministers in Egypt’s New Cabinet’, March 1, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/95299/Egypt/Politics-/UPDATED-PROFILES-Ministers-in-Egypts-new-cabinet.aspx
(accessed September 16, 2014).
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expected electricity tariffs ‘to increase at 7.5 per cent per annum during FY2014–
2018 . . . and 3 per cent thereafter’.79
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No Democratic Change . . . and Yet No
Authoritarian Continuity: The Inter-
paradigm Debate and North Africa
After the Uprisings
FRANCESCO CAVATORTA*
ABSTRACT North Africa has gone through dramatic events since the eruption of
the Arab uprisings in Tunisia in late 2010. Despite sharing similar characteristics
that were central to the uprisings, they have known different political and
institutional trajectories since then. The article provides an appraisal of the
contributions to this special issue focusing in particular on the peculiar situation
of countries where no genuine democratic change has occurred and where there is
little authoritarian continuity as well.
The Arab uprisings have generated an enormous amount of literature since early
2011 when the presidents of both Egypt and Tunisia were forced out of power
through sustained popular revolts against their rule, setting off a wave of unrest
across the region. Broadly speaking, the enthusiasm of the early days has been
replaced by more pessimistic analyses as events on the ground seemed to throw the
entire region further into political chaos and, in many cases, violence. The
academic focus on analyses of the positive role of social media, the mobilisation of
the youth, the strength of civil society activism, or the modernisation of party
politics have been supplanted by studies examining the rise of sectarianism, the re-
afﬁrmation of the importance of the military and security forces, and the de-
politicisation and disenchantment of ordinary citizens. In light of this extremely
varied and often contradictory academic and policy-oriented literature on the Arab
uprisings and their causes and consequences, it becomes very difﬁcult to provide a
balanced appraisal of what has genuinely changed in the region and what has
remained unaltered. In addition, one should not forget that the regional variation is
also very signiﬁcant in terms of political developments following the uprisings.
The trajectories of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt—to use the country-studies in this
special issue—are extremely different and can be considered in part at odds with
each other. Finally, the time-lag since the uprisings is not particularly long and
what might seem as a massive change today might end up being much less so in
the near future so and vice-versa.
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In summary, IFI engagement with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt since 2011
demonstrates an attempt to articulate dissent in the image of neoliberalism,
rendering North Africa’s uprisings within a discourse amenable to the deepening
of pro-market policies. IFIs have attempted to utilise the post 2011 moment to
maintain the essential characteristics of past practice, while employing a language
that professes a new course and sympathy with the social justice goals of the
uprisings. Nonetheless, ongoing social mobilisations have sharply affected the
trajectories of this process, and remain of signiﬁcant concern to policy makers.
In this context, the deepening engagement of IFIs with North Africa will likely
constitute a key axis of ongoing debates over the future of new political
arrangements in the region.
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where the ‘Spring’ never really arrived,5 but where, keeping in line with the
democratisation paradigm, it would eventually come. Elsewhere, it was argued,
political parties and social actors would have to work out the details of the
institutional compromises needed in order to arrive satisfactorily at the creation of
liberal-democratic systems that would certainly have teething problems, but
would eventually consolidate once all involved realised that liberal-democracy
was indeed some sort of ‘end of history’. The focus is often therefore on the
problems that transiting countries face6 and on the ways in which the transition
failed with attention being paid to the interactions among actors.7 As it turns out,
none of the contributions to the special issues point to democratic change as we
have traditionally understood it in the democratisation literature and in fact
emphasise that the reality under examination is far from being capable of
delivering democratic change in the way in which it is conceived in that literature.
In the case of Egypt, as Kohstall makes clear, the intention to genuinely
democratise was never present at the core of the regime—the military—and using
the case of higher education reform, he argues convincingly that the authoritarian
retrenchment is such that ideal loci of debate, critical thinking and scientiﬁc
inquiry, such as third level institutions, are perceived as security threats and
therefore need to be monitored closely. This is in keeping with developments
elsewhere in Egyptian society, from stamping out labour disputes to repressing the
Muslim Brotherhood and other dissenters. Interestingly, it is also in line with the
progressive securitisation of issues and places across the globe, liberal-
democracies included. In Morocco, either through the apt manipulation of the
reform on regional decentralisation or through the concessions provided to
potentially rebellious public sector unions, the tried and tested strategies of co-
optation have permitted the Monarchy to reassert its pre-eminence on the political
system.8 According to Fabio Merone, in Tunisia as well, considered to be either on
the way to democratic consolidation9 or the last hope of at least one successful
transition to democracy in the Arab world,10 a real transition to democracy capable
of consolidating has not yet occurred. In fact one of his main arguments is that the
uprising of 2011 has ‘simply’ permitted the re-integration of a conservative
middle-class represented by the Islamist party Al-Nahda, which some would
consider as having lost its Islamist ideological core long ago,11 into the national
project of state-building without altering the signiﬁcant class cleavages in the
country. Thus, a mass of deeply disenfranchised and marginalised people feel no
real connection to the political system being constructed, preferring to become
involved in jihadi Salaﬁsm or radical left-wing activism or to withdraw completely
5 Fre´de´ric Volpi, ‘Algeria versus the Arab Spring’, Journal of Democracy, 24(3) (2013), pp. 104–115.
6 Ann Lesch, ‘Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya’, Middle East Policy, 21(1) (2014),
pp. 62–74.
7 Nathan Brown, ‘Egypt’s Failed Transition’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013), pp. 45–58.
8 Ahmed Benchemsi, ‘Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition’, Journal of Democracy, 23(1) (2012), pp. 57–69;
Emanuela Dalmasso, ‘Surﬁng the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco: Apolitical Society and the Reconﬁguration
of a Sustainable Authoritarian Regime’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 217–232.
9 Alfred Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations’, Journal of Democracy, 23(2) (2012),
pp. 89–103.
10 Steven Heydemann, ‘Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy, 24(4) (2013),
pp. 59–73.
11 See Alaya Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation: 1980–2008’, Journal of
North African Studies, 14(2) (2009), pp. 257–272 and Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, ‘Moderation
through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party’,
Democratization, 20(5) (2013), pp. 857–875.
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More broadly, enthusiasm and pessimism about the uprisings and their
consequences correlate quite strongly with the paradigms of democratisation and
authoritarian persistence respectively. This special issue attempts to move beyond
the conceptualisation of North African politics through this rigid debate and
suggests that elements of change and continuity should not be framed necessarily
within the dominant paradigms, largely because of their normative assumptions
about the outcome of the uprisings. This attempt is in line with recent calls to
widen the research agenda on Middle East politics in order to better capture the
trends and hidden forces that operate within North African societies outside the at
times facile assumptions of both paradigms.1 This would allow not only for better
understanding, but also for formulating better predictions and avoid the ‘surprise’
of 2011. In addition the special issue contributes greatly to better specify the ways
in which polities across North Africa have developed since the uprisings,
providing insights on their historical and political trends beyond the immediacy of
events. While the introduction and the contributions attempt, as mentioned, to
steer clear of the debate between the ‘rival’ paradigms of authoritarian persistence
and democratisation, it is difﬁcult to completely marginalise them as potential
useful frameworks through which one can make sense of political events in North
Africa since the uprisings. The desire to move away from these paradigms has
largely to do with their normativity and their theoretical rigidity, which are quite
difﬁcult to disentangle. However, as argued elsewhere,2 such paradigms can still
be quite useful if one does not think of the insights of democratisation for instance
as capable of explaining all political developments in any authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian countries at all times and in a linear manner. The same applies to the
authoritarian persistence paradigm. Once this is accepted it is possible to engage
critically with both when providing an appraisal of post-Spring North Africa.3
The point is not to believe that their insights will inevitably lead to the normative
outcome in-built in them and be prepared to look at change and continuity as a
process of constant and at time contradictory adaptation to forms of governance
that seem to point increasingly to a convergence between what once were neatly
separate authoritarian and democratic countries and political systems.
No Democratic Change
The Arab uprisings gave rise early on to the rediscovery of the democratisation
literature that had been abandoned in the late 1990s and early 2000s in favour of
the literature on authoritarian resilience. In some writings about the uprisings ‘the
spirit of 1989’ was evoked4 and it was believed that processes of transition to
democracy were under way across North Africa, with the exception of Algeria
1 Marc Morje´ Howard and Meir R. Walters, ‘Response to Eva Bellin, Ellen Lust and Marc Lynch’, Perspectives
on Politics, 12(2) (2014), pp. 417–419.
2 Michelle Pace and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Arab Uprisings in Theoretical Perspectives’, Mediterranean
Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 125–138.
3 Fre´de´ric Volpi, ‘Explaining (and Re-explaining) Political Change in the Middle East During the Arab
Spring: Trajectories of Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Maghreb’, Democratization, 20(6) (2013),
pp. 969–990.
4 See for instance Mary Kaldor, ‘Civil Society in 1989 and 2011’, February 7, 2011 http://www.opendemocracy.
net/mary-kaldor/civil-society-in-1989-and-2011 and the Al Jazeera special focus, ‘The Arab World 1989’s
Revolution?’ http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2011/02/201121165427186924.html (both accessed September
26, 2014).
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North Africa. When one examines the effects of neo-liberal economic policies
across the pond on the Northern bank of the Mediterranean, similar issues of
increasing poverty, youth unemployment, widening income gap and collapsing
trust in institutional politics are present despite the fact that countries such as
Greece, Italy or Spain are liberal-democracies. In short, building democratic
systems at time when such systems are no longer as responsive as they once were
has proven detrimental to the construction of democracy in North Africa, leading,
according to Benstead’s work, many citizens to think that democracy is not suited
to their country, no matter how desirable in theory that might be.14 There is
mounting evidence that external economic constraints are in part to blame for this
‘gutting out’ of democratic representativeness in established democracies and
therefore how could this not affect countries where democracy is already ﬁnding it
difﬁcult to take hold? Established trade patterns, free trade agreements and
ﬁnancial dependency cannot be easily questioned or overturned by North African
countries without painful consequences and this has had a powerfully constraining
effect on the menu of policy choices available to local actors.
In addition to the role of international actors incapable or unwilling to
understand the predicament of North African countries and therefore design
policies intended to strengthen the need for a radical economic change of
direction, a number of local actors made political choices destined to perpetuate
long-standing social and economic relations against which many ordinary citizens
had revolted. The Islamist parties in power in Tunisia, Egypt—brieﬂy —and
Morocco—subordinated to monarchical power—did not challenge in any
meaningful way the economic structure in place for both pragmatic and
ideological reasons. At the ideological level, despite their emphasis on the need to
create a just and more equitable society with an emphasis on public services and
redistribution of the ill-gotten wealth of ruling elites, this objective was never
meant to be achieved through the adoption of economic policies questioning the
primacy of the free market or the necessity of integration into the global
economy.15 Sean McMahon goes as far as arguing that ‘the Ikhwan is neoliberal;
they, like Republicans and Tories, are market fundamentalists. The Ikhwan is
being marginalised because it was not reforming the state along neoliberal lines
fast enough’.16 Thus, rather than through radical economic change, the just society
could be achieved through the greater use of charity, which sounds very much like
the notion of compassionate conservatism popular in the United States. At the
pragmatic level, Islamist leaders decided that there was no political gain in
challenging entrenched economic interests because these could disrupt their
attempt at occupying state institutions after decades of political marginalisation.
Acutely aware of external constraints, they refrained from addressing the popular
demands coming from the street. It would be however mistaken to point the ﬁnger
solely at Islamist parties. As Buehler’s contribution makes clear, other actors too
preferred not to ‘rock the boat’ unduly in order to gain some material beneﬁts from
14 Lindsay Benstead, ‘Why do Some Arab Citizens See Democracy as Unsuitable to their Country?’,
Democratization (2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.940041 (accessed September 26, 2014).
15 See for instance Nader Habibi, ‘The Economic Agendas and the Expected Economic Policies of Islamists in
Tunisia and Egypt’, Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, no. 67,
October 1–8, 2012, and Sean McMahon, ‘Egypt’s Impoverishing Choice’, June 2012. http://www.
informationclearinghouse.info/article31658.htm (accessed September 25, 2014).
16 Sean McMahon, ‘Class Warfare in Egypt’, Counterpunch, July 9, 2013. http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/
07/09/class-warfare-in-egypt/ (accessed September 25, 2014).
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from institutional politics. In this context it is difﬁcult to see how new political
institutions can be legitimated and how they can build meaningful democratic
participation of citizens. This absence of genuine democratic change in East
Europe-style is exempliﬁed in the adoption of new constitutions, which constrain
rather than liberate and that entrench semi-authoritarian practices rather than
fundamentally challenging them, as Parolin argues in his contribution. This might
be slightly unfair on the Tunisian constitution and the efforts of both political and
social actors to come up with a document that would enshrine the broad consensus
on democratic mechanisms and individual freedoms that has held since the
departure of Ben Ali. However, as both Merone and Parolin outline, the nature of
such consensus is limited to the middle-class and entails the signiﬁcant ‘recycling’
of old elites—whether political or intellectual—into power. This is not to mention
the new Egyptian constitution drafted in the aftermath of the 2013 military coup or
the provisions in the newMoroccan constitution, which, as tradition dictates, do not
fundamentally alter the political and religious primacy of the Monarch.
This absence of genuine democratic change together with the recycling or return
of old elites to positions of power and prominence is in part the outcome of the
inability and unwillingness of a set of political and social actors to fundamentally
challenge embedded economic practices linked to neo-liberalism; an aspect to
which many contributions directly or indirectly refer to as being of signiﬁcant
importance in understanding how these polities operate. As shown in a number of
works on the causes of the Arab uprisings, the socio-economic question was
central to the demands of protestors across the region.12 The continued post-
uprisings failure to improve living standards, reduce unemployment and reverse
widening income distribution has undermined political processes across North
Africa. There are two broad reasons that can contribute to explain such failure.
First is the role of international actors, namely international ﬁnancial institutions.
As Hanieh illustrates in his contribution, negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank following the uprisings did not lead to a
fundamental rethink of the economic practices in place. On the contrary, the
continuity of such economic practices and the unwillingness to recognise their
deleterious effects on an increasing amount of individuals stands out starkly.
In part this derives from the misplaced belief on the part of international ﬁnancial
institutions —but also of the European Union through its trade policy and its
commercial agreements13—that neo-liberal reforms had worked poorly in the past
because they were carried out in an authoritarian context that, through its political
constraints, encouraged corruption and ‘bad governance’. The logic was that when
the political system became more responsive to ordinary citizens through
democratic mechanisms, ‘good governance’ would emerge and the positive effects
of neo-liberal reforms would begin to take hold. With this belief in mind, the
problem is therefore not the policies themselves, but their implementation and,
crucially, the implementers. While this might be partially true in theory—
accountable governments make better policy choices than unaccountable ones—
the reality has been very different on the ground and, interestingly, not only in
12 See for example Koenraad Bogaert, ‘Contextualising the Arab Revolts: The Politics Behind Three Decades of
Neo-liberalism in the Arab World’, Middle East Critique, 22(3) (2013), pp. 213–234 and Gilbert Achcar, The
People Want (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).
13 Andrea Teti, ‘The EU’s First Response to the Arab Spring: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(3) (2012), pp. 265–282.
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North Africa. When one examines the effects of neo-liberal economic policies
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ideological reasons. At the ideological level, despite their emphasis on the need to
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redistribution of the ill-gotten wealth of ruling elites, this objective was never
meant to be achieved through the adoption of economic policies questioning the
primacy of the free market or the necessity of integration into the global
economy.15 Sean McMahon goes as far as arguing that ‘the Ikhwan is neoliberal;
they, like Republicans and Tories, are market fundamentalists. The Ikhwan is
being marginalised because it was not reforming the state along neoliberal lines
fast enough’.16 Thus, rather than through radical economic change, the just society
could be achieved through the greater use of charity, which sounds very much like
the notion of compassionate conservatism popular in the United States. At the
pragmatic level, Islamist leaders decided that there was no political gain in
challenging entrenched economic interests because these could disrupt their
attempt at occupying state institutions after decades of political marginalisation.
Acutely aware of external constraints, they refrained from addressing the popular
demands coming from the street. It would be however mistaken to point the ﬁnger
solely at Islamist parties. As Buehler’s contribution makes clear, other actors too
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departure of Ben Ali. However, as both Merone and Parolin outline, the nature of
such consensus is limited to the middle-class and entails the signiﬁcant ‘recycling’
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inability and unwillingness of a set of political and social actors to fundamentally
challenge embedded economic practices linked to neo-liberalism; an aspect to
which many contributions directly or indirectly refer to as being of signiﬁcant
importance in understanding how these polities operate. As shown in a number of
works on the causes of the Arab uprisings, the socio-economic question was
central to the demands of protestors across the region.12 The continued post-
uprisings failure to improve living standards, reduce unemployment and reverse
widening income distribution has undermined political processes across North
Africa. There are two broad reasons that can contribute to explain such failure.
First is the role of international actors, namely international ﬁnancial institutions.
As Hanieh illustrates in his contribution, negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank following the uprisings did not lead to a
fundamental rethink of the economic practices in place. On the contrary, the
continuity of such economic practices and the unwillingness to recognise their
deleterious effects on an increasing amount of individuals stands out starkly.
In part this derives from the misplaced belief on the part of international ﬁnancial
institutions —but also of the European Union through its trade policy and its
commercial agreements13—that neo-liberal reforms had worked poorly in the past
because they were carried out in an authoritarian context that, through its political
constraints, encouraged corruption and ‘bad governance’. The logic was that when
the political system became more responsive to ordinary citizens through
democratic mechanisms, ‘good governance’ would emerge and the positive effects
of neo-liberal reforms would begin to take hold. With this belief in mind, the
problem is therefore not the policies themselves, but their implementation and,
crucially, the implementers. While this might be partially true in theory—
accountable governments make better policy choices than unaccountable ones—
the reality has been very different on the ground and, interestingly, not only in
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This larger failure to address socio-economic needs eventually furthered
political instability, which, in turn, affected the economy negatively, as the
collapsing revenues from the tourist industry in Tunisia for instance painfully
highlight. More generally, this has had a number of political repercussions. First, it
has focused the attention of local political actors away from economic policy-
making—by consensus it was out of their hands—and towards identity-based
issues. While Islamist parties, at least in Morocco and Tunisia, have proven to be
rather pragmatic when dealing with sensitive issues such as the introduction of
sharia law, revisiting personal status legislation or allowing for freedom of
conscience, their success has ‘frightened’ what can be termed the liberal sector of
society.18 It is true that both countries have had coalition governments between
Islamists and ‘liberals’, but the alliance has been uneasy, fraught with tension, and
ultimately, secular parties have lost the conﬁdence of many citizens and militants
who have left the party ﬂocking to political movements that are more
confrontational towards Islamists or becoming active in civil society activism.19
The confrontation has been much more intense in Egypt, although, ultimately, the
Salaﬁ party al-Nour backed the military coup of 2013 just like the ‘liberals’
because it rid government of the Muslim Brotherhood.20 Thus, on a range of issues
such as women’s rights, broader individual rights or protection of minorities,
tensions have characterised the relationships between the two camps, undermining
the temporary alliance they had made early before and/or during the ‘Spring’ and
affecting the mutual trust necessary to build solid institutions. The focus on
identity-based issues is not necessarily misplaced and it has had the merit of
highlighting the different policy positions of both the political and social actors
that had emerged out in the open from authoritarian rule. In a number of instances
and for many ordinary citizens these issues constitute a priority and they should be
addressed. However, such an emphasis might be detrimental to the necessary
focus that other possibly more important issues should attract. A second
repercussion has to do with political instability itself. Moments of transition or
regime change are by deﬁnition volatile and actors involved in the process are
uncertain about both tactics and strategy. In such a volatile situation, the inability
to address the majority of popular key socio-economic demands together with the
sense of a worsening security situation for all citizens because of the emergence of
radical social and political actors that had previously not invested so forcefully the
public scene has led to understandable demands for a ‘return’ to the past.
In short, the contributions to this special issue correctly refrain from analysing
change as inevitably directed towards democracy. What emerges is not only that
the conditions that are necessary for a genuine transition to some form of
accountable and broadly representative government are not yet—or no longer—
present, but that alternative paths of change exist, leading them simply to a
transition to somewhere.21
18 Moataz El Figeiry, ‘Tyranny of the Majority? Islamists’ Ambivalence towards Human Rights’, FRIDE
Working Paper, 113, October 1–19, 2012.
19 For the case of Tunisian parties see for example, Andrea Brody-Barre, ‘The Impact of Political Parties and
Coalition Building on Tunisia’s Democratic Future’, Journal of North African Studies, 18(2) (2013), pp. 211–230.
20 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘Arab Spring, Islamist Ice Age: Islamism, Democracy, and the Dictatorship of the
“Liberalism of Fear” in the Era of Revolutions’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 30(4) (2013),
pp. 1–18.
21 Morten Vlabjørn, ‘Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab World in a
Transition to Somewhere’, Middle East Critique, 21(1) (2012), pp. 25–35.
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these moments of political instability. The Moroccan public sector trade unions
used the protests in the country to secure increased advantages for workers when
negotiating with the political elite rather than use their considerable weight to
swell the ranks of protestors and demand more fundamental political, even
revolutionary, changes. In this respect, Tunisia was initially different from
Morocco because the trade union UGTT—or at least its local branches rather than
the national leadership—mobilised rather quickly to contribute to the overthrow of
the Ben Ali regime. However, as the ‘transition’ progressed in the country, the
UGTT also toned down considerably its revolutionary rhetoric preferring to play
the mediator between political parties and society in order to remain relevant and
obtain economic advantages. Both actors adopted a very rational behaviour that
allowed them not only to play a central role in political life, but were also able to
secure signiﬁcant material beneﬁts for their members, at least in the short-term.
This is quite positive per se and it is in line with the mandate of any union, but their
actions did not resonate with a wider public that was initially keener on more
radical positions, particularly in terms of the institutional changes necessary to
implement different economic policies. For instance in Morocco, the stance of the
public sector unions deepened an already weakening solidarity among workers, as
the ones in the private sector continue to suffer from poor social protections, under-
employment and difﬁcult working conditions. Beyond the role of unions, a more
profound problem is that the actors of the left more generally have been unable to
take advantage of the political and economic crisis. This dimension does not
emerge as strongly from the special issue, but it is an important part of the story
because it ‘connects’ the Arab world to other realities where the left also, despite
the ‘opportunity’ that the 2008 crisis provided, was unable to proﬁt either
electorally and/or ideologically from it. While much emphasis in the literature on
Arab politics is placed on progressive social movements, alter-globalisation
activists, workers’ protests and emerging spaces of leftist contestation, this has not
translated into widespread electoral or mass popular support for them. It is true that
meaningful change does not have to come through parliaments or political parties
and that an increasing number of people across different political systems are
organising through non-traditional means, but support for what can be broadly
construed as leftist politics when it comes to economics has notmaterialised. In part
this has to do with the dominant discourse—hegemonic Gramsci would say—that
there is no alternative to the economic system in place and that we therefore have all
to dance to the same tune even if we do not like it. This is not necessarily true in
reality, as many policy alternatives to the current ones have been provided for
decades, but the generalised perception is that alternatives do not exist. In part it has
also to do with traditional and long-standing divisions that have affected leftist
politics both in the Arab world and elsewhere. Long-standing political struggles
between different leftist personalities, accusations of betrayal and ideological
disputes on ﬁner points of leftist dogmas have left local actors unable and unwilling
to construct ideologically and to provide politically an alternative economic plan
that could meet at least in part the expectations of the protesting masses.17
17 Michele Penner Angrist, ‘Parties, Parliament and Political Dissent in Tunisia’, Journal of North African
Studies, 4(1) (1999), pp. 89–104. For an example of the problems of the Arab left outside of North Africa, see
Manal Jamal, ‘Beyond Fateh Corruption and Mass Discontent: Hamas, the Palestinian Left and the 2006
Legislative Elections’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 40(3) (2013), pp. 273–294.
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addressed. However, such an emphasis might be detrimental to the necessary
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because it ‘connects’ the Arab world to other realities where the left also, despite
the ‘opportunity’ that the 2008 crisis provided, was unable to proﬁt either
electorally and/or ideologically from it. While much emphasis in the literature on
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translated into widespread electoral or mass popular support for them. It is true that
meaningful change does not have to come through parliaments or political parties
and that an increasing number of people across different political systems are
organising through non-traditional means, but support for what can be broadly
construed as leftist politics when it comes to economics has notmaterialised. In part
this has to do with the dominant discourse—hegemonic Gramsci would say—that
there is no alternative to the economic system in place and that we therefore have all
to dance to the same tune even if we do not like it. This is not necessarily true in
reality, as many policy alternatives to the current ones have been provided for
decades, but the generalised perception is that alternatives do not exist. In part it has
also to do with traditional and long-standing divisions that have affected leftist
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governance much more difﬁcult. Previous attempts at authoritarian upgrading in
North Africa were not really driven from below or at least only partly so. There
were of course bread riots, demonstrations and mobilisations, spaces of open
political contestation and a sense that regimes were not quite as popular as they
claimed to be, but most challenges were dealt with reasonably easily and quickly
in part thanks to the repressive apparatus and in part through alliances with
emerging social groups that could prop up the ruling elites in exchange for
material beneﬁts. The veneer of liberalism of the late 1990s and 2000s was applied
therefore mainly to satisfy international patrons rather than to respond to
widespread and sustained pressures from below. The Arab uprisings were a
challenge of an entirely different scale and actually led to the departure of four
dictators who had been in power for decades and the breaking out of civil conﬂict
in Syria, whose regime was considered immune to any signiﬁcant popular
mobilisation. Irrespective of the survival of a number of regimes, particularly
monarchies, the reality of the uprisings is that they ensured that nowhere
authoritarian rule would remain unchanged. With the wall of fear no longer as high
or insurmountable, it has become vastly more complex to manage society because
there is today the realisation on the part of all social and political actors that a
signiﬁcant degree of pluralism characterises North African polities and that the
will of the people can no longer be embodied in one person or one party or one
idea.25 Such pluralism has to be accommodated.
First, political parties of all ideological persuasions have become more
important actors than they previously were. Despite their structural weaknesses,
the reasonably little trust they generate within the wider public, or their often petty
differences, they are no longer as insigniﬁcant as they used to be.26 Their presence
and activism testiﬁes to the variety of ideologies and social groups which they
attempt to mobilise. The leaders in power have to take this factor into account,
particularly when there have been free and fair elections, at least once,
immediately following the uprisings. Future elections might have to compare with
previous ‘democratic’ ones, fundamentally altering the nature of authoritarianism.
Second, workers have found a new voice and new avenues of mobilisation that
cannot be easily shut down.27 Through better domestic and international
connections workers’ movements and unions, even when they have come to
compromise with authoritarian leaders as Buehler argues in his article, have
acquired greater strength and while they have not achieved what they set out to do
during the uprisings they remain actors to be contended with, again demonstrating
the difﬁculty to continue ignoring them. Finally, civil society activism more
broadly has signiﬁcantly increased in the years after the uprisings and while
de-politicisation and disenchantment might have more recently prevailed in the
face of mounting difﬁculties and political disappointments, mobilisation around
all sorts of different issues is a much higher than it used to be.
25 This point had been made in Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus
Unity’, Political Studies, 50(3) (2002), pp. 497–513.
26 On the past insigniﬁcance of parties see Michael Willis, ‘Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of
Signiﬁcance?’, Journal of North African Studies, 7(2) (2002), pp. 1–22. On their increasing relevance see Lise
Storm, Party Politics and the Prospects of Democracy in North Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013).
27 Joel Beinin, ‘The Rise of Egypt’s Workers’, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
June 2012, pp. 1–23.
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No Authoritarian Continuity
The absence of democratic change does not necessarily equate with the persistence
of authoritarian rule as we knew it. Writing in 2004, Schlumberger and Albrecht
noted that democratisation in the Arab world was not the name of the game and
that authoritarian systems had simply regenerated themselves through a process of
re-legitimisation.22 They argued that institutions might have changed, but the
fundamentally authoritarian nature of the system had not. Later on Steven
Heydemann convincingly claimed that Arab states had simply been able to
upgrade their authoritarianism by employing hollowed out economic and political
liberal reforms, which gave the impression that regimes were changing—
democratising—while in fact they were solidifying the grip on power of the ruling
elites through informal processes of social and political control.23 In some of the
contributions to this special issue there is a hint that what occurred during the late
1990s and 2000s across the region might be repeated today with the mass protests
and brief democratic interludes in many Arab countries simply seen as another
stage in the renewal of authoritarian practices. This seems particularly the case for
Egypt under al-Sisi, but also of Morocco and Algeria, a case not dealt with in this
special issue. For countries where the claim that authoritarianism has reasserted
itself cannot hold, as in Libya and Tunisia, political instability and seemingly
endless conﬂicts, violent at times, for the control of political power among post-
uprising actors have generated such disillusionment with the current situation that
the desire for the ‘strong man’ to solve all problems has resurfaced. In short, not
much seems to have changed after the uprisings and the uprisings have not been
the earth-shattering or world-transforming events that they were initially deemed
to be. First, as early as October 2011 Heydemann and Leenders emphasised what
they called authoritarian learning, namely that authoritarian regimes were able to
learn from the mistakes of dictators that had fallen in order to shore up their rule
through appropriate policy responses.24 The case of Morocco as highlighted in this
special issue comes to mind. Second, the uprisings are increasingly perceived as
having destabilised the region. In this respect there is also a powerful longing
within the international community for the ‘good old days’ when one needed not to
worry too much about Muslim Brothers, Salaﬁsts, alter-globalisation activists,
sectarian militias, recalcitrant labour leaders or inﬂaming preachers because the
authoritarian regimes were seemingly able to keep a lid on society and avoid
the current chaos. The problem is, however, that the authoritarian continuity the
contributors to the special issue address is often superﬁcial and has to deal with
fundamental changes in state-society relations that make the ‘break’ of the
uprisings revolutionary. In addition the stability of old, if stability indeed it was, is
unlikely to return. Thus, the contributions to the special issue shed some light
directly and indirectly on instances of profound change that will have an impact on
the type of governance that will characterise North African societies. The tearing
down of the wall of fear surrounding citizens vis-a`-vis their regimes is potentially
the most signiﬁcant consequence of the uprisings and this renders authoritarian
22 Oliver Schlumberger and Holger Albrecht, ‘Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without Democratization in
the Middle East’, International Political Science Review, 35(4) (2004), pp. 371–392.
23 Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World’, Analysis Paper, Brookings Institution,
2007. http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/10arabworld.aspx (accessed September 26, 2014).
24 Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime
Responses to the Arab Awakening’, Globalizations, 8(5) (2011), pp. 647–653.
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governance much more difﬁcult. Previous attempts at authoritarian upgrading in
North Africa were not really driven from below or at least only partly so. There
were of course bread riots, demonstrations and mobilisations, spaces of open
political contestation and a sense that regimes were not quite as popular as they
claimed to be, but most challenges were dealt with reasonably easily and quickly
in part thanks to the repressive apparatus and in part through alliances with
emerging social groups that could prop up the ruling elites in exchange for
material beneﬁts. The veneer of liberalism of the late 1990s and 2000s was applied
therefore mainly to satisfy international patrons rather than to respond to
widespread and sustained pressures from below. The Arab uprisings were a
challenge of an entirely different scale and actually led to the departure of four
dictators who had been in power for decades and the breaking out of civil conﬂict
in Syria, whose regime was considered immune to any signiﬁcant popular
mobilisation. Irrespective of the survival of a number of regimes, particularly
monarchies, the reality of the uprisings is that they ensured that nowhere
authoritarian rule would remain unchanged. With the wall of fear no longer as high
or insurmountable, it has become vastly more complex to manage society because
there is today the realisation on the part of all social and political actors that a
signiﬁcant degree of pluralism characterises North African polities and that the
will of the people can no longer be embodied in one person or one party or one
idea.25 Such pluralism has to be accommodated.
First, political parties of all ideological persuasions have become more
important actors than they previously were. Despite their structural weaknesses,
the reasonably little trust they generate within the wider public, or their often petty
differences, they are no longer as insigniﬁcant as they used to be.26 Their presence
and activism testiﬁes to the variety of ideologies and social groups which they
attempt to mobilise. The leaders in power have to take this factor into account,
particularly when there have been free and fair elections, at least once,
immediately following the uprisings. Future elections might have to compare with
previous ‘democratic’ ones, fundamentally altering the nature of authoritarianism.
Second, workers have found a new voice and new avenues of mobilisation that
cannot be easily shut down.27 Through better domestic and international
connections workers’ movements and unions, even when they have come to
compromise with authoritarian leaders as Buehler argues in his article, have
acquired greater strength and while they have not achieved what they set out to do
during the uprisings they remain actors to be contended with, again demonstrating
the difﬁculty to continue ignoring them. Finally, civil society activism more
broadly has signiﬁcantly increased in the years after the uprisings and while
de-politicisation and disenchantment might have more recently prevailed in the
face of mounting difﬁculties and political disappointments, mobilisation around
all sorts of different issues is a much higher than it used to be.
25 This point had been made in Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus
Unity’, Political Studies, 50(3) (2002), pp. 497–513.
26 On the past insigniﬁcance of parties see Michael Willis, ‘Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of
Signiﬁcance?’, Journal of North African Studies, 7(2) (2002), pp. 1–22. On their increasing relevance see Lise
Storm, Party Politics and the Prospects of Democracy in North Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013).
27 Joel Beinin, ‘The Rise of Egypt’s Workers’, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
June 2012, pp. 1–23.
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issues and the convergent group-think of globalised political, bureaucratic and
business elites are only some of the many shared characteristics of all regimes.
Quite worryingly all this seems to lead to a point where the differences between
authoritarianism and democracy are increasingly blurred and it should encourage
therefore scholars to engage more critically with the paradigms developed thus far.
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Conclusion
Where does this leave the debate about the most appropriate theoretical
frameworks through which one can study the region as a whole and North Africa
more speciﬁcally? As mentioned earlier, Morten Valbjørn suggested that
following the uprisings countries were in transition to somewhere and not
necessarily to democracy. The contributions to the special issue suggest precisely
this. They present evidence of the absence of genuine democratic change and
implicitly question the assumptions that political developments in the countries
under examination can and should be read through the framework of
democratisation, whereby Tunisia is on its way to become a liberal-democracy,
Morocco is struggling to some way at the mid-point along the path and Egypt has
known a set-back that brought it back to the starting line. Yet, there is also
evidence that there is not necessarily authoritarian continuity either, challenging
the paradigm on the persistence of authoritarianism, which would tend to
downplay the signiﬁcance of the uprisings as mere blips that simply provided the
opportunity to redistribute power among different sectors of the authoritarian
ruling elites. The argument that Ray Hinnebusch makes in his contribution might
be more compelling because it is also linked to wider developments across the
globe. Hinnebusch argues that the countries under examination, although through
different historical trajectories and to different degrees, are hybrid regimes mixing
democratic and authoritarian traits where the fundamentals of policy-making, and
in particular economic policy, are beyond the reach of inﬂuence of ordinary
citizens. Such concept of hybrid regimes harks back, when it comes to the Arab
world, to the notion of liberalised autocracies that Brumberg had coined in the
early 2000s.28 However, and differently from Brumberg, the concept Hinnebusch
employs can be extended to describe the reality of many countries around the
globe, including ones that would deﬁne themselves as liberal democracies, and it
is a reality that should be analysed in its own right and not as if it were simply a
temporary stop on the path to a pre-deﬁned somewhere. There is possibly some
merit therefore in the idea of the convergence of governance that makes North
Africa not so exceptional after all, as political and bureaucratic elites increasingly
share beliefs about how societies and economies should be run.29 The similarities
of public policy-making across radically different regimes30 and the widespread
technocratization of policy choices that marginalise even the elected ofﬁcials of
established democracies31 together with the securatisation of all sorts of different
28 Daniel Brumberg, ‘The Trap of Liberalised Autocracy’, Journal of Democracy, 13(4) (2002), pp. 56–68.
29 At a more theoretical level see Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading
Authoritarianism in the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?’, Middle East Critique, 19(3)
(2010), pp. 217–232. Empirical research conducted on the EU has already demonstrated that shared beliefs are
more important than institutions when it comes to design policies. See for instance Claudio Radaelli and Karl
O’Connor, ‘How Bureaucratic e´lites Imagine Europe: Towards Convergence of Governance Beliefs?’, Journal of
European Public Policy, 16(7) (2009), pp. 971–989.
30 Aude Signoles, ‘Re´forme de l’Etat et trasnformation de l’action publique’, in Elizabeth Picard (ed.), La
Politique dans le monde Arabe (Paris: Armand Collin, 2006), pp. 239–261. I am grateful to Noureddine Mihoubi
for pointing me in this direction.
31 For an example of this at the international level see Peter Seeberg, ‘Union for the Mediterranean – Pragmatic
Multilateralism and the Depoliticisation of European-Middle Eastern Relations’, Middle East Critique, 19(3)
(2010), pp. 287–302. Already in 2004 the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development had warned
against the technocratic take-over of policy-making, ‘Technocratic Policy-making and Democratic
Accountability’, Research Brief, UNRISD, August 2004. http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/
(httpAuxPages)/AE49CC52BEFC658EC1256EFA002D44FB/$ﬁle/RPB3e.pdf (accessed September 25, 2014).
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